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This qualitative study actively engaged a group of eight pre-service mathematics teachers 
(PMTs) in an evolutionary process of generalizing and justifying. It was conducted in a 
developmental context and underpinned by a strong constructivist framework. Through 
using a set of task based activities embedded in a dynamic geometric context, this study 
firstly investigated how the PMTs experienced the reconstruction of Viviani’s theorem via 
the processes of experimentation, conjecturing, generalizing and justifying. Secondly, it was 
investigated how they generalized Viviani’s result for equilateral triangles, further across to  
a sequence of higher order equilateral (convex) polygons such as the rhombus, pentagon, 
and eventually to ‘any’ convex equi-sided polygon, with appropriate forms of justifications. 
 
This study also inquired how PMTs experienced counter-examples from a conceptual 
change perspective, and how they modified their conjecture generalizations and/or 
justifications, as a result of such experiences, particularly in instances where such 
modifications took place. Apart from constructivsm and conceptual change, the design of 
the activities and the analysis of students’ justifications was underpinned by the distinction 
of the so-called ‘explanatory’ and ‘discovery’ functions of proof.  
 
Analysis of data was grounded in an analytical–inductive method governed by an 
interpretive paradigm. Results of the study showed that in order for students to reconstruct 
Viviani’s generalization for equilateral triangles, the following was required for all students: 
 experimental exploration in a dynamic geometry context;  
  experiencing cognitive conflict to their initial conjecture; 
 further experimental exploration and a reformulation of their initial conjecture to 
finally achieve cognitive equilibrium.  
 
Although most students still required the aforementioned experiences again as they extended 
the Viviani generalization for equilateral triangles to equilateral convex polygons of 4 sides 
(rhombi) and five sides (pentagons), the need for experimental exploration gradually 
subsided. All PMTs expressed a need for an explanation as to why their equilateral triangle 
conjecture generalization was always true, and were only able to construct a logical 






The majority of the PMTs (i.e. six out of eight) extended the Viviani generalization to the  
rhombus on empirical grounds using Sketchpad while two did so  on analogical grounds but 
superficially. However, as the PMTs progressed to the equilateral pentagon (convex) 
problem, the majority generalized on either inductive grounds or analogical grounds without 
the use of Sketchpad. Finally all of them generalized to any convex equi-sided polygon on 
logical grounds. In so doing it seems that all the PMTs finally cut off their ontological bonds 
with their earlier forms or processes of making generalizations. This conceptual growth 
pattern was also exhibited in the ways the PMTs justified each of their further 
generalizations, as they were progressively able to see the general proof through particular 
proofs, and hence justify their deductive generalization of Viviani’s theorem. 
 
This study has also shown that the phenomenon of looking back (folding back) at their prior 
explanations assisted the PMTs to extend their logical explanations to the general equi-sided 
polygon. This development of a logical explanation (proof) for the general case after 
looking back and carefully analysing the statements and reasons that make up the proof 
argument for the prior particular cases (i.e. specific equilateral convex polygons), namely 
pentagon, rhombus and equilateral triangle, emulates the ‘discovery’ function of proof. This 
suggests that the ‘explanatory’ function of proof compliments and feeds into the ‘discovery’ 
function of proof. Experimental exploration in a dynamic geometry context provided 
students with a heuristic counterexample to their initial conjectures that caused internal 
cognitive conflict and surprise to the extent that their cognitive equilibrium became 
disturbed. This paved the way for conceptual change to occur through the modification of 
their postulated conjecture generalizations. 
 
Furthermore, this study has shown that there exists a close link between generalization and 
justification. In particular, justifications in the form of logical explanations seemed to have 
helped the students to understand and make sense as to why their generalizations were 
always true, but through considering their justifications for their earlier generalizations 
(equilateral triangle, rhombus and pentagon) students were able to make their generalization 
to any convex equi-sided polygon on deductive grounds. Thus, with ‘deductive’ 
generalization as shown by the students, especially in the final stage, justification was 






In conclusion, from a practitioner perspective, this study has provided a descriptive analysis 
of a ‘guided approach’ to both the further constructions and justifications of generalizations 
via an evolutionary process, which mathematics teachers could use as models for their own 
































Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.0   Introduction 
The phenomenon that was under investigation in this study was the process of generalization, 
with particular focus on constructions, explanations and justifications of further 
generalizations of the Viviani‘s result (or theorem). Viviani’s theorem holds that in an 
equilateral triangle,  the sum of the perpendicular distances from a point within the triangle to 
the sides is equal to the height of the triangle (or is constant) (De Villiers, 2011, p. 1). 
Viviani’s theorem was chosen as it opens up the possibility to generalizations that can be 
turned into a set of tasks to guide students towards constructing, explaining and justifying 
these generalizations.  The first task focussed on a particular generalization for equilateral 
triangles. The latter tasks were designed to provide opportunities to extend the equilateral 
triangle generalization and/or its associated explanatory/justification structure further to 
specific, but different equilateral convex polygons, such as the rhombus, pentagon, and then 
later more generally to any equi-sided convex polygon. The latter generalization of the 
Viviani result to any equi-sided convex polygon is regarded as the Generalization of 
Viviani’s theorem in this study. 
 
The notion of construction in this study encompasses the development of conjecture 
generalizations through inductive reasoning, analogical reasoning and deductive reasoning, 
and the notion of justification is considered as a continuum, with empirical argument on one 
end and deductive argument (proof) on the other end. From a deductive perspective the focus 
is on a logical explanation providing insight as to why a particular conjecture generalization 
(or generalization) is always true. 
 
1.1  Rationale for the study 
“Mathematical discoveries, conjectures, generalizations, counter-examples, 
 refutations, proofs (empirical, generic, deductive) are all part of what it means to do 
mathematics. School mathematics (as well as university mathematics) should show 
the intuitive and creative nature of the process, and also the false starts and blind 
alleys, the erroneous conceptions and errors of reasoning which tend to be a part of 






This study has been motivated by my participation in teaching of mathematics at secondary 
school and teacher education levels over a time span of 27 years.  In particular, through self-
study, attending seminars, workshops and conferences I have become more and more aware 
as to what it means “to do mathematics” as suggested by Australian Educational Council 
(1991).  In particular, during the period 1999-2002 whilst reading for my Master’s degree in 
Mathematics Education, I was given an opportunity to work in a dynamic geometric 
environment through using Sketchpad. The dynamic geometry environment (see Section 
2.5.1 and 2.5.2) provides a context for experimentation with mathematical objects and the 
making of conjectures, which can be empirically tested, validated and then generalized; 
refuted through provision of an empirical counter-example which could be of  global form; or 
modified through the construction of  a heuristic counter example; and/or ultimately proven 
to be true via deductive explanation (i.e. logical argument) (compare  Hanna & De Villiers, 
2008, p. 332). Furthermore, the design and nature of Sketchpad-based tasks that I was 
engaged in, enabled me to engage with many of the core mathematical processes like 
conjecturing, generalizing, refutation through counter-examples, justification - both empirical 
and deductive. This experience widened my perspective and deepened my conceptual 
understanding of what ‘doing mathematics’ really should or could mean in a classroom 
context.  
 
Further to this, as a result of the aforementioned experiences I have become more aware of 
the range of cyclical processes of experimentation, conjecturing, testing, generalizing, 
refuting and justifying that mathematicians traverse, but do not report on, in order to 
construct the polished definitions and theorems that we find in most mathematics textbooks 
and curriculum documents around the world (compare De Villiers, 2004, 2010). In particular, 
Freudenthal (1973) talks about the way in which textbooks hide, disguise or distort the way in 
which real mathematics is invented, and thus argues for an approach of ‘re-invention’. Hence, 
consistent with my epistemology that knowledge can either be created or discovered, this 
study extends my experiences to pre-service mathematics teachers, so that they themselves 
can  develop a deeper understanding of the processes that one may have to traverse in order 
to discover or create conjectures and generalizations via experimentation and proof (see De 
Villiers, 2003a, 2004, 2010). It is hoped that in this way they will in turn be able to engage 
their prospective learners in core mathematical processes in authentic mathematical learning 
contexts, when they go out on practice teaching sessions or when they are employed as 






Generalization and justification play a pivotal role in fostering both mathematical thinking 
and mathematical growth. For example, Mason (1996, p. 65) asserts that: “Generalization is 
the heartbeat of mathematics. If teachers are unaware of its presences, and not in the habit of 
getting students to work at expressing their own generalizations, then mathematical thinking 
is not taking place.”  
 
Furthermore, any form of justification invokes a particular kind of reasoning or a 
combination of reasoning forms, which inevitably provides the grounds on which students 
can naturally question, argue and conjecture, and/or construct a generalization, and/or also 
explain why a particular generalization is either true or false (compare Blanton & Kaput, 
2002; De Villiers, 2003a; Ellis, 2007; Hanna, 2000). Studies that focused on generalization 
and justification have found that students exhibit difficulty in constructing and justifying 
generalizations (Chazan, 1993; Hoyles, 1997; Hoyles & Kuchemann, 2002; Kieran, 1992; 
Knuth, Slaughter, Choppin, & Sutherland, 2002; Lee & Wheeler, 1987). Specifically, many 
studies have shown high school students tend to rely excessively on empirical examples to 
justify the truth of a mathematical proposition or conjecture generalization and struggle with 
deductive justification (Carpenter & Levi, 1999; Chazan, 1993; Hoyles, 1997; Knuth et al., 
2002; Martin & Harel, 1989 ; Weber, 2003).  
 
Taking into consideration the need for and importance of generalization and justification as 
well as its centrality and immediacy to mathematical experience in terms of promoting 
mathematical thinking and reasoning amongst students, many curriculum frameworks and 
researchers have suggested a greater focus on the processes of generalizing and justifying 
across mathematical curricula, particularly at school level (compare Ball & Bass, 2003; Coe 
& Ruthven, 1994; Davidov, 1990; Department of Education, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c; 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d;  NCTM, 2000; Yackel & Hanna, 2003).  For example, 
with the transformation of the South African schooling curriculum in the late 1990’s and the 
birth of Curriculum 2005, more emphasis has been placed on reasoning and on processes 
such as conjecturing, generalizing, justifying (or proving) in mathematics. This emphasis was 
explicitly expressed in the Teacher’s Guide for the Development of Mathematics Learning 
Programmes, which was designed to provide guidance as to how teaching, learning and 
assessment should typically occur in an Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) classroom.   It 






“In addition to the knowledge, skills and values explicitly listed in the Learning 
Outcomes and Assessment Standards of the Mathematics Learning Area Statement(s), 
mathematical reasoning is considered as an integral overarching skill that needs to be 
developed throughout the phases and across learning outcomes … The ability to 
reason or argue a case is not only important in Mathematics, but is also an important 
life skill in its own right. Mathematical reasoning teaches reasoning skills in general, 
but mathematical reasoning also has conventions that are peculiar to mathematics and 
learners need to recognize this. Some of the skills related to mathematical reasoning 
include: analysing; selecting; synthesizing, generalizing conjecturing, proving.” 
(Department of Education, 2003b, p. 29). 
 
In line with the emphasis referred to above, the development of mathematical generalizations 
(which directly inolves reasoning skills) through experimentation and justification has 
become one of the core foci of the mathematics curriculum across most grades in South 
African schools recently. For example, in grades 10-12, learners are expected to do the 
following: 
 “Investigate number patterns and hence: (a) make conjectures and 
generalizations; (b)  provide explanations and justifications and attempt to 
prove conjectures; 
 Produce conjectures and generalizations related to triangles, quadrilaterals and 
other polygons, and attempt to validate, justify, explain or prove them using 
any logical method (Euclidean, co-ordinate and or transformation).” 
(Department of Education 2003a, p. 12). 
 
More recently, in 2009 the Department of Basic Education reviewed the teaching, learning 
and assessment of mathematics across South African classrooms as per the National 
Curriculum Statements (NCS) for Mathematics (Department of Education 2002a, 2002b, 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c). After considering the findings of the 2009 curriculum review, the 
Department of Basic Education published four Mathematics Curriculum and Assessment 
Policy Statements (CAPS) (Department of Education 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d) making 
an effort to provide a document per phase that will explicitly guide teachers about teaching, 
learning and assessing in our classrooms. Even across the respective CAPS for Mathematics, 
reasoning, conjecturing, generalizing, justifying and proving are explicitly emphasized across 






 As per CAPS Mathematics Further Education and Training Phase Grades 10-12, 
teachers are expected to provide grade 10  leaners opportunities to investigate, make 
conjectures and also construct proofs when teaching the aspects related to the content 
topic called Euclidean Geometry, as described in the following example:  
“Define the following special quadrilaterals: the kite, parallelogram, rectangle,   
rhombus, square and trapezium. Investigate and make conjectures about the properties 
of the sides, angles, diagonals and areas of these quadrilaterals. Prove these 
conjectures.” (p.  25). 
 As per CAPS Mathematics Senior Phase Grades 7-9, teachers are expected to give 
learners chances at investigations that are designed within the context of the following 
broad guidelines: 
“Investigations promote critical and creative thinking. It can be used to discover rules 
or concepts and may involve inductive reasoning, identifying or testing patterns or 
relationships, drawing conclusions, and establishing general trends.” (p. 156). These 
skills include: 
 “Organizing and recording ideas and discoveries using, for example, 
diagrams and tables. 
 Communicating ideas with appropriate explanations. 
 Calculations showing clear understanding of mathematical concepts 
and procedures. 
 Generalizing and drawing conclusions.” (p. 156). 
 
The aforementioned emphasis of the South African National Curriculum for schools has 
important pedagogical implications for classroom practitioners. It means that mathematics 
teachers need to have first-hand knowledge and experience of mathematical processes (like 
conjecturing, generalizing, and justifying) to engage our mathematics learners successfully in 
the core mathematical processes as articulated by both CAPS and NCS. This automatically 
means that mathematics teachers themselves need to be appropriately educated to enlighten 
and engage their learners in core mathematical processes in meaningful ways. As pre-service 
mathematics teachers (PMTs) would continuously feed into the pool of mathematics teachers, 
who are expected to implement CAPS, it is prudent that PMTs themselves experience such 
processes in meaningful ways supported by appropriate contexts and environments (like 





hopefully influence the way they will attempt/proceed to teach their prospective learners 
mathematics, as argued by Molina, Hull, & Schielak  (1997, p. 11): 
 
‘The process of teaching mathematics and learning mathematics is iterative: the way 
pre-service mathematics teachers are taught influences their understanding of and 
beliefs about mathematics; their understanding of and beliefs about mathematics 
influence the way they teach; and the way they teach influences their students’ 
understanding and beliefs about mathematics.”  
 
Dynamic geometry software like Geometer’s Sketchpad can be invaluable in promoting 
reasoning, thinking and development amongst prospective teachers as it allows for 
experimentation via the ‘drag’ feature, which allows one to drag objects and dynamically 
manipulate them in the comfort of  full visual control ( ̈ner, 2008). Through using the drag 
facility one can drag (i.e. move around) a particular element of a dynamic figure, and the 
figure will then adjust itself to the altered condition (Goldenberg and Cuoco, 1998), but will 
maintain the invariant conditions.  ̈ner (2008, p. 348) citing Kaput (1992) says the dragging 
feature of Geometer’s Sketchpad “facilitates conjecturing and more inductive approaches to 
geometric knowledge, as students can reason about the generality of their hypotheses for 
several cases.” Once the students have generalized their conjecture, the facilitator can then 
use the opportunity to get them to deductively justify their conjecture generalization. In this 
respect  ̈ner (2008, p. 350) argues: “Dynamic Geometric Software (Geometer’s Sketchpad) 
affords an environment in which students can work with hunches and gain the confidence 
necessary to construct proofs for their conjecture.” Structuring conjecturing, generalizing and 
justification activities in a connected manner within a Sketchpad context is likely to “give 
students the opportunity to experience mathematics as a process of inquiry, not a finished 
product that needs to be mastered” ( ̈ner, 2008, p. 350). 
 
The kind and sequence of generalizing-justifying Sketchpad- based tasks used in this study 
has been designed to afford the pre-service mathematics teachers an opportunity to 
experience the typical path (namely: conjecturing, testing, generalizing, providing informal 
arguments, refuting via counter-example and proving providing a logical explanation) that 
mathematicians normally follow in order to construct, justify and make sense of new results. 
This study was motivated by the drive to provide the selected group of pre-service 





not look at the development of proof as purely a formal process bounded by an axiomatic 
deductive approach (see Schoenfeld, 1983). 
 
Counter-examples are powerful examples in that they provide the basis upon which a 
conjecture generalization can be shown to be completely or partially wrong. However, many 
students in our classrooms, and some teachers themselves, simply see the discovery of a 
single counter-example as a way of immediately disproving a conjecture generalization, and 
not as a possible opportunity to explore further and improve or correct their conjecture 
generalization so that it becomes valid (compare De Villiers, 1996; Komatsu, 2010; Lakatos, 
1976; Zazkis & Chernoff, 2008). The recent CAPS (Department of Educations, 2011a) seems 
not to be aware of the broader role of counter-examples, not only in the production of 
mathematics, but also in the teaching and learning  where the only assertion to counter-
examples is the following: “It must be explained that a single counter-example can disprove a 
conjecture, but numerous specific examples supporting a conjecture do not constitute a 
general proof” (p. 25). 
 
Although the latter part of the aforementioned CAPS statement can appear to be  congruent 
with views of the mathematics community as to what constitutes a mathematical proof (i.e. a 
logical explanation or ‘proof’), the  former part of the CAPS statement does not embrace the 
notion of a heuristic counter-example. In particular, if at all, when teachers and students 
experience counter-examples, their experience is just  limited to global counter-examples, i.e. 
examples that totally reject the main conjecture itself (De Villiers, 1996; Lakatos, 1976), and 
not heuristic counter-examples. A heuristic counter-example (see Section 3.2) is an example 
that does not refute a conjecture or statement in totality, but rather challenges a condition or 
property within the statement, which can either be improved on, partially removed or even 
left out in order to make the conjecture or generalization viable or more generalizable (De 
Villiers, 1996; Lakatos, 1976). In order to have a broader  perspective mathematics, teachers 
and students experience of counter-examples should not be just limited to ‘global’ counter-
examples, i.e. examples that only reject the main conjecture itself (see Section 3.2), but they 
should also be exposed to heuristic counter-examples which can lead to refinement and 
reformulation of conjectures.  
 
This study therefore attempts to provide a space for pre-service mathematics teachers (PMTs) 
to experience a heuristic counter-example through experimental exploration within a dynamic 





broader understanding of the nature of counter-examples and their associated roles in 
developing and justifying generalizations. If this happens, then it is plausible that current pre-
service teachers will enter the mathematics teaching profession with more insight as to how 
counter-examples should be treated in terms of modifying or rejecting conjecture 
generalizations. It is also possible that as and when the pre-service mathematics teachers 
begin to collaborate with other mathematics teachers, they will be in a better position to share 
their experiences and knowledge of heuristic counter-examples with one another, and thus in 
some way contribute to improving other teachers’ understanding as to how a heuristic 
counter-example can be used to refine/modify a conjecture generalization. 
 
The current  literature on constructivism and meaningful learning has shown that learners’ 
prior knowledge and experiences influence their thinking, and such prior knowledge and 
experiences sometimes lead to the development and/or exhibition of invalid conceptions (i.e. 
misconceptions) (Ben-Ari, 2001; Confrey, 1991; Olivier, 1989; Smith, DiSesssa, & 
Roschelle, 1993; Ryan & Williams, 2000, 2007; Tsamir & Tirosh, 2003). Moreover, as 
students tend to learn new ideas quite often through rote memorization in an isolated way, 
they often fail to intuitively see that the newly experienced information contradicts their 
existing ideas, and hence move on innocently to use their inherent misconception to interpret 
new information  and thus iteratively develop further misconceptions (compare Ben-Ari, 
2000; Confrey, 1991; Hynd, 2003; Luque 2003; Nesher, 1987; Olivier, 2009).  These inherent 
misconceptions could be the underlying cause of errors that we see learners and even teachers 
make (compare Brodie, 2010; Olivier, 1989; Smith et al., 1993; also see discussion in section 
3.4 of Chapter 3). 
 
Sections 3.1, 3.2 & 4.6 extensively discuss how students’ misconceptions can be treated 
through inducing cognitive conflict that is consonant with Piaget’s Theory of Equilibration, 
and hence bring about conceptual change. In the empirical part of this study a descriptive 
account is given of how pre-service teachers experienced a heuristic counter-example within 
the context of Piaget’s Equilibration Theory (or Socio-Cognitive Conflict Theory) to modify 
a particular conjecture generalization. Pre-service teachers and other mathematics teachers 
could possibly use this as a guiding heuristic of how to induce conceptual change as and 
when students in their mathematics classrooms make conjectures, generalizations, 






Furthermore, most students and teachers experience and see proof as a construction of an 
argument or chain of arguments to validate a mathematical claim or remove their doubt about 
the truth of a conjecture generalization or mathematical assertion (compare De Villiers, 
2003a & Hanna, 2000). This study attempts to break this restrictive perception held by 
mathematics students, teachers and researchers, by providing a detailed exposition as to how 
students can see proof as ‘acts’ that serve explanatory and discovery functions and also that 
proof via logical explanation can enable them to discover new generalizations or 
justifications and vice versa. The latter is complementary with Lanin’s (2005, p. 235) 
assertion that “generalization cannot be separated from justification”.  Emphasizing this  link, 
(Ellis, 2007, p. 196), says:  
 
“…the connection between generalizing and justification is bidirectional- engaging in 
acts of justification may be as likely to influence students’ ability to generalize the 
other way around”. Learning mathematics in an environment in which providing 
justifications for one’s generalizations can promote the careful development of 
generalizations that can be sensible and can be explained….A focus on generalization 
may help students not only better establish conviction in generalization but also aid in 
the development of subsequent, more powerful generalizations.”  
 
In addition, Lins (2001) as cited in Lanin (2005, p. 232) notes: “students’ justifications 
provide a window for viewing the degree to which they see the broad nature of their 
generalizations and their view of what they deem as socially accepted justification.” 
Moreover, as discussed in the literature review and theoretical considerations for this study 
(see Section 2.2), the predominant mode of generalization that permeates most mathematics 
classrooms at both school and pre-service teacher education level is of the inductive 
generalization type. There is very little exposition or engagement with the development of 
generalizations using analogy or deductive reasoning, i.e. analogical generalizations and 
deductive generalizations are not really persued across school and teacher education contexts. 
 
In the same way, Blanton and Kaput (2002) assert that through engaging students in the 
process of justification in our classrooms they could be encouraged to conjecture and thereby 
construct generalizations. Otte (1994, p. 310) alludes to the link between proof  and further 
generalization when he says: “A proof is expected to generalize, to enrich our intuition, to 
conquer new objects, on which our mind may subsist.”  To an extent this study explores this 






Although there is some research that has reported on the development of mathematical 
generalizations and/or justifications within a dynamic geometric context at pre-service 
teacher education level, there is a general lack of an adequate descriptive analysis of a guided 
approach to the construction and/or justification of a generalization within a dynamic 
geometric context. Research at pre-service teacher education level provides little descriptive 
analysis of a guided approach as to how pre-service teachers can extend an established 
generalization from one domain to the next, and how they can justify (or prove) such 
generalizations as they move from one domain to the next. Hence, this study will also attempt 
to provide a descriptive analysis of a ‘guided approach” to the development, extension and 
justification of a generalization across domains with the use of Sketchpad as and when 
necessary.  
1.2 The purpose of the study  
Firstly, the purpose of the study was to actively engage pre-service mathematics in an 
evolutionary process of generalizing and justifying, by starting with the construction and 
justification of the Viviani generalization for equilateral triangles, and then extending it to a 
sequence of equilateral convex polygons of four sides (rhombi), five sides (pentagons)  and 
finally to general convex equilateral n-gons (i.e. any equi-sided convex polygon), with a goal 
to   investigate: 
(a) How pre-service mathematics teachers generalize the Viviani result for equilateral 
triangles to a sequence of equilateral (convex) polygons of four sides (rhombi) and 
five sides (pentagons), and general convex equilateral n-gons (i.e. any equi-sided 
polygon); and  
(b) How pre-service mathematics teachers arrive at their justifications for each of their 
extended (or further) generalizations? 
 
In particular, the study focused on ascertaining whether pre-service mathematics teachers 
constructed and/or justified their generalizations whether  in a non-deductive manner (that is 
through experimentation which entailed empirical methods such as construction, 
measurement and dragging, visual examples, inductive or analogical reasoning, et cetera) or 
deductive manner (that is through the use of generic or deductive proofs). Furthermore, this 
study sought to explore how pre-service mathematics teachers experienced counter-examples 





generalizations and/  or justifications as a result of such experiences, particularly  in instances 
were such modifications took place. 
 
In addition, this study sought to use the explanatory function of proof to make proof more 
meaningful to pre-service mathematics teachers and provide them with  necessary insight as 
to why the Viviani result and its resultant further generalizations is always true. By exploiting 
the discovery function of proof and the ‘looking back’ strategy of Polya, this study sought to 
explore whether or not pre-service mathematics teachers can construct generalizations 
deductively (or otherwise) and extend a particular proof structure to explain an extended 
generalization, and see the general proof through particular proofs. 
 
Last but not least, from a practitioner perspective, the purpose of this study was  to arrive at a 
descriptive analysis of a “guided approach” to both further constructions and justifications of 
generalizations via an evolutionary process, which mathematics teachers could use as models 
for their own attempts in their mathematics classrooms.  
 
1.3  Research questions 
The issues and insights that I have voiced and discussed so far lead me to propose the 
following research questions: 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers construct a generalization, which says that the sum 
of the distances from a point inside an equilateral triangle to its sides is constant? If so, 
how do they accomplish this generalization (which is commonly referred to as Viviani’s 
theorem)?    
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers support their equilateral triangle generalization 
     with a justification, and if so, how do they construct (or provide) a justification for it? 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers further generalize and extend the Viviani Theorem 
for equilateral triangles to equilateral (convex) polygons of four sides (rhombi), five sides 
(pentagons), and then to equilateral convex polygons in general?  If so, how do they 
accomplish the constructions of such further generalizations? 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers justify each of their extended generalizations to 
equilateral convex polygons (namely, rhombus, pentagon and general equilateral polygon 
generalizations)? If so, how do they accomplish the justification of each of their 





1.4  Delimitation of the study  
As outlined in the purpose of the study, this study focused on pre-service mathematics 
teachers’ engagement in constructing and justifying a generalization of Viviani’s theorem. 
This research study is limited to a purposive sample of eight pre-service mathematics 
teachers (PMTs) from the Faculty of Education at University of Western Cape, who were  in 
their final year of study with regard to their first teacher education qualification (see Section 
6.4 for further details on the sample). Each of the eight pre-service mathematics teachers 
participated in one-to-one task-based interviews as discussed in Section 6.5. dealing with 
Methodology. Furthermore, in view of this study being conducted within a dynamic geometry 
context and limited to eight pre-service mathematics teachers from just one University, I, as a 
qualitative researcher am aware that the results emanating from this study cannot be 
generalized across to other contexts. 
 
1.5  Generalization: What is it?  
“Mathematical generalization involves a claim that some property or technique holds for 
a large set of mathematical objects or conditions. The scope of the claim is always larger 
than the set of individually verified cases; typically, it involves an infinite number of 
cases (e.g.,“for all integers”)” (Carraher, Martinez & Schliemann, 2008, p. 3). 
 
For example, at primary school learners might have done activities that required them to 
count the number of unit squares that cover the area of specific rectangles. At the end of such 
a series of activities they might have been able to generalize their experiences by saying     
                                     .. Such a generalization “applies even when the 
length and width are not integers but any real numbers” (Mason, 1999, p. 11). In analytical 
geometry, the rule                                     serves a general way of 
describing the effect of rotating any point         in the plane about the origin through any 
angle   in an anti-clockwise direction (Carter, Govender, & Heany, 2007, pp. 251-252; 
Mason, 1999, p. 11). 
 
Mason (1999, p. 9) says that: “Generalizing has to do with noticing patterns and properties 
common to several situations”, and asserts that a generalization is regarded as an expression 
or statement that can be specialized. This means as one uses/examines particular cases to 
recognize a pattern or regularity to provoke the formulation of a generalization (Njisane, 





produce particular cases or examples which it can characteristically generalize (compare 
Mason, 1999, p. 10). For example, consider a point         on a circle O, whose centre is at 
the origin. One can determine the coordinates of the image of the point        after it has 
been rotated about the origin through each of the angles     and      by using the 
generalized rule:                                     . The particular cases will 
then be: 
 
Particular case 1:  
                                                
 √ 
 




So the coordinates of    are :     
 √ 
 





Particular case 2:  
                                                  √   
 
  
     
 √  
 
) 
So the coordinates of    are :   √   
 
  
     




The processes of specializing and generalizing are intrinsically intertwined. In light of this, 
Tall (1988, p. 2) asserts that “generalization and the complementary process of specialization 
is common to both elementary and advanced mathematical thinking.” Picking upon this, 
Mason (1999, p. 33) similarly emphasizes this complementarity as follows: “Specializing can 
provide fodder for generalization, and generalizations must be checked to see that they do 
specialize back to the particular cases which spawned them”. 
 
In most instances, it is useful for one to specialize systematically so that a pattern can emerge 
(see the development of the Polygon Angle Sum Measure Generalization as illustrated later 
in this section). On the other hand, considering extreme examples within the context of 
specialization could help one to: “stretch an idea to its limits, in order to see what is going 
on” (Mason, 1999, p. 33). In other words, specializing can enable learners to make a 
conjecture generalization, and also interrogate their conjecture generalization to see if it also 
holds true for a greater variety of cases. In this way, learners can then be prompted to 
accept/reject their conjecture generalization, or modify or extend it (compare Mason, 1999, p. 
33).  Consonant with these ideas, Dreyfus (1991, p. 35) says: “To generalize is to derive or 






In the context of expanding the domains of validity, Njisane (1992, p. 63) affirms that 
generalization encompasses the extension of a class. For example, grade 9 learners would 
have been working with the identity                      in relation to whole 
numbers.  However, as one extends the ideas of addition and multiplication to fractions, one 
comes to realize that the identity can be applied to fractions as well. In other words, the 
operations of addition and multiplication as described by the identity are extended from 
whole numbers to fractions. These extensions are called generalizations (see Njisane, 1992, p. 
63). 
 
According to Dienes (1961, pp. 282; 296), “The process of generalization, instead of leading 
from elements to classes, leads from classes to classes … we shall regard abstraction as class 
formation, and generalization as class extension…”. Cognizant of generalization as a process 
that leads from classes to classes, Dienes (1961) defines a mathematical generalization as 
follows: 
“A class B is a mathematical generalization of the class A if B includes as part an 
isomorphic image of A, in relation to all relevant properties. This means that the 
classes A and B consist of quite different elements, as long as there was a part of B 
which somehow has an exact image of A, mirroring the properties of A in all relevant 
aspects” (p.  282). 
 
In consonance with the aforementioned definition, Dienes (1961, p. 282) further notes that: 
 
“An example of a mathematical generalization is that of passing from natural numbers 
to positive and negative integers. Positive integers have exactly the same properties as 
natural numbers, yet they form a sub-class of the class of directed numbers to which 
the natural numbers do not belong. The class of directed numbers is now the class B, 
the class of natural numbers the class A. The image of the class A in the class B is the 
class of positive integers.”  
 
This definition of generalization by Dienes (1961) as is Polya’s (1985) definition of 
generalization further on is unfortunately a little restrictive. The generalized class does not 
necessarily always contain the original class of special case. For example, generalizing the 
concept of an equilateral triangle to a rhombus makes use the common property of “all sides 
equal”, but the class of rhombi does not contain the class of equilateral traingles. However, 






Polya (1985, p. 108) is of the view that: “Generalization is passing from the consideration of 
one object to the consideration of a set containing that object; or passing from the 
consideration of a restricted set to that of a more comprehensive set containing the restricted 
one.” For example, “we generalize when we pass from the consideration of any triangle to 
any polygon. … In passing from triangles to polygons with   sides, we replace a constant by 
a variable, the fixed integer 3 by the arbitrary integer   (restricted only by the inequality 
   )”  (Polya, 1954a, p. 12).  A construction of a generalization, namely the Convex and 
Concave Polygon Angle Sum Measure Generalization, which typically exemplifies the 










Figure 1.5.1 represents a set of convex polygons. Most junior high school mathematics 
students would have experimented with triangles, and would have discovered that the sum of 
the angles of a triangle is      to any triangle. They would have probably justified their 
generalization by providing a deductive proof.  Thus, for the purposes of developing the 
Convex and Concave Polygon Angle Sum Measure Generalization, we could start by using 
the fact that sum of the angles of any triangle     is     , and proceed as follows: 
 
(a) Arbitrary convex quadrilateral     , having 4 sides has been divided into two 
triangles by drawing diagonal   . 
        the sum of the interior angles of the quadrilateral                
                                                                                           
                         
(b) Arbitrary convex pentagon      ,  having 5 sides has been divided into three  
triangles  by drawing diagonals     and   . 
        the sum of the interior angles of the pentagon             
 
 





                                                                                                        
                                       
(c) Arbitrary convex hexagon       , having 6 sides has been divided into four 
triangles  by drawing diagonals    ,     and    . 
        the sum of the interior angles of the pentagon              
                                                                                                 
                             
As can be seen through special cases (a), (b) and (c), the number of triangles a polygon can 
be divided into by drawing diagonals from one vertex to all the non-adjacent vertices is two 
less than the number of sides that makes up the polygon. This means that any convex polygon 
(i.e. any convex  -gon for    ) can be divided into       triangles. Therefore, we can 
make the following generalization: The sum of the measure of the interior angles of any 
convex polygon with   sides (i.e. any convex  -gon for    ) is           . 
 
Although the generalization has been made for any convex polygon, the result also holds true 
for any concave polygon, but choosing ‘any vertex’ or drawing ‘any diagonal’ no longer 
works to divide the concave polygon into (n-2) triangles as some diagonals, unlike the 
convex case, may fall outside (see Figure 1.5.2). The above proof argument therefore needs 
to be adapted to state that  a suitable vertex should be chosen so that all diagonals are drawn 
to fall inside. In arriving at this  generalization, the process of abstraction played a significant 
role. According to Dienes (1961, p. 280),  
 
“…the process of abstraction is defined as the process of drawing from a number of 
different situations something which is common to them all. Logically speaking it is 
an inductive process; it consists of a search for an attribute which would describe 
certain elements that somehow belonged together. A class is constructed out of some 















For example, through examining the special cases (a), (b), and (c), and then abstracting the 
idea that any convex or concave polygon can be divided into       triangles, it is thus 
possible to make the generalization: The sum of the measure of the interior angles of any 
convex or concave polygon with    sides is           .  
 
As illustrated here, ‘generalization’ is characterized as a process and also a product. In 
particular a generalization is constructed via the process of generalization (see Yerushalmy, 
1993). Similarly, Tall (1988, p. 1) says: 
 
“Generalization is the process of forming general conclusions from particular 
instances. The term also applies to the concept produced by the process, for instance  
          is considered an algebraic generalization of the arithmetic statement   
            and    is the generalization of   ” 
 
Furthermore, looking at the phenomenon of ‘generalization’ through a process-product 
orientation, Du Toit (1992, p. 115) says: “Generalizing is the process by which an observed 
abstraction is generalized as valid for a larger class or a statement that is valid for a greater 
variety of situations.” In other words, generalization is a process of formulating a statement 
that encompasses more possibilities and cases. For example, if we consider the Theorem of 
Pythagoras as re-discovered at school level, we understand that: “In any right angled triangle, 
the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides” 
(Gonin, Archer, Slabber, & Nel, 1981, p. 394).  In symbolic form, this means that for any 
right-angled       having  ̂      (see Figure 1.5.3),           .  Clearly in this 
instance of the Theorem of Pythagoras, there is a condition, namely  ̂  has to be    . 
 
Pythagoras’ Theorem can be transformed into a more general statement (or generalization) 
that embraces a larger number of cases for which statement is true. For example, by removing 
the restriction that  ̂     , it is possible for us to have the following generalization of the 
Theorem of Pythagoras: In any triangle      ,                     , where       are 
the lengths of the sides and  ̂ is the angle opposite  side   (see Mason, 1999, p. 23).   In 
retrospect, “specialization is passing from the consideration of a given set of objects to that of 
smaller set, contained in the given one” Polya (1954a, p. 13). Hence in this instance, the 

















Alternatively, one can also generalize the theorem of Pythagoras in numerous other ways. For 
example, “if regular pentagons are drawn on the sides of a right-angled triangle, then the area 
of the pentagon on the hypotenuse is the sum of the areas of the other two” (Mason, 1999, p. 
23).  In fact, as long as similar figures are constructed on the respective sides of the right-
angled triangle, then the area of the figure on the hypotenuse will add to the sum of the areas 
of similar figures on the other two sides. Moreover, one could generalize the two dimensional 
aspect of Pythagoras to three dimensions as follows: “The square length of the diameter of a 
cuboid with sides       is          . In this instance by choosing any one of the 
dimensions       to be zero one can return the special case, i.e. the two dimensional 
triangular case” (Mason, 1999, p. 24). As seen via the examples discussed in this section, that 
particular instances (or examples) of a generalization can be retrieved by the process of 
specialization. However, one should bear in mind that the retrieval or generation of such 
particular examples, does not necessarily tell us that the generalization is always valid (see 
Mason, 1999, p.  25).  
 
Taking into account all the aforementioned definitions, views and discussions as to ‘what is  
generalization’, I believe that the following definition of a generalization  as posited by Kaput 
(1999, p. 136)  is  useful for the purpose of this study: 
 
“Generalization involves deliberately extending the range of reasoning or 
communication beyond the case or cases considered, explicitly identifying and 
expressing commonality across cases, or lifting the reasoning or communication to a 
level where the focus is no longer on the cases or situation themselves but rather on the 
 





patterns, procedures, structures and the relationships across and among them (which, in 
turn, become new, higher level objects of reasoning or communication).”  
 
1.6   Types of Generalization 
Generalizations can essentially be classified into three different types of generalization within 
mathematics. They are respectively called inductive generalization, deductive generalization, 
constructive (a priori) generalization for propositions and concepts/structures/axiom systems.  
I propose to discuss each of these types of generalization in sub-sections 1.6.1, 1.6.2, and 
1.6.3 respectively. Further to this, I propose to focus on the kinds of reasoning such as 
inductive, analogical and deductive reasoning in Section 2.1. 
 
1.6.1  Inductive generalizations 
Inductive generalization means that a generalization is initially made on quasi-empirical 
grounds without necessarily any deductive thought involved, for example observing and 
formulating generalizations from the consideration of some particular cases (De Villiers, 
1996, p. 86).  Similarly, Yerushalmy (1993) citing Chi & Bassok (1989) states:  
 
“Induction is a well known process to reach generalizations by examination of 
instances or examples. An instance or a set of instances is examined, certain 
properties are identified. The given example is then taken as a member of a larger set 
and its properties are put into a larger set. Such generalization from multiple examples 
is developed on a similarity based approach” (p.  247). 
 
As alluded to in the earlier paragraph, the development of an inductive generalization is 
facilitated by the process of inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning (as discussed in Section 
2.1) is a process of observing data, recognizing or abstracting patterns/common 
features/qualities across a set of objects under consideration, and then making a statement 
that one thinks may be true for all the given objects (cases) under consideration as well as 
other objects (cases) of the same type or class, though at the time of making the statement one 
does not really know for sure that it is generally valid (see Polya, 1954a, De Villiers, 1992). 
Such a statement is called a ‘conjecture’ and is described by Mason, Burton & Stacey (1982) 
in the quotation captured here:  
 
“A conjecture is a statement which appears reasonable, but whose truth has not been 





known to be contradicted by any examples, nor is it known to have any consequences 
which are false. In other words, it has not been convincingly justified and yet is not 
known to be contradicted, nor is it known to have any consequences which are false” 
(p. 72). 
 
Polya (1967) and Reid (2002) as cited in Candas & Castro (2005, p. 402) suggest that the 
process of developing an inductive generalization (i.e. a conjecture generalization) via 
inductive reasoning occurs in the following way:  
 Observation of particular cases: Students experiment with particular cases of the 
problem posed and then try to note a pattern or observe regularity.  
 Conjecture formulation: Students then formulate a conjecture, by making a 
statement about all possible cases, but with an element of doubt. 
 Conjecture validation: At this stage students attempt to experiment with further new 
particular cases, but not general cases, to see if the conjecture still holds true for the 
new particular cases. 
 Conjecture generalization: On seeing that a conjecture is true for some particular 
cases, and having experimented to see that it holds for further new particular cases 
(conjecture validation), students might hypothesize that the conjecture is generally 
true. 
 
Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 1.6.1, James (1992, p. 160) describes the various processes, 
specializing, abstracting, generalizing and testing, which work in a harmonious way to build 
an inductive generalization. These processes can be enumerated as follows: 
 Specializing: Students examine particular cases and become familiar with the details 
of each case; 
 Seeing generality: As the students move through particular cases they begin to see 
some regularity across the cases. This awareness of the abstracted regularity or 
underlying sameness becomes more and more prominent as the students pass from 
one particular case to the next, and consequently boosts their sense of confidence in 
their observed  degree of sameness across the special (or particular) cases. 
 Expressing the generality: As soon as the student is quite confident with the 
underlying sameness that s/he has increasingly seen across the particular cases, then 
s/he begins to articulate the sameness in her/his own words and also comes to grips 





 Checking and Convincing (empirically):   By empirical testing students try to see if 
their generalizations also hold for new particular cases as well. 
 
 
Figure 1.6.1: Development of an Inductive Generalization (see James, 1992, p. 160) 
 
Although the process of inductive generalization serves as a way of creating a type of 
generalization (or conjecture), Yerushalmy (1993, p. 253) emphasizes that it is not “a process 
of deriving definite knowledge”. This means that such a generalization, called a ‘conjecture 
generalization’ in this study, needs to be justified via a logical explanation (proof) before 
being considered as legitimate/acceptable mathematical knowledge by the mathematics 
community. Despite this shortcoming, the process of inductive generalization has  played a 
pivotal role in the birth of many mathematical ideas, propositions and theorems across the 
field of mathematics, and still continues to play such a role even today.  
 
Taking into consideration that the development of inductive generalizations is underpinned 
by the process of inductive reasoning, Yerushalmy (1993, p. 246) says: “Generalizations are a 
particular kind of conjecture, created by reasoning from the specific to the general.” On the 
other hand, there are those that will refer to a conjecture as a conjecture, and reclassify such a 
conjecture as a ‘generalization’ only after it has been justified via a logical explanation (i.e. 
proved that conjecture is true for all cases through the use of deductive arguments). The latter 





through inductive reasoning a conjecture is established and subsequently the status of this 
‘conjecture’ is turned into a ‘theorem’ through the process of deductive justification. In such 
an instance the ‘theorem’ is then considered to be a ‘generalization’ and not a ‘conjecture 
generalization’.  
 
1.6.2  Deductive generalizations 
Contrary to an inductive generalization, a deductive generalization is made on the basis of a 
logical deduction, for example by deductively analyzing the conditions of a particular 
theorem (or theorems) and finding from its proof that a specific condition is sufficient and 
others are redundant. This can enable further generalization by leaving out the redundant 
property (compare De Villiers, 1996, p. 86). It is fundamentally important to note that in such 
a case the generalization is based entirely on deductive reasoning; for example, seeing the 
midpoints of the sides of a kite form a rectangle because a kite has perpendicular diagonals, 
and then realizing the same proof would hold for any quadrilateral with perpendicular 
diagonals. (A kite has perpendicular diagonals, but there are other quadrilaterals that have 
perpendicular diagonals that are not kites). 
 
1.6.3  Constructive (a priori) generalization 
Constructive (a priori) generalization of concepts or structure or axiom systems takes place 
when a more general concept or structure or axiom system is defined by relaxing or 
generalizing certain conditions. For example, consider defining a ‘bisecting quad’ as a new 
concept by generalizing the concept of a parallelogram by saying that it is any quadrilateral 
with at least one diagonal bisecting the other. Typically, when constructive (a priori) defining 
takes place the resultant definition is considered true by definition as it does not involve a 
propositional statement. Also, this kind of generalization, is typically exemplified, “when a 
set of axioms (or structure) is changed through the exclusion, generalization or addition of 
axioms (or subset of axioms) to that set, from which totally new content is then constructed in 
a logical deductive way” (De Villiers, 1986, p. 4).  
 
For example, within the process of constructive (a priori) generalization of concepts, we can 
by using analogy which is a kind of similarity (see Sections 2.1.5 & 4.4), constructively 
extend “the concept of a parallelogram to hexagons by defining a ‘parallelo-hexagon’ as a 
hexagon with opposite sides equal and parallel (see Figure 1.6.3)” (De Villiers, 2008, p .35) . 





constructively defining a parallel-hexagon as a hexagon with opposite sides parallel or an 













The same process of constructive (a priori) generalization, which is called condition –
simplifying generalization in some literature (Holland , Holyoak, Nisbet, & Thagard, 1986), 
could also apply to propositions (e.g. a theorem or conjecture), whereby relaxing one or other 
condition of a given proposition, new conjectures or theorems are formulated. For example, 
generalizing the theorem of Pythagoras by asking what happens to the relationship between 
the sides if we relax the condition that it is a right angle. However, when it comes to 
generalizing propositions (theorems or conjectures) in this way,  proof is needed. 
 
 
1.7   The importance of generalization 
From a mathematical perspective, generalizations are important for many reasons. For 
example,  Harel & Martin (1988, p. 101)  assert that: “Generalizations provide a broad 
perspective in which to observe particular phenomena, which in turn allows greater 
understanding of these particular phenomena.” Through generalizations one can find 
commonality to solutions and proofs, and hence be able to solve many types of problems in a 
routine and efficient manner (compare Polya, 1954a, p. 17). In other words, one can 
extrapolate/extend generalized results/ phenomena to “new situations to solve new problems” 
(Harel & Martin, 1988, p. 101).  In particular, generalization can afford students the 
opportunity to find an answer to pattern problems for any number efficiently, or extend the 
generalized patterns to generate new cases (Ellis, 2007, p. 461). Furthermore, the process of 
 
 
Figure 1.6.3: 1 





having students make generalizations and then testing these generalizations can impact 
student learning in the following ways: 
 Stimulate students to think and reason mathematically (Dreyfus, 1991; Mason, 
1999). 
 Give students a chance to confront their misconceptions or faulty ideas 
(Klymchuk, 2008). 
 Help students construct their own knowledge that leads to deeper 
understanding and reasoning abilities (Polya, 1954a). 
 
1.8  Justification: What is it? 
According to the Chambers Dictionary by Schwarz (1993, p. 908) justification is “the act of 
justifying; something which justifies.” This means justification is both a process and a 
product. As a process, justification in the affirmative refers to the demonstration of the 
correctness of an assertion such as a conjecture, proposition, generalization or opinion (see 
Oxford Dictionary, 1995). In particular, the verb justify brings to the fore the following 
‘doing’ words: ‘vindicate, excuse, prove right, show to be just, warrant, support, validate, 
uphold, sanction, confirm, sustain, bear out, defend, account for, explain, make explanation 
for” (Shepherd, 2006, p. 465). Equivalently, Mariotti (2007, p. 288) says the role of 
justification is that of “explaining, arguing, corroborating, verifying a particular statement.”  
So, in a broad sense, justification is the advancement of a reason or reasons for or against a 
proposition, opinion or conjecture, and this may include arguments that are verbal, data that 
is in numerical form, empirical examples, pictorial representations, drawings (compare 
Douek, 2009, p. 334) or logical arguments (i.e. deductive explanations which are commonly 
called proofs) (compare De Villiers, 2003a, p. 18). So in a sense, one can say that a 
justification is an argument or sequence of connected arguments raised in favour or against a 
particular claim.   
 
In retrospect, Duval (1999, p. 3) considers an argument to be anything that is used or  
advanced to support or refute a proposition, and says that items such as the following could 
serve such a purpose: a definition; a rule; a factual statement; outcome of an experiment; an 
example; a belief; a contradiction. In addition, Duval (1993, p. 3) asserts that when someone 
uses the aforementioned items to substantiate or say “why he /she accepts a proposition” then 
they take on the value of justification. This in essence means that through using either 





(Polya, 1954a & 1954b), one can develop an argument or a sequence of arguments that could 
act as a justification for a particular claim. 
 
In particular, there are two main categories of arguments, called “arguments of 
plausibility”and “arguments of necessity” respectively (Cabassut, 2005, p. 391). The former 
are “arguments in which the warrant entitles us to draw conclusions only tentatively 
(qualifying it with a ‘probably’) subject to possible exceptions (‘presumably’) or 
conditionally (‘provided that …’)”, and the latter are “arguments in which the warrant entitles 
us to argue unequivocally to the conclusion” (see Cabassut, 2005, p. 391; Toulmin, 1958, p.  
148).   
 
One may therefore regard justification “as a process in which a logically connected discourse 
is developed” (compare Vincent, Chick, McCrea, 2005, p. 281). Furthermore, argumentation 
is defined as “reasoning; sequence or exchange of arguments” (Chambers Dictionary, 1993, 
p. 84) or “a statement advanced to justify or refute a claim in order to attain the approbation 
of an audience or to reach consensus on a controversial subject matter” (Oggunyi, 2007, p. 
965). In light of the views voiced, it is befitting to consider argumentation and justification to 
be one and the same process in this study. 
 
Although justification like argumentation is a discourse, Douek (1999, p. 127)  stresses that   
the discourse itself does not necessarily have to be deductive in nature, and that the text 
generated as result of the discourse can very well be regarded as the representation of the 
justification. Duval (2007), Hollebrands, Conner, & Smith (2010), Krummheur (1995) as 
cited in Vincent et al. (2005, p. 281) all see an argument to be either part of a family of 
arguments posited within a complex justification or simply an outcome resulting from a 
justification and also asserts that justification is not just about convincing an audience, but 
could just very well be an ‘internal process carried out by an individual” to convince 
himself/herself about a particular claim.  Drawing from all the aforementioned expressions 
about justification, one can say justification is a process of arguing on the grounds of a reason 
or a network of connected reason(s) such that one is enabled to build/produce a conjecture (or 
conjecture generalization) and/or possibly explain its validity (compare Osborne, Eduran & 
Simon, 2004). 
 
Many authors in both mathematics and mathematics education view the purpose of 





statement is correct (i.e. verify the truth of mathematical statement like a conjecture 
generalization) or simply remove one’s doubt about a specific conjecture generalization, but 
nothing more (compare Hanna, 1989; Harel & Sowder, 1998, 2007; Volmink 1990, pp. 8;10). 
However, many often use the terms explanation, verification, and proof  very loosely and  
interchangeably to refer to this ‘convincing’ or ‘verification’ function of  justification 
(Marrades & Gutierrez, 2000). For example, the Department of Education (2003b, p. 8), 
describes justifying as “the learner is able to explain why he/she chose a particular course of 
action or did what he/she did.” Despite this notion of justification, the Department of 
Education (2003a), does not elaborate on the nature of justification nor does it give any 
specific examples, which an educator could reflect upon or mirror in his/her classroom. 
 
However, in other instances individuals discriminate between the general notion of 
justification and the deductive justification (i.e. proof). For example, Marrades and Gutierrez 
(2000, p. 89), in their study regarding the types of justifications secondary schools students 
produced whilst learning geometry in a dynamic computer environment, use “the term 
justification to refer to any reason given to convince people (e.g. teachers and other students) 
of the truth of a statement,” but use “the term (formal mathematical) proof to refer to any 
justification which satisfies the requirements of abstraction, rigor, language, etc., demanded 
by professional mathematicians to accept a mathematical statement as valid within an 
axiomatic system.”   
 
Cabassut (2005, p. 392) uses the term ‘validation’ to mean a “reasoning that intends to assert, 
necessarily or plausibly, the truth of a statement”, in order to differentiate between proof 
(deductive) and justification (argumentation) as follows: A proof “is a validation using only 
arguments of necessity,” and a justification (argumentation) “is a validation using arguments 
of plausibility and maybe arguments of necessity.” Similarly, Hanna and  De Villiers (2008, 
p. 331), consider justification (argumentation) to be “a reasoned discourse that is not 
necessarily deductive but uses arguments of plausibility” and deductive proof to be “a chain 







1.9  Types of Justification 
Bell (1976) as cited in Marrades & Gutierrez (2000, p. 89), argues that there two types of 
jsutifications that students use when responding to proof problems: “Empirical justification 
“characterized by the use of examples as element of conviction”, and deductive justification, 
“characterized by the use of deduction to connect data with conclusions.” Like Bell (1976), 
Balacheff (1988) after considering the results of experiments where high school students had 
to solve a range of proof problems, equivalently developed two distinct categories of 
justification, called pragmatic (empirical) justifications and conceptual (deductive) 
justifications. Pragmatic justifications  are constructed on the grounds of examples, 
illustrations or actions, whereas conceptual justifications do not involve actions or showings, 
but instead depend on the construction of particular properties at a rather abstract level as 
well as possible relations between such properties. (Balacheff, 1988; also see Marrades & 
Gutierrez (2000, p.  89). 
 
Amongst the types of empirical proofs suggested by Balacheff (1988, p. 219) has been the 
“generic example”. Balacheff (1998, p. 219) argues that: “The generic example involves 
making explicit the reasons for the truth of an assertion by means of operations or 
transformations on an object that is not there in its own right, but as a characteristic 
representative of the class.” Below is a typical example cited in Balacheff (1988, p. 219): 
 
“The remainder on dividing a number 22 or 55 is the same as the remainder on 
dividing the number formed by the rightmost two digits by 22 or 55…To fix these 
ideas, consider the number 43 728 and the divisor 55. The number 43 728 is equal 
to 43 700 + 28. However, 43 700 is divisible by 5x 5 because 43 700 is the product of 
437 and 100, and as 100 is 10 x 10, or 5 x 2 x 5x 2, the factor 100 is divisible by 5x 5. 
The remainder on dividing 43 728 by 5x 5 or 25 is therefore the same as that on 
dividing 28 by 25.” 
 
Balacheff (1998, p. 219) describes ‘the thought experiment’ as one of the types of deductive 
justifications, and acknowledges that in the cases of the generic example and the thought 
experiment, the objective is not to show that the result is true by simply demonstrating that it 
works, but rather to provide the necessary reasons as to why the result is true. In particular 
there is a connection between the generic example and thought experiment, in the sense that 





conceptual proofs. This is because the general character of the generic example is continually 
reflected upon in order to develop and construct the thought experiment, which in the final 
analysis practically detaches itself from the particular case under consideration. In terms of 
this envisaged connection, I am of the view that the generic example as a kind of justification 
does not belong to the set of empirical justifications as posited by Balacheff (1988, p. 219) 
and Marrades & Gutierrez (2000, p. 92), but rather it belongs to the continuum of deductive 
justifications as it allows one to see the general through the particular (see Section 5.3.1).  
 
At this juncture it would be helpful to cite Stylianides (2008, p. 10), who asserts that a 
generic example “is a proof that uses a particular case as seen as representative of the general 
case” and hence regards a generic example as kind of proof that is used to support a 
mathematical claim. Similarly, Harel & Sowder (2007, p. 811) using the notion of ‘proof 
scheme’ to synonymously mean justification states: “Generic example in our taxonomy 
belongs to the deductive proof scheme category”. Like Tall (1979), Harel & Sowder (1998, p. 
271) also maintains that: “In a generic proof scheme, conjectures are interpreted in general 
terms but their proof is expressed in a particular context.” (See Section 5.3.1). 
 
In particular, Harel and Sowder (1996, 1998, 2007) and Sowder & Harel (1998), through 
working with secondary school, college and university students have differentiated between 
three major levels of justification, namely: external conviction, empirical and deductive 
justifications. Harel & Sowder (1998, 2007) note that a student exhibits an ‘external 
conviction’ type of justification, when she/he provides a justification for his/her conjecture 
generalization through reliance on the information provided by an authority like a teacher or 
mathematics textbook, the structural appearance or layout of an argument, or through the 
meaningless use and manipulation of symbols. For example, a student exhibiting an 
externally based justification could accept a proof for a given mathematical theorem in a 
university mathematics textbook on the grounds of seeing the structure given, required to 
prove, as proof, and also by seeing that the textbook has been written by  a world reknowned 
professor in mathematics (who is an authority in the field of mathematics), without 
necessarily really checking if the posited argument makes any meaningful sense to 
himself/herself (see Harel & Sowder, 1998, 2007).  
 
Likewise De Villiers (1992) has also reports on children’s acceptance of theorems on the 
basis of ‘authority’ of the textbook or teacher or maybe parent or elder family member. In 





the results on the basis of authority, more so than on empirical grounds, as teachers in many 
classrooms in South Africa do not even allow learners the opportunity to explore 
mathematical statements experimentally or inductively. They are either just given as ‘truths’ 
by the teacher or the teacher gives a proof:  they are not even guided to rediscover the proof. 
Gila Hanna (2007) also mentions how even in mathematics, complicated or advanced proofs 
are often accepted on the authority of the mathematician rather than the ability to work 
through and understand the proof. For example, I accept that Andrew Weil and his partner 
have proven Fermat’s Last Theorem, but I only have a vague understanding of how it was 
achieved, but little understanding of the finer details. But I accept their authority and those of 
the reviewers and referees that have scrutinized and examined their work. So this is far more 
common than people may think at first glance. 
 
With respect to empirical justification, Harel & Sowder (1998, p. 252) asserts that: 
“conjectures are validated, impugned, or subverted by appeals to physical facts or sensory 
experiences.” For example, at classroom level, quite often justifications for conjectures or 
conjecture generalizations are constructed solely on the basis of examples. In more explicit 
terms, Gutierrez, Pegg & Lawrie (2004, p. 513) asserts that: “In empirical proofs examples 
are the argument of conviction.” In the same vein, psychologists affirm that concept 
formation by most individuals is naturally based on examples – and even on just a single 
specific example at times (Medin, 1989). Indeed in much of our daily practice, one also 
embraces examples in order to understand a particular point (or concept) or otherwise to 
check out their own sort of understanding. Consistent with the common drive by many to 
naturally use examples to substantiate a claim, Harel & Sowder (2007, p. 809 ) asserts that 
empirical justifications are: “marked by their reliance on either (a) evidence from examples 
of direct measurements of quantities, substitution of specific numbers in algebraic 
expressions, and so forth, or (b) perceptions.” This means that there are typically two core 
kinds of empirical justifications, namely  perceptual justification (i.e. visual pereception) and 
inductive justification (Harel & Sowder, 2007, p. 809). 
 
Harel & Sowder (1996, p. 62) asserts that a perceptual justification is “based solely on visual 
or tactile perceptions.” Quite often the usage of the perceptual justification, which is 
generally not supported by logical deduction, is prevalent amongst younger students. In a 
more general sense, students operate within the ambits of the perceptual justification, when 
they make an inference based on just one drawing in some instances or several drawings in 





conclusion is true. For example, students may examine a parallelogram and infer that the 
opposite sides are equal just by visual examination, and may not see the causal relationship 
between the opposite sides being parallel and the opposite sides being equal (i.e. that opposite 
sides being parallel imply opposite sides are equal). In other instances, more senior students 
might be convinced that the line drawn from the centre of the circle to the midpoint of chord 
is perpendicular to the chord by just looking at several computer-generated examples, and 
will most likely use similar kinds of examples to convince their peers (see Harel & Sowder, 
1996). Furthermore, in using the perceptual justification, it is highly probable that students 
might just not consider or account for the arbitrary case. 
 
According to Harel and Sowder (1998), a student exhibits an inductive kind of  justification, 
when he or she attempts to convince himself/herself (ascertains for themselves) or convince 
others (persuade others) that a specific conjecture holds true across more new specific cases. 
In this context, the notion of quantitative evaluations alludes to the following kinds of actions 
amongst others: “direct measurement of quantities, numerical computations, substitutions of 
specific numbers in algebraic expressions, etc.” (Harel & Sowder, 1998, p. 252). In many of 
our classrooms our students quite often exhibit the inductive kind of justification to remove 
doubt about the truth of a particular conjecture. For example, the findings from Chazan’s 
(1993) study revealed the predominant use of inductive proof scheme among high school 
students that participated in his study.  
 
In Martin & Harel’s (1989) study, they asked their first year pre-service elementary 
mathematics teachers to determine the mathematical correctness of inductive and deductive 
verifications of either a familiar or an unfamiliar statement, and found that more than half the 
students accepted an inductive argument as a valid mathematical proof, and that the said 
acceptance was not dependent on the familiarity of the context. The use of the inductive proof 
scheme is also prevalent amongst students who study mathematics at advanced levels. For 
example, Goetting (1995, p. 43) in her study, as cited in Harel & Sowder (1998, p. 252), 
found that “almost 40% of her advanced undergraduates used examples as basis for judging 
the truth of a divisibility question.”  
 
Like many others working in the field of mathematics and mathematics education, Harel & 
Sowder (1998, 2007) view deductive justification as a process that uses given data together  
with relevant  definitions, axioms, theorems to build a logical argument that validates a 





under consideration. However, one should bear in mind that the function of deductive 
justification (i.e. mathematical proof) is far more than just validation, verification of a result, 
removing doubt or convincing oneself or others (compare De Villiers, 2003a). As discussed 
in Section 5.4 below, deductive justification (proof) has other functions, for example, 
explanation and discovery (De Villiers, 2003a; Staples, Bartlo & Thanheiser, 2012). 
 
Simon & Blume (1996) asserts that in mathematics classrooms where justification is 
promoted and mathematical validation and understanding are important foci, “mathematical 
justification is likely to proceed from inductive toward deductive and toward greater 
generality” (p. 9). Through investigating and reflecting on the justifications that were 
articulated by the class of prospective mathematics elementary teachers, Simon & Blume (p. 
17) categorize their justifications as follows:  
 
 “Level 0 - responses identifying motivations that do not address justification 
  Level 1 - Appeals to external authority 
  Level 2 - Empirical demonstration 
  Level 3 - Deductive justification that is expressed in terms of a particular instance  
  (generic example) 
 Level 4- Deductive justification that is independent of particular instances”. 
 
The aforementioned levels represent a progression from justifications that have no bearing on 
the claim under consideration, to the reliance on some form of external validation, and 
progressing ultimately to construction of a justification that engages with the mathematical 










Figure 1.9.1:  Justification Framework (Lanin, 2005, p. 236) 
Justification Level Description  
Level 0: No justification Responses do not address justification 
Level 1: Appeal to external 
authority 
Reference is made to the correctness stated by some other 
individual or reference material. 
Level 2: Empirical evidence Justification is provided through the correctness of 
particular examples. 
Level 3: Generic example Deductive justification is expressed in a particular instance. 
Level 4: Deductive Justification Validity is given through a deductive argument that is 






Reflecting on and using Simon & Blume’s (1996) categorization of justification, Lanin 
(2005) developed  the justification framework as shown in Figure 1.9.1, to examine and 
analyze the kind of justifications that twenty five sixth grade students developed in order to 
justify the generalizations they produced as and when they were working through algebraic 
patterning activities using computer spreadsheets. 
 
Distilling from the types of justifications proposed by Bell (1976a and b), Balacheff (1998), 
and Harel & Sowder (1998, 2007), Lanin (2005), Marrades & Gutierrez (2000), Simon & 
Blume (1996), it is evident that external conviction justifications; empirical justifications; 
generic justifications and deductive justifications constitute the core categories of justification 
that permeate the field of mathematics and mathematics education. These justifications can 
be arranged in a continuum as shown in Figure 1.10.2, with external conviction justification 












This deliberate distinction of the notions of justification, suggests multiple approaches to 
justification. One approach is certainly justification in the form of a logical argument (proof), 
whilst other approaches could take the form of an empirical argument or generic proof or an 
external conviction. This study in its endeavour to expose pre-service mathematics teachers 
to alternate forms of justifications in mathematics, will consider the range of justifications as 











1.10 Outline of dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into twelve Chapters and includes thirteen Appendices. The 
Chapters in the study are as follows: 
 
Chapter one: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the study and explores the concepts of generalization and justification 
as processes and products to arrive at a set of working conceptions of generalization and 
justifications that guides this study. In particular this Chapter discusses the different types of 
generalizations and justifications that emanated from the literature review done for this study, 
and signals the kinds of generalizations and justifications that this study attempts to engage 
pre-service teachers with. Moreover, Chapter one presents the rationale for the envisaged 
study, and in doing so the researcher describes how he came to develop an interest in the 
topic under study, some pertinent reasons as to why this study is worth doing, and points out 
some gaps in the literature with regard to generalization and justification. Furthermore, the 
Chapter describes the purpose of the study and the research questions. Finally the Chapter 
presents the delimitation aspects and the dissertation outline. 
 
Chapter two: Generalizations and Justifications 
This Chapter  is an extension of the literature review discussed in Chapter 1. This Chapter 
focuses on the kinds of reasoning that underpins/defines the different kinds of generalization 
and justification that permeate mathematics and mathematics education. In addition this 
Chapter presents a literature review on research done in the context of generalizing and 
justifying both at school and tertiary levels. This Chapter ends with a sub-Chapter on 
conjecturing, generalizing and justifying within a dynamic geometric context. 
 
Chapter three: Misconceptions and Counter examples 
This Chapter represents a further literature review that was done on the topics 
misconceptions and counter-examples as result of the design of the study and the findings 
that emerged from the data analysis.  
 
Chapter four: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Considerations 
Chapter  four introduces the conceptual framework for this study from a learning theory 
perspective. To address the purpose of the study and answer the proposed research questions 
for this study, it became necessary for the researcher to engineer a conceptual framework that 





the constructivist theory of learning. In view of the topics (theoretical considerations) and 
frameworks that have been considered to guide this study, some are discussed in this Chapter 
4 and others are discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 4, the learning theory of constructivism in 
relation to cognitive and social constructivism is described and discussed. In addition, 
theoretical considerations pertaining to generalizations, justifications, scaffolding, discovery 
learning, and analogical transfer are discussed. In particular, Chapter 4 engages with the 
following theoretical frameworks: Piaget’s Theory of Equilibration (which is also known as 
Piaget’s Theory of Socio-cognitive Conflict); Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory and 
Ausubel’s Theory of Meaningful Learning. The other remaining theoretical considerations 
are discussed in Chapter 5. 
  
Chapter five: Further Theoretical Considerations  
This Chapter is the continuation of the theoretical considerations and theoretical frameworks 
for this study as articulated in the conceptual framework guiding this study. In particular this 
Chapter discusses the proving process; the conception of deductive proof for this study, and 
the different functions of proof. It culminates with a discussion on global and heuristic 
counter-examples. 
 
Chapter six: Research Design and Methodology 
This Chapter presents the research design, methodology and research procedures that were 
considered for this study and provides theoretical frameworks and approaches that were used 
to analyze the data. Initially this Chapter starts by briefly reiterating the purpose of the study 
and the research questions governing this study. It then elaborates on the qualitative research 
approach that has been adopted for this study and provides a discussion and motivation for 
using the interpretive paradigm as well as a case study approach for this particular study. This 
Chapter also discusses the target and accessible population (sample) as well as the 
characteristics of the sample, and also the data collection (production) techniques and 
instruments that were used in this study. Moreover, this Chapter presents the inductive-
deductive approach which was used to analyze the data within the context of the 
generalization and justification frameworks constructed for this study. Finally this Chapter 
culminates with a discussion on reliability and validity measures adopted for this study as 








Chapters seven to ten: Data Analysis, Results and Discussions 
In this section of the study the researcher presents the data analysis, findings (results) and 
discussion in an integrated inclusive manner in relation to the equilateral triangle problem, 
convex rhombus problem, convex equilateral pentagon problem and ‘any’ equi-sided convex 
polygon problem respectively. Hence, this means that: 
 Chapter seven presents the data analysis, findings (results) and discussion in an 
integrated manner in relation to the equilateral triangle problem. 
 Chapter eight presents the data analysis, findings (results) and discussion in an 
integrated manner in relation to the convex rhombus problem  
  Chapter nine presents the data analysis, findings (results) and discussion in an 
integrated manner in relation to the convex equilateral pentagon problem 
 Chapter ten presents the data analysis, findings (results) and discussion in an 
integrated manner in relation to ‘any’ equi-sided convex polygon problem (i.e. 
general convex equilateral n-gons). 
 
Chapter eleven: Findings in the context of the research questions 
In line with the guiding conceptual framework of this study, this Chapter provides a 
consolidated discussion of the research findings in the context of the research questions, and 
in doing so provides the evidence to verify  the research questions. 
 
Chapter twelve: Conclusion 
This Chapter presents the implications of the findings, limitations of this research, and 
recommendations for further research. Finally this Chapter presents  conclusion that 
embraces the purpose of the study and the associated key findings of this study. 
 
Appendices include the detailed task-based activities that were used during the one-to-one 
task based interviews as well as the interview protocols. 
 
As part of the literature review for this study, the next Chapter (i.e Chapter 2) focuses on 









Chapter 2: Reasoning, Generalization and Justification 
 
2.0 Introduction 
As reasoning underpins the kind of generalizations that one could attempt  and the kinds of 
justifications that one could propose to support and/or explain their generalizations,  I wish to 
discuss the three types of reasoning, namely: inductive, deductive and analogical reasoning in 
Section 2.1. Next, I propose to use Section 2.2 to explore some of the research around 
generalizations that has taken place in the field of mathematics /mathematics education and 
also illustrate how constructed generalizations can be extended across domains. Section 2.3 is 
meant to explore some research related to empirical and deductive justification (proof) at 
school level, whilst Section 2.4 will focus on research related to justifications at pre-service 
teacher education level and beyond. Section 2.5 provides an in-depth discussion around 
conjecturing, generalizing and  justifying within a dynamic geometry context. 
 
2.1 Reasoning in Mathematics 
Reasoning generally encompasses all thinking activities that entail making judgements and,  
inferences and drawing conclusions, which is quite consistent with Ball and Bass’ (2003, p.  
28) view that “Mathematical reasoning is no less than a basic skill.” Building on this,  
Bjuland (2007, p. 2) says “reasoning can be defined as five interrelated processes of 
mathematical thinking, categorized as sense –making, conjecturing, convincing, reflection, 
and generalizing.” Furthermore, Ross (1998, p. 254), the  former President of the 
Mathematical Association of American (MAA) argues:  
“It should be emphasized that the foundation of mathematics is reasoning.[… ] 
Results may be shown to hold in a small number of cases directly, but students must 
recognize that all they have in that case is evidence of a conjecture until the result has 
been firmly established. Construction of valid arguments or proofs and criticizing 
arguments are integral parts of doing mathematics. If reasoning ability is not 
developed in the student, then mathematics simply becomes a matter of following a 
set of procedures and mimicking examples without thought as to why they make 
sense.” 
According to the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics 1999 year book (see Stiff & 





with exploratory and investigative mathematical tasks, which promote the making of 
conjectures that needs to be explained and justified. At a more local level, the Department of 
Education (2003a) also makes a similar assertion. For example, the  Department of Education 
(2003a) has prescribed in its curriculum policy that reasoning skills should be developed by 
affording students activities that at least provide opportunities for analyzing, synthesizing, 
explaining, evaluating, justifying, convincing, proving.  
Looking at the issues mentioned above in a related manner, Russell (1999, p. 1) emphasizes 
the following aspects about active mathematical reasoning in mathematical classrooms: 
“First, mathematical reasoning is essentially about the development, justification, and 
use of mathematical generalizations. In the classroom, where mathematical reasoning 
is the centre of the activity, the solution of an individual problem is closely linked to 
the generalizations behind that solution. Second, mathematical reasoning leads to an 
interconnected web of mathematical knowledge within a mathematical domain. Third, 
the development of such a web of mathematical knowledge is the foundation of what I 
call “mathematical memory”, what we often refer to as mathematical “sense”. Fourth, 
an emphasis on mathematical reasoning in the classroom incorporates the study of 
flawed or incorrect reasoning as an avenue toward deeper development of 
mathematical knowledge.” 
Since reasoning permeates the processes of conjecturing, generalizing, convincing, 
explaining, justifying and proving, related kinds of reasoning are discussed in this narrative. 
According to Polya (1967), there are essentially two broad categories of mathematical 
reasoning, namely demonstrative reasoning and plausible reasoning. Demonstrative 
reasoning, which commonly embraces deductive reasoning is akin to mathematical proof, 
whilst plausible reasoning refers to both inductive reasoning and analogical reasoning (Polya, 
1967). Inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning and analogical reasoning will be discussed 
further in some detail in this Chapter. 
 
2.1.1 Inductive and Deductive Reasoning 
Inductive reasoning denotes the process of reasoning that occurs when, by merely looking at 
a set of examples, one generates a theory that one thinks will represent all the given examples 
as well as examples that are not present (Polya, 1967; de Villiers, 1992). Quite often this 





should not be confused with mathematical induction as a proof process. The following 
example can help to illustrate the use of inductive reasoning in our daily lives: 
The bin truck that came on day one was black.  
The bin truck that came on day two was black. 




           Therefore, the bin truck that comes daily is black. 
 
In the above example, it was induced that the bin truck that comes daily is black, but this 
might not necessarily be true. It could be that on day ten a red bin truck could come. Hence, 
generally we may say that a conclusion reached via inductive reasoning is not necessarily 
valid, more so since it is usually not possible to observe every known case. 
 
However, in other cases, inductive reasoning could yield a conclusion, which could later be 
shown to be valid, depending on the nature of the specific instances and conclusion. For 
example, if a student accurately measures the angles of seven different triangles using 
Sketchpad, and finds that the sum of the angles in each case adds up to 180
o
, then the student 
may inductively conclude that the sum of the angles in all triangles is 180
o
, which we know 
from our experience is valid, notwithstanding the fact that in normal mathematical practice 
one would have to show that the conclusion is valid via demonstrative reasoning. 
While inductive reasoning is the process of starting with a number of specific instances and 
creating general statements, deductive reasoning is defined as the process which occurs when 
we move from some accepted generalization(s) to specific instances. The following example 
(see Figure 2.1.1.1), can help to illustrate the use of deductive reasoning to produce a valid 
conclusion: 
   









  ̂    ̂            (sum of adjacent ∠’s on a straight line is 1800)……. (1) 
and    ̂    ̂           (sum of adjacent ∠’s on a straight line is 1800)…….(2) 
      ̂    ̂    ̂    ̂      …………………………………………………….. (3) 
 ⇒    ̂    ̂                     …………………………………………………….. (4) 
 
In the above example, statements 1 and  2 are called premises, and statement 3  a conclusion. 
By the common rules of deduction, if statements 1 and 2 (the premises) are true then the 
statement 3 (the conclusion) must be true. Hence, since statements 1 and 2 are true in the 
above example, we may with absolute certainty claim that statement 3 is true, and 
consequently declare the given argument as a valid argument, which in this case is a 
syllogism. 
 
Moreover, conclusive arguments as illustrated in the vertically opposite angle’s example, are 
called deductive, while inconclusive arguments as in the bin truck example are called 
inductive. It is therefore useful to distinguish between induction and deduction in terms of 
conclusiveness rather than just a movement between generality. In Figure 2.1.1.2 (see de 
Villiers, 1992, p. 46), the differences and similarities between these two reasoning processes 
are compared.  
 Deduction  Induction 
 
          True premises  True Premises 
           (General)  (Particular)   
Valid argument leads to  leads to                 Plausible argument 
        
  
 True Conclusion Probable Conclusion 




From Figure 2.1.1.2, it can be deduced that the relationship between premises and conclusion 
in a valid deduction is none other than logically leading to conclusion, whereas the 
relationship between premises and conclusion in induction is one only of plausible support. In 





other words, the conclusion arrived at via deduction is always true so long as the premises are 
true, where as the  conclusion arrived at  via the process of induction may be true or turn out 
to be false. For example, men who go fishing once in a while to Hout Bay may find that they 
only catch yellow tail fish. They then induce (or infer, or draw the conclusion) that the only 
fish that can be caught at Hout Bay is yellow tail fish, but this would not necessarily be true. 
 
2.1.2 The complementary roles of inductive and deductive reasoning in Mathematics 
In mathematics, one may observe a number of specific cases defined by specific conditions 
and characterisics, and find that a particular property (result) remains invariant, and hence 
make a conjecture. In this instance, we say  inductive reasoning has been used to arrive at the 
conjecture. However, to provide some insight as to why the conjecture is true for all cases or 
some delimited sets of cases, one then proceeeds to use deductive reasoning to construct 
logical explanation (called proof).  
 
For example, one might notice that every time they add the opposite angles of a cyclic 
quadrilateral by using Skecthpad, they add up to     . One might then conjecture that the 
opposite angles of cyclic quadrilateral is always     . These moves characterize the process 
of inductive reasoning (i.e. induction). Thereafter, one would normally proceed to use the 
axioms, definitions and theorems of geometry to prove that the the opposite angles of cyclic 
quadrilateral is always     , and when this happens we say that deduction has taken place. 
  
Generally, inductive reasoning is seen to to be a playing a key role is the discovery and 
creation of new mathematics. In practice, as students examine a number of special cases, they  
might continuously observe a regularity (regularities), and it is this regularity that drives them 
to make a mathematical conjecture that they strongly  feel (though not knowing with absolute 
certainty) is true. However, to justify (or demonstrate) with absolute certainty that the 
specific mathematical conjecture is true, it then beomes necessary  for one to use deductive 
reasoning to construct a logical explanation that is mathematically sound and relevant . Polya 
(1954a) (as cited in de Villiers, 1992, p. 47) states that the former process is “hazardous, 
controversial, and provisional,” while the latter is “safe, beyond controversy, and final.”  
 
Nonetheless, in recent years it is widely accepted that conjecturing, exploration, and the 
creation of new mathematical objects or results are largely underpinned by inductive and 
intuitive methods rather than deductive reasoning. (compare Lakatos, 1976; Polya, 1954a). 





would not have made the advances they made” (de Villiers, 1992, p.47). However, without 
deductive reasoning we would still be doubtful of many of their results. Therefore according 
to de Villiers (1992,  p. 47), “the one cannot do without the other. They supplement, nourish 
and support each other like symbiotic partners, and would stifle and suffocate on their own.”   
 
Mouly (1978) as cited in Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2002, pp. 4-5) argues that the 
inductive–deductive approach is a symbiotic relationship, which consists of: 
 
“a back-and-forth movement in which the investigator first operates inductively from 
observations to hypotheses and then deductively from these hypotheses to their 
implications, in order to check their validity from the standpoint of compatibility with 
accepted knowledge. After revision, where necessary, these hypotheses are submitted 
to further test through the collection of data specifically designed to test their validity 
at the empirical level. This dual approach is the essence of the modern scientific 
method and marks the last stage of man’s progress toward empirical science, a path 
that took him through folklore and mysticism, dogma, and tradition, causal 
observation, and finally to systematic observation.” 
 
2.1.3 Analogical Reasoning 
 
2.1.3.1  Reasoning via Analogy 
The South African Oxford School Dictionary (2004) describes analogy as “a partial likeness 
between two things that are compared.” In a more detailed manner, Sowa & Majumdar 
(2003, p. 1) lists  other possible meanings of an analogy, such as: “a similarity in some 
respects of things that are otherwise dissimilar, a comparison that determines the degree of 
similarity, or an inference based on resemblance or correspondence.” Polya (1954a, p. 13)  
also asserts that “analogy is a sort of similarity”. For example, to see the similarity between 
an aeroplane and a bird, wherein the cockpit is matched with the head of the bird, the wings 
of the plane are matched with the wings of the bird, is equal to making an analogy.  
Moreover, Gentner & Holyhoak (1997, p. 33), asserts that, “in analogy, the key similarities 
lie in the relations that hold within domains (e.g., the flow of electrons in an electric circuit is 
analogically similar to the flow of people in a crowded tunnel, rather than the features of the 





Gentner  & Holyoak (1997, p. 33), the recognition of “higher order relations”, commonly 
referred to as relations between relations, is essential and fundamentally important for the 
development of analogical similarities. The following example demonstrates the notion of 
higher order relations: Increasing the speed of your vehicle would cause an increase in the 
petrol consumption, just as the faster you run would cause an increase in your oxygen 
consumption. 
Robert Oppenheimer (1955) cited in  (1989, p. 413), writes: 
“Whether or not we talk of discovery or of invention, analogies are inevitable in 
human thought, because we come to new things in science with what equipment we 
have, which is how we have learned to think, and above all how we have learned to 
think about the relatedness of things. We cannot, coming into something new, deal 
with it except on the basis of the familiar and the old fashioned. The conservation of 
scientific enquiry is not an arbitrary thing; it is the freight with which we operate; it is 
the only equipment we have. We cannot learn to be surprised or astonished at 
something unless we have a view of how it ought to be; and that view is almost 
certainly an analogy.” 
Thus, we may equivalently say that reasoning via analogy plays a significant role in the 
discovery and invention of new aspects in mathematics. In this context, one could assert that 
“analogical reasoning entails understanding something new by analogy with something that is 
known” (English, 1998, p. 126). Moreover, Gentner (1983, 1989) as cited in English & 
Sharry (1996 p. 138), define analogical reasoning as a process of “transfer of structural 
information from one system, the base (called the source) to another system (called the 
target) through mapping relational correspondences between the two systems.” Indeed it is 
the very notion of “corresponding relational structures” that promotes analogy making 
amongst and within domains, which makes discoveries, generalizations and problem solving 
possible to a large extent in mathematics (see Polya, 1954a; English & Shary, 1996).  
In fact, Spearman (1923) cited in Novick (1988), claims that analogical reasoning 
encompasses our intellectual acts. For example, when learners at school, or university 
students or mathematicians themselves encounter a mathematical problem (called the target 
problem), they quite often resort to looking at how they solved a similar (or linked) problem 
called the source problem, and then attempt to apply a similar kind of strategy or known 





particular, Novick (1988, p. 510) asserts that “retrieval of an analogous problem may enable 
the student (or learner or mathematician) to adapt a known procedure for use with the target 
problem, thus precluding the necessity of constructing a new procedure.” 
However, in ordinary everyday thought, analogy making is a very natural and spontaneous 
process. Quite often we use analogical reasoning to think and deliberate on issues, and also to 
reach conclusions related to specific designs, problems and contexts, et cetera. For example, 
the idea that an aeroplane should have wings in order to fly was developed from seeing a bird 
in flight. Similarly, the general description of the resistor situation, which constitutes Ohm’s 
law, was made possible by comparing the resistor situation with the water-pipe situation 
(Winston, 1980). Likewise, Newton was able to formulate his famous laws by simply 
mapping  the relations between the movement of a projectile and that of the moon around the 
earth (de Villiers, 2009), and Archimedes developed his principle of buoyancy by reflecting 
on his own experience of floating in his bath (Alexander, White, & Daugherty, 1997). This 
most persuasively demonstrates the potential value of analogical reasoning as a generative or 
creative tool, and augurs well with Polya’s (1957, p. 43) assertion that “inference by analogy 
appears to be the most common kind of conclusion, and it is possibly the most essential 
kind.”  However, conclusions reached via analogical reasoning should be treated with some 
caution, because reasoning via analogy may not necessarily contribute to the development 
and production of conclusions that are sound and valid, like the way deductive reasoning 
does. 
2.1.3.2 The use of analogical reasoning and analogies in mathematics  
According to Gentner, Holyoak & Kokinov (2001) as cited in Sriraman (2005, p. 507),           
"analogy is generally  defined as the ability to reason with relations, to detect patterns, 
identify recurrences given superficial variations and abstract from these patterns.”  No doubt, 
such general definition is quite relevant to the area of mathematics. For example, quite often 
the establishment of a conjecture generalization or the construction of a “theorem” itself 
necessitates “the abstraction of structural relationships from a class of varying examples 
within which a particular pattern occurs” (Sriraman, 2005, p. 507).   
Ideally in mathematics, according to Polya (1954a, p. 13), “two systems are analogous if they 
agree in clearly definable relations of their respective parts”. For instance, a triangle, 
parallelogram and circle are respectively analogous to a tetrahedron (or pyramid), prism and 





straight lines (i.e. 3 straight lines), but similarly in space, a tetrahedron is bounded by the 
minimum number of planes (i.e. 4 planes), hence, the analogy between a triangle and a 
tetrahedron.  We may regard a triangle and a pyramid as analogous figures, by considering 
the following constructions: 
 Construct  a line segment and polygon as shown in the following figure: 
    
 
  ______  
 Place a point outside the line segment and connect it to the points (endpoints) 
of the line segment, you will then obtain a triangle.  
 
 Place a point outside the plane of the polygon and then connect it to all the 
points (vertices) of the polygon, you will then obtain a pyramid.   
  
Similarly, the analogy between a parallelogram and prism, can be easily illustrated as 
follows: Draw a segment parallel but opposite to the given line segment, and then by 
connecting the respective points, you would produce a parallelogram. Similarly, by drawing a 
polygon parallel but opposite to the given polygon, and connecting the respective points, you 
would produce a prism (see Polya, 1954a, p. 14). Moreover, “in the plane, a circle may be 
defined as the locus of all points equidistant from point, but similarly in space, a sphere can 
be defined as the surface formed by all points equidistant from a point, hence the analogy (de 











Furthermore, we could formulate theorems of solid geometry that are analogous with 
theorems from plane geometry. For example, in the plane, “the bisectors of three angles of a 
triangle meet in one point which is the centre of the circle inscribed in the triangle” but 
similarly in space, “the bisecting planes of the six dihedral angles of a tetrahedron meet in 
one point which is the centre of the sphere inscribed in the tetrahedron” (see Polya, 1954a, 
pp. 25 & 215).  
In light of this, exploration of solid geometry can be facilitated by making the necessary 
analogy with plane geometry, which could possibly lead to new mathematical conjectures. 
For example, since the triangle is analogous to the tetrahedron, it is possible to conjecture that 
the method for determining the center of gravity of a tetrahedron, may be analogous to the 
method for determining the centre of gravity of a triangle, which normally is found by 
drawing the medians of the triangle and locating the point of intersection of the medians (i.e. 
by finding the point of concurrency of the medians, known as the centroid) (see Crystal-
Alberta, 2010).  
There also exist an analogy between the finite and infinite. For example, according to Polya 
(1954a, p. 26), 
 
“the infinite series and integrals are in various ways analogous to the finite sums 
whose limits they are; the differential calculus is analogous to the calculus of finite 
differences; differential equations, especially linear and homogenous differential 
equations, are somewhat analogous to algebraic equations, and so forth.” 
 
Furthermore, analogy can be looked upon as a similarity of relations, wherein the relations 
are bound by the same specific laws. For instance, the addition of numbers is analogous to the 
multiplication of numbers, since both operations are bound by the same rules. In particular, 
both addition and multiplication are commutative and associative. According to de Villiers 
(2009, p. 34), in a case like this, “where the analogy is determined by clearly defined rules, 
there exists a duality, primarily because the two operations can be interchanged,” provided 
the commutative and associative laws are involved. In particular, de Villiers (2009, p. 34) 
makes the following assertion: “this duality between addition and multiplication extends to a 
fruitful analogy between arithmetic and geometric sequences to produce an interesting dual 
for the Fibonacci sequence, involving an analogous rule                 for producing 











  .” 
 
Many authors have endorsed the “use of analogies in mathematics,” which is quite succinctly 
nicely expressed by this limerick of Andre Weil (n.d) as cited in Sriraman (2005, p. 508): 
“As every mathematician knows, 
Nothing is more fruitful than these obscure analogies, 
These indistinct reflections of one theory into another 
These furtive caresses 
These inexplicable disagreements;  
Also nothing gives the Researcher greater pleasure…” 
 
Furthermore, Alwyn & Dindyal (2009, p. 1) asserts that: “The exercise of analogical 
reasoning is not merely the memorizing of previously solved problems. It is definitely not 
rote learning. It involves directed, purposeful mathematical thinking in determining the 
structural similarities and relational properties between the source and the target problems.” 
For example, Archimedes’ discovery of the integral calculus was made possible by 
constructing appropriate analogies at a relational level and also knowing how and when to 
use them to generate new ideas or make new findings. In actual fact, he found the area of the 
enclosed by a straight line and parabolic segment, and the volume of the sphere by making 
analogies with the equilibrium concept from mechanics (Polya, 1954a, p. 155).  
Arguably, reasoning through identifying similarities from experiences is by no means low 
quality reasoning, but it should be regarded as powerful reasoning that can/might provide 
opportunities to lead to new knowledge (Crystal-Alberta, 2010; Lithner, 2003). More 
importantly, the ability and know-how to spot and select similarities, and thereby group or 
classify them is of significant importance and pre-requisite for the learning of mathematics, 
not forgetting that analogical reasoning serves many purposes, inter-alia explanations, 
discovery, problem solving as well as algebraic abstraction.   
Although, the use of analogy can allow students to observe and use commonalities between 
different mathematical concepts, algorithms, representations, theorems, classifications, 





teachers should ensure that learners do not ignore or disregard differences that may exist 
amongst the objects under study (de Villiers, 2009). Further to this, one should refrain from 
using false analogies, such as referring to ‘apples’ and pears to prevent learners from 
conjoining ‘unlike’ terms such as     . This is a false analogy as algebraic symbols 
represent numbers and never represent objects, and its use can lead to serious, persistent 
miconceptions. 
 
2.1.3.3 Some Challenges of Using Analogies 
According to English (1998), quite often novice problem solvers, when trying to establish a 
similarity between the source and the target, erroneously focus more attention on superficial 
characteristics rather than the critical underlying relational structural properties, which in 
many instances lead to the misrepresentation of claimed analogies. This misinterpretation 
invariably leads to students making errors, more so in cases where students do not have the 
prerequisite knowledge and skills related to the specific mathematical discourse or where the 
analogies are weak (i.e. the levels of similarity are low when compared to the high level of 
dissimilarity) (see Crystal-Alberta, 2010).  Furthermore, the inappropriate transfer of 
meaning from the source of the target, which is quite prevalent in instances of over-
generalization, can also contribute to the making of significant mathematical errors (see 
Crystal-Alberta, 2010).  
In particular, Alwyn & Dindyal (2009, p. 4), in their study of “analogical reasoning errors in 
mathematics at junior college level”, finds  students making errors dubbed misuse of the 
distributive property. For example, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.3.1, the error in the third line 
could be attributed to invalid analogical reasoning, wherein the student “erroneously applied 









  - (2)
1/2x
”. Furthermore, the error in line 5, also demonstrates another type of 
“analogical reasoning error”, where the student “applied the procedure of differentiating a 
polynomial to an exponential function”. Alwyn & Dindyal (2009, p. 4) with reference to 
Lithner (2003) makes the following assertions: “In mimicking the procedure, the student had 
transferred the solution strategy by identifying similarities.  However it was unfortunate that 
the student had completely focused on the superficial likeness and had not taken the structural 
differences between the two forms of mathematical expressions. In using analogical 
reasoning, students need to purposefully direct their mathematical thinking to the structural 







                 
 
 
2.2 Generalization within broader context of research and teaching 
“During generalization what occurs is, on the one hand, a search for a certain 
invariant in an assortment of objects and their properties, and a designation of that 
invariant  by a word, and, on the other hand, the use of the variant that has been 
singled out to identify objects in a given assortment” (Davydov, 1990, p. 5). 
 
The conceptualization mentioned above views generalization as a process and a product that 
permeates the field of research on generalization to some extent across schools, teacher 
education contexts, and mathematics classrooms at higher education institutions.  Although 
generalization is considered to be both “an object and a means of thinking and 
communicating” (Dörfler , 1991, p. 63), a review of research on generalizations has shown 
that various kinds of generalizations exist within the domain of mathematics and mathematics 
education.  For example, Carraher, Martinez, & Schliemann (2007), Dörfler (1991) and 
Davydov (1990) distinguish between empirical and theoretical generalizations. For example, 
according to Dörfler (1991) the development of empirical generalizations entails the 
examination of a set of specific cases (or examples) and then distilling commonalities, 
regularities or qualities that exist amongst the given cases. However, Dörfler (1991) asserts 
that during such episodes of  empirical generalizing there is an over-reliance on particular 
examples, and a lack of a particular goal which could serve as a guiding light to inform one 
up front as to the  kind of qualities (features) that s/he should focus/concentrate upon when 
trying to make a generalization. As a result the chance of generalizing or extending such a 
generalization (i.e. an empirical generalization) further is compromised.  
 
In keeping with the views stated earlier, Davydov (1990) points out that some of the 
difficulties that students experience with instructional material in the classrooms can be 
attributed to their largely empirical approach to constructing generalizations.  In contrast to 
 





empirical generalizations, Zakis & Liljedahl (2002, p. 379) citing Dörfler (1991) says 
theoretical generalization is: 
 
“both intentional and extentional…starts with… ‘a system of action’ in which 
essential invariants are identified and subscribed for by prototypes… is constructed 
through abstraction of the essential invariants …abstracted qualities are relations 
among objects rather than object themselves.” 
 
Carraher et al. (2007, p. 18) says: “Empirical generalizations are thought to arise from an 
examination of the data for underlying trends and structure. Theoretical generalization is 
thought to spring from the ascription of models to data.” In a mathematical sense, for 
example, this means that the mere examination of a finite set of ordered pairs in a table form 
does not necessarily warrant the construction of a general formula based function for any 
infinite domain such as counting numbers, real numbers or complex numbers. This in 
essence, means that such a formula based function can only be expressed via a statement that 
explicitly captures its generality (Carraher et al., 2007, p. 18). Furthermore, in emphasizing 
the conception of theoretical generalizations, Kondakov (1954, p. 457), Strogovich (1946, 
p.91) and Chelpanov (1946, p. 91) as cited in Davydov (1990, p. 177) respectively say: 
 
 “Generalization is the mental delineation of certain general properties belonging to a 
whole class of objects and the formulation of a conclusion that extends to every 
particular object in the given class” 
 “Generalization is the mental transition from the attributes of particular, individual 
objects to attributes belonging to whole group of these objects” 
 “The term generalization often designates, not just the process of singling out 
common properties, but its result as well, which is contained in the general concept.” 
Harel & Tall (1991, p. 38) sees generalization as a process that enables one to apply an 
established argument to a more extensive range of situations or broader context. From a 
cognitive perspective they posit the existence of the 3 different kinds of generalizations 
within a mathematical context as follows: 
 “Expansive generalization occurs when the subject expands the applicability range of 
an existing schema without reconstructing it” 
 “Reconstructive generalization occurs when the subject reconstructs an existing 





 “Disjunctive generalization occurs when, on moving from a familiar context to a new 
one, the subject constructs a new, disjoint, schema to deal with the new context and 
adds it to the array of schemas available” (Harel & Tall, 1991, p. 38). 
Radford (2003) categorizes the kinds of generalizations students produced into 3 types, 
namely: factual, contextual and symbolic. Generalizing via numerical action typically 
constitutes factual generalization, and generalizing the objects that underpin such actions is 
characterized as contextual generalization.  The understanding and use of algebraic language 
characterizes symbolic generalization. Furthermore, Radford (2006) differentiates between 
arithmetic generalizations and algebraic generalizations in the context of the elements of the 
generalizing process.  The three elements of the generalizing process as postulated by 
Radford are as follows: 
 
 The first one is: “noticing a commonality in some given particular terms” 
 The second one is: “to form a general concept – a genus – by generalizing the noticed 
commonality to all terms of the sequence” 
 The third one is to understand: “that the genus or generalized object crystallizes itself 
into a schema, i.e. a rule providing one with an expression of whatever term of the 
sequence” (p. 15). 
Following this line of thought, Radford (2006, p. 15) asserts that when the first two elements 
of the generalizing process have to be completed to perform an arithmetic generalization, and 
only when all three elements of the generalizing process are enacted upon and completed that 
an algebraic generalization can come into being. 
 
Furthermore, through a qualitative study investigating the generalization strategies twenty- 
two grade nine learners exhibited whilst doing a task embracing linear patterns, Becker & 
Rivera (2005, p. 121) identified twenty three assortment of  strategies  that students used. On 
carefully analysing the strategies that students used, as well as their inner understanding of 
the use of variables, representational fluency, they found that students exhibited three types 
of generalizations based on similarity, namely: numerical, figural, and pragmatic. These 
findings were consistent with Gentners’ (1989) results, which showed that learners used 
different similarity strategies to construct generalizations (inductions) using everyday objects. 
In particular, Becker & Rivera (2005, p. 128) found students who used the numerical strategy 
to generalize employed trial and error as a similarity strategy but with no real sense of what 





devoid of meaning and lacked representational fluency as and when used to generate linear 
sequences of numbers. Those students who used the figural generalization kind of strategy, 
employed perceptual similarity strategies, wherein the core focus was on the relationships 
amongst the set of numbers in the linear sequence under consideration. In such instances the 
variables were not seen as just placeholders but rather as ‘contributors’ to the development of 
meaningful functional relationships. On the other hand those students who characteristically 
employed a pragmatic generalization strategy, employed both numerical and figural kinds of 
strategies, with a high degree of representational fluency.  
 
Becker & Rivera (2005) asserts that students who exhibit figural generalization do move on 
to eventually become pragmatic generalizers. Moreover, they found that those students 
(called disjunctive generalizers) who were not able to generalize, appeared to make some 
start by using numerical strategies, but in principle lacked the intuitive sense to try other 
possible approaches and see plausible connections between various representation forms and 
strategies for making generalizations. Likewise, Lanin (2005) finds that students who 
resorted to using geometric schemes to see a particular rule via visual representation were 
more successful in the provisioning of general arguments and developing generalizations as 
compared to students that employed a numerical scheme or the ‘guess and check’ kind of 
strategy. In retrospect, Rivera & Becker’s (2003) analysis of the induction processes that 
forty-two pre-service teachers  invoked to construct their sets of generalizations, suggests 
that: “even if relationships among numerical values have had a greater contribution to 
similarity than did figural ones, those who induced figurally acquired a better understanding 
of the generalizations they constructed” (p. 63). 
 
As evidenced in the research discussed so far, it appears that in many of our classrooms, 
particularly at school level, inductive generalization becomes the most common form (or if 
not the only type) of generalization that teachers indulge their learners in. Ellis (2007b) adds 
that at school level the development of generalizations is frequently pioneered through the 
examination of specific cases via patterning tasks. Similarly, many researchers have focused 
their classroom research primarily around inductive generalizations, but mainly within the 
context of algebra largely at school level. In such instance the generalization research focused 
mainly on the development of mathematical rule or property (Ellis, 2007a citing Carpenter & 






A number of studies (compare Garcia- Criz & Marinin, 1997; Lannin, 2003; Stacey, 1989 as 
cited in Ellis, 2007a) have suggested that being aware of the types of generalizations that 
students can generate in mathematics can help to provide a much broader understanding as to 
the various ways in which students could “construct general rules to fit particular cases or 
data” (Ellis, 2007a, p. 222). Hence,  via an empirical study that included teaching sessions 
and interviews, Ellis (2007a) proceeded to distill the different ways in which seventh graders 
and eighth graders constructed generalizations and also the types of mathematical 
generalizations they constructed. In so doing, Ellis (2007a, p. 233-234) defines ‘generalizing 
actions’ as the moves that students make as they generalize, and ‘reflection generalizations’ 
as the “final statements of generalization”. Ellis (2007a, p. 234) argues that the students 
generalizing actions can be classified into the three broad categories, namely: “relating, 
searching and extending”. Figure 2.2.1 as cited in Ellis (2007a, p. 235), provides the 
distinguishing attributes characterizing each of the categories of generalizing actions, which 
can be used to track the kind of mental activities that students engage in during the process of 


























As elaborated in Figure 2.2.1, the idea of ‘relating’ as explained by Ellis (2007), underpins 
the notion of seeing some ‘sort of similarity’ (i.e. analogy) between two or more cases or 
situations as expressed by Polya (1954a), although s/he may not necessarily be able to 
elaborate as to how the cases are connected at that given moment. During the searching 
action, the student primarily repeats the same kind of procedure or action to try and see if 
some degree of similarity exists between the considered cases or situations (Ellis, 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c). The generalizing-extending action is basically characterized by the move of a 
student to expand an observed pattern or a similarity relationship into a more general 
structure (Ellis, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). 
 
According to Ellis (2007a, p. 244) reflection generalizations are highly linked to the 
generalization action of students and represent either: “a verbal statement, a written 
statement, or the use of the result of a generalization.” Figure 2.2.2, provides an overview of 
the categories of reflection generalizations that Ellis (2007a) found to be prevalent amongst 
the middle school learners that participated in her research study. The ‘influence’ category of 
refection generalization resonates much with Piaget’s notion of adaptation (see Sections 4.2 













   
 
 
As Ellis (2007a) argues that ‘extending’ was one of the ways that the middle school learners 
in her study generalized, one should bear in mind that in a mathematical context,  
generalization does not only accrue via inductive reasoning, but rather through other ways 
 





such as analogical reasoning and deductive reasoning (compare Yerushalmy, 1993; De 
Villiers, 2003b).  Therefore as classroom practitioners, we should take into consideration 
these plausible ways (or processes) that could be used by a student to develop a 
generalization, and also come to understand that generalizations are not just assimilated via 
inductive reasoning only, but rather through looking back and reflecting on existing 
generalizations and asking ourselves how can we generalize the existing generalization 
further or across to other contexts or extend a previously established generalization further. 
However, in such instances one’s intuitive sense and ability to reason inductively, 
analogically and/or deductively is crucial to the process of generalization and the construction 
of a further generalization (or the extension of an established generalization to other 
domains). For example, through looking back and reflecting on a previous generalization or 
result, and by analyzing the conditions governing the logical explanation for such a 
generalization from a deductive perspective, one can realize that a specific condition is 
sufficient but not necessary, and hence proceed to argue for a further generalization (de 
Villiers, 1996, p. 86). In addition, one could extend a particular established generalization (or 
theorem) further on inductive and analogical grounds as well. For example, De Villiers 
(1996) illustrated how the Varignon theorem can be generalized further through using a 
deductive approach, an analogical approach and also an inductive approach. In light of this, 
the discussion in the next few paragraphs focuses on the generalizing of Varignon’s theorem 
within this context. 
 
Firstly, Varignon’s theorem as illustrated in Figure 2.2.3 states that: “If the midpoints E, F, G 
and H of the adjacent sides of any quadrilateral ABCD are consecutively connected, then 
EFGH is a parallelogram” (see De Villiers, 1996, p. 76). The deductive explanation that 
supported the generality of the aforementioned theorem was constructed along the following 
lines:  In Figure 2.2.3, diagonals AC and BD were drawn. Then by using the midpoint 
theorem, which states that “the line joining the midpoints of two sides of a triangle is equal to 
half the third side and is parallel to the third side”, it was shown via deductive argument that 













In an attempt to enquire as to whether the Varignon result can analogously be extended to 
hexagons, De Villiers (1976, p. 78) found that when the midpoints of the adjacent sides of a 
regular hexagon are consecutively connected, another regular hexagon is produced as shown 
in Figure 2.2.4.1. In particular a hexagon with opposite sides parallel and equal is produced, 
i.e. a parallelo-hexagon is formed. However, De Villiers (1996, p. 77) found through 
experimentation in a dynamic geometry context, that when the midpoints of a non-regular 
hexagon are consecutively joined (see Figure 2.2.4.2), the resultant hexagon does  not have 
opposite sides that are both parallel and equal. On the basis of the latter result, De Villiers 
realized that  the joining of the consecutive midpoints of any hexagon does not always 
produce a parallelo-hexagon, i.e. it is not true in general that such a construction will produce 
a parallelo-hexagon. This then prompted De Villiers to ask himself the question: “under 
which conditions would we find a hexagon with opposite sides parallel and equal” (1996, p. 
77). 
 
Through looking back and reflecting on the logical explanation (i.e. deductive proof) that was 
used to provide insight as to why a parallelogram is produced when the consecutive points of 
any quadrilateral are joined, and also considering the characteristic property upon which the 
explanation depends, and analysing the properties of  Figure 2.2.4.2, De Villiers (1996, p. 77)  
immediately fathomed out that    would be parallel and equal to the opposite side    if 
       , and likewise  realized that          ⇒         and  
          ⇒         .  This means that for any hexagon possessing the afore-described 
properties, one could inscribe a parallelo-hexagon by consecutively connecting the midpoints 
of the sides of such an hexagon. 
 
 









Furthermore, De Villiers (1976, p. 77) was able to see that a hexagon        having 
 
 





diagonals        ,          and           would indeed be parallelo-hexagon. This 
can be easily explained as follows:           ⇒                  ⇒           











Figure 2.2.5, illustrates three examples of parallelo-hexagons wherein the midpoints have 
been consecutively join to also produce inscribed parallelo-hexagons. De Villiers (1996, p. 
77) also pointed out that the afore-illustrated parallelo-hexagons        can alternately be 
drawn by constructing two congruent triangles     and     with       ,       , and 
      , and then connecting            . 
 














Through using the same kind of reasoning postulated for the hexagon case, the result can 




Figure 2.2.5: Examples of inscribed parallelo-hexagons 





and        . If the midpoints of the sides of such octagons are connected then inscribed 
paralello-octagons are formed (see Figure 2.2.6). However, the octagons          
themselves are not necessarily parallel-octagons. Practically such octagons can be drawn by 
merely constructing parallelograms      and      and then joining                . 
 
Taking into consideration the cases as discussed, De Villiers (1996, p. 78) constructed a 
generalization (called Generalization 1) as shown here: 
 
 “                         2n-gon                                         
                                                                      
           -  -gon.” 
 
After justifying Generalization 1 through the construction of a logical explanation,    
De Villiers (1976, p. 79) argued that the result is further generalizable to 2n-gons with the 
property                     or                      for which the respective   -gons 
will  have                    or                  . 
 
On reflecting on the original result, De Villiers (1996, p. 79) proceeded to examine as to 










Thus, through taking into consideration that the result depended on                   and  
                , De Villiers (1996, p. 79) proceeded to investigate how the 
aforementioned relationships can be maintained if          and    are not the midpoints of 
the sides. In so doing, De Villiers extended his investigation to another particular case, 
namely parallel-hexagon              as shown in Figure 2.2.8, and subsequently 
formulated Generalization 2 as follows: 
 






“                         2n-gon                                         
      a                                                          
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Furthermore, through observing some particular cases as illustrated in Figure 2.2.9, de 
Villiers (1996, p.83) constructed the following converses to respectively Generalization 1 and  
2 on inductive grounds: 
 
Converse to Generalization 1:  
“                         2n-gon                                          
                                                                          
                     ,                       -2n-gon                  .” 
 










“                         2n-gon                                          
 
 
Figure 2.2.8: Parallelo-hexagon 





                                                                          
                             ,                      -2n-gon         
          .” 
 
However, De Villiers (1996, p. 94) on looking back and reflecting on the proofs that had been 
constructed to logically justify the converse statements (or generalizations), saw that he did 
not utilize the property                    at any stage in the construction of his proof. 
Hence, on deductive grounds he proceeded to construct the following generalization (which 
is called Generalization 5 in this section): 
 
“                         2n-gon                                      
                                                                        
                              ,              2n-gon                   .” 
 
The afore-described deductive generalization is illustrated for a hexagon as contained in 
Figure 2.2.10 
 










Moreover, through examining some specific cases like the triangle and pentagon as illustrated 
in Figure 2.2.11, De Villiers attempted to establish what happens when                .  
Consequently, on analogical grounds De Villiers produced the following generalization 
(which is called Generalization 6 in this section): 
  
“                               -gon                                      
                                                                          
 





                              ,                    -gon            









De Villiers (1996) has illustrated how the Varignon theorem can be generalized further in  
different ways, namely: deductively, analogically and inductively (also see De Villiers, 
2009). However, on the  contrary these ways of generalizing (particularly analogically and 
deductively) are not focused upon adequately in many of our pre-service mathematics teacher 
education classrooms. Further to this, research looking at how pre-service mathematics 
teachers further generalize a particular generalization or theorem across other domains seems 
to also be lacking as per my literature review. 
 
 2.3 Some research related to empirical and deductive justification (proof)  
      at school level 
In recent years, within the field of mathematics education there has been an upsurge of 
interest focused on developing reasoning, justifying and proving skills with a view to 
promoting students’ understanding of mathematics. Hence, curriculum policies like C2005 
(see Department of Education, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b), the National Curriculum for 
England and Wales (Department for Education, 1995), and the Principles and Standards for 
School Mathematics (PSSM) (see NCTM, 2000), governing the teaching and learning of 
mathematics have been reconstructed to resonate with the aforementioned foci and views. 
Consequently, curriculum materials have been developed to promote and support such an 
endeavour. For example, within the Connected Mathematics Project (CMP) curriculum there 
was a pool of rich -proof tasks developed for utilization in the middle school mathematics 
classrooms. However, when Bieda (2010) conducted a study to investigate the enactment of 
students’ justifying and proving competencies amongst middle school learners, results 
showed that the experiences of the students with the CMP tasks, which provided 
opportunities for encouraging the construction of conjectures, generalizations and proofs, 
 





were “insufficient for developing and understanding what constitutes valid mathematical 
justification” (p. 351). 
 
In particular, Bieda’s (2010) study showed that 52 of 73 proof related problems that were 
implemented as per intentions outlined in the prepared CMP curriculum texts, resulted in the 
production of 109 conjectures (generalizations) that created the opportunity to prove. 
However, 59 of 109 conjectures (generalizations) were justified by the students through the 
use of empirical or non-proof arguments whilst the remaining 50 (46%) conjectures 
(generalizations) were not justified in any particular way by the students. With regard to the 
category of generalizations which students did not support with any justifications, the 
teachers of these students responded in one of the following ways: 
a. Teachers gave no feedback to elicit a justification, 
b. Teachers sanctioned the conjecture as valid without justification, or 
c. Teachers asked other students to state whether or not they agreed with a student’s 
conjecture (Bieda, 2010, p. 365) 
 
In performing  an analysis of the types of justifications provided for the 59 conjectures, it was 
found that in 28 cases the justifications were in the form of a general argument, while in 31 
cases (roughly half) the justifications were in the form of non-proof arguments. In this 
instance, where justifications were provided, teachers did not provide feedback to 17 
justifications (10 general arguments and 7 arguments were founded solely upon confirming 
examples). However, the remaining 42 justifications received feedback from the teachers in 
one of the following forms: 
a. Sanctioning of the justification (positive appraisal); 
b. Questioning related to justification; or 
c. Requesting of feedback from other students. 
 
Despite the effort by the teachers to provide feedback to students’ justifications, the nature 
and lack of appropriate feedback did not encourage and sustain ensuing discussions 
pertaining to the validity of arguments posited by students, and thus resulted in students not 
changing their conceptions. Moreover, the findings of the research indicate that the kind of 
feedback provided by the teachers in a large number of instances was not equivalent in terms 
of its status to the kind of deductive proof that one would expect to see in a mathematics 
classroom. In particular, despite the teachers involved in this study having undergone special 





the CPM materials, it was found that “teachers were just as likely to sanction a justification 
with a positive appraisal if it was a justification based on non-proof arguments as justification 
based on general arguments” Bieda (2010, p. 317). The aforementioned finding is not 
surprising, as it has likewise been previously reported in the literature (like Chazan ,1993; 
Hoyles and Jones (1998); Koedinger 1998, etc.) that students quite often present empirically 
based justifications as their proofs and not general argument as such. For example, with 
regard to a nation-wide study in the United Kingdom focusing on justifying and proving in 
school mathematics, Healy and Hoyles (1998) as cited in (Battista, 2009, p. 103), finds that 
students who performed extremely well in mathematics (as measured by tests and exams), did 
not exhibit the desired performance in terms of proof construction and in most instances 
resorted to the use of empirical verification as a kind of justification.   
 
One plausible reason for the aforementioned state of affairs is the manner in which proofs are 
dealt with at both school and tertiary level. More often than not it is presented as a “formal 
confirmation of statements that pupils [students] are told are true” (Hoyles & Jones, 1998, p. 
121). Such an approach with virtually no room for class discussion, debate, justification and  
critique causes one to see the construction of a proof as nothing more than “a standardized 
linear deductive presentation of an argument, in which form is often perceived as more 
important that content” (Hoyles & Jones, 1998, p. 121).  This kind of selfish and stifling 
direct approach results in students experiencing conceptual difficulties as to what proof really 
is.  For example, Hoyles & Jones (1998, p. 121) reported that students tend not to see and 
understand the conceptual difference between deductive and empirical arguments, and quite 
often prefer to use an empirical argument to justify their claim or conjecture; students see 
deductive proof to be just ‘more’ evidence that authenticates the validity of a claim; students 
do not use proof as part of a problem solving activity, neither do they understand its purpose 
in most instances, and quite often just see it as an irrelevant –add on kind of exercise/activity.  
 
With regard to the latter point, Hershkowitz, Dreyfus, Ben-Zvi, Fiedlander, Hadas, Resnick, 
Tabach, & Schwarz (2002) as cited in Battista (2009, p. 103), likewise affirms that students 
in most instances do not really see and realize the purpose of proving. Furthermore, Battista 
& Clements (1995, p. 48; 2009, p. 103 ) assert that whilst mathematicians see proof as a 
meaningful method to establish the validity of an idea that results from their mathematical 
thought, students think otherwise and see it rather as a set of formal rules which have no real 






 The results of Fischbein & Kedem’s (1982) study, which looked at high school students’ 
perceptions of proof as a general argument that validates the truth of a mathematical 
statement, reveals that even after students constructed a valid proof for a mathematical 
statement or just learnt of a correct proof for a mathematical statement they were still quite 
adamant that surprises could be possible, and thus preferred to empirically test the conjecture 
further.  In so doing,  the students exhibited very little faith in the general argument 
articulated by a proof, but rather showed more faith in the generality of a posited conjecture if 
they could see that the conjecture could be empirically (via numerical calculations, 
measuring, etc.) upheld across more and more cases.  All this suggests is that the students 
have not yet realized that a proof is in fact a general argument that asserts the truth of a 
conjecture for any arbitrary, and infinitely many more, cases. 
The reliance on positive empirical examples by high school students to justify a conjecture 
pertaining to a kite-activity was also reported by Koedinger (1998, p. 327). In fact many 
students in the study were initially quite content by merely positing one example that they 
had drawn as sufficient evidence to justify their conjecture, whilst “a rare few showed any 
unprompted signs of thinking that further evidence was necessary or desirable” (Koedinger, 
1998, p. 327). However, there was a case where a student seemed to have constructed a 
proof, but this was done more in respect to the adherence of traditional classroom habits 
rather than his/her inner personal motivated desire to validate the conjecture per se. 
Moreover, students were found to be in a state of confusion when requested to provide further 
evidence to justify their conjecture, and the majority of students were specifically told to 
provide a proof “‘like you do in class’” prior to attempting to produce such a justification 
(Koedinger, 1998, p. 327). Furthermore, the study also showed that students developed false 
conjectures as a result of drawing over-specialized figures of a kite. For example, some 
students  who drew a rhombus ABCD, a special kite, and then constructed diagonals AC and 
BD intersecting at O, made the following conjecture for all kites:             
         .   
 
Koedinger’s (1998) study showed that students generally experienced a great deal of 
difficulty in setting up proofs for their formulated conjectures. Although about 10% of the 
students managed to work on their proofs, they struggled primarily because they did not 
realize that specific constructions, like the construction of diagonal BD to create triangles 
could be shown to be congruent. So most students in this category needed specific hints like: 
“‘What methods do you know for proving congruent triangles?” and ”Do you remember 





managed to conjecture and prove that the diagonals of a kite are perpendicular with virtually 
very little or no prompting. Furthermore, whilst working towards a proof of the 
aforementioned conjecture, one of the students deduced a new conjecture, which she had not 
thought of previously. Although in most mathematics classrooms, “the discovery of a 
conjecture is usually the product of induction from examples, this student’s work illustrates 
that proof can also serve as a discovery tool” (Koedinger, 1998, p.327). This finding is 
startling in the sense that our everyday mathematics educators address the production of 
conjectures in their classrooms through empirical investigations (induction) and reserve the 
use of deduction to justify the conjecture, but in this study we see that it is evidently possible 
to produce a conjecture through deduction.  
 
Arising out of concerns that students treat empirical verification as deductive proof, Chazan 
(1993) interviewed seventeen high school students (nine urban and eight suburban), who 
employed empirical evidence in their geometry classes to investigate their understanding of 
what counts as proof.  With regard to interviews pertaining to the nine urban students, the 
study showed that two students were of the view that by doing actual measurements across a 
set of examples and obtaining the desired regularity is enough to justify the validity of a 
conjecture for all cases,  i.e., “measuring  ‘proves’ for all members of a set with an infinite 
number of elements”; five did not hold the aforementioned view that the provision of 
“measuring examples” is a  ‘proof’ in itself; one student was rather unclear, whilst another 
student seemed to have changed her view during the course of the interview to support the 
notion that empirical examples is not  ‘proof’” (Chazan 1993, p. 369). Regarding the 
interviews with the remaining eight suburban students, three students endorsed the notion that 
“measuring examples is a  ‘proof’ for all members of a set with an infinite number of 
elements,” with one of the three students expressing reservations as to whether the 
aforementioned kind of proof could rule out the possibility of finding a counter-example;  
three students initially disagreed with the view, but vacillated during the interview to finally 
endorse it; and two of the students explicitly did not support the view.    
 
In Chazan’s (1993) study, those that supported the notion that the provision of empirical 
examples exhibiting a desired regularity is ‘proof’ in itself, i.e. “that evidence is proof” (p. 
369), focused on either the number of examples or the type of examples. For example, with 
regard to the latter focus, which pertained to the proposition related to triangles, one of the 






“If I did it on a bunch of triangles, like different kinds of triangles, and then if I would 
find it to be all true then I’d just accept it….If you keep doing this like maybe ten 
more times and it just keeps on doing that, I’d just say it just would have to be that 
way” (Chazan, 1993, p. 369).  
 
Furthermore, whilst there were students who believed that evidence (empirical) is proof,  the 
study also found that there were some students who believed that “proof is just a kind of 
evidence” (Chazan, 1993, p. 371). The latter position held by some students can be ascribed 
to any of the following reasons  (Chazan, 1993, p.372) : 
1. Deductive proof provides no safety from counter-examples.  
2. Deductive proofs are about single diagrams. 
3. Deductive proofs are based on assumptions. 
  
Notwithstanding what has been said, Battista (2009, p. 104) asserts that Chazan’s findings 
could be attributed to either students not being fully conversant with the logic of proof or 
their prior experiences with incorrect proofs. Battista (2009, p. 104) also asserts that students 
might become “skeptical about the generality of a deductive proof … when the proof does 
not really lend insight into why a proposition is true,” and says “in such instances, a 
mathematically and reasonable response is to explore the proof further by examples, perhaps 
reviewing the proof for some of those examples, even developing alternative proofs.” Hence, 
the skepticism articulated by students about the generality of a proof should not always be 
seen from a negative perspective or be taken to imply the poor understanding of the nature of 
proof by students. But this should be interpreted in terms of the context in which it arises. 
 
Healy & Hoyles’s (1998) research project, Justifying and Proving in Mathematics, started in 
1995 and focused on the National Curriculum for Mathematics, which was used in England 
and Wales. The curriculum was designed to first provide the general body students with 
opportunities to investigate, make conjectures, test, refine and justify their conjectures via  
empirical examples (reasoning or arguments), whilst the formal proofs were reserved for later 
stages to be attempted  by high flying students only. Focusing on high performing students, 
the main aim of the project was to examine the impact of the aforementioned curriculum 
design on their views and competencies with regard to mathematical proof. Through the use 
of a questionnaire the researchers ascertained the competence of students in constructing 
proofs, as well as their views in regard to some aspects such as: generality of valid proofs, 





even the high flying students performed poorly on the questions that required the construction 
of a proof. In fact a large number of them did not have the necessary idea of how to begin a 
proof, whilst those who made an attempt could not relate their assertions via a logical 
argument. Moreover, Healy and Hoyles (1998, p. 2) finds that:  
 
“empirical verification was the most popular form of argumentation used by the  
students in their attempts to construct proofs, and in problems where empirical 
examples were not easily generated, the majority of students were unable to engage in 
the process of proving.” 
 
Although most students made use of empirical arguments to justify conjectures, they were 
quite aware that their justification would not earn the highest marks from the teachers. This 
suggests that students were somewhat aware that empirical justification was not adequate in 
itself to establish the general validity of a conjecture, but were rather handicapped in doing 
otherwise simply because they did not how to do otherwise (i.e. they did not have the 
necessary know-how to construct a deductive argument or justification). Although students 
experienced difficulties in evaluating arguments that appeared in the questionnaire, the 
majority of students tended to show appreciation for the generality that a valid proof carries 
with it. In other words, students seemed to be aware that “once a statement had been proved, 
no further work was necessary to check if it applied to a particular subset of cases within its 
domain of validity” Healy & Hoyles (1998, p. 3). Furthermore, whilst  students were better at 
identifying a correct proof (valid mathematical argument) for a particular conjecture from a 
set of given proofs as compared to constructing a valid proof on their own, the study found 
that such a choice was not just limited to the correctness of the proof, but was indeed 
influenced by the extent to which the argument implied generality, clarified and explained the 
mathematics under the spotlight, as well as whether the mathematical argument was written 
in a formal way or not. 
 
Further to this, Healy & Hoyles (1998) finds the kind of performance exhibited by students is 
shaped by the kind of conceptions of proof they held. For example, empirical arguments were 
posited by over one quarter of the sample of 2459 students who had “little or no sense of 
proof” (p. 4); those  (over half of the sample of 2459 students) who appeared to have a firm 
understanding of the kind of generality that a proof carried with it, were much better in 





sample) who were of the view that a proof should be explanatory, preferred to present their 
argument in narrative form instead of the formal proof form. 
 
Pertaining to counter-examples, Galbraith’s (1981) study found that many secondary students 
did not seem to have a firm understanding of the role of counter-examples for two reasons. 
Firstly, the “mechanism of refuting was not understood,” (p. 17)  meaning that a considerable 
number of students (55 out of 153) did not realize that an example could be counted as a 
counter-example only when it satisfies the premises (conditions) of the conjecture, but  
violates the conclusion of the conjecture. Secondly, “the philosophy of disproof by counter-
examples was not appreciated,” (p. 17) in other words some students (13 out of 73) did not 
realize that it takes just one and only one counter-example to refute a conjecture. Here are 
some typical responses that were cited in Galbraith (1981, p. 17): 
 
“Bill (14 years): “One example is not enough to disprove it.” 
Jill (13 Years): “ Need about 11.” 
Michelle (15 years): “One example is enough but the more you get the more you are  
disproving.”” 
 
Upon reflecting on the  kinds of responses about counter-examples discussed earlier, it 
appears the students do not seem to have a good understanding of the purpose of proof, and in 
particular they do not seem to know that  when a valid proof is constructed to justify a 
conjecture it indeed  justifies a conjecture for a related arbitrary case. Consequently, they find 
it hard to accept that it takes just one counter-example to reject a conjecture or mathematical 
proposition.  
 
In summary, many students at school seem to prefer empirical arguments over deductive 
arguments and see an empirical argument as a valid proof.  There are also pockets of students 
who do not seem to comprehend the generality that a valid proof articulates, and hence they 
either continue to  empirically test posited claims after a valid proof has been constructed (or 
presented) to justify its existence, or look for more than one counter-example to reject a 
conjecture (or the conjecture proof). Moreover, it seems that the development of a conjecture 
is confined mostly to induction via relevant investigative activities, but virtually no 






2.4 Some Research Related to Justifications at Pre-service teacher  
       Education level and beyond 
As pre-service teachers, practicing teachers, and students at both college and other tertiary 
institutions may have certain misconceptions in geometry (see section 3.1), they may also 
hold and exhibit misconceptions associated with justifications. I wish to discuss  some of 
these misconceptions in this section. For example, Schoenfeld (1986, p. 243) engaged in a 
study that focused on the development of conjectures by college students within a context 
characterized by compass and straight edge constructions, and found that most of the students 
were naïve empiricists, whose approach was limited to an “empirical guess-and-test loop”.  
With reference to the latter point, Schoenfeld (1986) found that students would go ahead to 
construct a figure as per the details of their conjecture, and then accept their conjecture as a 
statement that is generally true if their resultant construction looked sufficiently correct, with 
no effort to seek for a deductive justification. This move by the students of accepting their 
conjecture as valid based wholly on the belief their construction “looks” accurate implies that 
they resorted to accepting the visual appearance of their constructed figure(s) (or drawing(s)) 
as a form of justification that guarantees the eternal truth of their conjecture, which indeed is 
a misconception. For example, if a figure looked like a square, then the students would 
immediately conclude that it was a square without offering a justification in the form of a 
deductive proof. According to Schoenfeld (1986, p. 243), this misconception resulted in 
students, who were involved in the study, to either reject or correct solutions to posited 
problems simply because their resultant construction(s) (or figure(s)) were not sufficiently 
correct, or accept incorrect solutions to posited problems because their constructions looked 
reasonably good.  
 
In the very same study (Schoenfeld, 1986), students first constructed a proof that offered an 
answer to a given problem. However, when requested to do the actual construction problem, 
a large number of students simply ignored the results (properties) that they derived initially 
via their proof, and hence landed up making conjectures that contradicted what they had 
initially proved already. According to Schoenfeld (1986, p. 243), “in some cases this was the 
result of impetuous behavior, since there is a strong (and incorrect) perceptual bias toward a 
particular hypothetical solution to the construction problem,” and in other instances “students 
simply did not see any connection between the deductive mathematics of theorem proving 
and the inductive mathematics of doing constructions.” Furthermore, Schoenfeld (1986, p. 





correctness of a specific construction procedure, namely “the procedure for a construction is 
correct if it produces an accurate figure.”  It seems that the given students relied too much on 
‘visual’ representations to validate specific conjectures, with the result that they said that a 
particular conjecture was false if their resultant construction or presented pictorial picture  did 
not look right.  
 
Knuth (2002) examined the conceptions of  proof that was held by a group of 16 in-service 
secondary school teachers who were either at van Hiele level 3 (ordering) or beyond. At van 
Hiele level 3, an individual is expected to have the necessary skills, knowledge and insight to 
classify and inter-relate figures according to their properties, and also order the properties of 
geometric figures logically via short chains of deductions. In contrast, at van Hiele level 4, 
individuals begin to construct longer sequence of statements, and start to develop 
understanding of the concept deduction as well as the roles of axioms, theorems, and proof. 
(see de Villiers, 1999 & 2003a; Gutierrez & Jaime, 1998; compare Senk, 1985 & 1989). 
Although most teachers in this study did not see the role of proof in mathematics as being 
that of explanation (i.e. proof promotes understanding and provides insight as to why a 
particular result is true), all the teachers did see proof as a means of verification as per their 
suggestions that a primary role of proof is to establish the truth of a mathematical statement. 
However, in doing so, 11 teachers suggested that the truth of a statement is established 
through the provision of a logical or deductive argument, whilst the remaining five teachers 
suggested that the truth of statement is established through the provision of a convincing 
argument. The following two responses represent the suggestions of the first group of eleven 
teachers: 
 “I think it means to show logically that a certain statement or certain 
conjecture is true using theorems, logic, and going step by step; 
  I see it as a logical argument that proves the conclusion. You are given a 
statement, and the logical argument has this statement as its conclusion” 
(Knuth, 2002, p. 386). 
 
According to Knuth (2002), all the in-service teachers held the view that proof enables one to 
establish the truth of a mathematical statement or conclusion, but several of them 
demonstrated that they did not have the necessary understanding of the generality that is 
expressed by a proven statement.  For example, in-service teachers were provided with the 




















After reading the proof, the in-service teachers acknowledged that the proof made sense to 
them and that they understood the proof. However, when asked whether there could be a 
counter-example that could refute the proof argument, some teachers drew some additional 
triangles before actually responding that there was no such counter-example. However, this 
kind of empirical view exhibited by the teachers resonates with the practice of professional 
mathematicians, as they often also do empirical checks after constructing a proof to check if 
they have not perhaps made a silly mistake in their proof or to check whether the proof is 
valid for all cases. In other words certainty for mathematicians is not gained exclusively by 
means of proof, but often by a combination of deductive proof and some empirical evidence. 
 
Further to this, when one teacher was questioned as to why she drew additional triangles,  she 
explained as follows: “Because proof by exhaustion. There are millions of triangles that exist, 
and I’ve only looked at three” (Knuth, 2002, p. 387). Even, when the facilitator drew an 
extremely obtuse triangle with a short base, and questioned the teachers as to whether the 
aforementioned conclusion as per proof in Figure 2.4.1, would hold for such  an atypical 
triangle, five teachers first embarked on drawing sketches containing the given conditions 
before responding that the stated conclusion will continue to hold. A further four teachers, 
unconfidently (diffidently) responded that the conclusion could be true. Their responses 
suggested that they were not easily convinced of the truth  of a conclusion by just seeing a 
written coherent deductive argument, but that they rather preferred to first test a conjecture 
via empirical examples before making any assertion as to whether a written coherent 
 





deductive argument warrants the truth of a conclusion (or conjecture) or not. The latter 
preference tallies with similar findings expressed by Fischbein & Kedem (1982) as well as 
Healy & Hoyles (1998 & 2000) in their respective studies. 
 
In principle, the empirical moves exhibited by the teachers do not resonate with the absolutist 
perspective that only proof gives conviction in mathematics, but instead supports the need for 
empirical checks even after a proof is constructed. Hence, as facilitators in our mathematics 
classrooms, we need to be aware of such moves by our mathematics students and be more 
empathetic towards such empirical responses. Further to this, De Villiers (2004) argues that: 
 
“From a Lakatosian viewpoint, therefore, it is useful, by means of quasi-empirical 
exploration, to test not only unproved conjectures but also results already proven 
deductively. Such testing ought also to be encouraged, rather than suppressed, among 
our students, as it may give new perspectives for further research or contribute to the 
refinement and/or reformulation of earlier proofs, definitions, and concepts. The 
Lakatosian view, therefore, contrasts strongly with a traditional, rationalist view like 
that of Fischbein (1982) that a ‘formal proof offers an absolute guarantee to a 
mathematical statement. Even a single practical check is superfluous’ (p. 17)” (p. 
407). 
 
Furthermore, most of the in-service teachers in Knuth’s (2002) study did not provide any 
evidence that suggested that they were conversant with the explanatory function of proof as 
espoused by many mathematics and mathematics educators alike, for example De Villiers 
(1991), Hanna (1990) and Hersh (1993). In particular, their focus on proof was more 
procedural in nature in that they were more interested in understanding how to proceed from 
the given premise to the conclusion of a proof rather than really gaining the necessary insight 
and understanding of the underlying mathematical relationships that a proof brought to the 
fore. This kind of view could be attributed to the nature of the in-service teachers’ experience 
with proof during their earlier secondary school, college or undergraduate years of study, 
wherein the focus was primarily on the employment of some deductive mechanism to 
produce a final product called proof (see Chazan, 1993; Harel & Sowder, 1998). Schoenfeld 
(1994, p. 75) asserts that through practices  such as the one just mentioned, we find that 
“proof has no personal meaning or explanatory power for students.” No doubt, if we expect 
teachers and prospective teachers to experience proof and its explanatory power, they have to 





mathematical relationships embedded in a proof which also shows why a particular theorem 
(or result) is indeed true. 
 
In light of this kind of inquiry, Knuth (2002) presented the in-service teachers with five 
mathematical statements, wherein each statement contained justifications that ranged from 
proof to non-proof arguments. In all there were eight non –proof like arguments and 13 proof 
arguments, and the arguments were constructed via varied approaches (e.g. algebraic; proof 
by induction) and some arguments were more explanatory than others. Although the results 
showed that the given ‘proof arguments’ were recognized as deductive proofs by nearly all 
in-service teachers, many of them rated empirically based demonstrations also as deductive 
proofs. For example, the empirical based argument in Figure 2.4.2, was classified as a 













In addition, Knuth’s (2002) study shows that the in-service teachers were more convinced by 
the form in which the argument was presented rather than the substance it contained. In much 
the same way, Weber (2001) also finds that college students hold the view that a proof is 
valid so long as it is written in the traditional two-column format. Weber’s (2001) study also 
shows that many undergraduate students use irrelevant inferences in their failed proof 
attempts, and that their attempts to develop a proof are frequently characterized by the 
writing down of a number of rules with the hope that one of them would probably provide a 
lead or path to the desired proof. 
 
Martin and Harel (1989) in their study investigated the views of proof held by a group of first 
year pre-service teachers that were doing a sophomore level course in mathematics. The pre-
Figure 2.4.2: Empirical demonstration – Sum of the angles of a triangle is  
                     180
o







service teachers were given a task that entailed generalizations that were familiar and 
unfamiliar, which were accompanied by inductive examples and patterns as well as proofs of 
the following forms: false, particular, general, and the pre-service teachers had to judge the 
mathematical correctness of the posited inductive and deductive justifications.  The two set 
sets of generalizations that the pre-service teachers had to work with are as follows: 
 
 “Familiar generalization: If the sum of the digits of a whole number is divisible by 
3, then the number is divisible by 3” 
 “Unfamiliar generalization: If a divides b, and b divides c, then a divides c” (Martin 
& Harel, 1989, p. 43). 
 
Results of the study showed that the particular inductive argument was accepted as a valid 
mathematical proof by more than half of the participating pre-service teachers, a deductive 
argument was accepted as valid mathematical proof by over 60% of the pre-service teachers, 
and just over a third of them simultaneously accepted a posited inductive argument and a 
correct deductive argument as being mathematically valid. Furthermore, an incorrect 
deductive argument for the familiar generalization was accepted by 38 % of the pre-service 
teachers as being mathematically correct, and 58% of them accepted an incorrect deductive 
argument for the unfamiliar generalization as being mathematically correct. 
 
On reflecting on the pre-service teachers’ acceptance of inductive and deductive arguments as 
mathematical proofs, Martin & Harel (1989, p. 49) draws the following conclusion: “the 
inductive frame, which is constructed at an earlier stage than the deductive frame, is not 
deleted from memory when students acquire the deductive frame.”  In particular, Martin & 
Harel (1989) asserts that a person’s natural everyday experience of utilizing empirical 
evidence (or examples) to support the construction of a hypothesis or accept/ refute a posited 
hypothesis (or conjecture), reinforces a person’s inductive frame of thinking. This natural 
reinforcement of the inductive frame of thinking through one’s daily experiences, plausibly 
explains why inductive and deductive frames of thinking existed simultaneously in many of 
the pre-service teachers (Martin & Harel, 1989, p. 49). Furthermore, the prevalence of the 
simultaneous existence of both frames of thinking in many students, “suggests that the 
activation of both the inductive and the deductive proof frames may be required for students 
to believe a particular conclusion” (Martin & Harel, 1989, p. 49). The latter point 
corroborates to some extent with Fischbein & Kedem’s (1982) finding, wherein they noted 





by deductive proof. As discussed earlier, this is not uncommon even for professional 
mathematicians. Further to this Lakatos (1976) makes the same point, namely counter-
examples to false or poorly formulated  conjectures and proofs can only be found be quasi-
empirical checking; so perhaps one should not be too harsh in judging these students. 
 
Further to the point under focus, Martin & Harel (1989) finds that a false proof argument was 
not rejected by many of pre-service teachers who accepted a general proof argument. The 
authors postulate that the students belonging to this category seem to “rely on a syntactic-
level deductive frame in which the verification of a statement is evaluated according to 
ritualistic, surface features” (Martin & Harel, 1989, p. 49). In other words, the students tend 
to look at the mere appearance of the argument and not the correctness of the argument, when 
deciding to accept or refute a posited deductive kind of argument. However, Martin & Harel 
(1989, p. 49) finds that there were a small number students who made their judgment about 
the correctness (or incorrectness) of a posited deductive argument “according to causality and 
purpose of argument,” and hence claims that these students possessed a “conceptual-level 
deductive frame.”  
 
Furthermore, Martin & Harel (1989) finds that high levels of acceptance of a particular proof  
argument were demonstrated by those students who accepted a general proof argument, and 
attempted to explain the aforementioned result in the following ways. Firstly, the authors 
suggested that the “students may be interpreting a particular proof as an inductive argument, 
in which case it is seen as an instantiation of the inductive argument frame.” However, the 
authors realized that this is quite unlikely primarily because high levels of acceptance of a 
particular proof also prevailed amongst students who rated inductive arguments low. 
Secondly, the authors postulated that “a particular proof may be viewed as an instantiation of 
the deductive processes used in the general proof” Martin & Harel’s (1989, p. 50). In 
corroboration with Vinner’s (1983) finding (as cited in Martin and Harel, 1989, p. 50),  which 
noted that students in his study “preferred using a particularization of the deductive processes 
used to prove the statement rather than the general result.” Martin and Harel (1989, p.50), 
suggests that the conceptual-level  deductive frame is comprised of  two sub-frames, namely: 
generalized-results and generalized deductive processes. Figure 2.4.3, represents the model of 


















2.5 Conjecturing, Generalizing and Justifying within a Dynamic Geometry 
      Context 
 
2.5.1 The Geometer’s Sketchpad: What it is and what can you do with it 
The development and introduction of dynamic geometry software (DGS) such as The 
Geometer’s Sketchpad (GSP), Cabri, Cinderella, into the fields of Mathematics and 
Mathematics Education has created a classroom atmosphere wherein students’ learning can 
go well beyond standard traditional mathematics content and practices. For example in 
geometry, there are now more opportunities than before for students to construct figures (or 
engage with readymade figures), explore, make and test conjectures, justify and refute their 
generalizations, pose and solve significant problems, and devise original proofs (Battista & 
Clements, 1995; Jackiw, 1995; Scher, 2002; Schwartz & Yerushalmy, 1986). In addition, the 
advent of DGS, has sparked the development of research in new fields, for example chaos 
theory and fractal geometry, and rejuvenated existing areas of research (De Villiers, 2007c). 
However, De Villiers (2007c) also cautions that there are some pitfalls associated with DGS, 
like “painless learning”, “visualization makes easier” and “dynamic experimentation as 
sufficient verification”. 
 
Since GSP is the software that the participants in this study used during their one-to-one task-
based activities, the ensuing discussions relate mainly to this software. GSP affords students 
opportunities to engage with already constructed dynamic figures or to actually construct 
dynamic figures on their own (with guidance if necessary) in terms of given mathematical 
relationships (or properties) using the relevant construction tools such as line segment, point, 
circle. The aforementioned GSP constructions (figures) can “always be dragged, squeezed, 
 





stretched or otherwise changed while keeping all mathematical properties interact” (Jackiw, 
1991, p. 2).  For example, Figure 2.5.1, called a sketch, contains a cyclic quadrilateral ABCD, 









   
 
 
The ‘drag’ mode makes it possible for students to experiment with the afore-constructed 
cyclic quadrilateral (which is called a mathematical object) such that the relationship amongst 
points (A, B, C, D), line segments (AB, BC, CD, and DB) and circle ABCD with centre O, 
which has been defined by the construction itself, is preserved at all times either when the 
figure is manipulated or when one of the basic components of the construction is dragged  
(see Hoyles & Noss, 1994, p. 716).   
 
For example, if point B is dragged in any direction, one would always obtain quadrilateral 
         such that points             are concyclic  (i.e.          will still remain a cyclic 
quadrilateral). According to Driscoll, Egan, DiMatteo & Nikula (2009, p. 162), “an invariant 
is something about a situation that stays the same, even as parts of the situation vary”. We 
may hence regard the vertices of quadrilateral ABCD being always concyclic points, as an 
invariant property of figure ABCD. 
 
In the main one can distinguish between random dragging (i.e. wandering dragging)  and 
directed dragging. Random dragging (wandering dragging)  is done without any particular 
goal in mind or intent about what is being looked for and directed draging occurs when a 
student has an intention to move something or create some alternative experience (compare 
Sinclair, de Bruyn, Hanna & Harrison, 2004). Generally when students engage in random 
dragging, their opportunites to discover are compromised and often they become distracted 
from lesson activites and do not achieve the intended outcomes of the task/lesson (compare 
 





Grayson, 2008). However, often students will do random dragging, then pause to think, and 
then do directed dragging when doing investigative activities using GSP. 
 
 In general, when a dynamic Sketchpad figure is dragged, the relationships defined by the 
construction will always be maintained, but the properties that are not defined by the 
construction could change or vary. So, in effect by manipulating a figure, for example 
through the ‘drag’ mode, one could explore a range of possible figures which are governed by 
the set of construction constraints. According to Jackiw (1991, p. 2), this feature of GSP, 
“makes it easy to distinguish between those properties that are sometimes true, and those that 
are always true for a given situation.” In addition, GSP makes provision for students to record 
the instructional steps for their geometric constructions as scripts, thus making it possible for 
students to just play back a script in order to either construct or re-construct the desired figure 
in a sketch. The latest version of GSP (version 5) uses scripts in the form of a ‘Create Tool’ 
button.  Being able to re-play a script provides students with the added opportunity of being 
able to re-trace the process (or the path that was followed) in the construction of a particular 
dynamic figure. In a research article, Giamati (1995, p. 456) explains: “The most useful 
aspect of scripting one’s constructions is that students can test whether their constructions 
work in general or whether they have discovered a special case.” 
 
In particular the ‘drag’ effect, made possible by the tools embedded in GSP, can create 
opportunities for one to see many empirical examples quickly and thereby construct plausible 
inductive generalizations (conjectures). By dragging, students can alter the size and 
orientation of constructions and notice that a specific conjecture they produced always 
remains true, and hence become quite convinced in the truth of their conjecture such that it 
may result in them wanting to know why their conjecture is always true (see Mudaly, 2002). 
Quite often students in such circumstances feel no need for deductive justification as reported 
by Marioti (2001). A downside to the ‘drag’ effect is that students operating under an 
empirical proof scheme (Sowder & Harel, 1998), may mistakenly take the array of supporting 
empirical examples produced through ‘dragging’ as a means of proving  (in the deductive 
sense) (see Izen, 1998, p. 719). With regard to the latter, De Villiers (1998), reports that in 
such instances he managed to encourage a deductive explanation by explicitly asking the 
students to determine why their results, which they have obtained through the use of 






The GSP, regarded by many as a dynamic chalkboard, is a powerful tool for visualization. 
For example, Whiteley (2000, p. 2) writes: 
 
“The programs (Cabri and Sketchpad) expand the role of precise visual and 
diagrammatic reasoning in all stages of our work: posing questions, making 
conjectures, creating counter-examples, seeking and recognising connections.  The 
change is dramatic and we leave a session with the program more refined information, 
connections and images. These refined images then run our heads as we work with 
problems and the solutions, both mentally and with words and pictures on paper, 
guided by these dynamic visual processes. These diagrams become part of our 
internal vocabulary and our ongoing mental processes. We also see unexpected 
events: an extra coincidence of lines or points in the construction; a transformation; or 
a mental association with some pattern in some previous geometric study.” 
 
Furthermore, Scher’s (2002) study has shown that: “the mathematical insights that students 
derived from dynamic geometry software were not always those intended by the 
interviewers” (p. 60). In other words through using dynamic geometry software, students 
were able to make constructions that would not have been realizable in a paper, pencil and 
straight edge context, and hence managed to assimilate mathematical discoveries that were 
not within the expectation range of results the facilitator expected. This kind of enactment 
demonstrates that  GSP, when used diligently can push the boundaries of knowledge 
production to an extent that new results can surprisingly be discovered with a concomitant 
need to logically explain why such discoveries  are always true.  
 
2.5.2 Research related to conjecturing, generalizing and justifying in a GSP context 
Being able to construct dynamic figures or use ready-made sketches, which could be 
manipulated, particularly through dragging, has made the processes of generalizing, 
conjecturing, and justifying much more accessible to both students and teachers across 
mathematics classrooms at both school and tertiary levels. In light of this, I wish to focus on 
some research pertaining to the learning and/or teaching of geometry within a Sketchpad 
context in this section. 
 
In a study involving university students, Giamati (1995), who viewed GSP as an exploratory 
tool that enabled students to investigate and hence uncover invariants, formulate conjectures, 





centers, set the following question, which was suitable for exploration within a Sketchpad 
environment: 
“If            
 
      , how can we locate   and find  , where   is the center of 
rotation and   is the angle of rotation?” 
 
To facilitate the exploration, students were given several ready- made sketches of triangles 
and their images under rotation about a point D. The students, henceforth discovered that they 
needed to construct the following line segments     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ , and    ̅̅̅̅̅ , and did so accordingly. 
Some students proceeded further to construct the perpendicular bisectors of the 
aforementioned segments, with points E, F and G being their respective midpoints. In most 
instances students got into the habit of recording all their constructions as scripts of a rotation 
of a triangle about a given point, and this enabled students to quickly observe that the 
bisectors appeared to be concurrent at a point. Figure 2.5.2.1 illustrates a successful 
conjecture that students made, namely: “D is the centre of rotation for mapping       onto  














Giamati (1995) used the GSP environment from a facilitator perspective to support the 
students to develop a proof that justified the aforementioned conjecture. In the final analysis, 
students constructed a deductive proof that justified the existence of the following theorem: 
“If the two triangles are congruent and            
 
      , then the perpendicular 
bisectors of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, and    ̅̅̅̅̅ are concurrent at point D.”  Immediately after the construction 
of the aforementioned proof, Giamati (1995, p. 457) stretched the students’ thinking by 
 
Figure 2.5.2.1: An illustration of a successful conjecture: D is the centre of rotation for 





posing the following question: “Is this an if- and- only-if theorem?” In principle, to be 
considered as an if- and- only-if theorem, students were aware that they needed to show via 
deductive proof that its converse is also true. In the process of attempting to construct a 
deductive argument, students engaged in lots of explorations and required several hints. The 
explorations and hints, resulted in students being able to construct a counter-example that 
showed that the converse of theorem was not true, and thereby helped conclude that the 
proven theorem was indeed not of the if-and-only-if type (or their initial conjecture as per 
Figure 2.5.2.1, was not bi-conditional). 
 
With regard to the aforementioned task being foregrounded in a Sketchpad environment, 
Giamati (1995, p. 458) maintains it was an invaluable experience for the students, and 
accordingly comments: 
 
“The students gained a deeper understanding of the problem by using their scripts to 
explore it and make conjectures than they would have if the results had merely been 
explained to them. Naturally, the exploration did not replace the proof, but it became 
a solid foundation on which to build the proof. The students were able to construct 
various examples quickly enough to recognize that certain conjectures were 
unreasonable…. In this example, the students found it satisfying to see the proof of 
their conjecture…. The power of the Geometer’s Sketchpad combined with the power 
of proof gave a complete illustration of the theorem and the aspects of ‘doing’ 
Mathematics.”  
 
In a paradigm similar to that of Giamati (1995), Izen (1998) asserts that software such as GSP 
makes the construction of both simple and complex figures much easier for students as 
compared to pencil and paper; allows  students to measure distances between points, lengths 
of segments, angles, gradients (slopes), perimeters, areas; and makes it possible for students 
to set up formulas that could support their conjectures. In particular, Izen (1998, p. 718), re-
affirms that the move of selecting a vertex of a figure and dragging it, is equivalent to the 
actual construction of many figures satisfying the same given information in a conjecture. 
These series of constructed figures thus make it possible for students to see that their 
established conjecture continues to be true. Hence, in this sense Izen (1998) holds the view 
that inductive reasoning can be utilized to “demonstrate the likelihood that a theorem is true,” 
and that both the process of inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning can be used to 





insight into a given theorem.  Furthermore, Izen (1998) firmly asserts though working in a 
DGS environment can enable one to generate compelling empirical evidence to justify the 
truth of a theorem, it  is certainly not a mathematical proof.  
 
Izen (1998) believes that his approach to the teaching and learning of geometry embraces the 
involvement of his students in dynamic geometry tasks that encourage them to discover 
geometric relationships; to establish the extent of the validity of their conjecture through 
experimentation; to construct the conclusions as theorems before getting the students to 
construct a justification via deductive proof  for the stated theorem or established conjecture. 
For example, in retrospect, the construction of the following theorem, “The angle bisector of 
an angle of a triangle divides the opposite sides into two segments that are proportional to the 
other two sides” (Izen, 1998, p. 719), the activity as depicted in Figure 2.5.2.2, which had to 
be done using Sketchpad, was initially given by Izen to his students.  
 
As a result of the explorations conducted in accordance with guiding instructions and 
questions described in Figure 2.5.2.2, Izen (1998, p. 719) reports that his students discovered 
and confirmed with a high levels of belief the following result: “If the measure of an angle of 
a triangle is bisected then the bisector divides the opposite sides into two segments in the 
same ratio to the lengths of the other two sides of the triangle.” Before asking his students to 
prove the associated theorem, Izen gave his students exercises that involved the application of 












After completing the aforementioned exercises, the students who were working in a 
Sketchpad context but provided with relevant support and guidance from the facilitator, 
managed to successfully construct a deductive proof that explained why the theorem is true. 
 






The move of a student being able to explain why the given theorem (or any other theorem) is 
true, inculcates a sense of ownership of the developed proof in the student,  and “prevents the 
student from feeling that the teacher is force-feeding information that makes no sense” Izen 
(1998, p. 719). 
 
In a study that also bears some commonalities with Giamati’s (1995) and Izen’s (1998) 
studies in respect of the didactical approaches employed to conjecturing and proof, Mudaly 
(1998) conducted an experiment with the purpose of determining “learners’ need for 
conviction and explanation within the context of dynamic geometry, and whether proof could 
be introduced to novices as a means of explanation” (Mudaly, 2000, p. 22). In particular a 
scaffolded worksheet selected from De Villiers’s (1999) curriculum material, was used as a 
tool to facilitate the one-to one task- based interview that Mudaly (1998) conducted with a 
group of 17 grade nine  learners.  Although this group of learners was selected randomly, 
they had prior experience in using computers but not with GSP, and were not yet introduced 
to proof in geometry.  The design of the material, which embraced a scaffolding approach, 
afforded learners the necessary opportunities to explore, make observations, conjecture (or 
discover) a plausible solution to a Viviani (see Contreras & Martinez Cruz, 2009, p. 246) 
linked  problem, test and refine the conjectures, and ultimately explain why their  discovered 
plausible solution is always true. 
 
Mudaly’s (1998, p. 54) research attempted to answer the following core of research 
questions: 
 Are learners convinced about the truth of the discovered geometric conjecture and 
what is their level of conviction? Do they require further conviction? 
 Do they exhibit a desire for an explanation for why the result is true? 
 Can they construct a logical explanation for themselves with guidance? 
 Do they find the guided logical explanation meaningful? 
 
The problem, stated in the form of a Viviani problem and given to the learners to solve within 
a dynamic geometric context, was structured as follows: 
 
“Sarah, a shipwreck survivor manages to swim to a desert island. As it happens, the 
island closely approximates the shape of an equilateral triangle. She soon discovers 
that the surfing is outstanding on all three of the island’s coasts and crafts a surfboard 





total sum of the distances from the house to all three beaches is a minimum? (She 
visits them  with equal frequency)” (see De Villiers, 2003, p. 23) 
 
To kick-start the inductive processes of exploration and conjecture, a ready-made dynamic 
sketch (see Figure 2.5.3) of an equilateral triangle containing the elements described in the 












With the Geometer’s Sketchpad software, learners were able to drag point P to various 
positions within the confines of the equilateral triangle, and observe that the lengths of the 
segments PH, PI and PF continuously changed, but the sum of the lengths PH, PI and PF 
always remained constant. Within a few minutes after exploring the problem using the tools 
embedded in GSP, most of the students became highly convinced but surprised that Sarah 
could build her house at any point inside the described island.  
 
Learners tested their conjecture via computer exploration, and thereby became more and 
more convinced in their conjecture, as indicated by their final levels of convictions projected 
below (see Mudaly & De Villiers, 2000, p. 25):  
 14 (82,3%) were 100% convinced 
 2 (11,8%) were 98%  to 99% convinced 
 1(5,9%) were 55 % convinced 
 
Despite the learners having achieved such high levels of conviction, the majority of the 
learners expressed a desire for an explanation as to why their conjecture is always true, 
independent from their need for conviction. The latter finding corroborated with De Villiers’s 
(1991a, p. 258) finding pertaining to a non-dynamic geometry context: “Learners who have 
 
Figure 2.5.3: Dynamic Sketch of Shipwreck problem (compare Mudaly, 1998,  






convinced themselves by quasi-empirical testing still exhibit a need for explanation, which 
seems to be satisfied by some sort of informal or logico-deductive argument” (as cited in 
Mudaly & De Villiers 2000, p. 26). In relation to the element of surprise expressed by the 
learners in the conjectured result, Mudaly & De Villiers (2000, p. 26) citing Hadas & 
Hershkowitz (1998, p. 26) makes the following assertion:“It seems that the learners’ need for 
an explanation arose out of finding the result surprising, with the surprise causing the 
cognitive need to understand why it was true.” 
 
Despite the learners seeking an explanation eagerly, none of the learners were able to 
construct an explanation on their own when asked to do so. Thus some guidance via a 
scaffolded set of questions was provided to the learners, and this enabled them to build up 
their own logical explanations with a reasonable degree of ownership and appreciation. 
Therefore, it was in this sense that the learners’ desire for an explanation was utilized as an 
opportunity to introduce the learners to proof as means of explanation rather than just 
verification. Despite all the learners positively acknowledging that their constructed argument 
satisfied their needs for explanation (or curiousity), Mudaly & De Villiers (2000, p. 28) 
expresses some reservations of the learners’ positive responses based on the possibility that 
“they might have only responded positively to please the teacher.” However, through 
reflecting on the learners’ body language, facial expressions and tone of voice when 
presenting their positive responses, Mudaly & De Villiers (2000, p. 28) concludes that a 
majority of the learners seemed to have found the logical explanation satisfying. 
 
In summary, this Chapter focussed on the kinds of reasoning in mathematics, the concept of 
generalization, some research done in the context of generalizaing and justifying at both 
school and tertiarty levels, as well as conjecturing, generalizing and justifying within a 
geometric context. 
 










Chapter 3: Misconceptions and counter examples 
 
3.0 Introduction 
At times students have difficulty with particular aspects of mathematics because of 
misconceptions  they possess in areas linked to the topic under consideration. Section 3.1, 
provides a discussion as to how misconceptions develop in students and the consequences of 
such misconceptions on new learning. Further to this, counter examples are discussed from 
both a heuristic and global perspective in Section 3.2.  
 
3.1 Misconceptions 
“Misconceptions are usually an outgrowth of an already acquired system of concepts and 
beliefs wrongly applied to an extended domain. They should not be treated as terrible 
things to be uprooted since this may confuse the learner and shake his confidence in his 
previous knowledge. Instead, the new knowledge should be connected to the student’s 
previous conceptual framework and put in the right perspective” (Nesher, 1987, pp 38-
39). 
 
In mathematics learners make mistakes for different reasons. For example, mistakes could be 
attributed to hasty reasoning,  misreading information, poor concentration levels, incorrect 
transcription of given information or a computational error due to carelessness – and in most 
instances such mistakes are not regular occurrences (Almeida, 2010; Swan, n.d, p. 34). For 
example, in the example below a student was requested to add the following algebraic 
expressions:                                     . The student responded 
as follows: 
                  
                            
                                       
                               
 
The student’s solution demonstrates that he/she understands the algorithm for the addition of 
algebraic expressions, but s/he did not produce the correct sum of                 . 
The incorrect solution produced by the student is attributed to the incorrect transcription of 
the sign of second term,     , of the second algebraic expression in his/her write up. This is 





(1982, p. 6) defines a slip as an “unintentional, careless mistake in that little extra care 
apparently makes them disappear”. Equivalently, Olivier (1989) defines slips as follows: 
“Slips are wrong answers due to processing; they are not systematic, but are sporadically 
carelessly made by both experts and novices; they are easily detected and are spontaneously 
corrected.” (p. 196) 
 
On the other hand, mistakes can be more serious in nature – particularly when they are 
committed regularly as the result of “consistent, alternative interpretations of mathematical 
ideas” (Swan, 2001, p. 34). These kinds of mistakes are referred specifically to as ‘errors’ in 
the literature. In particular, Olivier (1989, p. 197) describes errors as follows:  “Errors are 
wrong answers due to planning, they are systematic in that they applied regularly in the same 
circumstances”. Furthermore, Olivier (1989, p. 197) asserts that errors “are the symptoms of 
the underlying conceptual structures that are the cause of errors”, and refers to the associated 
“underlying beliefs and principles in the cognitive structure that are the cause of systematic 
conceptual errors” as misconceptions. In the similar vein, Ben-Zeev (1996, 1998) as cited in 
Brodie (2010, p. 13), defines misconceptions as “underlying conceptual structures that 
explains why a learner produces a particular error or set of errors”, and asserts that 
misconceptions are  responsible for errors. 
 
Moreover, within the various fields of education like mathematics, science and computer 
science, extensive research has been done in the area of misconceptions from a constructivist 
perspective (see Ben-Ari, 2001; Confrey, 1991; Olivier, 1989; Smith III, diSessa, & 
Roschelle, 1993). According to Ben-Ari (2001, p. 58), a constructivist would see a 
misconception as “a logical construction based on a consistent, though nonstandard theory, 
held by the student” and not as a slip or (trivial) mistake. In particular Ginsburg (1977) 
asserts students’ mistakes (or responses) are seldom careless or capricious in nature, but are 
systematically grounded in their prior conceptions that they bring to the classroom, and hence 
from the learner’s perspective makes a lot of sense. Furthermore, research done by Smith et 
al. (1993, pp. 119-121) on misconceptions from a constructivist perspective, used the term 
misconception to “designate a student conception that produces a consistent and systematic 
pattern of errors across time and space” and also brought to fore the following dominant 
views pertaining to misconceptions: 
 “Misconceptions arise from students prior learning, either in the classroom (especially 
for mathematics) or from their interaction with the physical and social world;” 





 “Misconceptions can be strongly held and resistant to change;” 
 “Misconceptions interfere with learning;” 
 “Instruction should confront misconceptions.” 
 
The afore-mentioned research affirms that learner’s errors in mathematics emanate from 
rational thinking with reference to prior organized strategies, rules and generalizations, which 
cannot just be dismissed as ‘wrongful thinking’ but rather be construed  as legitimate outputs 
in relation to their existing mental frameworks. For instance, in relation to earlier experiences 
either inside or outside the classrooms, learners develop generalizations like the following:  
 “Multiplication makes numbers larger” 
 “you can’t divide smaller numbers by larger ones”; 
 “division always make numbers smaller”; 
 “the more digits a number has, then the larger is its value”; 
 “Shapes with bigger areas have bigger perimeters” (compare with Almeida, 2010; 
Olivier, 1989; Ryan & Williams, 2007; Swan, 2001, n.d, p. 34) 
 
If one considers the generalization, ‘multiplication makes numbers larger’ within the context 
of natural numbers, then it is plausible to make such a generalization primarily because it is 
true for every multiplication sum involving natural numbers. Moreover, through related 
experience of questions, exercises, problems and classroom discussions associated strictly 
with the multiplication of natural numbers in early grades, the conception that multiplication 
makes numbers larger becomes a kind of natural belief in the minds of the young learners i.e. 
it becomes firmly embedded in their multiplication schema. This generalization, whilst true 




   
 
  
   
 
  
 ;                ;                 that 0,32 must be bigger than 0,3, 
and so on. In this instance, we explain the cause of the learner’s response by saying that s/he 
has applied (or extended) the generalization, ‘multiplication makes numbers larger’, which 
s/he has established through working with the multiplication operation in the context of 
whole/natural numbers, to other domains such as fractions and decimals.  Hence, we can say 
that misconceptions result “from structures that apply appropriately in one domain being 
over-generalized to another” (Brodie, 2010, p. 13). Equivalently, Nesher (1987, p. 35) 
describes misconceptions  as “a line of thinking that causes a series of errors (systematic) all 







Just like many other constructivists, Almeida (2010, p. 4) asserts that: 
“misconceptions arise frequently because a pupil is an active participant in the 
construction of his/her own mathematical knowledge via the reception and the 


















Nesher (1987) and Resnick et al. (1989) as cited in Smith et al. (1993, p. 120) also affirm 
“that misconceptions usually originate in prior instruction as students  generalize prior 
knowledge to grapple with new tasks”. For example, in early grades learners discover or 
experience the algebraic analogue of the distributive law of arithmetic: 
                                          
The aforementioned distributive law, is reinforced via many concrete examples, exercises and 
assignments in the classroom, where they basically work with each term independently. In 
fact the distribution of a given number over two or more terms becomes so entrenched in the 
learner’s cognitive structures, that when learners are confronted with an exercise like 
          , they respond as follows:                          
 
 
      .  
This kind of error, which is certainly a systematic error, can be largely attributed to the over-










                                           accommodation 
 
Extant idea: 
If I subtract a whole 
number from another 
whole number, I will 
get a smaller number. 




Misconception: If I subtract two integers I will 
always get a smaller number.Thus a student writes 7 
– (-3) = 4 instead of 10. In particular because the 
prior idea is entrenched in the mind of the learner, 
he/she ignores the fact that -3 is a negative integer 
and treats it as +3, and then just deducts it from 7. 





early algebra lessons, to operations that are not distributive (Olivier, 1989; Almeida, 2010). 
Matz (1980) refers to errors like √     √  √  ;                    ; 
              ;                      as linear extrapolation errors. In 
addition, Olivier (1989, p. 204) accounts for the aforementioned errors as follows: 
 
“these errors are an overgeneralization of the property                  , 
which applies only when  is a linear function of the form                  , 
where   is any function and * any operation. This super-formula now acts as another 
deep level procedure, saying “work the parts separately”, so that the indicated errors 
are continually being re-created, which explains its obstinate recurrence.” 
 
In light of this discussion, extrapolation errors could also be attributed the matching rule 
according to Behr & Harel (1990). The matching rule suggests that learners perceive 
similarity between a previous solved problem (called the base) and a newly posed problem 
(called the target), and hence believe that the procedure that was used to solve the base 
problem can also be used to solve the target problem. Naturally, in order to circumvent any 
conflict the student will try to apply the familiar procedure to the new (or target) problem and 
not apply a new or different method. Thus if students search for similarities between what is 
already known and the new (or the familiar and unfamiliar), and concludes that similarity 
exists when in fact it does not, serious errors like extrapolation errors can develop through 
over-generalization.  
 
In our classrooms, there are myriad of examples, wherein generalizations that are valid in a a 
particular domain or context are inappropriately extended (or perhaps restricted) to other 
domains - in other words become ‘over-generalizations’ and thus result in errors. An 
important example of an over-generalization is characterized by the following belief that 
many learners hold: “The rules of invariance that apply to algebra also apply to geometrical 
shapes. So there must be equality in all respects when A becomes B” (Almeida, 2010, p. 35). 
This aforementioned belief, which is in fact called a ‘conservation’ misconception, is often 
the course of systematic conceptual errors. For example, consider the response from a learner 
to an activity pertaining to area and perimeters as illustrated in Figure 3.1.2. In the learner 
response it is quite plausible to assume that the conservation misconception, has been 















   
 
 
The ‘over-generalization’ syndrome permeates all levels and aspects of mathematics. For 
example, at grade 10 level, learners solve quadratic equations via factorization as follows: 
Case 1: 
            
               
                    
              
 
In solving, the above quadratic equation where the right hand side is zero, learners are 
expected to make use of the following general rule:                          In 
engaging the aforementioned rule learners are expected to proceed sequentially according to 
the following of the equation was given in the form            
 Factorize the algebraic expression on the left hand side 
 Set each factor equal to zero, and then solve for  . 
 
The aforementioned steps become so entrenched in the learner’s cognitive schema, that when 
they are given the exercise,            , some learners proceed as follows: 
Case 2: 
             
               
                    
               
 
 






The above stated response (Case 2) shows that the learners have failed to make the right-hand 
side zero, before proceeding to the following steps: factorizing; setting each linear factor to 
zero, and solving for  . In effect the learners have misapplied the method to solve quadratic 
equations that are equal to zero (as illustrated in Case 1) to quadratic equations that are not 
equal to zero (as is illustrated in Case 2). In effect, the learners have not realized the pivotal 
role of the zero on the right hand side of the quadratic equation, but instead just treated it as 
any other number (Olivier, 1989; Almeida, 2010). Matz (1980) as cited in Olivier (1989, p. 
201) offers an explanation for the persistent prevalence of the aforementioned error across 
many classrooms through the consideration of two fundamental procedures that are 
responsible for governing one’s “cognitive functioning”, namely: “surface level procedures, 
which are ordinary rules of arithmetic and algebra”, and “deep level procedures, which 
create, modify, control and in general guide the surface level procedures”   
 
With regard to the latter, “generalization over numbers” is one such kind of deep level 
guiding principle, which in practical terms means that “specific numbers don’t matter- you 
could use other numbers” (see Olivier, 1989, p. 201).This notion that any numbers will work 
emanates from learners prior experiences with numbers in other contexts, for example when 
multiplying three digit numbers by two digit numbers learners come to see that the given 
method is not restricted to a unique set of numbers but it also works for alternate sets of 
numbers. Similarly, when they learn the algorithm to do long division of numbers, they do 
see that the algorithm works for other numbers as well. Since, this “deep level guiding 
principle, generalizing over numbers” (Olivier, 1989, p. 201), works extremely well in 
contexts such as multiplication, division, addition and subtraction of numbers, learners 
develop the “ natural tendency to overgeneralize over numbers” (Olivier, 1989, p. 201), in 
other contexts. Hence, in the solving of the quadratic equation not equal to zero (Case 2), 
learners have over-generalized over the numbers on the right hand side of the equation i.e. 
they thought the algorithm will work for any number on the right hand side. Thus, the 
learners did not transform the given equation to the pre-requisite form      , before 
applying the following steps: 
 Factorize the algebraic expression on the left hand side 
 Set each factor equal to zero, and then solve for  . 
 
Reflecting on the aforementioned examples that characterize some misconceptions in 
Mathematics, we have seen that a ‘misconception’ is not necessarily wrong thinking but an 





knowledge that was relatively correct for a particular domain to another domain where it is 
no longer valid (Olivier, 1989; Ryan & Williams, 2007; Swan, 2001, Smith et al.1993). Thus 
for example, ‘division makes smaller”, is a valid generalization in one domain (that of natural 
numbers) that is often misapplied to a wider domain (that of rational numbers). Likewise, 
when dealing with the addition of matrices (of the same order), students are able to discover 
and apply the following generalized rule: to get the sum of two matrices, just add the 
corresponding terms in each matrix. However, when multiplying two matrices, students 
inappropriately extend the process (i.e. over-generalize the process) pertaining to the addition 
of matrices to get the product of the given matrices i.e. “take each term in the two matrices 
and multiply them together to get the resultant corresponding term in the answer” (Bull, 
Jackson, & Lancaster, 2010, p. 307).   
 
These acts of over-generalizations are endemic in mathematics and have to be circumvented 
through appropriate pedagogical strategies that promote discussion, justification and 
reasoning, and thus result in students reorganizing their own conceptions (Conn & 
Bauersfeld, 1995; Cobb, Yackel & McCalin, 2000, Ryan & Williams, 2000; Tsamir & 
Tirosh, 2003). For example when a generalization is established, an educator should pose the 
followings kinds of questions: 
 When does the generalization not apply? Can you justify your response?  
 Is the generalization true for this case? Why? 
 Why does the generalization not apply for the following case? 
 Can you provide other examples for which the generalization will hold? Can you 
justify your response in each case? 
 
Through the kind of questions pointed out in the preceding part, it is quite possible that a 
learner might realize the extent to which his/her generalization can apply, and thus not over-
generalize the said generalization. Through such prevention of over-generalizations, 
misconceptions could be prevented and invariably errors could be prevented.  However, if 
learners experience new concepts and generalizations only via ‘nice’ functions and ‘good’ 
examples and not special cases (or counter-examples), then misconceptions can arise as 
articulated by “Tall’s generic extension principle”, which says “If an individual works in a 
restricted context in which all examples considered have a certain property, then in the 
absence of counter-examples, the mind assumes the known properties to be implicit in other 






In terms of Piaget’s theory of cognitive functioning, when learners are exposed to new 
concepts in the classrooms, they attempt to interpret and construct meaning of such new 
concepts within the context of already existing conceptions or schemas within their broader 
cognitive structure (Louw et al., 1998; Piaget, 1975, 1977, 1985). Thus, if misconceptions 
prevail within their existing schemas, then there is a great probability that when learners are 
subjected to new concepts in the classroom that their resultant conception might innocently 
deviate quite significantly from the intended and acceptable one, and hence perpetuate the 
vicious cycle of misconceptions upon misconceptions and unnecessary cognitive conflict. 
Worse still, the triggered cognitive conflict could become so overwhelming and frustrating 
for learners that it could possibly lower their morale and confidence to such an extent that 
they decide to disengage completely with the mathematics at hand. Hence, it is imperative 
that educators identify and diagnose the misconceptions learners possess and provide the 
necessary treatment via appropriate interventions to remedy such misconceptions. Otherwise, 
learners will continue to “misapply algorithms and rules in domains where they are 
inapplicable” (Almeida, 2010, p. 17).  
 
With regard to the avoidance of misconceptions, Wood (1988, p. 201) argues that: 
 
“The only way to avoid the formation of entrenched misconceptions is through 
discussion and interaction. A trouble shared, in mathematical discourse, may become 
problem solved’ 
 
Wood’s assertion, suggests that educators should create the necessary climate in the 
classroom for learners to debate, argue, justify and critique newly presented/discovered 
information, which for example could include concepts, propositions, conjectures and 
generalizations. Moreover, general body of research suggests that looking beyond the error 
itself with a view to try and understand the kind of reasoning or justification that the learner 
has executed in order to produce his/her response, could be more productive for educators 
and learners in terms of identifying and remedying the underlying misconception that causes 
the given error (Brodie, 2010; Chazan, 1993; Confrey, 1991; Nesher, 1987; Sasman, 
Linchevski, Olivier, & Liebenberg, 1998; Smith et al., 1993). Hence, with regard to errors 
made by our learners in our mathematics classrooms, educators should do their utmost to 
diagnose the related misconception (if any) by getting learners to explain or justify or provide 
reasons for their responses (Almeida, 2010; Smith et al. 1993). Once the reasons for the 





use to challenge or contrast the given misconception. For example, consider Figure 3.1.3, 













By looking at the response of the student in Figure 3.1.3, it appears that the learner  believes 
that a larger area implies  a larger perimeter. This misconception could be based on the notion 
of subtraction makes smaller. According to Almieda (2010, p. 52), “one way to contrast or 
challenge this misconception that a larger area implies a larger perimeter is to give the pupils 
examples where it is not true. For example, a 1 x 2 square and a 1 x 3 rectangle. Alternatively 
show that any staircase D made out of rectangle C has perimeter equal to C by a counting 
exercise”. 
 
It is quite plausible that once the educator has diagnosed the underlying cause of a particular 
error, the educator could be in a better position to construct a special example (or a counter –
example) that could contradict the learner’s current ideas, and thereby create the desired 
cognitive conflict in the mind of a learner (Piaget, 1975, 1997). Consequently a learner’s 
mind will be thrown into a state of non-balance, which ‘alone can force a subject to go 
beyond his present state and to seek new equilibrium” (Piaget, 1977, p. 12). To regain such 
equilibrium or cognitive harmony, the learner may have to construct and reconstruct existing 
schemas, and subsequently also cognitive structures, to encompass (or incorporate) the new 
incoming (conflicting) information (or intrusions) (Piaget, 1977; Block, 1982). Regaining 
such equilibrium (or cognitive harmony) results in the reconstruction and transformation of 
misconceptions into correct conceptions, which is often a signal of intellectual growth. Thus 
in their classrooms, educators should be tolerant and empathetic to students that make errors 
or exhibit misconceptions (Olivier, 1989), make the most effort to diagnose the underlying 
 





misconceptions associated with errors, and hence create the necessary atmosphere (which 
includes opportunities for discussion and justifications) to challenge such misconceptions. In 
this regard educators ought to have the necessary teacher content knowledge (Shulman, 1986) 
to construct appropriate examples (counter-examples) that will induce the necessary cognitive 
conflict in the minds of the learner and consequently activate the processes of assimilation 
and accommodation to bring about the desired conceptual change.  
 
3.2  Counter examples & refutations 
 
3.2.1 Counter-examples 
According to Bolt and Hobbs (2004) and Hummel (2000) a counter-example is a particular 
case (or example) which disproves a conjecture. Similarly Klymchuk (2008, p. 1) states that 
“a counter-example is an example that shows that a given statement (conjecture, hypothesis, 
proposition, rule) is false”.  According to Houston (2009, p. 92), “the ‘counter’ part of the 
word (counterexample) comes from the fact that we are countering, in the sense of rejecting 
or rebutting, the truth of a statement". For example, consider the conjecture: “     
   –         is  a prime number for every natural number  ” (Hummel, 2000). If a student 
attempted to establish the truth of this conjecture by cases (or a case based approach), s/he 
may proceed as follows as cited in Hummel (2000, p. 61): 
 
If n = 1, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 41 is a prime number 
If n = 2, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 43 is a prime number 
If n = 3, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 47 is a prime number 
If n = 4, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 53 is a prime number 
If n = 5, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 61 is a prime number 
                                      
 If n = 10, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 131 is a prime number 
                                      
 If n = 20, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 421 is a prime number 
                                      
 If n = 39, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 1523 is a prime number 
If n = 40, then n
2
 –n + 41 = 1601 is a prime number 
Having found that the result for all 40 cases is always a prime number, the student may 





the conjecture explicitly states that n
2
 – n + 41 is a prime for every natural number n. Hence, 
to make such a conclusion (i.e. n
2
 – n + 41 is a prime for every natural number n) is  deemed 
to be fallacious in nature, particularly because not all cases have been taken into account. For 
example, for the case n = 41, we get n
2
 – n + 41 = (41)
2
 – 41 + 41 = (41)
2
 = 1681, which is 
not a prime number. This kind of example, leads us to say that the number 41 (or case n = 41) 
is a counter-example to the statement, “If   is any natural number, then         –         
is  a prime,” primarily because it makes  (41) a composite number rather than a prime 
number. In fact in terms of logic and propositional calculus, the number 41 makes the 
antecedent true and the consequent false, and hence we regard the number 41 as a counter-
example to the given conjecture (Hummel, 2000).  In equivalent terms, we say that a counter-
example is “an example that satisfies all the conditions of a statement but not the conclusion” 
(Education Development Centre, Inc., 2002, p. 15).   
 
However, reflecting on the student’s envisaged approach, it is quite plausible to say that it is 
not really essential to utilize the case-based approach (or quasi –empirical testing) to 
ascertain the truth of the conjecture in this particular case, because it is possible that through 
inspection one could immediately realize that 41 is a factor of n
2
 – n + 41 and n
2 –         
  , when n = 41, and thereby claim that he or she has found a counter-example (see de 
Villiers, 2004).  This single counter-example plays a significant role in illustrating to students 
why the given conjecture is false. Indeed a single counter-example like this is sufficient to 
refute a false statement (Peled & Zaslavsky, 1997). More importantly, this counter-example, 
may necessitate the abandonment or reformulation/refinement of the given conjecture (de 
Villiers, 1996). For example, the initial conjecture can be refined to read as follows: 
 f(n) = n
2
 – n + 41 is  a prime number for every natural number n, where          . 
 
In addition, whilst a counter-example is an example that shows a conjecture is incorrect or a 
case that proves the conjecture is wrong, a counter-example could also be an example which 
shows that a definition is inadequate (Serra, 2003, p. 136).  The latter notion of a 
counterexample can be applied in our mathematics classrooms as follows: once a student has 
developed a definition of a geometric figure, s/he should test it by trying to construct or 
create a figure that meets the criteria of his/her definition but isn’t what s/he is trying to 
define. In effect this means looking for a counterexample that will used as the reason that will 
render a given definition inadequate, notwithstanding the fact that if no counter-example can 





of the geometric figure is a plausible one. For example, consider the following definition: a 
rectangle is a figure with two pairs of congruent sides. Now we can construct a counter-
example, by drawing a figure with two pairs of congruent sides that is not a rectangle. Here 









   
The above counter-examples, suggest that the definition is inadequate. However, if one 
modifies (or refines or polish) the definition to read: a rectangle is a four- sided figure in 
which opposite sides are congruent and all angles measure    , then would no longer be in a 
position to construct a counterexample (Serra, 2003). Except, of course, not a ‘good’ 
definition as it is ‘uneconomical’ in that it contains the redundant properties of equality of 
sides which follow logical from the equality of angles.  
 
The natural tendency to contest the generality of developed conjectures by mathematicians 
creates opportunities for the development of other conjectures and generalizations in 
mathematics. For example, mathematicians all over the world are still searching for a formula 
that generates prime numbers. In this attempt Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665) communicated to 
one of his fellow mathematicians, Marin Mersenne, that “the numbers  are always 
prime if n is a power of 2” (O’Connor & Robertson , 2009, p. 2). In fact Fermat tested his 
conjecture for the fol1owing values of n: 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16, and then asserted that his 
conjecture will definitely not hold true for cases where “n is not a power of 2” (O’Connor & 
Robertson, 2009). However, 100 years later Leonhard Euler showed that the conjecture is 
false for the next case     by merely showing that the number is composite as follows:  
 = 2
32
 + 1 = 4294967297 = 641 x 6700417 (Klymchuk, 2008, p. 2; O’Connor & 










Furthermore, also within the domain of prime numbers, Goldbach conjectured that “every 
odd integer , is the sum of three primes” and forwarded this to Euler in 1742 
(Kahrobaei, n.d.: slide 8).  However, Euler responded that “every even integer , is the 
sum of two primes” (Kahrobaei, n.d.: slide 8).  For example, 20 = 3 +17, 24 = 11 + 13, 28 = 
11 +17, and so on. The latter is called Goldbach’s conjecture, and up today no one has proved 
that the conjecture is true nor found a counter-example that renders the conjecture to be false 
(Hummel, 2010; Klymchuk, 2008; Rotman, 2010). In fact as recent as 2006, the conjecture 
has been tested for all positive even integers up to 2.10
17
, and no counter-examples have been 
found (Kahrobaei, n.d.: slide 8). 
  
3.2.2 Refutations 
According to the Oxford Dictionary (2005, p. 375), refute means “prove that a person or 
statement, et cetra to be wrong.” Reflecting on this meaning from a mathematical perspective, 
we find that when one has a hunch that a mathematical statement is false, then one attempts 
to refute such a false statement through either advancing a theoretical kind of argument based 
on theorems, axioms and definitions (i.e. proof argument) or providing a counter-example. 
Moreover within the context of mathematical discovery, counter-examples are seen as pivotal 
‘players’ because quite often they serve as good indicators as to whether a conjecture is 
completely false or partially false. Hence, in this regard Komatsu (2010, p. 2) affirms 
Lakatos’s (1976) notion that the production (or construction) of a counter-example is a 
“fundamental method of refutations”. Lakatos (1976, pp. 7-13) differentiates between two 
types of refutations, namely heuristic refutation and global refutation, through the expressed 
notions of a “local counter-example” and “global counter-example” respectively.  
 
3.2.2.1 Global Refutation 
Counter-examples are powerful examples, in that they provide the necessary basis upon 
which a conjecture or suggested hypothesis can be shown to be wrong. In particular, Lakatos 
(1976, p. 11), describes a ‘global counterexample’ as an example which “refutes the main 
conjecture itself”. Furthermore de Villiers (2004, p .404) says, global refutation actually 
refers to “the production of a logical counter-example that meets the conditions of a statement 
but refutes the conclusion and thus the general validity, of the statement”.  The following 
example as cited in Houston (2009, p. 93) illustrates the notion of global refutation: 
 
“Let p and q be real numbers. If p/q  , then p  and q . This can seem quite 





real numbers such that p/q  and yet both p and q are not in . Thus p = π/3 and q 
= π/2 provides a counterexample to the statement.”  
 
Moreover, Houston (2009, p. 93) claims that a mathematical statement constructed in the 
form “If …., then …”  cannot be argued to be true by the mere construction (or presentation) 
of just one example wherein both the premises and conclusion are true. On the other hand, as 
Houston (2009, p. 93) says “just one example for which the statement is not true” is sufficient 
to refute such a statement or to conclude that the statement is not a potential theorem.  
 
However, global counter-examples are not produced by deductive reasoning only, but also by 
quasi-empirical testing (or experimentation) in many instances. For example, consider the 
following conjecture produced by a group of pre-service mathematics teachers: ‘A 
quadrilateral with opposite sides parallel is a rhombus’. To produce a counter-example to 
refute this false statement, all one has to do is to use the given information to construct a 
quadrilateral that is not a rhombus, using Sketchpad  or any other  software, or by using the 
straight edge, compass pencil and paper. In this particular case, one can proceed to construct 
an arbitrary quadrilateral as follows using Sketchpad: 
 Construct segment AD 
 Construct segment AB 
 Through B construct line parallel to AD 
 Through D construct line parallel to AB 






    











Following, the above quasi-empirical method, it is possible to obtain the following figure, 
which is quadrilateral with opposite sides parallel, but is definitely not a rhombus.  So 
essentially, we have shown quasi-empirically that ‘opposite sides parallel’ is not sufficient 
condition to produce a rhombus all the time. This Figure 3.2.2.1, is a counter-example to the 
conjecture: ‘A quadrilateral with opposite sides parallel is a rhombus’ 
 
According to de Villiers (2004, p. 404), it is often sensible to first test unknown mathematical 
conjectures quasi-empirically, wherever possible, primarily because such testing serves a 
twofold purpose, namely: 
“The construction of a counter-example if it is false”, and “the attainment of a 
reasonable amount of certainty (conviction), which then encourages one to start 
looking for a proof”. 
 
3.2.2.2 Heuristic Refutation 
Lakatos (1976, p. 11) asserts that a ‘local counterexample, is “an example which refutes a 
lemma (without necessarily refuting the main conjecture)”, and can be regarded to be a 
“criticism of the proof, but not of the conjecture”. In the same vein, we can say that a local or 
heuristic counter-example is a counter-example that does not disprove a statement in totality, 
but instead “challenge only one step in a logical argument or merely aspects of the domain of 
the validity of the proposition” (de Villiers, 2003b, p. 178). More importantly, “heuristic 
counter-examples are mostly not strictly logical examples, since they are after all not 
inconsistent with the conjecture in its intended interpretation, but are heuristic, since they 
spur growth of knowledge”(de Villiers, 2003b, p. 179). 
 
This means that a heuristic example requires some modification or polishing of a concerned 
conjecture, theorem or its proof, but with the proviso that the core ideas of the original 
conjecture, theorem or its proof is upheld according to the original formulation (de Villiers, 
2004 & 2010). This equivalently translates to saying: “the original conjecture (theorem) is 
usually still valid and true, not disproved at all, though perhaps modified, refined and much 
better understood” (de Villiers, 2004, p.  408).  
 





, .  However, through inspection, one can note that a cannot be 
negative number, but that a can be zero or bigger than zero. Thus we claim that a > 0. Then 





conclusions, it thus becomes possible for one to revisit the original conjecture and strengthen 
the stated assumption by actually adding on the following set of realized conditions: a > 0 
and b>0. This essentially means that the original conjecture, will remain valid and true, if it is 




,  s.t. a > 0 and b >0 
(adapted from Houston, 2009).  So, effectively in this case, one can say that we have merely 
altered the “domain of validity” of the conjecture. 
 
3.2.3 Lakatos’s theory of counter-examples in relation to proofs and refutations 
Lakatos (1976), in his book Proofs and Refutations, narrates the different ways that 
colleagues in the mathematics community reacted to potential counter-examples that have 
been raised to the proof of the Descartes–Euler conjecture for all regular polyhedra, which 
states that V - E + F = 2, where V, E and F denote the number of vertices, edges and faces 
respectively. Associated ways in which the individuals responded to potential examples were 
described through the methods of “monster-barring”, “exception barring”, and “proofs and 
refutations” (Lakatos, 1976, pp. 13-33).  
 
According to Lakatos (1976), ‘monster–barring’ refers to the outright rejection of a potential 
counter-example to a theorem.  In these instances, the rejection is done without the provision 
of a valid reason, but by the convenient review and construction (or reconstruction) of 
operational definitions such that it actually excludes the identified counter-examples as part 
of the intended set of examples or any necessary consideration thereof.  In essence, the 
resultant product of monster barring is “the modification or clarification of a definition” 
(Larsen & Zandieh , 2008, p. 208).  
 
Whilst this kind of approach, may create an escape route from a particular counter-example, 
there exists a probability that the altered definition, may create a room for other counter-
examples to surface, or simply exclude possible examples that may validate or support a 
given theorem.  
 
‘Exception barring’ firstly entails citing the surfaced counter-examples, which are legitimate 
examples, as mere exceptions to a stated theorem, primarily to enhance the validity of the 
stated theorem in all other instances without any course for concern regarding the domain of 
validity pertaining to the stated theorem. Secondly, exception barring may involve the 
rephrasing or reconstruction of a conjecture by actually zoning onto the domain of validity 





In general, within the context of exception barring the counter-example is considered to be 
legitimate, and consequently the conjecture is modified or improved upon and not the 
underlying definition itself as with the case of monster barring.   
  
‘Proof analysis’, which is another way in which individuals can respond to potential counter-
examples, is a core methodological stage in Lakatos’s “more mathematically mature method 
of mathematical discovery, known as proof and refutations” (Swinyard & Larsen, 2010, p. 2). 
Larsen & Zandieh (2008, p. 207) describes the four stages of  Lakatos’s (1976) method of 
proof of proof and refutations as follows:  
 The first stage is the construction of the initial conjecture, known as the “primitive 
conjecture”.  
 Stage two is characterized by the construction of a proof, which in Lakatos’s (1976, p. 
127) terms is “a rough thought experiment or argument, decomposing the primitive 
conjecture into sub-conjectures or lemmas”.  
 Stage three is characterized by the “emergence of global counter-examples”. The 
afore-said counter-examples are “global in the sense of applying to the primitive 
conjecture rather than merely one of the sub-conjectures”. 
 Stage 4 is  “the analysis of the proof to discover the lemma (perhaps hidden) to which 
the global example is a local counter-example. The result of this stage is an improved 
conjecture featuring a new proof-generated concept.” 
 
In ‘proof–analysis’, an individual re-examines and interrogates the constructed proof 
pertaining to an established primitive conjecture with a view to identify “a potentially 
obscured sub-conjecture for which the counter-example is problematic” (Swinyard & Larsen, 
2010, p. 11).  In this sense, the moves entailed in proof analysis, enables one to develop the 
necessary argument to motivate for the possible improvement of an initial primitive 
conjecture, wherein the improved conjecture will indeed include a new proof generated 
concept. For example, Cauchy in 1821 stated and proved the following conjecture (regarded 
as a primitive conjecture by Lakatos) as cited Larsen & Zandieh, 2008, p. 207: “The limit of a 
convergent sequence of continuous functions is continuous.” However, later in 1847 Seidel 
(as cited in Larsen & Zandieh, 2008, p. 207)  in his quest to find the hidden assumption in 
Cauchy’s proof, “discovered the concept of uniform convergence”. The discovery of the 
concept of uniform convergence was the catalyst responsible for the improvement of the 





of a uniformly convergent series of continuous functions is continuous” (Larsen & Zandieh, 
2008, p. 207). 
 
It is the proof analysis stage that makes it possible for one to distinguish the method of  
“proofs and refutations” from the method of “exception–barring” (Larsen & Zandieh, 2008, 
p. 207). In the context ‘proof analysis’ (with reference to Lakatos’s method of ‘Proof & 
Refutation’), the sole purpose of modifying the conjecture in question is to actually provide a 
definite opportunity for the proof to be realizable and acceptable to the mathematics 
community, but with the obvious good intention of retaining the ‘counter-example’ as just 
another ordinary example within the domain of the conjecture, rather than actually excluding 
it (Larsen & Zandieh, 2008) 
 
3.2.4 Reframing Lakatos’s ways of dealing with counter-examples for classroom  
          practice 
Larsen & Zandieh (2008) in their study focused on students responses to counter-examples 
and their corresponding outcomes. In their study students were engaged with the definition of 
a subgroup and the properties it satisfies. The Lakatosian framework for proofs and 
refutations, were reframed as follows for this particular study: a response from a student that 
signaled the rejection of a counter-example on the basis that “it is not a true instance of the 
relevant concept”, was considered as monster barring; a response from a student that resulted 
in a “modification of the conjecture to exclude a counter-example without reference to a 
proof” was considered as exception barring; and a response which entailed a modification of 
the conjecture with the good intention to “make the proof work rather than simply exclude 
the counter-example from the domain of the conjecture”, constituted the notion called  proof- 
analysis (Larsen & Zandieh , 2008, p. 208). 
 
The aforementioned reframed Lakatosian ways of dealing with counter-examples are 
described in Figure 3.2.4 with respect to the following aspects: activity type, activity focus 
and activity outcome.  This reframed version provided a lens through which students 
responses to counter-examples and resultant outcomes were analyzed.  
 
Fundamentally, the findings of Larsen & Zandieh’s (2008) study, were compatible and 
consistent with the framework posited in Figure 3.2.4. For example, when faced with 
counter-examples, students displayed the elements of monster-barring by revisiting the 





students showed symptoms of exception-barring by first acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
counter-examples, and thereafter embarking on the modification of their conjectures instead 
of the underlying definitions.  
 
Type of activity Focus of activity Outcome of activity 
Monster-barring Counter example & 
 underlying definitions 
Modification or clarification of an 
underlying definition 
Exception barring Counter example & 
 conjecture 




The proof, the counter 
example & the  conjecture. 
Modification of the conjecture & 
sometimes a definition for a new 
proof-generated concept. 
Figure 3.2.4: Reframing the ways of dealing with counter-examples described 
                    by Lakatos (1976) (as cited in Larsen & Zandieh, 2008, p. 9) 
 
 
According to Inhleder & Caprona (1985, p. 8) as cited in Balacheff (1991, p. 89), the 
constructivist learning theory asserts that a student explores actively his or her environment 
and also that a student “participates actively in the creation of space, time and causality”. 
Hence, in terms of the constructivist view, the student is considered as an active participant in 
the building of his/her own knowledge pertaining to the field of mathemetics (Balacheff, 
1991). In accordance with this view, Piaget (1975) as cited in Balacheff (1991, p. 80) assert 
that intellectual development is initiated by statements that are contradictory in nature, which 
inevitably results in the equilibrium within and amongst the schemata in the cognitive 
structure of the learner to be disturbed; and it is through searching for explanations to 
overcome the experienced contradictions that new knowledge is constructed in the minds of 
the learners.  
 
Indeed, Balacheff (1991) articulates  that there exists a great degree of consistency between 
the aforementioned theory of intellectual development advanced by Piaget and Lakatos’ 
model which describes the growth of knowledge in mathematics through the notion of 
‘proofs and refutations’ within a broader context that incorporates a range of complex ways 
of responding to counter-examples. With regard to the latter, Lakatos (1976, p.5) argues that:  
 
“Informal, quasi-empirical, mathematics does not grow through a monotonous 





improvement of guesses by speculation and criticism, by the logic of proof and 
refutations.”  
 
Moreover, within this notion of overcoming a contradiction, Balacheff  (1991, p. 92) asserts: 
“A counter-example in the mathematics classroom is often understood as sort of catastrophe 
because it implies the definitive rejection of what has been refuted”. On the contrary, in a 
mathematician’s experience, this is not as such, but rather one that is fuelled at least with the 
following actions: careful interrogation of the counter-example; modification of the 
conjecture; inserting conditions into the conjecture; justifying and proving or possible 
rejection of the counter-example. 
 
Drawing on the aforementioned kind of action-moves that is consonant with  mathematician’s 
kind of experience, Balacheff (1991) conducted qualitative research to ascertain how students 
react to counter-examples and re-look at their conjectures and proofs. Within this context, 
Balacheff (1991, p. 90-101), presented 13-14 year old students with an experimental activity, 
whereby they had to conjecture a way to calculate “the number of diagonals of a polygon 
once the number of its vertices is known”. In keeping with Laktosian style of dealing with 
conjectures, the observer presented the students with counter-examples to their proposed 
conjectures and the students had to respond to the resultant contradictions. Results of the 
study showed that a range of Lakatosian ways of treating a refutation (or counter-example) 
was utilized by different groups of students to overcome/deal with the posited contradiction, 
namely: “rejection of the conjecture”;“modification of the conjecture”; “exception barring”; 
“definition revisited”; “rejection of the counterexample” (see Balacheff, 1991, pp. 90-101). 
 
3.2.5 Steering refinement of conjectures and proofs through counter examples  
Interacting with counter-examples raised against a conjecture in terms of making sense of it 
or just constructing counter-examples against a posited conjecture, fosters the development of 
both reasoning and justification skills within the context of argumentation, and thus improves 
the opportunity for learning and successful intellectual development. Hence, to stimulate 
mathematical learning at school level, many mathematics education researchers (Balacheff, 
1991; Larsen & Zandieh, 2008, Komatsu, 2010; Reid, 2002; Zazkis & Chernoff, 2008) 
strongly recommend that some of our classroom activities should mirror mathematical 







Komatsu (2010, p. 1) embarked on a research case study “to explore how primary school 
students re-examine their conjectures and proofs when they confront counter-examples to the 
conjectures they have proved”. According to Komatsu (2010, pp. 4-7) reported on two 
students who proved their primitive conjecture via an action proof using manipulative 
objects, and who were then subsequently challenged with a counterexample. In summary, the 
details are as follows: 
 Two students, Daiki & Takuya, after expressing a degree of surprise with regard to 
their calculations, “52 +25 = 77, 26 + 62 = 88 and 31 + 13 = 44”, subsequently 
made the following conjecture (primitive conjecture): “the tens and ones digits of the 
two integer sums are equal”. 
 Diaka & Takuya developed a justification (action proof) for their conjecture using 
counters. 
 The students (Diaka & Takuya) were subsequently furnished with the following   
counter-example by the author: “Well, can you apply the same operation to 85 +58?” 
 Thereafter, through careful reflection and interrogation of their proof with aid of the 
colour counters (manipulatives), conceded to “85 +58” being a counter-example to 
their original conjecture. 
 The students then attempted to improve on the truthfulness of their conjecture, by 
adding the following condition to their primitive conjecture: “When the sums become 
three digit-numbers, the digits become different”.   
 Thereafter, the facilitator requested the two students re-visit the counter-example “85 
+58” and represent the sum using counters from a horizontal viewpoint instead of the 
previous vertical viewpoint. Their observation from the aforementioned activity 
coupled with their reflection on their earlier attempted proof made it possible for them 
to realize how to modify their previous conjecture and produce a new conjecture that 
was much more comprehensive, namely: “the two- integers sums were equal with 11 
multiplied by the number of pairs of the counters”.  
In the main, the counter-example to the students’ primitive conjecture was the catalyst 
responsible for stirring the need in the students to refine their primitive conjecture and 
associated proof. For, example, when Komatsu (2010, p. 5) presented the students with 
counter-example, “Well, can you apply the same operation to 85 +58?”, they experimented 
and reflected upon it and after some time had passed on, they began to accept the counter-
example  with some degree of surprise, and responded as follows: “ This is a big problem, we 





7) posed the following question to the students, “Is the conjecture spoiled?”, one student said 
“no”, whilst the other said “we must overcome this problem”.  According Komatsu (2010, p. 
7), the latter student’s response, suggests that “this confrontation with the counter-example 
functioned as a driving force for their active refinement of conjecture and proofs.”  
Retrospectively, it was careful analysis and reflection by the students on their attempted 
justification of their primitive conjecture in tandem with the counter-example that made it 
possible for the students to realize the falseness of their primitive conjecture and also to 
identify the potential gaps in the primitive conjecture, and then subsequently construct a more 
comprehensive conjecture as they did quite successfully (Komatsu, 2010, p. 1).  
 
Within the domain of research, Zaskis and Chernoff (2008), describe an episode of 
instructional interaction, which embraces a counter-example heuristic through the lens of a 
‘pivotal-bridging example’’ to eradicate misconception(s) experienced by a prospective 
elementary school teachers. According to Zaskis and Chernoff (2008, p. 197), 
 
“An example is pivotal for a learner if it creates a turning point in the learner’s 
cognitive perception or in his or her problem solving approaches; such examples may 
introduce conflict or resolve it….When a pivotal example assists in conflict resolution 
we refer to it as pivotal-bridging example, or simply a bridging example, that is an 
example that serves as bridge from learner’s initial (naïve, incorrect or incomplete 
conceptions) towards appropriate mathematical conceptions.” 
 
 For example in Zaskis and Chernoff  (2008) study, one of the prospective elementary school 
teachers, Selina, who was presented with a task requiring her to simplify:   , and 
interviewed with respect to her responses whilst attempting to reduce the fraction. Selina 
made the response,  =  , and then attempted to simplify by looking for factors that 
were common to both the numerator and denominator. However, during the continuous 
interview about whether the number 437 was a prime number or not, Selina replied as follows 
(Zazkis & Chernoff, 2008, p. 199): “Yes, it is, because it’s two prime numbers, of course it is, 
because two prime numbers multiplied by each other are prime, (pause).” 
 
Thus in effect, Selina has conjectured that when two prime numbers are multiplied then the 
resultant product is prime. However, Selina was later requested to consider the number 15, 





expressed as a “product of two prime numbers”, namely 15 =3 x 5, even though 15 did not 
belong to the set of prime numbers. In this sense, the choice of the example, number 15, can 
be classified as a ‘pivotal example’’ for Selina, primarily because it “it introduces cognitive 
conflict and challenges her initial ideas” (Zazkis & Chernoff, 2008, p. 199). However, despite 
all the aforementioned experiences, Selina still held onto her initial conjecture, “two prime 
numbers multiplied by each other are prime”. 
 
The interviewer subsequently presented the number 77 to  Selina for her consideration, and 
only thereafter on further seeing that 77 can be expressed as the ‘product of two prime 
numbers’ realized that the ‘product of two prime numbers’ does not yield a prime number, 
and consequently abandoned her conjecture.  In this sense, the number 77 served as a 
‘pivotal-bridging example’ for Selina , because it helped her to see link between the numbers 
15 and 437 which then made it possible for her to reconcile “her initial naïve ideas with the 
conventional mathematics” (Zaskis & Chernoff, 2008, p. 205). Expressed differently we can 
say that the pivotal example and pivotal-bridging example played a significant role in 
bringing about the desired conceptual change. Moreover, from the responses of Selina during 
the interview, Zaskis & Chernoff (2008) realized that although from a mathematical 
standpoint the falsity of a mathematical statement can be determined via the production/citing 
of just one counter-example, there exists a serious need for educators to be aware that not all 
counter-examples are necessarily equally effective in pedagogically assisting a learner to 
recognize a faulty or false conjecture. Thus from a pedagogical perspective, some students 
only begin to reject a conjecture after experiencing more than one counter-example. Hence, 
Zazkis & Chernoff (2008, p. 206) suggests that instructors (educators or facilitators) need to 
be aware of the convincing power of different counter-examples, so that they can 
appropriately choose “strategic counter-examples that may serve as pivotal examples in 
addressing learners misconceptions”. 
 
Furthermore, Fujita, Jones, Kunimune, Kumakura & Matsumoto (2011), reflected on the 
work and results of Larsen and Zandieh’s (2008) research, which was framed within the 
context of the Lakatosian constructs of proof and refutation, and subsequently embarked on a 
teaching experiment in a Japanese lower secondary school. Apparently, at the lower 
secondary level, a large number of students, where sucked into notion of developing their 
“primitive’ conjectures with respect to 3D geometry problems by just focusing on visual 
images at the expense of proper geometrical reasoning. In this experiment, the researchers 





together with practical activities and group discussions to break the cycle of reasoning via 
visual images and improve their levels of geometrical reasoning levels. 
 
Results of Fujita et al.’s (2011) study, showed that appropriate management of students 
discussions of counter-examples in the classroom within the broader context of Lakatos’  
approach to counter-examples, promotes the necessary space for monster-barring  and 
exception –barring types of responses to conjectures such that the resulting modification to  
the conjecture enables the proof to work as per proof-analysis heuristic. Moreover, the results 
show that the employment of aforesaid heuristics in the context of whole classroom 
discussions followed by small group discussions can promote the development of students’ 
geometrical reasoning capability (Fujita et al., 2011 ) 
 
3.2.6 Refutation Schemes & generating conjectures through refutation 
Lin (2005, p. 11) claims  that the refuting process covers five sequential processes:  
 
“Entry; testing some individual examples point-wisely for sense making; testing with 
different kinds of examples; organizing all kinds of examples; identifying one (kind 
of) counterexample when realizing a falsehood”. 
 
Taking into consideration the processes encompassing the refuting process, Lin (2005)  
presented  a group of learners with a false conjecture, and analyzed students’ reasons on 
refuting using a coding scheme (see Lin, 2005, p. 12). The nature of the responses presented 
by learners suggests that there exists synergy between their thinking process and the 
suggested refutation process. 
 
Furthermore, in advancing explanations for refuting the postulated  false conjectures, many 
learners provided heuristic arguments and explicit counter-examples with supporting reasons, 
but some learners went to the extent of producing: “relations, known properties evidences, 
general rules, etc.” (Lin, 2005, p. 13). These kinds of results, prompted Lin (2005) to 
investigate the links and relationships between the “refuting process” and conjecture 
production i.e. to explore possible avenues of continuity. For the envisaged investigation, two 
refuting-conjecture tasks (one in geometry & the other in algebra) were developed and 
subsequently administered grade 9 learners. Results of the investigation showed that “a high 
percentage of learners were able to produce correct conjectures when working on refuting –





“existence of continuity between the refuting process and the production of truth statements,” 
which in effect meant that “refuting is an effective learning strategy for generating 
conjectures” Lin ( 2005, p. 15). 
 
To provide a good opportunity for learners to construct or produce innovative conjectures, it 
is strongly recommended that “the content in a given false conjecture be relatively well 
designed” Lin (2005, p. 15). For example, Lin (2005) used the item in Figure 3.2.6, to 
provide space for learners to create brand new conjectures. Indeed the following is a typical 
kind of innovative conjecture that was produced, but in the context of a rectangle: 
 
“If a line cuts a rectangle along the pair of longer sides into two parts so that the cross 
segment is equal to the longer side, then two parts can be inverted to form a 




               
 
 




3.2.7 Engaging with counter-examples in a teacher-education context 
Counter-examples play a powerful role in terms of providing students with the necessary 
insight into why a particular mathematical statement is false or almost true. Hence, it is 
imperative that prospective mathematics teachers develop the necessary skills pertaining to 
the construction of counter-examples. Within this context, Ko & Knuth (2009), investigated 
prospective teacher’s abilities in producing counter-examples in the domain of 
differentiation, which is part of the calculus content in secondary schools and undergraduate 
mathematics courses at both universities and colleges. Results showed that the prospective 
secondary teachers despite having majors in mathematics struggled to identify whether a 
given proposition was true or false, and produce necessary counter-examples. Hence, Ko & 
Knuth recommended that more attention should be devoted to developing the necessary 
knowledge and skills of prospective mathematics educators to construct counter-examples, 
 





which they can in turn fruitfully utilize when they become fully fledged mathematics 
educators.  
 
For example, the following mathematical statement was presented by Ko & Knuth to a 
willing sample of Taiwanese prospective secondary mathematics teachers: “Let f be a 
function defined on a set of numbers S, and let . If f is continuous at  , then f is 
differentiable at a.” (p. 72). Results showed that about 42% could not generate a complete 
counter example. Two participants cited, , as a counter-example 
to refute the given mathematical statement (Ko & Nkuth, 2009, p. 72). According to Ko & 
Nkuth (2009, p. 72), one of the participant’s indicated the following: “ is continuous at 0 
but  is not continuous at 0”, and the other showed that “ is continuous at -1 but 
 is not differentiable at -1”. Indeed these two participants misrepresented the first 
derivative of   as , which resulted in the construction of an invalid counter-example to 
refute the given mathematical statement. Moreover, the first student’s response, demonstrates 
a misunderstanding of the notion of continuity, because is not continuous at 0. All 
these excerpts, merely illustrate that these two participants did not have the necessary and 
sufficient understanding of continuous functions as well as differentiation. With reference to 
these kinds of results as the background, Ko & Knuth (2009) asserts that the conceptual 
understanding and strategic knowledge are pre-requisites for the determining of the truth or 
falsity of a proposition through either generating a proof or counter-example respectively. In 
the main, Ko & Knuth (2009) found that majority of the participants exhibited a lack of 
sound understanding of pertinent concepts in differentiation, when constructing either a proof 
or counter-example. 
 
In mathematical practice, it is quite possible to raise a range of different counter-examples 
that can refute a particular false mathematical claim. However, from a logical perspective all 
such correct counter-examples share the same “logical status” and are hence considered 
“equally appropriate” for the refutation of a particular false claim (Peled & Zaslavsky 1997, 
p.49). This basically means that any single counter-example from the established range of 
correct counter-examples may be used to posit a mathematically sufficient argument that 
renders a given claim to be indeed false (Peled & Zaslavsky 1997, p. 49). On the other hand, 
from a pedagogical perspective, Peled & Zaslavsky (1997, p. 49) asserts that different 
counter-examples to a particular mathematical claim may not necessarily have the same 





claim may be much more illuminating and powerful than others with regard to the provision 
of “insight into the claim and ways to refute it” (Peled & Zaslavsky ,1997, p.49). 
 
In a sense, just as Hanna (1990) and Hersh (1993) from a pedagogical perspective, assert that 
there are proofs that only prove (i.e. are convincing to a mathematician) and there are proofs 
that also explain (i.e. have a pedagogical power for a student), Peled & Zaslavsky (1997, p. 
49) also assert that there are “counter-examples that (only) prove and there are counter-
examples that (also) explain”. 
 
Furthermore, Peled & Zaslavsky (1997, p. 51) is of the view that counter-examples that have 
the potential to explain provide a better opportunity to facilitate learning, and in the context 
of disproving  false claims recommends that a preferred counter-example should possess  two 
kinds of explanatory features: “First, it should provide an explanation as to why the claim is 
false. Secondly, it should provide a way to see a class of additional counter-examples (if 
more than one exists), hence, suggest a way to generate other counter-examples.” 
Furthermore, Peled & Zaslavsky (1997, p.51) affirms that the greater the generality of a 
counter-example, the greater the amount of explanatory power it possesses with respect to the 
explanatory features, primarily because it “provides insight into how to generate a whole 
family of counter-examples.” Moreover, the construction or provision of a family of cases 
that do not satisfy a particular claim may serve as a better explanation as to why a particular 
claim is false as compared to the construction or provision of just one single special instance. 
 
In particular, Peled & Zaslavsky (1997) conducted a study that focused on the explanatory 
nature of counter-examples, wherein the participants involved were a group of 38 in-service 
secondary mathematics educators who had a BSc degree in mathematics and more than 5 
years of teaching experience, and a group of 45 pre-service educators in their third year of 
study who completed a fair number of undergraduate mathematical courses. In this study, the 
participants were given the following two false geometric statements (called task 1 & task 2 
respectively), related to sufficient conditions for quadrilateral congruence: 
 
1. “Two rectangles having congruent diagonals are congruent; 
2. Two parallelograms having one congruent side and one congruent diagonal are 






Results showed that all of the participants, produced exactly one counter-example per given 
geometric statement, despite being requested to produce at least one counter-example. In 
terms of the correctness of the counter-examples, 37(97%) educators (teachers) and 24(53%) 
pre-service educators (student teachers) gave an adequate counter-example for the first 
geometric statement, whilst 29 (76%) educators and 19 (42%) pre-service educators gave an 
adequate counter-example for the second geometric statement. A Chi-square test with 
, showed that the percentage of subjects able to construct an adequate counter-
example was significantly higher for educators (teachers) than pre-service educators (student 
teachers). 
 
The analysis of the explanatory nature of the adequate counter-examples generated by the 
participants, identified the following three types of counter-examples (Peled & Zaslavsky 
1997, p. 51): 
1. “Specific: A counter-example which satisfies the task, as it provides a specific 
example contradicting the claim, yet does not give a clue to an underlying 
mechanism for constructing other (similar or related) counter-examples,” 
2. “Semi-general: A counter-example which provides an idea about a mechanism for 
generating (similar or related) counter-examples for the claim, yet does not tell the 
“whole story” and does not cover the whole space of counter-examples,” 
3. “General: A counter-example which provides a “behind the scene story”, and 
suggests a way to generate the entire counter-example space.” 
 
In essence, specific counter-examples merely serve the purpose of refuting a claim, but are 
limiting in the sense that they do not contribute in any particular manner to the understanding 
of the general case or the development of a strategy to construct other supporting counter-
examples. On the other hand, general counter-examples provide an explanation as to why the 
claim can be refuted and also a strategy to generate other supporting counter-examples.  
 
Although the generation of a general counter-example to every false claim is not always 
feasible, the analysis in Peled & Zaslavsky (1997, p. 59) implies that “counter-examples can 
be used not only for satisfying tasks in the logical sense (i.e. refuting false claims) but also as 
didactic tools or prompts for explanations which provide insight into the meaning and 
essence surrounding the elements of the claim.”  With regard to the latter part of the 
implication, the findings reveal that “counter-examples are not regarded and used as didactic 





The findings also reveal that the teachers produced more counter-examples of an explanatory 
nature than the student teachers. The authors attribute this disparity to teaching experience, 
which to an extent does contribute to raising the level of understanding of the subject-content 
matter as well as the level of sensitivity and appreciation of explanations. However, the 
authors affirm that teaching experience alone does not necessarily guarantee the production 
of more general counter-examples, and consequently recommends that both teachers and 
prospective teachers should engage in robust discussions and analysis of the pedagogical use 
of counter-examples over above the basic logical aspect, and also reflect continuously on 
their own processes of constructing counter-examples. With regard to this latter approach, 
Leinhardt (1993) as cited in (Peled & Zaslavsky, 1997, p. 59), argues that it will “better 
prepare teachers to construct powerful instructional explanations that both build on carefully 
chosen examples and analysis of limitations and conditions of use.” So, unless teachers or 
prospective teachers experience such approaches & processes themselves, they will most 
probably not afford their learners the necessary opportunities to engage with counter-
examples in manner that encourages them to explore the entire counter-example space and 
not just a single specific counter-example. Thus, it is necessary that teacher educators build 
this component regarding counter-examples into their curriculum, and continuously subject 
their pre-service and in-service educators to the envisaged kind experience related to counter-
examples, from both a logical and pedagogical perspective (Peled & Zaslavsky, 1997).  
 
In another study which was conducted to investigate mathematics educators “reasoning for 
refuting students’ invalid claims” within the domain of Euclidean geometry, Potari, 
Zacharides and Zaslavsky (2009, p. 281-290), worked with seventy six educators that were 












“In a geometry lesson, in grade 10, the teacher gave the following task: 
Two triangles ABT and EHZ have BT = HZ = 12 and AB = EH = 7 and the angles 
ATB and EZH equal to 30 degrees. Examine if the two triangles are congruent. 
Two students discussed the above task and expressed the following opinions: 
Student A: The two triangles have two sides and an equal angle. Therefore they are 
congruent. 
Student B: We know from the theory that two triangles are congruent when they 
have two sides and a contained angle equal. Therefore the given triangles are not 
congruent. 
If the above dialogue took place in your classroom, how would you react?” 
 





The data for their study was generated through a task that required all the educators to 
respond to the claim advanced by two students about the congruency of two given triangles. 
The details of the task are as shown in Figure 3.2.7.1. The response advanced by student A, 
stems from an over-generalization of the congruency theorem, which states: “If two triangles 
have two sides and the contained angle that are respectively equal then they are congruent” 
Potari et al. (2009, p. 281-290). The geometric construction as shown in Figure 3.2.7.2 serves 











A reflection on the geometric construction in Figure 3.2.7.2, brings the following general 
geometric theorem to mind: “If the shorter of the two given sides is opposite the given angle 
(i.e. , where  is the given angle), then there will be two distinct triangles that are not 
congruent, except for the special case ” (compare Potari et al, 2009, p. 284). 
Hence, a second approach to refute student’s A claim, is to provide a deductive justification 
for this general theorem, and then apply the justified theorem to the specific given case (see  
Potari et al., 2009, p. 284). Furthermore, a third approach to refute student A’s claim, could 
entail the use of the sine rule & cosine rule from a trigonometric perspective. For example, 
the application of the cosine rule for the given angle produces two possible values for the 
length of the third side. Furthermore, the application of the sine rule to a case where the 
greater of the two given sides is opposite the given angle (i.e. b  , where B is the given 
angle), yields either an acute angle or an obtuse angle opposite the larger side (see Figure 
3.2.7.3). Hence, all this implies that it is possible to generate “two (and only two) distinct 
non-congruent triangles”, which satisfy the given conditions of student A’s claim (see  Potari 


















       
With regard to student A’s claim, results showed that no reply was obtained from three of the 
mathematics teachers; the triangles were regarded to be congruent by eight mathematics 
teachers; and the triangles were to deemed to be “not necessarily congruent”  by the other 
sixty five mathematics teachers.  In the latter case, sixty three teachers provided an explicit 
justification to their particular assertion or claim. Figure 3.2.7.4, gives an overview of the 
classification of the raised justifications into different groups. In the main, 45 out of the 63 
mathematics teachers signaled that a counter-example essential to justify their claim, whilst 
the remaining 18 of the 63 teachers attempted to justify their claim through using known 















As can be seen in Figure 3.2.7.4, the invalid claim raised by student A was appropriately and 
correctly refuted by precisely thirteen teachers. In effect 11 of them refuted correctly through 
constructing a counter-example whilst the other two succeeded in their refutation by using 
theorems.  Results also showed that from a complement of 18 teachers who based their 
 
 
Figure 3.2.7.3 : Two distinct triangles 
Figure 3.2.7.4: “Mathematics teachers justifications of the assertion that the two given 






reasoning for refutation on known theorems, sixteen of the teachers purely reasoned from the 
perspective that none of the existing congruency theorems applies to this particular case, 
which is an “invalid proof-like argument” according to the authors. Potari et al. (2009, p. 
284) cite the following teacher response to illustrate  a typical case of an  invalid proof-like 
argument, which teachers themselves erroneously regarded as  a “valid proof for refuting 
student A’s claim”: 
 
“Student A replied without considering the known criteria for congruence triangles. I 
would encourage him to draw the two triangles so that to realise that these criteria 
cannot be applied.”  
 
A large number (45 out of 63) of the teachers attempted to refute the student A’s claim 
through the notion of counter-examples. However, 8 teachers just made reference to the idea 
of a counter-example, but with no serious consideration of a tangible counter-example. On 
the other hand 37 out of the 45 teachers made an attempt to provide their own specific 
counter-example in order to refute student A’s claim. In their attempt, 20 of these 37 teachers 
actually provided incorrect counter-examples, whist six teachers provided counter-examples 
that was kind of correct but had no justification, and 11 teachers provided a counter-example 
that was correct with the necessary justification by actually constructing two triangles that 
satisfied the premise-conditions of student A’s claim but were not congruent (see Potari et al., 
2009, p. 286) 
 
Potari et al. (200, p. 288) are of the view that the findings of their study has some  parallels 
with the findings of Lin’s (2005) study, in the sense that teachers either did one of the 
following: 
i. “Confirmed the invalid claim,” 
ii. “Suggested the possibility of a counter example without generating it,” 
iii. “Constructed a counter-example accompanied by a mathematical proof.” 
Moreover, results show that teachers reflected on their personal example spaces, when they 
attempted to generate counter-examples  
 
Giannajoulias, Matorides, Potari & Zachariades (2010, p. 160) in their study investigated the 
nature and structure of secondary school teachers’ argumentation that was used to “convince 





particular 18 teachers of secondary school mathematics were presented with three 
possibilities of a student’s proof to a particular mathematical statement, but  the  proof 
contained an algebraic claim that was invalid. The mathematics teachers were given the task 
to analyze each of the constructed proofs in order to pick up possible errors and moreover 
“explain how they would refute the students’ invalid claims” Giannajoulias et al. (2010, p. 
160). However, results of the study showed that teachers undervalued the role of counter-
examples when attempting to refute invalid claims, a finding that that also surfaced  across 
other studies pertaining to students (see for example Balacheff ,1991; Larsen & Zandieh, 
2008; Lin, 2005). The study in fact showed that most teachers used theoretical arguments 
based on theorems to refute a claim, and by and large refrained from using counter-examples 
for such purpose. In particular, the study showed that a very limited number of teachers made 
use of counterexamples “in their argumentation”, and  that most teachers generally 
“underestimate their value as a proof method” (Giannajoulias et al., 2010, p. 160).  
 
The rationale for such behavioral action was premised on the following kind of belief held by 
the teachers themselves: 
“refutation by using theorems provides stronger and more general conclusions than by 
using counter-examples and that counterexamples are exceptions in the sense that 
Lakatos (1976) discusses them” (Giannajoulias et al., 2010, p. 166).  
 
The aforementioned study also revealed that the use of counter-examples was limited to 
instances where an appropriate theorem could not be used or instances where teachers wanted 
to just bolster some support for their theoretical arguments.  
 
3.2.8 Counter-examples as a pedagogical strategy 
The first experience of students with counter-examples can be challenging in the sense that 
they might battle to comprehend that a correct mathematical statement cannot be argued to be 
true by the mere provision of single example which shows that the statement is indeed true, 
but that just one example (known as a counter-example) which shows that a given false 
mathematical statement is not true is indeed enough to conclude that the given false 
mathematical statement is false (see Klykmuch, 2008; de Villiers, 2004). On the other hand, 
students may just regard a particular counter-example as a mere exception to the rule, and 
consequently not regard a specific false conjecture to be false. Within this context, Selden  & 






“Students quite often fail to see a single counter-example as disproving a conjecture. This 
can happen when a counter-example is perceived as ‘the only one that exists’, rather than 
being seen as generic” (As quoted in Klymchuck, 2008, p. 5). 
 
To avoid the aforementioned  kind of responses from students both at school or tertiary level, 
then it is incumbent upon teachers and lecturers to engage their students in counter-example 
activities in way that mirrors the trajectory of a mathematician’s lived experience. In this 
sense, Lin & Yu’s (2005) study with high school students who were involved with refuting 
and conjecturing, revealed that one can create an environment for the construction of counter-
examples by actually deliberately posing false propositions to the student, and that by using 
their model of procedural refuting, learners can develop a better understanding of  both the 
role & type of counter-examples and thereby enhance their competencies of conjecturing and 
indirect proving.   
 
Similarly, Klymchuck (2008, p. 4) asserts that students should be given the necessary 
opportunity in the classroom to examine and comment on a “mixture of correct and incorrect 
statements”, which will then create a space for learners to refute an incorrect mathematical 
claim via counter-example(s). Also Klymchuck (2008, p. 4) suggests that counter-examples 
can be used teaching in the following ways: 
 
 In your lesson or lecture make a deliberate mistake; 
 Design tasks like tests, assignments, etc., that require the citing or construction 
of a counter-example; 
 Request students to spot an error in a given text; and 
 Request students to develop their own incorrect mathematical statements and 
counter-examples to them. 
  
In summary, this review of several studies pertaining to counter-examples as discussed in this 
section has shown that the appropriate use of counter-examples can deepen students’ 
conceptual understanding, and also reduce or eliminate some misconceptions (see Section 3.1  
for detailed discussion on misconceptions). These benefits of the use of counter-examples are 






 Provides a space for the development of core skills such as conjecturing, 
analysing, justifying, verifying refuting, proving. 
 Supports a much more interactive and critical mind with respect to a learning 
situation or learning context. 
 Promotes the development of “students’ mathematical understanding beyond the 
merely procedural or algorithmic levels”. 
 Students’ “example set” of particular concepts (for example functions) are 
developed and expanded, and in the process links and relationships among 
mathematical ideas are brought to the fore.  
 
The next two Chapters (4 and 5) focuses on the theoretical considerations and frameworks 




























Chapter 4: Theoretical Considerations and Frameworks 
 
4.0 Introduction 
I have thus far used the previous Chapters to signpost the need to engage pre-service 
mathematics teachers in the processes of generalizing and justifying in a particular domain 
and then extending such a generalization across other domains via experimentation and 
justification, as well as the purpose and core research questions for this study. Having done 
that, I wish to use this Chapter to introduce the conceptual framework for this study from a 
learning theory perspective. To address the purpose of the study and answer the proposed  
research questions for this study, it is necessary for me to engineer a conceptual framework 
that embraces a number of connected theoretical frameworks and topics that are compatible 
with the constructivist theory of learning. In view of the extent of the topics and theoretical 
frameworks that have been considered to guide this study, I wish to discuss some of them  in 
Chapter 4 and others are discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 4, the learning theory of 
constructivism in relation to cognitive and social constructivism is described and discussed. 
In addition theoretical considerations pertaining to generalizations, justifications, scaffolding, 
discovery learning, and analogical transfer are discussed. In particular, Chapter 4 engages 
with the following theoretical frameworks: Piaget’s Theory of Equilibration (which is also 
known as Piaget’s Theory of Socio-cognitive Conflict); Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory 
and Ausubel’s Theory of Meaningful Learning. The other remaining theoretical 
considerations are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 Conceptual Framework 
Maxwell (2005, p. 33) citing Miles & Huberman (1994) and Robson (2002) describes the 
conceptual framework of a study as “…the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, 
beliefs, and theories that supports and informs your research – is a key part of your design”. 
Similarly, Bell (2005) is of the view that a conceptual framework is the basic structure that 
provides the necessary grounds on which a particular research study can be built upon. 
Furthermore, a conceptual framework ought to facilitate sense making and contextual 
understanding of the findings of a research study for both practitioners and researchers. In 
this respect, Polit and Hungler (1995, p. 101) as cited in Al-Eissa (2009, p. 86)  holds the firm 






“Frameworks are efficient mechanisms for drawing together and summarizing 
accumulated facts… The linkage of findings into a coherent structure makes the body 
of accumulated knowledge more accessible and, thus, more useful for both 
practitioners who seek to implement findings and researchers who seek to extend the 
knowledge base.” 
 
Further to this, Maxwell (2005, p. 35) asserts that: 
“…conceptual framework for your research study is something that is constructed, not 
found. It incorporates pieces borrowed from elsewhere, but the structure, the overall 
coherence, is something you build, not something that exists ready- made; … the most 
productive conceptual framework are those that integrate different approaches, lines 




   Figure 4.1: Conceptual Framework  
    
Given this background, my conceptual framework as summarized in Figure 4.1 serves as a 





helps me to develop research questions that are realistic, focused and relevant, select 
appropriate methods and identify potential validity threats to my conclusions that can impact 
my study (Maxwell, 2005). 
 
4.2 Constructivism: A learning theory 
In this section, I wish to explore the notion of constructivism as a learning theory as well as 
cognitive and social constructivism. This I believe will guide the overall direction of this 
study as discussed further in Section 4.2.2.   
 
4.2.1 The main tenets of constructivism 
“Learning is much more than memory. For students to really understand and be able 
to apply knowledge, they must work to solve problems, to discover things for 
themselves, to wrestle with ideas… The task of education is not to pour information 
into student’s heads, but to engage students’ minds with powerful and useful 
concepts” (Slavin, 1997, p. 269) 
 
The above statement is consistent with constructivism, which is a learning theory that 
principally says “Learners construct, rather than record, knowledge” (Eggen & Kauchack, 
2007, p. 234). Expanding on this principle, constructivism can be described as a view of 
learning that sees learning as: “A building activity in which individuals build an 
understanding of events, concepts  and processes, based on their personal experiences and 
often supported by, amongst other things, activity and interaction with others” (Pritchard, 
2007, p. 2). The main tenet of constructivism is the idea that students make use of their 
existing knowledge or information (for example, facts, concepts and procedures) to make 
sense of new information and new experiences, and thereby fashion a solution to a problem 
or modify their existing ideas or re-organize what is already known (Appleton, 1997, p. 303). 
This means that students continuously seek to interpret the teacher’s instructions and 
discussions according to their existing understandings and experiences (Cobb and Steffe, 
1983; Maher, Paca, & Pancari, 1988). In other words students are active processors of 
information, and do not merely absorb knowledge that a teacher tries to pass onto them in 
class. Olivier (1992) in citing Piaget (1970) and Skemp (1979), says: 
 
“A constructive perspective on learning assumes that concepts are not taken directly 





an experience depends on the quality of ideas he is able to bring to that experience…. 
Knowledge does not simply arise from experience. Rather it arises from the 
interaction between experience and our current knowledge structures” (1992, p. 195).  
 
Thus, constructivism holds that when learners are able to construct a plausible solution to a 
problem or create new ideas or knowledge (like rules and hypothesis that explains things) 
through searching, using and interacting with relatable prior knowledge, meaningful learning 
is mostly likely to be experienced by such a cohort of learners (Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 
1978; Driscoll, 2005). Expressed in another way, constructivism is an epistemological view 
of knowledge acquisition which emphasize that meaningful learning is the active construction 
of knowledge by the student and not the mere transfer of objective knowledge from one 
student to another or from teacher to student (Applefield, Huber, & Moallem, 2000, p. 36. 
Olivier, 1992, p. 195; Snowman, McCowan, & Biehler , 2009, p.  490). However, in relation 
to the student constructing his/her own knowledge, Balacheff ( 1991, p. 89) in citing Piaget 
(1975) says: “The starting  point of this developmental process … is the experience of a 
contradiction which is likely to provide a cognitive disequilibrium: It is the overcoming of 
such a contradiction which results in new constructions.” This then implies that as teachers 
and lecturers, one should constantly take cognisance of what one teaches and how we teach it 
(Lockhead, 1991, p. 75). 
 
Furthermore, meaningful learning just does not happen arbitrarily or haphazardly, but it 
relates to information or concepts that learners already have developed (Ausubel, Novak, & 
Hanesian, 1978). For example, if we learn that a square is a regular figure, this information 
relates to our existing information about a square and about the regularity concept. In this 
instance the connection between ‘square’ and ‘regular’ is not arbitrary but rather a selective 
interplay between ‘existing’ and ‘new’ knowledge. The implication of this is that students do 
not enter our classrooms with blank minds, that is as ‘tabula rasa’ or passively receive 
information, but rather participate actively in the construction of ‘new’ knowledge by always 
attempting to assign new data or information meaning in relation to their individual 
perceptions of prior experiences (Applefield, Huber, Moallem, 2000, p. 43; Ogunnyi & 
Mikalsen, 2004, p. 153). It is in this sense, that Bodner (1986, p. 873) re-iterates Piaget’s 







The afore-mentioned perspective on learning has profound implications for teaching. This 
view was first conjectured by Piaget who after doing research on how children acquire 
knowledge, provided some answers to the core question of epistemology, namely “how do 
we come to know what we know?” (see Bodner 1986, p. 874). It basically means that 
students must be given more opportunities to construct their own knowledge than is typical 
across many of our classrooms (Slavin, 1997, p. 270). For example, students should be given 
authentic tasks that allow them to experimentally explore, observe, make conjectures and 
construct generalizations, which they can then be encouraged to support by providing a 
logical explanation or explain why such a generalization is always true.  This, in a sense 
suggests that our classrooms should become more student-centred with the teacher acting as a 
facilitator or guide rather than actually doing everything for the learner in a recipe mode 
style. As Confrey (1990, p. 100) says: 
 
“When I teach mathematics I am not telling students about the mathematical 
structures which underlie objects in the world, I am teaching them how to develop 
their cognition, how to see the world through a set of quantitative lenses which I 
believe provide a powerful way of making sense of the world.” 
 
When a classroom environment like the one described by Confrey (1990) is provided to  
students, it is plausible that students could make sense of new results and thereby build their 
own understanding of such results, i.e. they construct meaning for themselves. In keeping 
with Confrey’s perspective of inducing meaningful learning, Von Glasersfeld (1984) as cited 
in Bodner (1986, p. 874), maintains: “… learners construct understanding. They do not 
simply mirror and reflect what they are told to do or what they read. Learners look for 
meaning and will try to find regularity and order in the events of the world in the absence of 
full or complete information”. 
 
Although learners construct their own knowledge in the form of concepts, theories, ideas, 
propositions, generalizations, proofs, solutions to problems, it does not mean that they are 
given a free reign to construct any knowledge. The knowledge they construct needs to be 
continually tested via their own personal experiences across similar or new contexts or 
though mediated learning environments (Bodner, 1986; Njisane, 1992). To Piaget the process 
of constructing knowledge is characterized by the learner trying to make sense of his/her new 
experiences in terms of the linked prior knowledge that is stored in a particular  cognitive 





has a powerful effect on the way the learner comes to see what s/he understands and 
subsequently build new knowledge on (Snowman, McCowan, & Biehler , 2009, p. 239, 
Tobin & Tippins, 1993, p. 7). Over the years practitioners in a variety of fields have 
embraced constructivism as a theoretical framework on which to base their activities, and in 
the process, a number of kinds of constructivism have emerged with particular theoretical 
rationale. For example, naïve constructivism, radical constructivism, cognitive 
constructivism, social constructivism.  
 
Despite the various kinds of constructivism that evolved over the years, Cobb (1988, p. 
89), a constructivist, asserts that:  
 
“A fundamental goal of mathematics instruction is or should be to help students 
build structures that are more complex, powerful, and abstract than those that 
they possess when instruction commences. The teacher’s role is not merely to 
convey to students information about mathematics. One of the teacher’s primary 
responsibilities is to facilitate profound cognitive restructuring and conceptual 
reorganization.”  
 
Through taking cognizance of Cobb’s (1998) constructivist views on learning of 
mathematics, Clements & Battista (1988, p. 35) expresses another goal of  
constructivism as follows: 
 
“Students should become autonomous and self motivated in their mathematical 
activity. Such students believe that mathematics is a way of thinking about 
problems. They believe that they do not "get" mathematical knowledge from 
their teacher so much as from their own explorations, thinking, and participation 
in discussions. They see their responsibility in mathematics classrooms not so 
much as completing assigned tasks but as making sense of, and communicating 
about, mathematics. Such independent students have the sense of themselves as 
controlling and creating mathematics.”  
 
A synthesis of the views of those who have used the different brands of constructivism 
signals that “knowledge is personally constructed but socially mediated” (Tobin & Tippens 
1993, p. 6). Thus, in essence there exists a dialectical relationship between the individuals’ 





p. 7), citing Saxe (1992), state that “individuals construct novel understandings as they 
attempt to accomplish goals rooted in both their prior understandings and their socially 
organized activities”. Furthermore, constructivists like Cobb (1990); Saxe (1992) & Wood et 
al. (1992), suggest that practitioners should not see the social and personal emphases of 
constructivism as an either/or dichotomy, particularly since they “both  have important roles 
in  thinking about knowledge, knowing, and teacher and learner roles in our classrooms” 
(Tobins & Tippens ,1993, p. 6).  In this respect, Wood et al. (1992, p. 3) say: 
 
“It is useful to see mathematics as both cognitive activity constrained by social and 
cultural processes, and as a social and cultural phenomenon that is constituted by a  
community of actively cognizing individuals.” 
 
Hence, for the purpose of this study, I have adopted both cognitive and social constructivism 
so as to allow the emphases in constructive thought to embrace the twin processes of 
equilibration, namely assimilation and accommodation, as students work in a dynamic 
geometry environment supported by scaffolded task-based activities and myself as the  
facilitator and researcher. The use of this complementary paradigm, gave latitude to the 
researcher to design task based activities that can allow the pre-service teachers to 
experiment, explore, conjecture, generalize, justify, and also possibly exhibit misconception 
which can be corrected. By using both forms of constructivist   theories of learning, I  
envisaged that it would be possible to account for a pre-service teacher construction of 
personal meaning and shared meaning, and also account for the errors and misconceptions, 
and episodes of conceptual change induced through experimentation and counter-examples.  
 
4.2.2  Cognitive and Social constructivism 
Cognitive constructivism, which is mainly an outgrowth of Piaget’s ideas of cognitive 
development   as discussed in Section 4.6, emphasizes that: 
 
“Knowledge is acquired as a result of a life-long constructive process in which we try 
to organize, structure, and restructure our experiences in the light of existing schemes  
(schemas) of thought, and thereby modify and expand these schemes (schemas)”  






Thus cognitive constructivism is a form of constructivist learning theory which emphasizes 
that as learners confront new information from their environment – the physical and social 
world around them they constantly search for meaning and understanding in relation to their 
existing understanding or schemas (Piaget, 1952, 1959, & 1989;  Eggen & Kuachak,  2007; 
Pritchard, 2009) to try and maintain or re-establish their cognitive equilibrium. Schemas are 
large units of inter-related concepts and ideas which are stored in memory that can be 
retrieved and utilized to make sense of new experiences. When we are able to explain new 
experiences in terms of our existing schema(s), we say that the cognitive equilibrium is 
maintained, and when we cannot we say that our cognitive equilibrium is disturbed. Piaget 
(1970) says that when disequilibrium occurs, there often is a natural tendency to re-establish 
cognitive equilibrium, and this is when individual knowledge construction is stimulated and 
learners thinking advances – thus characterizing intellectual development. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.6, equilibrium is maintained and achieved through the process of 
adaptation. As shown in Figure 4.2.2 in this section, adaptation consists of two reciprocal 




Figure 4.2.2: Maintaining equilibrium through the process of adaptation (Eggen & Kauchak,  
















When new information arises, and can be fitted into a learner’s existing schema with no 
dissonance, we say the process of assimilation has taken place. Through the assimilation of 
the new material or information the learner’s existing schemata are enlarged, that is existing 
concept(s) are extended to cover a broader spectrum of ideas and examples and further 
distinctions through differentiation (Olivier, 1992, p. 196).  However, when a learner 
experiences new information that is inconsistent with his current schema or conflicts with his 
ideas stored in his existing schema, a process of accommodation has to take place to restore 
the necessary equilibrium. This means that through careful and critical thinking, existing 
schemas have to be adjusted, modified or restructured so that the new information, ideas and 
procedures  can be fitted in without causing any more dissonance. When this happens the 
desired cognitive equilibrium will be achieved, and learning would have occurred (see Louw 
& Louw, 1998,  p. 43).  
 
In essence cognitive constructivism focuses on how a learner builds new knowledge via 
innate processes like  assimilation, dis-equilibration, accommodation, equilibration, which 
are supported by opportunities that makes it possible for the learner to interact with his 
teachers, peers, objects or things around him/her in a meaningful way (Snowman, McCowan, 
& Biehler , 2009, p. 240). For example, when learners experience a discrepant event that 
causes cognitive conflict, cognitive disequilibrium is induced, and they then begin to 
negotiate the meaning of the ideas and experiences that are not consistent with the existing 
schema to try and uncover the inconsistency between their current conception/knowledge and 
their new experience (Dalgarno, 2009). In this respect Fosnot (1996, p. 29) emphasizes that 
disequilibrium facilitates learning and that challenging tasks set in meaningful contexts 
should be given to students with the aim to allow them to explore and generate affirming and 
contradictory instances. However, in doing so, the errors committed by students should not be 
disregarded but rather be illuminated, further explored and discussed to correct the 
underlying misconception(s).  
 
This is to suggest that through carefully designed individual or socially mediated discovery-
oriented learning activities, the learner(s) can uncover the noted inconsistency or discrepancy, 
and thereby reorganize and restructure their existing conceptions or schema to accommodate 
the new findings or discoveries. It is in this way that new knowledge is generated and 
conceptual change is advanced as postulated by Piaget. Furthermore, this means that through 
engaging students meaningfully in investigative and problem-solving tasks that promote an 





their mathematical experiences inclusive of their  misconceptions, students can  become more 
actively involved in constructing progressively more complex understandings of 
mathematical content for themselves (see Donald, Lazarus & Lolwana 1997, p.  41). This in 
principle is consistent with Piaget’s (1953) view that knowledge is not just transmitted ‘as is’ 
from one person to the next, but is rather actively constructed and developed to higher levels 
by the person encountering authentic learning experiences within their social and physical 
environment (see Donald, Lazarus & Lolwana, 1997, p. 41).  
 
Building on Piaget’s notion that a learner constructs his/her own knowledge through 
encountering particular experiences within a given environment, social constructivism places 
more emphasis on the building of knowledge via social interaction and language usage 
(Eggen & Kauchek, 2007). In fact the basic premise of social constructivism as highlighted 
by Vygotsky (1978) and other social constructivists like Ernest (1994) is that knowledge 
construction is a shared experience rather than just an individual experience, and that through 
the process of sharing individual perspectives learners construct understanding, which at 
times may not just be achievable by a learner on his/her own (Gauvain, 2001; Greeno, 
Collins, & Resnick, 1996).  In the same vein, Snowman, McCown and  Biehler (2009, p. 495) 
defines social  constructivism as: “A form of constructivist learning theory that emphasizes 
how people use such cultural tools as language, mathematics, and approaches to problem 
solving in social settings to construct common or shared understanding of the world in which 
they live” (2009, p. 495). Ernest (1994, p. 304) in adopting a complementarity stance to 
constructivism says that a social constructivist theory to learning mathematics is: “a theory 
which acknowledges that both the social and individual sense making have central parts to 
play in the learning of mathematics.” Similarly, Murray (1992) supports the view that 
mathematical knowledge is individual and a social construction. Furthermore, Ernest’s (1991) 
complementarity notion of social constructivism as reported in Ernest (1994, p. 308) 
characterizes two key features of constructivism as follows: 
 
“First of all there, there is the active construction of knowledge, typically concepts 
and hypotheses, on the basis of experiences and previous knowledge. These provide a 
basis for understanding and serve the purpose of guiding future actions. Secondly 
there is the essential role played by experience and interaction with the physical and 
social worlds, in both the physical action and speech modes. This experience 





intended and perceived outcomes which lead to the restructuring of knowledge, to 
improve its fit with experience.”  
 
When it comes to social experiences, Piaget asserts that peer interactions are a much better 
catalyst of cognitive development than the sets of interaction with adult. The reason for this  
is that the learners find it more comfortable to engage, challenge, discuss, debate and analyse 
the reasons and argument (s) of another learner’s view than they would be able to do 
similarly with an adult (Snowman, McCown & Biehler, 2009, p. 68).  Further, Snowman, 
McCown & Biehler, (2009, p. 68) believe that: 
 
“It is the need to understand the ideas of a peer or playmate in order in order to 
formulate responses to those ideas that lead to less egocentrism and the development 
of new, more complex mental schemes. Put another way, a strongly felt sense of 
cognitive conflict impels the child to strive for a  higher level of equilibrium. Formal 
instruction by an adult expert simply does not have the same impact regardless of how 
well designed it might be. That is why parents and teachers are often surprised to find 
children agreeing on the same issue after having rejected an adult’s explanation on the 
very same thing.” 
 
Thus, the kinds of activities that we design for our classrooms, should allow learners to 
interact with their peers to a justifiable extent such that they can conjecture, discover, 
generalize, and justify their generalizations with arguments substantiated by appropriated 
reasons, warrants and backings. In this way, it is highly likely that learners could 
enlarge/modify their existing schemas through the processes of assimilation and 
accommodation as they construct and acquire new knowledge. Furthermore, this kind of 
learning trajectory could also be promoted by engaging learners in learning opportunities that 
allow them to work in socially mediated environments like Geometer’s Sketchpad and Geo-
gebra individually or in groups. In this sense the computer with the associated software 
program can serve as “an expert peer or collaborative partner to support the skills and 
strategies that can be internalized by the learner” (Snowman, Mcown & Biehler, 2009, p. 80). 
 
According to Snowman, McCown & Biehler (2009, p. 78), technology inclusive of programs 
like Geometer’s Sketchpad, can be used to stretch learners thinking and enhance their 
cognitive development in two possible ways. Firstly, technology can be used as a simulation 





misconceptions and errors in thinking. Secondly, technology can be used as a source that 
enables learners in a classroom to think critically, debate issues, experience ideas that do not 
quite fit their current conception and as a result experience cognitive conflict and 
disequilibrium.  
 
From a social constructivist perspective, the kind of learning opportunities that we present to 
our learners either in  technology based or non-technology based environments,  should  
make provision for or take cognisance of the following: 
 
 Learning should be facilitated preferably by a more knowledgeable person, like a 
teacher for example. However, in such instances the teacher should be serving as a 
guide (or facilitator) as the learner works collaboratively (i.e. with his/her peers or in a 
computer environment) to construct new conceptions or ideas, and only intervene in 
instances when a learner: 
 seems to be struggling to move on with the given task or parts of the given 
tasks; or 
 demonstrates misconceptions and errors in thinking; or 
 requests clarification or specific help; or 
 made a major breakthrough with the given problem or task, for example made 
a discovery or provided a  logical explanation to a conjectured generalization. 
 
 The guidance provided  should  enable a student(s) to link whatever knowledge and 
skills they are expected to acquire to their existing schemas, but in a manner that 
allows them  to gradually internalize such new knowledge and skills so that they can 
in the process become increasingly self-regulated and independent (Snowman, 
McCown & Biehler (2009, p. 240). 
 When a learner cannot complete a task when working on his/her own or 
collaboratively, the teacher (or facilitator) should first diagnose the problem to 
ascertain the conceptual and procedural difficulties that the learner has been 
experiencing, and in the process determine what is blocking/hindering the learner 
from making progress with the given task or problem or to complete the task 
independently on his/her own. According to his/her diagnoses the teacher or facilitator 





“the process of giving support to the learners at the appropriate time, at the 
appropriate level of sophistication, and in an appropriate way to meet the individual’s 
need” (Pritchard, 2007, p. 6). In other words, scaffolding refers to the minimal 
assistance that is provided to a learner (or group of learners) to  jump start the given 
task (or problem) and help the learner to complete the allocated task (or problem) as 
far as possible on their own (Bruner, 1985, 1986; Vygotsky, 1978). This could mean 
providing the learner (or group of learners) with a great deal of support at the 
beginning of the teacher (facilitator) intervention, and then diminishing such support 
as the task or problem progresses to make allowance for the learner to take increasing 
responsibility for his/her learning as soon as he/she is able to do so (Eggen & Kaucak, 
2007, Puntambekar & Hubscher, 2005; Slavin, 1997; Snowman, McCown & Biehler 
2009; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976).  
According to  Pritchard (2007),  Slavin (1997) and  Snowman, McCown & Biehler 
(2009) scaffolding can take place in various ways, for example:  tailor made 
investigative tasks; the provision of clues and hints when a student is working on a 
problem, providing an example; a spontaneous question or reminder as the student is 
proceeding with a task;  the breaking down of a problem into  sub-steps; modelling;  a 
list of reminders regarding the process/procedure to tackle a question; provision of 
feedback; probing via questioning;  the provision of related apparatus such as Zome 
tools for 3D Geometry, tools like the scientific calculator and computer software 
programs like Geometer’s Sketchpad that could  help in the process of conjecturing 
and generalizing or completing a given problem; a writing frame to support a 
particular style of writing;  and  anything else that makes it possible for a student to 
grow in independence as a learner. However, in the main, when scaffolding is offered 
it does not mean that the teacher (or facilitator) should simplify the task, but rather 
that the graduated intervention of the teacher (or facilitator) should to an extent 
simplify the role of the learner (Greenfield, 1984). 
The process of scaffolding is central to notion of the zone of proximal development (ZPD), 
which is described by Vygotsky (1978, p. 86) as: “the distance between the actual 
developmental level as determined by the leaner’s independent problem solving and the level 
of potential development as determined through the problem solving under adult guidance or 
in collaboration with more capable peers”. In simpler terms the difference between what a 
learner can successfully complete on his/her own and what he/she can accomplish with some 





as “a point which at which a child has partly mastered a skill but can act more effectively 
with the assistance of a more skilled adult or peer.” Just as construction workers use 
scaffolding to support their building efforts, teachers can likewise use scaffolding to support 
the learners to make progress towards their upper limit of the ZPD and thereby achieve the 
desired meaning and understanding for themselves. However, the kind of support rendered 
should be provided according to the needs of a given learner, and not be applied blanketly to 
all students, i.e. it has to be differentiated. Furthermore, Pritchard (2007, p. 6) says the 
following about scaffolded interventions: 
 
“In formal situations this intervention might be planned, but often a timely and, well   
judged intervention depends upon circumstances that cannot necessarily be predicted, 
and in many situations, also upon the skill and experience of the teacher. In many 
cases a teacher will fulfil this role, but others are equally capable and likely to do so. 
In planning work for children a teacher needs to take into account the current state of 
the children in question, and plan accordingly and appropriately. In an ideal situation, 
this could mean planning for individuals, but in a more realistic situation this is not 
usually possible.” 
 
In general, Vygoysky (1978) asserts that when scaffolded assistance is meaningfully 
provided, students with a broader ZPD zone are likely to experience a greater degree of 
cognitive development as compared to their peers with a narrower ZPD, particularly because 
those students with broader ZPD have more to gain from the applied interventions or 
facilitation (Snowman, McCown & Biehler, 2007). 
 
In addition to scaffolding, Snowman, McCown & Biehler (2007, p. 3) expresses the view that 
discovery learning is also a learning method that resonates well with the both the cognitive 
and social constructivist perspectives of learning. As there may be some similarities (though 
superficial) between discovery learning and the constructivist oriented approach to learning 
perspective of learning, I as the researcher am aware that epistemologically “discovery” 
learning and “constructivist” learning are not reconcilable. A discovery process assumes a 
Platonist stance and that objects exist ‘a priori’; hence they are discovered. In constructivism, 
mental objects are not discovered, but created or re-invented. Furthermore, some 
constructivists like Von Glasersfeld (1991) would not see discovery learning tallying with 
constructivist epistemology, which assumes all knowledge is created, not discovered. 





knowledge is both discovered and invented. In using a discovery approach to learning, 
students are often given the opportunity to experiment, explore and engage actively with 
objects, mathematical concepts and problems, and thereby develop their understanding of it 
(Slavin, 1997). It is within this realm that discovery learning feature so strongly in the design 
of the tasks that have been used to conduct this study. The next section 4.3 expands on the 
notion of discovery learning.  
4.3 Discovery learning and exploratory environments 
According to Confrey (1991, p. 112) discovery learning stresses the importance of: (1) 
engaging students actively in the learning process; (2) focusing more on the process of 
“coming to know”  than  just the production of correct responses or solutions; and  (3) trying 
to unpack and make sense of the underlying concepts that are related to the given task or 
problem. 
 
Thus, from a constructivist perspective on learning, teaching methods that make provision for 
students to work in an environment that encourages exploration, discovery of rules and 
conjectures, construction of generalizations and justification; establishment and modification 
of concepts (i.e. conceptual change) typically promotes meaningful learning (Ausubel, 
Novak, & Hanesain, 1978; Ausubel & Youssef, 1963; Brooks & Brooks, 2001; Bruner, 
1969,1966, 1973, 1983,1986;  Piaget, 1953, 1970, 1974).  Resonating with this view, Confrey 
(1990, p. 12) is of the view that a teacher should:  
“ …promote and encourage the development for each individual within his or her  
class of a repertoire for powerful mathematical constructions for posing, constructing, 
exploring, solving and justifying mathematical problems and concepts and should 
seek to develop in students the capacity to reflect on and evaluate the quality of their 
constructions.”  
This largely means that through using a discovery approach to learning, students should be 
given opportunities to learn wholly on their own by doing tasks such as investigations and 
problem-solving that cause them to be actively and purposefully involved in observation, 
reasoning, reflective abstraction, drawing of conclusions and/or the justification of such 
conclusions (Fostnot, 1996; Yssel & Dill, 1996; Wilcox, 1993). In most instances such 
discovery learning opportunities arouses students’ natural curiosity, which invariably 





necessary from the teacher, until they find satisfying explanations or answers  for themselves  
(Yssel & Dill, 1996; Slavin, 1997). In this way deeper understanding of the mathematical 
knowledge is promoted and the responsibility for learning is shifted to the learner (Newman, 
Stepich, Lehman, & Russel, 2000). Furthermore, Slavin (1997, p. 273) observe that a 
discovering learning approach promotes “the learning of independent problem-solving and 
critical-thinking skills because they must analyze and manipulate information.”  
 
Consonant with the notion of discovery learning, Bruner (1996, p. 72), a pioneer and strong 
promoter of discovery learning, maintains that: 
 
“We teach a subject not to produce living libraries of that subject, but rather to get a 
student to think … for himself, to consider matters as an historian does, to take part in 
the process of knowledge–getting. Knowing is a process not a product.” 
 
However, the process of knowledge getting as posited by Bruner does not necessarily imply 
that students must only discover new mathematical content such as concepts, principles, 
generalizations and explanations, which was not previously discovered, but rather students 
should be given opportunities to reinvent selected mathematical content as contained in their 
pre-scribed curriculum documents. This means that teachers should design tasks that allow  
students to experience the same kind of steps, methods and processes that the original 
discoverers or inventors had used or may have followed to discover or invent the selected 
piece of  mathematical content. The latter notion of invoking students to retrace the path by 
which established mathematical content can be meaningfully discovered or invented, has 
been an underlying focus of  Klein’s (1924) ‘bio-genetic principle’  of teaching and 
presenting mathematical content.  
 
In essence, Klein (1924) as cited in De Villiers (2003) argues against the sole use of the 
axiomatic deductive approach to present mathematical content to students, and strongly 
argues for the use of the ‘bio-genetic principle’ in teaching mathematical topics so that 
students can gain first-hand experience as to how mathematical content can be discovered or 
invented, and thereby realize that mathematics is a process and not just a ‘meaningless’ body 
of knowledge imposed upon them. In this way, mathematics students could then become 
empowered and motivated to experiment, explore, conjecture, wrestle with questions and 





or further re-discover already invented mathematics on their own (Bruner, 1967; Freudenthal, 
1973; Polya, 1981). 
 
Likewise, Human (1978, p. 20) refers to the afore-described reinvention approach to 
mathematical development as the ‘reconstructive approach’, and as cited in De Villiers 
(2003a, p. 13) asserts that: 
 
“With this term we want to indicate that content is not directly introduced to students 
(as finished products of mathematical activity), but that the content is newly 
constructed during teaching in a typical mathematical manner by the teacher and /or 
the students.”  
 
Consistent with the learning theory of constructivism, the use of the re-constructive approach 
in classrooms provides an opportunity for students to be actively engaged with genuine 
mathematical processes such as specializing, conjecturing, generalizing, defining, 
convincing, axiomatizing and justifying by which they can reconstruct or develop 
mathematical content that is meaningful (De Villiers, 2003a; Njisane, 1992).   
 
One way to engage students in processes of mathematical activity that can lead up to a 
meaningful assimilation and/or accommodation of mathematical content is to provide 
environments such as Geometer’s Sketchpad, Geoemetric Supposer; Geo-gebra and 
Mathematica that allow for discoveries and insight. For instance, students could use 
Geometer’s Sketchpad to construct figures and then use the drag facility to produce numerous 
corresponding configurations. In this way students can observe which attributes of the figure 
remain invariant (i.e. constantly remain the same) when the figure is transformed in some 
way (i.e. when parts of the situation are varied). Hence, students could have a greater chance 
to visually see specific relationships playing out and/ or be encouraged make plausible 
conjectures, which they can later try to justify via the construction of a logical explanation 
(proof). In this way, students can be given an opportunity to experience a process of 
discovery that more closely reflects the way mathematics is often invented, and summarized 
by Bennett as follows: “A mathematician first visualizes and analyses a problem, making 
conjecture before attempting a proof” (Bennett, 2002, p. viii). 
 
However, Balacheff (1991, p. 89) in reference to Lakatos (1976) work on proofs and 






“Students have to learn mathematics as social knowledge; they are not free to choose 
the meanings they construct. These meanings must not only be efficient in problem 
solving, but also be coherent with those socially recognised. This condition is 
necessary for the future participation of students as adults in social activities. After the 
first few steps, mathematics can no longer be learned by means of interactions with a 
physical environment, but requires the confrontation of the students’ cognitive model 
with that of other students or of the teacher, in the context of the given mathematical 
activity. Especially in dealing with refutations, the relevance of overcoming what is at 
stake in the confrontation of two students’ understandings of a problem and its 
mathematical content.”  
 
Although discovery learning advocates that students should be given the necessary space and 
opportunity to work autonomously, discover as much as possible for themselves and take 
‘ownership’ of their work, it is prudent that teachers do not only facilitate but track their 
students’ progress so that they can intervene sensitively and guide them as and when 
necessary (Southwood & Spanneberg, 1996, p. 70). In general, the guidance rendered should 
not disturb or interfere with students’ line of thinking, but should provide just enough support 
to enable the students to move onto a plausible problem solving path or progress with the 
given problem (or investigation) to the extent that they can solve the given problem or 
discover mathematical results largely on their own by building on their existing knowledge 
and experiences. The latter pedagogic move is a key practice of the guided discovery 
approach to learning, which is grounded in cognitive and social constructivism (Eggen & 
Kauchak, 2007, p. 430). 
 
When employing the guided discovery approach in a classroom, it is customary for the 
teacher (or facilitator) to identify the learning outcomes for the given lesson (or task), and 
accordingly select the relevant target content (namely the concept, relationship, rule, 
generalization or proof) that s/he wants his/her students to discover or re-invent. Thereafter, 
the teacher (or facilitator) should design a sequential set of scaffolded questions that could 
lead to the target discovery or arrange the relevant information so that patterns can be found 
and generalizations be made. However, from the moment the students begin working on the 
teacher (or facilitator) designed task, the teacher (or facilitator) should continuously monitor 
their progress to identify their obstacles, and in the process offer the necessary guidance that 





connections that would culminate in the discovery of new results or the moment of ‘Eureka’ 
(Eggen & Kauchak, 2007; Mayer, 2004; Moreno, 2004; Snowman, McCown & Biehler, 
2009). Moreover as facilitators of knowledge construction in our classrooms we need to 
always bear in mind that learning is not promoted only through discovery and invention but 
also by social discourse involving justifying, negotiation, sharing, logical explanation and 
evaluation (Clements & Battista, 1990; Bruner, 1986).   
 
4.4 Analogical Transfer Including Gentner’’ Structure Mapping Theory 
4.4.1 Analogical Transfer 
As discussed in Section 2.1.3.1, analogy is synonymous to similarity. Extending on this 
notion of similarity, Schlimm (2008, p.178) says, “an analogy is a relation of similarity 
between two domains, where a domain is a fixed representation of certain aspects of a 
phenomenon, situation, process, problem, conceptual structure, etc., that are relevant for a 
particular analogy”.  In this context, a domain constitutes of a set of elements, referred to as 
objects, and a number of relations that hold between them (Schlimm, 2008, p. 178). 
Furthermore Schlimm (2008, p.179) says: “Although inferences by analogical transfer are 
neither truth-preserving nor infallible, analogical reasoning plays a prominent role in 
advancing science and mathematics.” Polya (1954a) has provided the mathematics 
community with an in-depth and comprehensive discussion of analogical reasoning in 
mathematics. According to Polya (1954a), clarifying  analogies, particularly those that are 
vague, unclear and ambiguous, is a pivotal pre-requisite for mathematical discovery.  
 
Thus Polya (1954a) describes three kinds of possible clarifications. Firstly, Polya (1954a, p. 
28) asserts that “analogy is a similarity of relations”, and affirms that the similarity is 
meaningful and plausible if the “relations are governed by the same laws”. For example, he 
says “addition of numbers is analogous to multiplication of numbers”, primarily because 
“both addition and multiplication are commutative and associative” and “both admit an 
inverse operation” (Polya, 1954a, p. 28). 
 
In addition,  Polya (1954, p. 28) asserts that “in general, system of objects subject to the same 
fundamental laws (axioms) may be considered as analogous to each other, and this kind of 
analogy has a completely clear meaning”. This approach to analogy-making advocated by 






Further to this, through a detailed discussion of the example, which illustrates addition of real 
numbers is analogous to the multiplication of positive numbers in another sense, Polya (1954, 
p. 29) demonstrates that “from any relation between original elements, we can conclude with 
certainty the corresponding elements of the translation , and vice versa”, and goes on to 
further state that “ a correct translation that is a one-to-one correspondence that preserves the 
law of certain relations, is called isomorphism in the technical language of the 
mathematician. Isomorphism is a fully clarified sort of analogy”. In light of this,  Polya 
(1954a, p. 29) claims that homorphism (or merohedral isomorphism) is another kind of 
clarified analogy, which he describes as a “systematically abridged translation”, wherein  
subtleties might get lost whilst representing  everything in the original  format but ensuring 
that relations are preserved, despite being at a reduced level. From the clarifications, Polya 
has alluded to both a common set of laws or axioms, and structure–preserving mappings 
(which are synonymous to Gentner’s (1983) Structure Mapping Theory (SMT)), as a means 
for making analogies precise. 
 
Although scientists and mathematicians have successfully employed the Axiomatic Approach 
to analogy making (Schimm, 2008), Gentner’s version of the Structure Mapping Theory 
(SMT)  evidently seems to have received much wider use, particularly in philosophy and 
cognitive psychology, and has gained even more attention in the analogical reasoning 
literature (Gholson, Smith, Burman & Duncan, 2004). 
 
4.4.2 The Structure Mapping Theory 
The Structure Mapping Theory (SMT) put forth by Gentner in 1983 and reaffirmed in 
Gentner (1989, p. 201), holds that “an analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one domain 
(the base) into another (the target), which conveys that a system of relations that holds 
amongst the base objects also holds among the target objects.” Equivalently, in mathematical 
language, “an analogy between two domains, is a mapping  f between the objects and 
relations of one domain (source) and another (target), such that if a relation R holds for some 
objects a1, a2,... in the source domain, the corresponding relation f (R) also holds for the 
objects f(a1), f( a2 )… in the target” (Schimm, 2008, p. 181).  
 
Thus, according to Gentner (1989, p. 201), in the context of analogy making, the focus is on 





to SMT, “in interpreting an analogy people seek to put the objects in the base in one-to-one 
correspondence with the objects in the target so as to obtain the maximum structural match,” 
but most importantly, “objects are placed in correspondence by virtue of their like roles in the 
common relational structure,” and not necessarily on any specific resemblance between the 
target objects and their corresponding base objects (Gentner, 1989, p. 201).  
Moreover, within the context of analogy making, Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov (2001), and 
Gentner & Markman (1997) set forth the view that structural alignment or mapping is 
characterized by structural consistency, relational focus and systematicity. According to 
Rattermann (1997, p. 251) structural consistency means that any matching relation must 
subscribe to the “one-to-one mapping constraint (i.e., an element in one domain 
representation corresponds to at most one element in the other representation) and to the 
parallel connectivity constraint (i.e. if elements correspond across two representations, then 
the elements that are linked to them must correspond to them as well)”. In particular, 
Schlimm (2008, p. 181) supports Gentner & Markman’s (1997, p. 47) assertion that “parallel 
connectivity requires that matching relations must have matching arguments” by actually 
stating that “every matching relation must have matching arguments (‘parallel connectivity’). 
The relational focus thrust emphasizes that “analogies must involve common relations but 
need not involve common object descriptions” (Gentner & Markman, 1997, p. 48). 
 According to Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov (2001, p. 11), the principle of systematicity 
makes possible “an implicit preference for deep, interconnected systems of relations 
governed by higher order relations, such as causal, mathematical or functional”, while 
Schlimm (2008, p. 181) equivalently says “systematicity requires the mapping to include as 
many higher order and inter-related connections as possible.”  According to Gentner & 
Markman (1997, p. 47), “a matching set of relations interconnected by higher order 
constraining relations makes a better analogical match than an equal number of matching 
relations that are unconnected to each other.” 
 
4.4.3 Another term for the process of analogy: cognitive blending 
Another term for the process of analogy is ‘cognitive blending’, which is almost certainly 
related to Gentner’s theory of Structural Mappings and gives helpful broad context for the 
central role of analogies in many forms of reasoning. In particular cognitive blending is 
associated with the discussion of meaning (including the technical term ‘semiotics’ the 
construction of meaning) and the kinds of ways we think (Fauconnier &  Turner, 2002). 





another input, we have built a blend”. Moreover reflecting and comprehending previous 
experienced ideas, theories, discourses and results enables one to bring their structures (or 
partial structures) into a blend characterized by a developing emergent structure that can 
enable one to solve a problem or explain a given result meaningfully (Rydning 2005). 
 
4.4.4 Analogy in the context of similarity & explanatory structure 
In order to accommodate the notion of an analogy as described in the above example, we find 
in the literature, the notions of relational similarity and surface similarity being clearly 
distinguished as follows: Surface similarity is defined as “an identity between two problem 
situations that play no causal role in determining the possible solution to one or the other 
analog” (Gentner,1989, p. 219), whereas relational similarity  refers to “correspondences 
between objects that play parallel roles in the source and target” (Richland, Holyoak & 
Stigler, 2004, p. 238), and in particular, encompasses identities linked to causal relationships 
or “higher order relations such as cause or implied” (Gholson, Smith, Buhrman & Duncan, 
1997, p. 157). In particular, Forbus, Gentner  and Law (1995) and  Gentner, Rattermann and 
Forbus (1993) as cited in  Ratterman (1997, p. 250), suggest that if the representations 
between domains are “aligned based on common relational structures, they then exhibit 
relational similarity and thus “form an analogy”, and “if the representations are aligned based 
on common objects or characteristics they form either literal similarity matches (when both 
objects and relations match) or mere appearance matches (when only the objects and some 
relations align.” 
 
 According to  Vosniadou (1989, p. 414) an analogy exists between any domains that “share a 
similar explanatory structure”. In this study the broad domains are considered to be 
equilateral triangles, rhombi (rhombuses), pentagons, …, any equi-sided polygons. In 
essence, Vosniadou (1989, p. 414) postulates that analogical reasoning can occur “…between 
any two systems (concepts, theories, stories), which belong to fundamentally different or 
remote conceptual domains…”, or “…to the same or at least very close conceptual 
domains…”, as long as they share a similar explanatory structure. In particular, Vosniadou 
(1989, pp. 414-415) refers to the analogies as “between domain analogies” and “within 
domain analogies” respectively. However, “within domain analogies are regarded as literal 
similarities by some theories of analogy” (Vosniadou 1989, p. 415). For instance, Gentner as 
cited in Vosniadou (1989, p. 415)  is of the firm view that “within domain comparisons are 





relational properties.” Otherwise, in all other respects,  Vosniadou (1989, p. 414) concurs 
with Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory, by actually stating (1) “the process of reasoning 
by analogy involves transfer of structural information from source to target system, and (2) 
“this transfer of knowledge is accomplished by mapping or matching processes, which 
consist of finding correspondences between two systems.”  
However, Vosniadou (1989, p. 416), argues that distinguishing between “within domain” and 
“between domain” comparisons, is not the driving necessity when ascertaining the “process 
of reasoning by analogy”, but contends that reasoning by analogy can even be applied to “any 
two items that belong to the same fundamental category if it involves transferring an 
explanatory structure from one item to the other.”  
In more general terms the “analogy mechanism”, proposed by  Vosniadou (1989, p. 416), 
functions as follows irrespective of the nature of the given domains: 
 The system retrieves a familiar source example together with an explanation 
of how this source example satisfies some goal (e.g., Find the dimensions of a 
workshop for the area to be a maximum and find its maximum area) 
 The system maps the explanation derived from the source onto the target and 
attempts to find out if this explanation is justified by the target example. 
 If the target example justifies the explanation, then it is concluded that it 
satisfies the goal. (Find the dimensions of a closed box for which its total 
surface area will be a minimum). 
Below is a typical example which can illustrate the transfer of the explanatory structure from 
the source system to the target system. These two problems under discussion in the given 
example, deal with finding maxima and minima using derivatives, and thus one could say that 
in this case we are dealing with problems in the same fundamental category. However, the 
first problem relates to the concept area (or a 2-dimensional figure on plane), whilst the 
second problem relates to the concept volume (or a 3-dimension figure in space), and 
consequently one may tend to say that because these are two different conceptual domains 
then this equivalently means we are dealing with ‘between domain analogies’.  
Figure 4.4.1 illustrates the transfer of the explanatory structure from the source system to the 
target system. These two problems under discussion in the given example, deal with finding 
maxima and minima using derivatives, and thus one could say that in this case we are dealing 
with problems in the same fundamental category. However, the first problem relates to the 





concept volume (or a 3-dimension figure in space), and consequently one may tend to say 
that because these are two different conceptual domains then this equivalently means we are 
dealing with ‘between domain analogies’. 
 
In the example as shown in Figure 4.4.1, it is quite evident that source (base) system can 
share many similar properties with the target system, but nevertheless “the reasoning process 
is analogical in nature because it rests on the mapping of an explanatory structure from the 
source system to the target system” (Vosniadou, 1989, p. 416). Moreover, the examples as 
shown in Figure 4.4.1, also illustrate the notion of “structural alignment” proposed by 
Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory. In other words, when one reflects on the explanation 
structure related to the source system and target system respectively in Figure 4.4.1, we find 
elements of structural consistency, relational focus and systematicity upheld. 
 
Firstly, there exists a common relation focus between both problems, primarily because both 
problems are associated with the application of derivatives to solve applied optimization 
problems (i.e. applied maximum and minimum problems using calculus methods). In this 
case, the student has realized that finding the dimensions of the rectangular box for which the 
volume will be a maximum is just the same procedure as finding the dimensions of the 
parking bay for which the area will be maximum, although in the target case we are dealing 
with a 3D-shape (or volume) and in the source target we are dealing with a 2-D shape (or 
area). Basically, the student has invoked or retrieved the source problem to attempt to solve 
the target problem. In retrieving the solution structure of the source problem, the student 
actually managed to retrieve or assemble the representation of the solution of the source 
problem on paper (or in his mind). In doing so, the student mapped the relational structure of 
the source problem (one that was previously solved) onto the new problem (target problem), 
and thus was able to solve the target problem using structure or steps of the source problem, 
by adapting it wherever necessary (see English, 1998; Rattermann, 1997), for example (a) in 
Step 2, constructing the volume formula for the given target problem, by first finding the 
surface area of the box in terms of the variables x and h, and then equating it to the volume of 
600 cm
3
, and thus deriving  h =  
       
  
 ; as well as in step 5, where the student had to solve 







 Source System  Target System 
Problem  A garage owner wants to build a 
rectangular parking bay with a perimeter 
of 80m so that it encloses the maximum 
area. Determine the dimensions of the 
workshop for the area to be a maximum 
and find this maximum area. 
 A rectangular box has no lid, and is made from 600 
cm2 sheet metal and is h cm high. The length of the 
container is two times as long as it is wide. 
Determine the dimensions of the rectangular box 
for which its volume will be a maximum and 
calculate this maximum volume. 
Step 1 Draw a diagram to represent the situation 




 Draw a diagran to represent the situation 
 
 
Step 2 Insert the dimensions of the rectangle onto 
the diagram 
 Let length be x m. 
breadth is (40 –x )m 
 Insert the dimensions of the rectangular box onto 
the diagram. Let breadth be x cm. 
length  is 2x cm 
Now the height h, also has to be expressed in terms 
of x: 
Surface area of the box = 600 cm2  
2(2xh) + 2(xh) + 2x2 = 600         
6xh + 2x2 = 600  
 6xh + 2x2 = 600  
 h =  
       
  
 
Step 3 Express the Area (A) of the parking bay in 
terms of x.  
A = x ( 40- x) 
  = 40x - x2 
  Express the Volume of the box in terms of x. 
V  = lbh    = (2x)(x).
       
  
 
                 = 
          
  
  = 200 x - 
   
 
 
Step 4 Find 
  
  
 :                
  
  
 = 40 -2x  Find 
  
  
  :           
  
  
 = 200 - 




                         = 200 – 2x2    
Step 5 For maximum Area (A),  
  
  
 = 0  
       40 -2x = 0 
       x = 20 
for maximum area, the dimensions of 
the parking bay  are  20m x 20m and 
maximum area (A) =  40x - x2  
                          = 40(20) – (20)2 = 400 m2 
 For maximum Volume,  
  
  
 = 0  
        200 – 2x2 = 0  
         x2  =  100  
          x  =  10 
   x = 10  (x > 0, breadth of container)  
for maximum volume, dimensions are 20 cm x 
10cm x 6 
 
 
 cm, and  
Maximum volume = 200 (10) – 
      
 
 
             = 1333,33 cm3 





Secondly, with regard to structural consistency, there is certainly a kind of “structural 
parallelism (consistent, one-to-one correspondence between the elements) that exists between 
the two representational structures” (Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov, 2001, p.11), in particular 
with respect to the strategy to solve the source and target problems respectively (see Figure 
4.4.1). In other words, the matching relations have matching arguments (i.e. parallel 
connectivity is explicit between the source and target.                              
 
Thirdly, in the above example, the principle of systematicity is invoked, because in both 
cases, the relation is governed by the same higher order mathematical relation, namely the 
use of derivatives to determine the maxima or minima of a given function. In particular, the 
rules of differentiation were used to determine the critical points of the function A in the 
source problem, and function V in the target problem respectively, by using the fact that a 
critical point occurs at a point where the derivative is zero. Thus in the source case, A´(x) was 
found and then set to be equal to zero, like A´(x) = 0, which was subsequently solved to find 
the critical value(s) that gives the maximum value of A(x). Similarly, in the target case, V´(x) 
was found, then equated to zero, and subsequently solved to determine the critical values, 
which will generate the maximum value of V(x). 
From the above discussions, it seems that Gentner’s principle of structural alignment or 
mapping that is used to determine relational commonalities between a source and target, is 
also embedded in ’s notion of analogical reasoning, which primarily holds the transfer of an 
explanatory structure as the pivotal determinant of analogical making or reasoning. However, 
it is not necessary to have a one-to-one mapping for every element (or step/aspects) in the 
source and target, but it is essential for those elements (or steps/aspects) that are connected 
and play a role in developing an argument or solution to the target case or problem at hand. 
 
Further to this, from an axiomatic approach to analogies, Schlimm (2008, p.181) 
acknowledges that in mathematical terms, an analogy can be represented as an isomorphism, 
where “(i) every object of the source is mapped to a unique object of the target and  (ii) every 
object of the target is assigned to an object of the source” , or by an embedding or partial 
embedding. Furthermore, according to Gentner and Markman (2005) as cited in Schlimm 
(2008), an analogy can also be characterized by homomorphisms, “where more than one 






Thus according to Schlimm (2008, p. 182), analogical transfer can also be described as 
follows: “The morphism determines a substructure that is common to the source and target 
domains, and those features (objects or relations) that are connected to this substructure and 
present in the source, but not in the target domains, are projected into the target”.  
 
In accordance with the axiomatic approach to analogies, two systems (or domains) are 
analogous if the objects or elements within each system (or domain) are “subject to the same 
fundamental laws or axioms” (Schlimm, 2008, p. 189). Moreover, Schlimm (2008, p. 189) 
says that: , “the assessment of the structural alikeness of two domains in terms of laws or 
axioms depends on being able to find formal statements (or axioms) that, when appropriately 
interpreted, are true in both domains. These statements then express commonalities between 
the domains, that is, the positive analogies.” Schlimm (2008, p. 191) demonstrates these 
distinctions by using examples from group theory, concluding that “the structure- mapping 
explication of analogies fails in certain object rich domains (which are very common in 
mathematics), whereas the axiomatic approach to analogies is not subject to the same 
limitations and can characterize analogies in an informative way.” Despite the failure of SMT 
under certain conditions, it is widely used particularly in relation-rich domains, associated 
with philosophy, cognitive psychology, and science. However, the notion of relational 
similarity, which is the core entity in analogy making between domains, is embedded in both 
approaches, namely, the structure mapping approach and the axiomatic approach. Thus, we 
could regard these approaches, as approaches that support each other in analogy making, 
particularly in the context of mathematics. 
 
According to Schlimm (2008, p. 192), “the process of explicating analogies by means of 
common axiomatization has also a number of important practical consequences, which can 
strongly influence further developments and prompt new discoveries.” Moreover, the 
axiomatic approach allows one the opportunity to determine the system of axioms that 
represents a specific domain, or to establish the essential commonalities amongst the 
domains, and thereby use it as a basis to assess whether the observed analogy can be applied 
to other structures in terms of finding new analogies. This essentially means that 
“axiomatically expressed knowledge about the structural similarity between two domains can 






Regardless of  whatever approach is used, the “transfer of relational knowledge across 
contexts is of central importance in human cognition”, more so in the context of analogical 
transfer leading to generalizations and new discoveries (Gentner et al., 2004, p. 586). 
Moreover Gick & Holyoak (1983) as cited in Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson (2004, 
p.586), asserts that, “one way to promote structural transfer is by comparing two initial 
examples (or cases),” primarily because the nature of the comparison itself provides a more 
salient and broader understanding of the common relational structure (Gentner & Markman, 
1997). According to Kurtz, Miao & Gentner (2001) as cited in Gentner et al. (2004, p. 586) 
this process or procedure of comparing two examples or partly understood examples in order 
to ascertain a “common interpretation” is called “analogical encoding”. Indeed, using 
analogical encoding, Catrambone & Holyoak (1989) as cited in Gentner et al.(2004, p. 586),  
“demonstrated comparing two initial examples can facilitate deriving schema, which in turn 
facilitates transfer to a structurally similar cases or problem.” Indeed Gentner, Loewenstein & 
Thompson (2004, p. 586), further finds that “comparing two structurally similar examples 
(analogical encoding) not only facilitates transfer to future structurally similar cases, but also 
the retrieval of prior structurally similar examples or cases from memory.” Furthermore, 
Richland, Holyoak, & Stigler et al. (2004, p. 38) also claims that “analogical comparison can 
result in the formation of abstract schemas to represent the underlying structure of the source 
and target objects, thereby enhancing reasoners’ capacity to transfer learning across 
contexts.” 
 
Based on the various discussions presented in Section 4.4, I propose to adopt Gentner’s 
Structure Mapping Theory ( SMT) for this study based on the following  critical factors: 
 Analogical reasoning involves transferring an explanatory structure between any two 
items (or systems or domains). In other words, analogical reasoning is not restricted to 
fundamentally different or remote conceptual domains (which are normally referred to 
as “between- domain analogies” in the literature). 
 Structural parallelism is consistent, one to one correspondence between mapped 








4.5 Forms of Meaningful learning as viewed in Assimilation Theory 
According to Ausubel’s Assimilation Theory (as cited in Ausubel, Novak and Hanesian, 
1978, p. 68), “new information is linked to relevant, pre-existing aspects of cognitive 
structure and both the newly acquired information and the pre-existing structure are modified 
in the process. …most meaningful learning is essentially the assimilation of new 
information.”  In other words, when new information is acquired through linking it with ones 
existing schemas or cognitive strcutures, then meaningful learning is said to occur (Ausubel 
et al,. 1978).  Ausubel (as cited in Ausubel et al., 1978) proposed the following processes by 
which meaningful learning occurs: (i) subordinate learning which constitutes ‘subsumption’ 
(derivative subsumption and correlative subsumption), (ii) ‘superordinate learning’, and (iii) 
‘combinatorial learning’.  However, “a primary process in learning is subsumption, in which 
new material is related to relevant ideas (or previous knowledge) in the existing cognitive 
structure on a non-verbatim basis (previous knowledge)” (Aziz, Razali, Hasan, & Yunos,  
2009, p. 10). 
 
4.5.1 Subsumption 
According to Ausubel et al. (1978, p. 58), “in both concept learning and propositional 
learning, new information is frequently linked or anchored to relevant aspects of an 
individual’s existing cognitive structure.” This process of linking new information to pre-
existing information or concepts in the individual’s cognitive structure is what Ausubel has 
termed subsumption. However, when this new information is subsumed or incorporated into 
one’s cognitive structure under more inclusive and general ideas, it is organized 
hierarchically in terms of the level of abstraction, generality, and inclusiveness of ideas, thus 
making it possible for the new learning to be related in a hierarchical manner to previous 
ideas, concepts or propositions (compare Ausubel et al., 1978;  Cooper, 2009). Consequently, 
Ausubel et al. (1978, p. 58 ) says, “the emergence of new propositional meanings most 
typically reflects a subordinate relationship of the new material to the existing cognitive 
structure.”  
 
Ausubel (1962, p. 217) argues that when one encounters new information, the natural first 
process is to “subsume the new information under a relevant and more inclusive conceptual 
scheme.”  Furthermore, Ausubel (1962, p. 17) asserts that “the very fact that it is subsumable 
(relatable to stable elements in cognitive structure), accounts for its meaningfulness and 
makes possible perception of insightful relationships.” However, if one encounters 





learning as opposed to meaningful learning takes place (Ausubel, 1962; Cooper, 2009). 
Moreover, the resultant rote learning may possibly give rise to development of a new 
cognitive structure, which may assist with meaningful learning at some other time (see 
Cooper, 2009; Ausubel et al., 1978). 
 
As alluded to earlier, there are essentially two different kinds of subsumption, namely 
derivative subsumption and correlative subsumption. 
 
4.5.1.1 Derivative subsumption  
       
       Established idea    
          A 
 
          
    New   a5 a1 a2   a3  a4 
  
Figure 4.5.1.1: Derivative subsumption (see Ausubel et al., 1978,  p  .68) 
         
According to Ausubel et al., (1978, p. 68), in derivative subsumption,” new information a5 is 
linked to the superordinate idea A and represents another case or extension of A. The critical 
attributes of the concept A are not changed, but new examples are recognized as relevant.” 
This essentially means that the new cases or examples that learners comprehend or 
understand, are part and parcel or just mere examples of an established system of concepts or 
propositions that learners have already learned or are familiar with, or “it is just supportive or 
illustrative of a previously learned concept or proposition” (Ausubel et al., 1978).  
Furthermore,  Ausubel et al., (1978, p. 58) states that “in either case the new material to be 
learned is directly and self-evidently derivable from or implicit in an already established and 
more inclusive concept or proposition in cognitive structure.” 
 
Example 1:  
 Previous Knowledge: Let’s suppose Rajen has acquired the concept of a quadrilateral 
in grade 5. He knows that a quadrilateral is any closed figure in the plane with four 
vertices and four straight sides. However, in grasping the quadrilateral concept, Rajen 
only experienced examples of the following shapes as quadrilaterals: trapezium, 








Trapezium  Rectangle  Square        
 
 Now in grade 6, Rajen encounters for the first time a “kite” quadrilateral, which 
actually fits his previous conception of a quadrilateral. In other words, the object, 
which in this case is the kite, reflects the characteristic property of a quadrilateral, 






                                       Kite 
 Consequently, the idea of a “kite” quadrilateral is linked and consolidated into his 
idea of a quadrilateral, without effectively changing the idea of a quadrilateral in any 
significant way. 
 
4.5.1.2 Correlative subsumption 
 
            Established idea 
           X 
 
          
            New        y   u  v      W  
                
 Figure 4.5.1.2: Correlative subsumption (see Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 68) 
 
According to Ausubel et al., (1978, p. 68), “in correlative subsumption, new information y is 
linked to the idea X, but is an extension, modification, or qualification of X. The criterial 
attributes of the subsuming concept may be extended or modified with new correlative 
subsumption.”  This essentially means that an existing or previously learnt concept (or 
proposition)  can be modified, extended or elaborated upon by subsuming the related new 







 Previous Knowledge: Let’s suppose Rajen has acquired the concept of a simple closed 
quadrilateral in grade 5. He knows that a simple closed quadrilateral is a quadrilateral 
with straight sides only meeting at the vertices.  Furthermore, his concept of a simple 
quadrilateral is limited to a convex quadrilateral, which is a simple closed 
quadrilateral with none of its angles reflexive. 
 However, in grade 6, Rajen encounters a new kind of simple closed quadrilateral with 
one of its angles being reflexive, called the concave quadrilateral.  
 Hence, Rajen has to revamp or broaden his idea of a simple closed quadrilateral, in 
order to accommodate the idea of concave quadrilateral. So, in other words, Rajen 
must change his conception of simple closed quadrilaterals from that which only 
contains convex quadrilateral to one that contains both convex and concave 
quadrilaterals. When this happens we say correlative subsumption has taken place. 
 
In the case of correlative subsumption, one is inclined to say that this kind of learning “is 
more valuable learning than that of derivative subsumption”, particularly because it adds 
value and develops a better understanding of the established concept or idea (Alexander, 
2004, p. 2).  Moreover, Ausubel et al. (1978, p. 58) asserts that  “new subject matter is 
learned by correlative subsumption.”  
 
4.5.2. Superordinate learning: 
             New idea A     
 
          
       Established ideas      a1     a2   a3 
  
Figure 4.5.2: Superordinate Learning (see Ausubel: 1978, p. 68) 
 
“In superordinate learning, established ideas a1, a2 and a3 are recognised as more specific 
examples of the new idea A and become linked to A. Superordinate idea A is defined by a 
new set of criterial attributes that encompass the subordinate ideas” (Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 
68). This means that in our mathematics classrooms, our learners could very well learn a new 
concept or inclusive proposition that could serve as an umbrella concept to subume already 






According to Ausubel et al., (1978, p. 59), superordinate learning is prevalent in activities 
that either involve inductive reasoning or synthesis of component ideas, and “occurs more 
commonly in conceptual than propositional learning”. 
 
Example: 
 Rajen was familiar and well acquainted or conversant with the following 
quadrilaterals: rectangles, squares and isosceles trapezoids. However, he did not know 
that they were all examples of cyclic quadrilaterals, until he was taught that any 
quadrilateral with opposite angle supplementary is cyclic. 
 In this case, Rajen was already aware of these quadrilaterals, but he was not aware  
that they were special cases of cyclic quadrilaterals, until it was explained to him 
(probably by his teacher) or discovered by himself perhaps by dragging a cyclic 
quadrilateral in a dynamic geometry environment into each of these cases. This is 
typically a case of superordinate  learning. 
 
4.5.3. Combinatorial Learning  
 
                      New Idea  A  B – C- D (Established Ideas) 
   
Figure 4.5.3.1: Combinatorial Learning (see Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 68) 
 
“In combinatorial learning New Idea A is seen as related  to existing ideas B, C, and D but 
neither is more inclusive nor more specific than Ideas, B, C, and D. In this case the New Idea 
A is seen to have some critical attributes in pre-existing ideas” (Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 68).  
This essentially means that previous knowledge does serve as the foundation or prerequisite, 
upon which a new idea is developed or formulated, but the development of the new idea or 
proposition “bears neither a subordinate or superordinate relationship to the particular 




A carpenter wanting to design a door, may need to refer to his knowledge about the 





door he wants. Moreover, the carpenter must know when to use a square, rectangular or 
circular shaped door if he is designing a cabinet. 
 
Furthermore, according to Aziz, Razali, Hasan and Yonos (2009), combinatorial learning is 
equivalent to analogy making or analogical thinking. According to Holyoak & Gentner 
(2001), the ‘process of analogical thinking’ is made up of connected sub-processes. For 
example, in a typical reasoning scenario, the following processes will be invoked as per 
Holyoak & Gentner’s line of thinking (2001, p. 13): 
 “One or more relevant analogs stored in long- term memory must be accessed” 
 “A familiar analog must be mapped to the target analog to identify systematic 
correspondences between the two, thereby aligning the corresponding parts of each 
analog” 
 “The resulting mapping allows analogical inferences to be made about the target 
analog, thus creating new knowledge to fill gaps in understanding” 
 “These inferences need to be evaluated and possibly be adapted to fit the unique 
requirements of the target” 
 “Finally in the aftermath of analogical reasoning, learning can result in the generation 
of new categories and schemas, the addition of new instances to memory, and new 




Let’s consider the factorization of a trinomial of the general form ax
2
 + bx + c. A student for 
example, could easily factorize  3x
2
 + 10 xy + 8y
2
, to produce the factors (3x +4y) (x +2y). 
However, when requested to factorize the expression, 3(a + b)
2
 + 10 (a+b) (a-b) + 8 (a-b)
2
, 
the student observes a similarity with the example, 3x
2
 + 10 xy + 8y
2
. By using a previous 
idea of substitution, namely, x =  (a + b) and y = (a-b), the student then transforms the 3(a + 
b)
2
 + 10 (a+b) (a-b) + 8 (a-b)
2
 to read as 3x
2
 + 10 xy + 8y
2
, which s/he factorizes by referring 





 + 10 (a+b) (a-b) + 8 (a-b)
2
 
Let x =  (a + b) and y = (a-b), 
Therefore Expression = 3x
2
 + 10 xy + 8y
2   








(3x +4y) (x +2y)   ……… Factorizes the trinomial
 
  = {3((a + b) + 4(a-b)}{(a + b) + 2(a-b)} … substitutes in trinomial 




 Figure 4.5.3.2: Analogy Making: hypercube from a 3D cube (see de Villiers, 2008, p. 35) 
 
A hypercube (a four dimension cube) can be defined by analogy from a three-dimensional 
cube. According to de Villiers (2008, p. 35), “a cube when viewed directly from the front 
appears like a square with corresponding vertices …(i.e. a 2-D representation of a 3-D 
object)”. Thus, “by analogy a hypercube could be considered as a cube inside a cube (i.e. a 3-
D representation of a 4D object” (see de Villiers, 2009, p. 35). This analogical process is 
illustrated in Figure 4.5.3.2. 
 
Furthermore, according to Ausubel et al., (1978), students develop new generalizations , such 
as the hypercube from the 3D cube, even across different learning areas or fields, through 
combinatorial learning. For example, relationships between mass and energy, heat and 












4.6 Piaget’s Equilibration Theory, Conceptual Change & Cognitive 
     Conflict 
 
4.6.1 Piaget’s Equilibration Theory 
Piaget’s cognitive theory suggests that cognitive development is “propelled by the human 
need for cognitive equilibrium – that is a state of mental balance” (Berger, 2004, p.43). In 
light of this, when a person is confronted with a new experience (or new information) within 
or outside the classroom, then he or she naturally attempts to interpret and understand such 
new experiences in relation to his existing understandings, knowledge and schemas. If in the 
event that the person’s new experience or new idea ‘slots’ in nicely with the person’s existing 
schemas or understandings then equilibrium may prevail upon otherwise cognitive 
disequilibrium. An imbalance that produces confusion, doubt, questions, dissonance, discord, 
, may prevail within the existing cognitive structure (schemata) (Berger, 2004; Gage & 
Berliner, 1992; Piaget, 1978, 1985). This imbalance then necessitates some intellectual work 
to restore equilibrium, which in Piaget’s terms means that the person must adapt in some way 
to the new experience or information (Piaget, 1978, 1985).  
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.6.1, assimilation and accommodation are two processes of 
adaptation that could restore equilibrium (Berger, 2004; Piaget, 1978, 1985). Assimilation “is 
the process of changing what is perceived so that it fits present cognitive structures” (Gage & 
Berliner, 1992, p. 216). This means “reinterpreting new experiences so that they fit into the 
old ideas” (Berger, 2004, p. 43) or already available cognitive structures (schemas). On the 
other hand, accommodation is “the process of changing cognitive structures so that they fit 
what is perceived” (Gage & Berliner, p. 216), that is “revamping old ideas so that they can fit 
the new experiences” (Berger, 2004, p. 43) 
 
The journey (as illustrated in Figure 4.6.1.1) from a state of equilibrium to a state of 
disequilibrium as a result of some kind of conflict or contradictory statement and the 
subsequent return to a state of equilibrium through either the process of accommodation or 
process of assimilation constitutes the process of equilibration (Berger, 2004; O’Donell, 
































Further to this, Piaget (1985, p. 6) asserts that theory of equilibration is underpinned by the 
following two postulates: 
“First postulate: Every assimilatory scheme tends to incorporate external elements  
that are compatible with it.” 
Second postulate: Every assimilatory scheme has to be accommodated to the elements 
it assimilates, but the changes made to adapt it to an object’s peculiarities must be 
effected without loss of continuity.” 
 
The first postulate reaffirms that when an individual encounters new information or 
challenges, the first natural attempt on the part of the individual is to map it onto existing 
schemata that is very similar to the new information or challenge. Furthermore, it certainly 
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does not suggest the construction of any new structures. However, the second postulate 
suggests that modifications, reconstructions or refinements must be made to match existing 
schema to house the new information or knowledge in the mind, but the original schema that 
served as source for the construction of the new schema must be preserved and retained as 
part of the cognitive structure so that it could continue to play a role in direct assimilation of 
information that it was accustomed to assimilate prior to the development of the new schema. 
Thus, in essence the second postulate affirms that previous knowledge is never erased (see 
Piaget, 1978, 1985). 
 
Below are some examples that characterize the process of equilibration. Firstly, suppose a 
learner’s experience with quadrilaterals was limited to convex quadrilaterals only. In other 
words, the only quadrilaterals that the learner experienced were simple closed quadrilaterals 











Suppose that in a class tutorial, it is the first time that the learner sees a concave quadrilateral 
(see Figure 4.6.1.3), and the task requires the learner to describe the figure to his/her 
classmate. It is plausible that this task could create some perturbation in the learner, and 
moreover create internal cognitive conflict when attempting to reconcile the concave 
quadrilateral with his existing understanding or schemata. However, by initially looking at 
the figure with some kind of classroom support, it is plausible that the learner would realize 
that it is a simple closed quadrilateral by merely observing that  is a quadrilateral with sides 
only meeting at the vertices. Furthermore, via some facilitator or peer support the learner may 
look at the angles and notice that one of the angles is reflexive. Thus as a result of  invoking 
the existing schema of a simple closed (convex) quadrilateral schema and focusing on the 
measure of the angles, the learner may probably tell his classmate that it is a simple closed 
 
 





quadrilateral with one of its angles reflexive. In this way, the concept of simple closed 
quadrilaterals is expanded to include concave quadrilaterals.  
 
This is the process of assimilation, wherein a new idea has contributed to the development of 
an existing schema of the learner, by: (a) expanding his/her existing concept of a simple 
closed quadrilateral, which was initially limited to convex quadrilaterals, to now include 
concave quadrilaterals as well, and (b) entrenching the aforementioned distinctions through 
the element of differentiation, namely reflexive angles i.e. all angles not reflexive versus one 
angle being reflexive (see Olivier, 1989). The aforementioned expansion invariably can help 
to eliminate the initial perturbation the learner has experienced and thereby contribute to the 
restoration of equilibrium within the cognitive structures. Moreover, since the assimilation of 
the concave quadrilateral into the simple closed quadrilateral schema (called the original 
assimilatory schema) was successful, the original assimilatory schema must be transformed 
into a new assimilatory schema. (i.e. modifications) must take place. This effectively means 
that the learner must reconstruct or reorganize his simple closed quadrilateral schema to 
include a new type of quadrilateral, namely a concave quadrilateral, within the parameters of 
Piaget’s postulate 2.  Once this modification (a biological process) of the simple closed 
quadrilateral schema has taken place, we say that accommodation of the concave 
quadrilateral has occurred in the cognitive structure (Melis, Ulrich & Goguadze, 2009; 
Piaget, 1978, 1985).  
 
Through this process of accommodation, the mind adapts itself to the new evidence/context, 
and it is in this sense we say that conceptual change has occurred in the mind of the learner 
with regard to the concept ‘simple closed quadrilateral’ and that equilibrium has been 
established. The consequence of the resultant conceptual change and associated equilibrium 
is that in future when the learner sees a replica of Figure 4.6.1.3, he would most probably 
recognize it as a simple closed quadrilateral – free from any kind of perturbation, dissonance 
or discord, i.e. it will be immediately assimilated without any conflict. 
 
Just as we have seen the interplay between the two processes, assimilation and 
accommodation, in bringing about conceptual change and restoring equilibrium with regard 
to the aforementioned concept of simple closed quadrilateral, the same kind of interplay 
prevails between the two processes continuously  in other instances pertaining to conceptual 
change/development as well. However, in cases where a learner is faced with a new 





disequilibrium will definitely arise. In such instances of disequilibrium the process of 
accommodation and not assimilation has to ‘kick’ in first in order to restore equilibrium i.e. 
schema (or schemata) must be reconstructed and re-organized to realize the desired 
equilibrium within the cognitive structures (Berger, 2004; Piaget 1978, 1985). The latter 
position is to some extent illustrated in the Hadas, Hershkowitz and Schwartz (2000) study 
wherein two tasks, namely the sum of the interior angles of a polygon (called Task A) and the 
sum of the exterior angles of a polygon (called Task B), were designed and given to about 90 
grade 8 learners to do within a dynamic geometry environment pair-wise. In particular, the 
activity was structured as follows: 
 
“Task A: Measure (with the software) the sum of the interior angles in polygons as 
the number of sides increases. Generalize, and explain your conclusion. 
Task B: Measure (with software) the sum of the exterior angles of a quadrilateral. 
Hypothesize the sum of the exterior angles for polygons as the number of sides 
increases. Check your hypothesis by measuring and explain what you found” (Hadas, 
Hershkowitz and Schwartz, 2000, p. 132) 
 
After experimenting with the sum of the interior angles across several simple closed polygons 
like the triangle, quadrilateral, pentagon, hexagon, a large number of the students (32 reports)  
generalized “that the sum of the interior angles increases by 180
0
 when the number of sides 
increases by 1”; a fair amount of students (18 reports)  expressed their generalization through 
either one of the following general algebraic formulae (or rules), “                 
                  ”; and 5 pairs of students generalized in  both aforementioned ways 
(Hadas, Hershkowitz and Schwartz, 2000, p. 132). Furthermore, the majority of the learners 
attempted to provide an explanation for their generalization by “generalizing their 
measurements, or, by adding a triangle when the number of sides increases by one.” The 










Figure 4.6.1.4:  Students’ drawings of various explanations in Task A (Hadas, 






However, it is quite plausible that the aforementioned generalization may be a new idea or 
experience for the student, which may not be consistent or compatible with his/her existing 
schema, and thus may cause some perturbation in the learner. To relieve the learner from 
such perturbation, it then becomes necessary that the student change or reconstruct existing 
schema to accept or accommodate the new information (Piaget, 1978, 1985). Through the 
successful accommodation of the new information, more powerful knowledge will be 
developed and equilibrium will thereby be restored. 
  
Now moving onto Task B, Hadas, Hershkowitz and Schwartz (2000) reports that 37 of the 49 
responses (8 individual interview responses and 41 written responses from students working 
in pairs) initially conjectured that the sum of the exterior angles of a simple closed polygon 
increases as the number of sides increases. However, the latter conjecture captured the 
generalization that students constructed and justified earlier in Task A. It is quite plausible 
that the students’ experiences in Task A, wherein they constructed and explained  the 
generalization pertaining to the interior angle sum of a polygon, and their subsequent 
accommodation of the idea (or generalization) within their cognitive structures, may have 
impacted on the construction of the students’ initial conjecture in Task B. In other words, it is 
quite possible that the nature of the information in the hypothesis question of Task B, 
triggered the retrieval of the modified schema established with regard to the generalization in 
Task A, which acted as an assimilatory scheme for the question in task B and  unfortunately 
resulted in an incorrect conjecture being produced in Task B. 
 
Nevertheless, when the students attempted to validate their conjecture they made in Task B 
by measuring the sum of the exterior angles of particular polygons using the measuring tool 
within a geometric dynamic environment, they were rather surprised to find that the sum of 
the exterior angles were always remaining fixed at 360
0
. This contradiction appears to have 
challenged students’ established schemata, and hence disturbed the equilibrium i.e. it brought 
about disequilibrium (or cognitive conflict). This experienced cognitive conflict sparked an 
interest in the students, causing them to want to understand “why”?. Hence, the subsequent 
discourse around the surprise result focused on students providing explanations for their 
surprising result. In total fifty different explanations spanned across the following five 
categories: No explanations (17 responses), inductive explanation (2 responses), partial 
deductive explanation (6 responses), visual-variations explanation (16 responses), and 






In such a pedagogical environment where learners are encouraged to provide explanations 
and come to understand why their result is true, it is plausible to conjecture that learners 
would  be in a much better position to reconstruct and reorganize their existing schema (or 
schemata) to accept the new (surprising result), and thus regain cognitive harmony or 
equilibrium. Consequently, if  such students are posed the question like ‘what is the sum of 
the exterior angles of decagon’, at some later point of their schooling career, they would 
probably  recognize it as some kind of familiar information, and naturally invoke the ‘sum of 
the exterior angle of a polygon” schema to respond to such a question, obviously with 
virtually no perturbation whatsoever, i.e. they will easily assimilate the information or 
question into their existing cognitive structures and respond with a fair degree of ease. 
 
Once a new experience or idea has been accommodated, and afterwards learners come across 
a similar concept, idea or question in other contexts or experiences, it is plausible that may be 
able to assimilate it directly into the related schema easily and thereby maintain (or retain)  
the equilibrium status within their cognitive structures. Furthermore, we have seen via the 
aforementioned examples in this section that accommodation can occur first and then 
assimilation or vice versa, much of which depends largely on the degree of compatibility of 
the new idea or experience with existing schemas. In this respect, Donald, Lazarus, and 
Lolwana (1997, p. 45) says:  
 
“Progressive accommodations create more possibilities of assimilations and vice 
versa, in ever expanding cycles. These have to be organized and kept in a sort of 
dynamic balance across the child’s different maps, and in relation to his ‘whole’ 
map of the world at any specific time.” 
 
In my view, the discussions presented so far underpin the process of equilibration, which 
inevitably is the ‘engine’ that drives development (Donald, Lazarus, & Lolwana,1997, p. 45) 
and serves as the mechanism to promote ways of thinking (Elkind, 1974). 
 
4.6.2 Conceptual Change and Cognitive Conflict  
Consistent with the constructive perspective on learning, learning by conceptual change is 
characterized by the building of new ideas in the context of old ones through the partial or 
major restructuring of already existing knowledge, concepts or schemata (di Sessa 2006; 
Biemans & Simons, 1999; Duit, 1999). It is in this sense that the emphasis is on “change” 





concepts or schemata is what distinguishes conceptual change from other types of learning, 
and provides students with a more fruitful conceptual framework to solve problems, explain 
phenomena, and function in the world (Biemans & Simons, 1999; Davis, 2011). 
 
Prior knowledge, which is construed as all the knowledge that learners have when entering a 
learning environment, is regarded as the most important ingredient in the process of 
meaningful learning (Ausubel, 1968; Duit, 1999). In terms of the constructivist view of 
learning, learners are seen as active constructors of their own knowledge who naturally 
engage with their prior knowledge (or prior conceptions) when attempting to make sense of 
new information that they encounter or experience in their classrooms. Thus, when the 
learners are confronted with new information, it is possible that some of the prior conceptions 
may be compatible or coherent with the new information or experiences, and thus constitute a 
foundation of learning. On the other hand, new information may not be compatible with any 
prior linked conception(s) and thus de-rail further learning. In this instance the learners are 
then compelled to restructure/reorganize their existing knowledge (or conception), which 
then essentially means that they must face a conceptual change (Desmet, Gregore, Mussolin, 
2010, p. 521). 
 
Cognitive conflict, which is the key driver for conceptual change, as alluded to in the 
aforementioned set of instructional strategies, is actually a psychological state signalling a 
discrepancy between one’s cognitive structure (schema)  and new information (or experience) 
or between cognitive structures (or schemas) (Lee & Kwon, 2001; Lee et al, 2003). Much of 
the research and development on cognitive conflict was inspired by Piaget’s theory of 
equilibration which explains how the processes of assimilation and accommodation work in a 
complementary manner to restore equilibrium in the mind of the learner when it is thrown 
into a state of disequilibrium. The latter state of disequilibrium, which Piaget commonly 
referred to as cognitive conflict, can be generated by merely creating the space for a learner 
to experience and acknowledge some contradiction or inconsistencies in his or her ideas 
(Zaslavksy, 2009; Lee et al, 2003; Buchs, Butera, Mugny, Darnon, 2004). In this respect, 
purposively constructed counter-examples could be strategically used to introduce cognitive 
conflict.  
Likewise, other researchers have used different kinds of terms to explain a cognitive conflict 
situation within the context of their research focus or epistemologies. For example, Festinger 





p. 299): “The discomfort caused by logical inconsistency or contradiction motivates the 
individual to modify his or her beliefs in order to bring them into closer correspondence with 
reality”(Zaslavsky, 2005, p. 299).  Another researcher, Berlyne (1960) as cited in Zaslavsky 
(2005, p. 300) uses the term ‘conceptual conflict’ in his theory of “conceptual conflict”, 
which affirms that cognitive conflict plays a formidable role in knowledge 
production/acquisition. In particular, his ‘conceptual conflict theory says: “Conceptual 
conflict has high arousal potential, motivating the learner to attempt resolve it by seeking new 
information or by trying to reorganize the knowledge he or she already has” (Lee et al. , 2003 
citing Berlyne 1960, 1963, 1965). 
 
With regard to fostering and promoting conceptual change in the classroom, Nussbaum and 
Novick (1982) have pointed out the following instructional strategies as cited in Biemans & 
Simons (1999, p. 250): 
 “make students aware of their own preconceptions (or the preconceptions of others) 
through an “exposing event”, 
 “create a cognitive conflict through a “discrepant event”, and  
 “support students’ search for a solution to this conflict and encourage conceptual 
change.”  
 
The aforementioned “cognitive conflict” approach to conceptual change has been used quite 
widely in many teaching and learning contexts. For example, Tirosh and Graeber (1990) used   
cognitive conflict approach to probe the following misconception held by a group of pre-
service elementary teachers: “In division the quotient must be less than the dividend.” 
According to Fischbein et al., (1985) the sources of the aforementioned misconception are as 
follows: 
 The first source of the given misconception is the partitive model - associated with 
 the primitive thinking about division as sharing. 
 The second source is associated with pace-setting at school:  First division is 
 introduced in the context of whole numbers only, and then much later is division by 
 rational numbers, particularly rational numbers less than one, are introduced.   
 
During the interviews, twenty-one pre-service teachers were posed the question: “In a 





number of the pre-service teachers (15 out of 21), argued that in division the quotient is 
always less than the dividend by providing the following kinds of justifications: 
 “Division is sharing. When you share things, each one gets less than the whole 
amount. Therefore the quotient is less than the dividend (7 subjects),” 
 “There are no such examples [in which the quotient is greater than the dividend] (4 
subjects),” 
 “Division is the inverse of multiplication. Since multiplication always make bigger, 
division always makes smaller,” 
 “Arguments based on algorithmic procedures. For example, one of the interviewees 
argued that in the case of decimal divisor, “you have to change the divisor to a whole 
number, add zeros to the dividend, and then, ultimately the quotient is less than the 
dividend” (Tirosh and Graeber, 1990, p. 102). 
 
The interviewer then posed the following question to the students: Determine 4  . Some of 
the students, after using the standard algorithm, recognized their inconsistency and 
immediately acknowledged that quotient is not always less than the dividend. Other realized 
the same after a second prompting question. Moreover, the remaining students were provided 
with more support and directed questions in attempt to enable them to overcome the 
misconception. Hence, the results of the study show that as a result of the purposeful and 
constructive use of the conflict approach, misconceptions were alleviated and treated and thus 
helped pre-service teachers to develop a more accurate conception about the size relationship 
between the quotient and dividend, and in addition, improved their ability to construct written 
expressions for multiplication and division word problems (see Tirosh and Graeber (1990) for 
details). 
 
Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog (1982), in their development of a model to explain 
conceptual change, also took cognizance of Piaget’s notion of disequilibration and 
accommodation. Their model comprised of two major components, namely the pre-requisite 
conditions for accommodation to take place and a person’s conceptual ecology. Conceptual 
ecology in this sense refers to the existing set of conceptions that a student already possesses 
and which inadvertently will serve as an immediate framework of reference with which the 
students will first engage or interact with in order to make sense of new information or 
experiences. In this sense, a person’s conceptual ecology is said to consist of many different 
kinds of knowledge, such as anomalies, analogies and metaphors, examplars and images, and 





Posner et al (1982, p. 214) states that the following pre-requisite conditions must be fulfilled 
to trigger the occurrence of accommodation and thus experience conceptual change: 
  
 The student must be dissatisfied with the existing conception, meaning the 
student’s current existing conception must no longer be able to assist the student 
to comprehend or explain the new experienced concept. In other words, none of 
the student’s existing conceptions can come to the fore to successfully resolve any 
anomalies or solve the envisaged problem. 
 The new conception must be intelligible, coherent and internally consistent to the 
student.  
 The student must identify the new conception as plausible. In other words the 
student ought to have an inner gut feeling that a newly constructed concept will be 
able to assist to resolve experienced anomalies or problems. Moreover, there has 
to be reasonable degree of consistency between the newly formulated conception 
and other knowledge. 
 The new conception must be fruitful and make sense in many situations. 
Moreover, it should create new pathways of enquiry and also be able to be 
expanded to make sense of other experiences when the need arises. 
 
In terms of the conditions mentioned earlier, a student upon experiencing a new phenomenon, 
may comprehend the new conception (i.e. find it to be intelligible), reconcile it without any 
necessary contradictions with previous conceptions (i.e. find the conception to be plausible) 
and also see the value of the new conception – for example in terms of solving a particular 
problem (i.e. find the conception to be fruitful). When such circumstances prevail, the student 
is then in a favorable position to incorporate the new conception easily into his existing 
cognitive structures or schema, and such a process is referred to as assimilation by Posner et 
al. (1982), Strike and Posner (1985), and Hewson (1989). However, if the new conception is 
meaningful to the students (intelligible) but contradicts existing conceptions (not plausible), 
then a state of conflict prevails. Consequently the acceptance of the new conception is kind of 
blocked by the existing set of conceptions. Thus, in order for a person to accept a new 
conception, it is essential that the status of the blocking conception be lowered before the new 
conception can begin to rise. This process is referred to as accommodation by Posner et al. 






The aforementioned conceptual change theory of Posner et al.(1982), strongly suggests that 
necessary space and opportunities be created for learners to establish meaningful connections 
and relationships between prior knowledge (or conceptions) and new information to be 
learned, and correct their existing conceptions if necessary. However, much criticism was 
leveled against their theory of conceptual change (see Duit, 1999, Lederman, 1992, Pintrich 
et al., 1993). For example, Pintrich et al. (1993) asserted that Posner et al’s theory focuses too 
much on the rational issues but does not consider the affective and social issues pertaining to 
conceptual change, i.e. it neglects the learner as a whole. In particular, it does not consider 
the teacher and other learners in the given learning environment, and how they influence the 
learner’s conceptual ecology, which is an important ingredient in determining conceptual 
change or not. Hence, Strike and Posner (1992), after acknowledging the deficiencies in the  
original conceptual change theory model, revised it to accommodate the cognitive, affective, 
social and contextual factors, with much more emphasis on the interaction between prior 
conceptions and new conceptions. Moreover, in consonance with most constructivist 
approaches of learning and instruction, the theory supports the application of dynamic 
conceptual change processes as well as the provisioning of relevant “supporting” conditions 
to enhance conceptual change (Biemans & Simons, 1999). 
 
Similar to the conditions posited by Posner et al (1982, p. 214), Eggen and Kauchak (2007, p. 
246) assertd that the following conditions are required for students to change their thinking: 
 
 “The existing conception must become dissatisfying; that is it must cause 
disequilibrium. 
 An alternative conception must be understandable. The learner must be able to 
accommodate his or her thinking so that the alternative conception makes sense. 
 The new conception must be useful in the real world. It must re-establish 
equilibrium, and the learner must be able to assimilate new experiences into it.” 
 
However, many other theoretical models have been developed by other academics and 
researchers to explain conceptual change as well. Some of them are: Carey (1985); diSessa 
(1988, 1993); Brewer (1987); Vosniadou (1994); and  Thagard (1992).  Whilst some of the 
models were not necessarily designed to be implemented in the classroom, a number of 
empirical studies were carried out in order to establish the feasibility of using them for 





various empirical studies shows that the following set of instructional strategies can best 
represent many of the instructional efforts made to promote conceptual change: 
 “The induction of cognitive conflict through anomalous data”; 
 “The use of analogies to guide student’s change”, and 
 “Cooperative and shared learning to promote collective discussion of ideas.” 
 
Moreover, in reviewing research in the field of education, Guzetti et al., (1993) stated that 
instructional strategies and approaches that were effective in fostering conceptual change had 
a common element of producing cognitive conflict. In the similar vein, Limon (2001) also 
reported that nearly all theoretical models that were constructed to explain conceptual change 
highlighted “cognitive conflict as a central condition for conceptual change” (p. 359).. 
However, to  the contrary, cognitive conflict may not produce the necessary conceptual 
change, particularly if the students do not ‘see’ the conflict or experience difficulties in 
dealing with contradictory or anomalous data (Duit, 1994; Chin & Brewer, 1993; Dekkers & 
Thijs, 1998; Guzzeti & Glass, 1993; Strike & Posner, 1992). Worse still, the contradictory 
information can become a nightmare for students (and even depress them) if they do not have 
enough knowledge to attempt the resolution of the conflict (Lee et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
there exist many instances where teachers are quite successful in constructing learning 
episodes that make it possible for learners to experience cognitive conflict, but such 
opportune moments are lost in many instances because they do not have the necessary and 
sufficient experience (or expertise) to guide the learners to resolve the cognitive conflict 
(Zazkis & Chernoff, 2008, p. 196). 
 
Despite the aforementioned shortcomings of the cognitive conflict approach, there are many 
studies that have demonstrated the important role that cognitive conflict plays in fostering 
successful conceptual change (Druyan, 1997; Hewson & Hewson, 1984; Rolka, Rosken & 
Liljedahl , 2007; Tirosh & Samir 2006; Thorley & Treagust, 1987; Zazkis & Chernoff, 2008;   
& Lieven , 2004; Watson 2007).  For example in Watson’s (2007) study, 58 students were 
posed with a number of questions pertaining to the concept of average. After considering 
their responses, the students were then presented with sets of alternate responses from 
students from other schools. Responses after the experience of cognitive conflict showed an 







Moreover, in the application of the conflict approach in our classroom, an educator should be 
aware that a cognitive conflict process is triggered when a learner: 
“ a. Recognizes an anomalous situation, 
   b. Expresses interest or anxiety about resolving the conflict, and 
   c. Engages in cognitive reappraisal of the situation.” (Lee et al, 2003, p. 588). 
 
Thus in a classroom situation, when a student realizes that his existing conceptions are not 
consistent with the result of an investigation, he may be surprised, become doubtful or just 
think of it as something strange. However, if the student becomes interested in the situation 
then he may display such interest by exhibiting increased levels of interest, curiosity and 
focused attention. On the other hand a student may become anxious about the situation, 
which could be gauged through notions of confusion, discomfort, frustration and probably a 
feeling of oppression. Thus, it is imperative that facilitators (or educators) in the classroom 
monitor learner responses to new information very carefully and provide the necessary 
support – otherwise the opportune moment for intellectual growth will be lost. If support or 
guidance is not provided timeously and appropriately, the student may conveniently 
reappraise his state and consequently decide to suspend the state. However, if appropriate 
constructive support is provided, the student may think longer and more critically and thus 
seek a more reasonable understanding, which inevitably enhances knowledge building. (see 
Lee et al., 2003). 
  
Moreover, conceptual change approaches that seek to foster students thinking via discussion 
and argumentation related to induced cognitive conflict, have shown to be extremely 
powerful in developing reasoning and justification skills of students in association with their 
concurrent improvement of specific conceptual understandings (Mason, 2001). Quite often 
within such an approach a question related to the experience at hand is constructed and posed 
by the educator to the students, and the necessary space is created for students to provide 
their perspective or view on a particular kind of question. To facilitate and enhance such a 
learning context, the educator may use phrases such as ‘give reasons’, ‘provide evidence’, 
‘form an argument’, ‘make an assumption’ in an effort to guide students in their reasoning 
(Anderson et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2003).  
 
By and large cognitive conflict is regarded as an analogue to the Piagetian notion of 
disequilibration (Zazkis & Chernoff, 2008) and is considered as a useful pedagogical strategy 





1996). In view of the extensive incorporation of the notions of assimilation and 
accommodation in most models of conceptual change, this study will use Piaget’s 
Equilibration Theory to explain identified constructs of conceptual change.  
 
In summary, this Chapter has focused on constrcutivism as a learning theory, scaffolding, 
discovery learning and exploratory environments, analogical transfer including Gentner’s 
Structure mapping theory; Ausubel’s Theory of Meaningful Learning,  Piaget’s 
Equiliabration Theory, conceptual change and cognitive conflict.  
 
The next Chapter, continues with the discussion of the following theoretical aspects that 
guided this study: types of generalizations (see Section 5.1); types of justifications (see 






















Chapter 5:  Further Theoretical Considerations  
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter is a continuing narrative of issues and insights examined in Chapter 4. A 
classroom that provides opportunities for students to conjecture, generalize and justify their 
generalizations can provide the necessary intellectual space for learners to externalize their 
thoughts, clear their doubts, upgrade their knowledge, gain new insights, make informed 
decisions and even change their perceptions (Ogunniyi, 2010 notes). In this study, through 
the use of the Viviani linked activities, the necessary space is created for pre-service 
educators to construct their own generalizations, justify their validity through 
experimentation and proof, and even refine their generalizations after experiencing counter-
examples. Furthermore, in this study, the set of plausible arguments resulting in the 
generalization and the set of valid arguments resulting in the proof of an established 
generalization was tracked an reported on. In particular, this Chapter, provides a discussion pf 
the following theoretical aspects: types of generalizations, types of justifications; conception 
of deductive proof, and functions of proof. 
 
5.1 Generalization 
As indicated in Chapter 1, this study focuses mainly on the construction of the following 
types of generalizations: Inductive generalization; analogical generalization and deductive 
generalization. Furthermore, taking into cognizance the processes of developing an inductive 
generalization as suggested by  Canadas & Castro (2005) and James (1992), and discussed in 
Chapter 1, this study adopts the Canadas, Deulofu, Figuerias, Reid & Yevdokimov (2007, p. 
64) model for inductive generalization, which is relevant for dynamic geometry contexts. 
They rececommend that the development of conjecture generalizations by empirical 
induction from dynamic cases could proceed through the following stages: 
 “Manipulating a situation dynamically through a continuity of cases, 
 Observing an invariant property in the situation, 
 Formulating a conjecture that the porpoerty holds in other cases, 
 Validating the conjecture, 
 Generalizaing the conjecture, 






In the context of this study, justification is defined as a rationale or argument for some 
mathematical generalization. As alluded to in the literature survey, justifications vary in 
nature depending on the kind of argument that is advanced in favour or against a specific 
conjecture generalization. Hence, in this study justification will be treated as a continuum 
(continuity spectrum) with authoritative justification on the lower end, followed by empirical 
justification and generic example justification respectively, with deductive justification being 
the ultimate kind of justification on the upper end (compare Huang, 2005).  Drawing from the 
notions of justifications posited within research contexts by Bell (1976a & b), Balacheff 
(1988), De Villiers (2003a), Dörfler (1991), Hanna (2000), Marrades & Gutierrez (2000), 
Harel & Sowder (1996, 1998, 2007), Sowder & Harel (1998) as elaborated in Sections 1.8 
and 1.9, the range of justifications that has been considered for this study includes 
authoritative justification, empirical proof, generic proof, and deductive proof. 
 
5.2.1 Authoritative justification  
It is possible that students, can construct their justifications (proof schemes) within the ambit 
of an authoritarian proof scheme, particularly if they believe that they can only justify a 
conjecture/conjecture generalization/result through the endorsement and acknowledgement of 
information/statement(s) in a textbook, or an educator (lecturer or professor statement), or by 
just obtaining the necessary confirmation from a wise and knowledgeable peer. Indeed 
referring to an authority for the purposes of justification, is not a misnomer in the field of 
mathematics, for even experts in mathematics may at times whole-heartedly accept a 
colleague’s  result, without  necessarily considering  or evaluating the details of the reasoning 
that was used to arrive at the established result (Sowder & Harel, 1998). However, classroom 
instruction that dwells heavily on authoritarian type of justifications, can result in an 
“authoritarian syndrome”, whereby students will always want to convince themselves or 
others that a particular conjecture generalization is true, by only making reference to a 
statement in a textbook or citing a statement made by an educator or obtaining the ‘nod’ from 
their colleague, without fully comprehending the rationale  (or reasoning) behind such 
“appropriated” statement(s) or confirmation(s). This kind of reliance by students on some 
form of authority to justify their moves or claims, can be counter-productive in the sense that 
such students can merely attempt to use axioms, definitions, theorems and corollaries or 
specific algorithms, procedures and methods to justify their conjecture generalization(s), 





This kind of approach invariably suppresses or curtails the opportunity to develop a deeper 
understanding of related topics or explain similar results successfully (Sowder & Harel, 
1998), and also contributes to the development of misconceptions at times. 
 
5.2.2 Empirical proof (justification) 
Empirical justification, which is commonly known as empirical proof is a kind of 
justification wherein the correctness of particular examples is the argument of conviction (see 
Gutierrez, Pegg, Lawrie, 2004, p. 513). In other words, it is a kind of justification where one 
attempts to demonstrate the validity of a conjecture generalization by showing it is true in a 
number of randomly selected cases, but does not account for the arbitrary case (compare 
Balacheff, 1988; Marrades & Gutierrez, 2000; Harel & Sowder,1996, 1998, 2007; 
Hollebrands & Smith, 2009; Sowder & Harel 1998)  This is more an informal argument 
commonly referred to as an empirical argument that employs inductive level of reasoning, 
and is regarded as an argument that “provides inconclusive evidence for the truth of a 
mathematical claim,” i.e. it is regarded as a non-proof argument (Stylanides, 2008, p. 12). 
According to Canadas et al. (2007), empirical argument can be raised through either the 
consideration of a finite number of discrete cases or dynamic cases. Within the context of the 
study, pre-service educators work in a Sketchpad environment; they construct empirical 
examples that bear the invariant properties through use of the ‘drag’ mode; they construct 
conjectures (conjecture generalizations) through taking cognisance of observed regularities 
that prevail across one or more examples; they present their corroborating examples or 
observed relationships in them as the grounds (or evidence) to justify the truth of their 
conjecture (conjecture generalization). On the other hand, when the conjecture generalization 
is ‘included in the statement of a problem”, pre-service educators “have only to construct 
examples to check the conjecture generalization and justify it” (Marrades & Gutierrez, 2000, 
p. 91). Given the aforementioned underpinnings of empirical proof, some students working 
within an empirical proof scheme, more particularly in a non-Sketchpad context, tend to rely 
on just one type of drawing or pictorial representation to demonstrate the validity of their 
conjecture. 
 
The following example (see Figure 5.2.2), wherein students demonstrate the validity of a 
conjecture by constructing empirical examples within the context of an interactive geometry 






















5.2.3 Generic Proof  
According to Leron & Zaslavsky (2009, p. 1), a generic proof is, “roughly, a proof carried out 
on a generic example", wherein a generic example according to Mason & Pimm (1984, p. 
287), “is an actual (particular) example, but one presented in such a way as to bring out its 
intended role as the carrier of the general.” Moreover, Stylianides (2008) with due reference 
to Balacheff (1988), Mason & Pimm (1984), Rowland (1998) & Harel & Sowder (1998), 
states that, “a generic example is a proof that uses a particular case seen as representative of 
the general case.” Furthermore, in the main, the term “generic proving” refers to all kinds of 
mathematical activity revolving around a generic proof (Leron & Zalavsky, 2009). 
 
The following elementary example, the sum of the first odd numbers, cited in Rowland 
(2002, p. 150) and further discussed in Rowland, Turner, Twaites, & Huckstep (2009, p. 97), 
can help illustrate the notion of generic proving in the context of a generic example. 
 
Example 1: Generic Proving 
Conjecture Generalization: The sum of 1+3 +5 + … up to any odd number is always a 
square number. 
One possible proof for this conjecture generalization, by generic example, is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 5.2.2: Empirical examples to justify inscribed angles in the same segment 






      1 
     1 + 3 = 2
2 
                            1 + 3 + 5 = 3
2
  





Figure 5.2.3.1: Sum of odd numbers is a square number  
 
The diagramatic representation in Figure 5.2.3.1, illustrates that when you start with 1 object  
and then add odd number of objects , namely 3, 5 and 7, consecutively, they correspondingly 
produce a square array of objects at each stage. Equivalently, this representation means that 
sum of the first odd number and each consecutive odd number 3, 5 and 7, produces a square 
number at each stage. In this particular case, we have merely focused on just one specific 
instance (i.e. 1 + 3+ 5 +7) of the general claim or conjecture generalization.  This is typically 
“a generic example in so far as it is then clear that the addition of each subsequent odd 
number preserves the square array” (Rowland et al., 2009, p. 97). So effectively, we can say 
that a possible proof of the conjecture, the sum of 1+ 3 +5 + … up to any odd number is 
always a square number, has been raised through a generic example, and in this sense we may 
call the explanation a generic proof. 
 
 In this particular case, the generic example points to a more general truth, but does not 
replace the general proof itself. Furthermore, the generic proof in this instance, may be very 
useful for primary school children (and maybe some high school children), through which 
they can produce similar versions for other examples, particularly because the development 
of a complete formal proof may not be within their capability to do so (Leron & Zaslavsky, 
2009).  For example, we can use mathematical induction, which is generally beyond the reach 
of a primary school child and many high school students, to raise a general proof for the 
given conjecture generalizations as follows: 
  
General Proof: Using mathematical induction 
In symbolic notation, the sum of 1+3 +5 + … up to any odd number is a square can be 
represented as follows: ∑            =  
   with n = 1, 2, 3, ….
 
 
Step 1:  For  i = 1 ,   ∑            = 1       and   
  =    
 ∑            =   







Step 2: Assume the statement is true for some k, i.e. ,   ∑            =   
  .  Then, 
      ∑              =     ∑                   
 
    
               =     + (2  +2-1), by the inductive hypothesis 
                   =    + 2  + 1 
                      =        
 
Thus if the kth  statement is true, then so is the (k+1) th statement. Hence, our formula is true 
by the Principle of mathematical Induction.                          
 
To further illustrate the notion of generic proving, but in the context of geometry, the 
researcher reflects on a lesson that was observed during one of his school based practice 
sessions. In this lesson the student teacher was focusing on the sum of the interior angles of 
any polygon.  The key points of the lesson are discussed in Example 2 below, with intention 
to illustrate the essence of generic proving.  
 
Example 2: Generic Proving 
 
Generalization:  The sum of the interior angles of any (simple-closed) polygon is  
                          
  
The above generalization is quite often presented to learners at junior high school level. 
Section 1.5 of Chapter 1, provides an outline of the generalizing process that leads to the 
development of this generalization. The case by case approach  provides insight as to why the 
above-mentioned theorem holds true for the given particular instance, and not just a 
confirming instance of the given theorem. By reflecting on this particular case, like the 
quadrilateral - a generic example, learners were able to carry the “sameness” to other specific 
instances such as the pentagon and hexagon. The pentagon case and hexagon case can 
illustrate that the transparent presentation of an initial generic example (like the quadrilateral 
case) contributes to analogy making with other instances (such as the pentagon and hexagon 
cases), more easily and confidently (see Rowland, 2002), and thus contributes to ascertaining 
the truth. Furthermore, on reflecting on all three cases, learners can come up with the 
following kind of observation: 
Angle sum of a polygon with 4 sides = 2 x 180
0
  =  ( 4-2) x 180
0
  
Angle sum of a polygon with 5 sides  = 3 x 180
0
  =  (5-2) x 180
0





Angle sum of a polygon with 6 sides = 4 x 180
0
  =  (6-2) x 180
0
                                                 
 
Through careful inspection of the above particular cases, learners can be able to see the 
general as follows: The sum of the angles of any (simple-closed) polygon of   sides = 
            . This essentially means, that the learners may not probably think of any 
“instance in which the analogy could not be achieved” (Rowland, 2002). This could be 
attributed to the fact that the coherent set of generic cases, provides necessary explanation 
and illumination of why the sum of the angles of any polygon of   sides =              
(see Hersh, 1993). 
 
The notion of generic proving, permeates all levels of mathematical activities ranging from 
primary school to postgraduate level mathematics and beyond. Balacheff (1988, p. 219) as 
cited in Rowland et al. (2009, p. 97) argues that:  “The generic example involves making 
explicit the reasons for the truth of assertion by means of operations or transformations on an 
object that is not there in its own right, but as a characteristic representative of the class”.  
Equivalently, Rowland (1998, p. 68) affirms that “the generic example serves not only to 
present a confirming instance of a proposition, which it certainly is –but to provide insight as 
to why the proposition holds true for that single instance”. Also, Tall (1979) suggests that  
generic proving or the development of generic proof (s), is a potential way for students to 
comprehend and understand proofs that normally requires a higher level of deductive logic 
and thinking. 
 
Moreover, according to Alibert & Thomas (1991, p. 216), a generic proof “works at the 
example level but is generic in that the examples chosen are typical of the whole class of 
examples and hence the proof is generalizable.” However, Alibert & Thomas (1991, p. 217.), 
acknowledges that generic proof is different to a general proof, in that the latter “works at a 
more general level but consequently requires a higher level of abstraction.”  Furthermore, 
from a strict logical perspective, the necessary provision of a formal proof cannot be 
substituted by a generic proof, but nevertheless “the generic proof may sometimes be 
preferable if it results in improved understanding on the part of the students” (Alibert & 
Thomas, 1991, p. 217).  For example, when teaching the section on arithmetic sequences, one 





 a + ( a + d) + ( a + 2d) + … {a + (n- 1)d} is given by Sn = 
 
 
 (a + l), where n is the number of 
terms, a is the first term and l= a + (n - 1)d  is the last term.  To illustrate the procedure to 
obtain Sn , the sum of an arithmetic series, we take the following series as a generic example: 
   
2 +5 + 8 +11 + 14 + 17 + 20 
If S6 denotes the sum of this series, then  
          S6 = 3 +   6 +    9 +  12 + 15 + 18 + 21       ….  (1) 
Write the series in reverse order:  S6 = 21 + 18 + 15 + 12 + 9  +  6  +  3    ….. (2) 
Adding (1) and (2):        2S6 = 24 + 24 + 24 + 24 + 24  + 24 + 24 
6 lots of the first and last terms: 2S6 = (3+21) + (3+21)+ (3+21)+ (3+21) + (3+21)+  
     (3+21) 
         2S6 = 6 (3+ 21) 
           S6 = 
 
 
 (3 + 21) 
        = 72 
 
From the above generic example, it is clear that S6 = (½   number of terms)   (sum of the 
first and last terms). Furthermore, the above generic proof, creates some understanding of 
how to develop a proof for the general case (i.e. formal proof) in a much more meaningful 
manner. Let us illustrate the above method in the case of the general arithmetic series,  
a + ( a + d) + (a + 2d) + … {a + (n - 1)d}. 
 
General Proof: 
Consider the general arithmetic series, a + (a + d ) + (a + 2d) + … {a +(n-1)d}. 
Let l = {a +(n-1)d} in the general arithmetic series, for convenience. 
Hence, we obtain the general arithmetic series of the form: 
a + (a + d) + (a + 2d) + …+ ( l - 2d) + (l - d) + l 
Now, let us proceed using the same method as for the generic case: 
Sn = a + (a + d) + (a + 2d) + …+ ( l - 2d) + (l - d)   +   l 
Write the series in reverse order: Sn = l  +  ( l - d) + (l - 2d) + … +  (a + d) + (a + 2d) + a 
Adding (1) and (2):    2Sn = (a + l) + (a + l) + (a + l) + …+ (a + l)+ (a + l) + (a + l) 
 n lots of first and last terms  2Sn = n(a + l)  
  Sn = 
 
 
 (a + l) , where l = {a +(n-1)d} 






Given this, we can say with some degree of certainty, that through the generic example, 
which is a particular case in this instance, one could see the general proof of the sum to n 
terms of any arithmetic series. Moreover, this concurs with Mason and Pimm’s (1984, p. 287) 
view that:  “a generic example is an actual example, but one presented in such a way as to 
bring out its intended role as the carrier of the general.” In other words the example should 
allow one “to see the general through the particular” (Leron & Zaslavsky, 2009, p. 4). 
Furthermore, whilst we know the mathematical truth of any conjecture generalization, can 
normally be established through general proof, it is nevertheless quite evident in arithmetic 
series example, that the nature of the proof of the sum to n terms of an arithmetic series, can 
be realized through the development of a logical argument based on the proof-like structure  
that permeates the generic example (compare Rowland, 2009). Thus, essentially, we could 
say that generic example in this instance, provided a “window” through which the “general 
case” was constructed. Moreover, Movshovitz–Hadar (1988, p. 18), asserts the following:   
 
“The proof of generic example, should not be confused with a fully general proof. It 
only suggests the full proof through a generalizable concrete example. From the 
purely logical point of view there is no replacement for the formal proof. From a 
pedagogical point of view, a proof of the generic example can sometimes replace the 
general proof.” 
 
Furthermore, according to Rowland (2001, p. 177): 
 
“…the idea of a generic example is that we can ‘see’ beyond its particularity to what 
might happen in other instances. The transparent presentation of an example is 
intended to enable transfer of the argument to other instances. Ultimately the audience 
can conceive of no possible instance in which the analogy could not be achieved. ” 
 
To illustrate the notions articulated by Rowland, we will first consider a generic proof, which 
shows that √   is  irrational, and then illustrate how a similar argument can be used via 
analogy to show that √
 
 









Generic Proof  1: √   is  irrational (cited in Alibert & Thomas, p. 217): 
 
“We will show that if we start with any rational     and square it, then the result 
      cannot be 2. 
On squaring any integer  , the number of times that any prime factor appears in the 
factorization of n is doubled in the prime factorization of   , so each prime factor 
occurs an even number of times in n
2
. In the fraction      , factorize     and    into 
primes and cancel common factors where possible. Each factor will either cancel 
exactly or we are left with an even number of experiences of that factor in the 
numerator or denominator of the fraction. The fraction       can never be simplified 
to 2/1 for the latter has an odd number of 2’s in the numerator. So the square of a 
rational     can never be equal to 2”.  
 
Generic Proof 2:  √
 
 
  is irrational (cited in Alibert & Thomas, p. 217): 
“We will show that if we start with any rational     and square it, then the result 
     , cannot be 5/8. 
On squaring any integer n, the number of times that any prime factor appears in the 
factorization of n is doubled in the prime factorization of   , so each prime factor 
occurs an even number of times in n
2
. (For instance, if n = 12 = 2
2







). In the fraction      , factorize    and    into primes and cancel common factors 
where possible. Each factor will either cancel exactly or we are left with an even 
number of experiences of that factor in the numerator or denominator of the fraction. 
The fraction      , can never be simplified to 5/8 for the latter is 5/23, which has an 
odd number of 5’s in the numerator (and an odd number of 2’s in the denominator). 
So the square of a rational can never be equal to 5/8”.  
 
Within the context of a generic–example assisted proof, Movshovitz–Hadar (1988, p. 17) 
recommends that an ideal generic example is one that is “large enough to be considered a 
non-specific-representative of the general case, yet small enough to serve as a concrete 
example.” For example, Movshovitz–Hadar uses a very special 8x 8 square matrix (see 
Figure 5.2.3.2) to construct a generic proof which serves as a lens through which the general 
proof of the following theorem is seen: “For any n 

  n matrix, n a positive integer, such that 





elements, no two of which are in the same row or column, are invariant” (see Albert & 
Thomas, 1991, pp. 217-218). 
 
  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
  19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
  28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
  37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 
  46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 
  55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 
  64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 
  73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
 
Figure 5.2.3.2: A representative matrix for the Theorem  
 
Moreover, Leron & Zaslavsky (2009), asserts that the “complexity” rather than “size” of the 
generic example is the preferred option. For example, in relation to the theorem, a natural 
number which is a perfect square has an odd number of factors, the perfect square, 36, was 
chosen as the generic example to develop a generic proof as follows: 
 
“All possible factorizations of 36 are; 1   36, 2  18, 3   12, 4   9, 6   6. 
All the factors of 36 appear in the above list. Counting the factors, we see that all the 
factors appearing in all the products, except the last one come in pairs, and all are 
different, thus totaling to an even number. Since the last product contributes only one 
factor, we get a total of odd number of factors. Specifically, for the case of 36, we 
have 2  4 + 1 = 9 factors” (Leron & Zaslavsky, 2009, p. 1). 
 
In particular, Leron & Zaslavsky (2009, p. 4), affirms that 36 is a good generic example for a 
generic proof  of the ‘perfect square’ theorem, primarily because it has a good reasonable 
number of factorizations, as compared to 4, 25 or even 169 which, “would have been too 
special” in the sense that they “have too few factorizations”.  
 
Although, generic proofs provide an opportunity for students to see the structure of the 
general proof in some cases, it is also highly probable that “some of the more subtle points of 
a proof may not easily manifest themselves in the context of the generic proof: some steps 





ensure that they will always happen” (Leron & Zaslavsky, 2009, p. 4). Moreover, Rowland 
(2002) asserts that some scaffolding may be necessary to ensure that students are able to 
transfer parallel arguments from the generic proof to the more formal generalized argument 
(or general proof). 
 
5.2.4 Deductive Proof (justification)  
Deductive Justification, which is commonly known as proof (deductive) is a justification that 
is logically valid, based on initial assumptions, definitions and previously proved results. This 
is more a formal argument and is usually a deductive level of reasoning (Compare Balacheff, 
1988; Harel & Sowder , 2007; Marrades & Gutierrez , 2000). 
 
The following example illustrates the notion of deductive justification:  













Given: Circle with centre   and segment    subtending   ̂  and   ̂  in the same circle 
Required to prove:   ̂    ̂  
Construction: Join   and   to the centre   of the circle 
Proof:              ̂     ̂                    (                                    
              and      ̂     ̂                  (                                    
                    ̂      ̂                               
                     ̂     ̂                               
 
 






5.3 Conception of Deductive (Mathematical) proof adopted in this study 
“Proofs are the mathematician’s way to display the mathematical machinery for solving 
problems and to justify a proposed solution to a problem is indeed a solution” (Rav, 1999, 
p.  13) 
 
In the aforementioned conception of a proof, “mathematical machinery” refers to items like 
definitions, axioms, proven theorems, deductive reasoning, logical rules of inference such as 
modus ponens and modus tollens, counter examples, reasoning leading to a contradiction, 
etcetera, which belongs to a family of shared principles and deduction rules (mathematical 
theory). In a very similar way, Williams (1992, p. 42) defines a proof as “a logical, reasoned 
argument, presented step by step, using only definitions, axioms and proven theorems, which 
shows that the stated consequence or result does in fact follow” (Williams,1992, p. 342).  So 
from a strict logical perspective, a proof in mathematics is “a logical argument that one 
makes to justify a claim and to convince oneself and others” (Blanton & Stylianou, 2003, p. 
113).  
 
According to the literature on proof (see Hersh, 1993 & 1997; Ramos, 2005; Martinez & Li, 
2010, Douek, 1999), there are basically two main conceptions of a mathematical proof 
(deductive proof), namely an ordinary mathematical proof (called a practical 
proof/demonstration by some) and a formal mathematical proof. An ordinary mathematical 
proof, which is commonly used by members of the mathematical community nowadays, 
entails what one does to make one another believe the posited theorems or conjectured 
generalizations from a logical perspective; it involves the use of deductive reasoning to 
construct a logical argument that convinces someone like a teacher, student, prospective 
mathematician, or a mathematician that a given mathematical proposition is indeed true. On 
the other hand, a formal mathematical proof, which is embedded in mathematical logic and 
may involve the philosophical aspects of mathematics also, involves a more rigorous 
construction of a deductive argument using “a sequence of transformations of formal 
sentences, carried out according to the rules of predicate calculus” (Hersh, 1993, p. 391.) in 
order to convince the toughest skeptic/logician.  
 
However, within the last three to four decades, the tenet that the production of formal proofs 
through the use of deductive reasoning is the most significant aspect of mathematics has been 
challenged by many mathematicians and mathematics educators. They honestly feel that there 





and debated a shift in focus to broaden proof to the production of arguments that foster not 
just the strict logical view that a proof should verify the validity of a conjecture but also that 
proof should promote understanding and provide an explanation as to why a conjecture is 
always true (de Villiers, 1990; Hanna, 2000; Hersh, 1993). Davis (1986) as cited in Hanna 
(1991, p. 56) describes proof as a “debating forum”, wherein one could advance different 
kind of arguments as to why their conjecture is true or not. Furthermore, as cited in Hanna 
(1991, p. 56), Tymoczko (1986) sees a proof as having a “certain openness and flexibility”, 
and Kitcher (1984) asserts that validity of a proof is a function of “correct or reasonable 
social practice”.  
 
As a result of views like the ones discussed in the aforementioned paragraph, there is a 
continuous desire amongst members of mathematics education community to conceptualize a 
meaning of proof that captures the salient features of a proof in terms of its structure, related 
processes, functions; characterizes ‘proving’ as a social process; and make sense to the 
classroom community. Moreover, Fawcett (1938) as cited in Blanton, Stylianou, & David 
(2003, p. 113), made the following remarks about the concept of proof:   
 
“The concept of proof is one which not only pervades work in mathematics but is also 
involved in situations where conclusions are to be reached and decisions to be made. 
Mathematics has a unique contribution to make in the development of this concept, 
and […] this concept may well serve to unify mathematical experiences of the pupil”  
 
Within the context of the aforementioned kind of desires and remarks, Stylianides (2007, 
291-292) constructed a definition of proof that encapsulates proof as an argument made up of 
three inter-related components, namely a “set of accepted statements”, “modes of 
argumentation” and “modes of argument representation”. According to Stylianides (2007, p. 
291), proof is defined as follows: 
 
“Proof is a mathematical argument, a connected sequence of assertions for or against 
a  mathematical claim, with the following characteristics: 
It uses elements accepted by the classroom community (set of accepted statements) 
that are true and available without further justification; 
It employs forms of reasoning (modes of argumentation) that are valid and known to, 





It is communicated with forms of expression (modes of argument representation) that 
are appropriate and known to, or within the conceptual reach of, the classroom 
community.” 
 
Furthermore, each of the components of the aforementioned definition is exemplified via a 
characteristic set of examples as shown in Figure 5.3. 
  
Component of an argument Examples 
Set of accepted 
 statements 
Definitions, axioms, theorems, etc. 
Modes of  
argumentation 
Application of logical rules of inference (such as modus ponens and modus 
tollens), use of  definitions to derive general statements, systematic 
enumeration of all cases to which a statement is reduced (given that their 
number is finite), construction of counterexamples, development of a 
reasoning that shows the acceptance of a statement leads to a contradiction, 
etc. 
Modes of argument  
representation 
Linguistic (e.g. oral language), physical, diagrammatic/pictorial, tabular, 
symbolic/algebraic, etc.  
Figure 5.3: Examples of the components of a mathematical argument (Stylianides,  
                 2007, p. 292) 
 
The notion of classroom community in Stylianide’s definition refers to an audience that 
should determine whether an argument constructed to justify a conjecture generalization (or 
theorem or any other result for that matter) can be accepted as a mathematical proof or not. 
Furthermore, the following interpretations should be borne in mind with regard to the use of 
the aforementioned definition within the context of mathematics and mathematics education:  
 
a. The notion of classroom community embraces all students and facilitators like prospective 
educators/teachers, educators, teacher educators, lecturers and also the community of 
professional mathematicians. 
b. The terms true, valid and appropriate are used within the context of conceptions that are 
currently shared and agreed upon in the fields of mathematics and mathematics education. In 
particular the term ‘true’ resonates with the use of “axioms, theorems, definitions and modes 
of reasoning that a particular community may take as shared at a given time”, and the term 
‘valid’ is used to classify an argument wherein the assertions are connected by means of 
accepted rules of correct inference such as modus ponens and modus tollens (see Stylianides, 





contradiction, mathematical induction, contraposition, and exhaustion are examples of 
proofs” (see Stylianides, 2008a, p. 196). 
c. With regard to the act of using ‘statements accepted by the classroom’, Stylianides (2007) 
does not necessarily mean that each student in classroom community must understand the set 
of accepted statements in the same way, but rather that the statements used in the construction 
of a logical argument should be able stand its ground in public without further justification. 
d. Similarly, with regard to ‘modes of argumentation’ and ‘modes of argument 
representation’ Stylianides (2007) does not necessarily mean that each student in classroom 
community must know or understand the respective modes in the same way, but rather 
suggests that the specific mode(s) of argumentation and representation a student may use to 
construct a logical argument could be influenced by either of the following two factors: (1) 
the student’s prior experience with such modes of argumentation and representation; (2)  the 
extent to which selected modes could be  within the conceptual reach of a student under 
necessary facilitator guidance and supervision.  
 
Taking into consideration that the proof potential of a given justication can be influenced by 
the form of argumentation posed (Bieda, 2010) and that the degree of comprehension of a 
proof by the classroom community is to a large extent a function of the form(s) of argument 
representation that prevails in a written justification, the definition of proof advanced by 
Stylianide’s (2007) has been adopted for the purposes of this study, but with the following 
stance: A good proof should not just  establish the veracity of a statement, but amongst other 
purposes, it should provide an explanation that sheds light as to why a particular statement 
claim is true, and also provide opportunities to discover new results (see de Villiers, 1990 & 
2003a). 
 
5.4 Functions of Proof in mathematics 
From a historical perspective, proof was introduced as a device primarily to verify the 
correctness of a mathematical statement (Zaslavsky, Nickerson, Stylianides, Kidron, 
Landman, 2010). In other words proof, a deductive argument, created through the use of 
accepted logical rules of inference, axioms, definitions and established theorems, was seen as 
an argument that was constructed to enable one to remove his/her personal doubt or to 
remove the doubts of others about the truth of a particular mathematical conjecture or 
assertion (de Villiers, 1998; Harel & Rabin, 2010, p. 140). In particular, past and present 
mathematics educators have maintained the view that a proof enables them as well as their 





or established conjecture generalization. These views chime with the following assertions 
espoused given in de Villiers (1999, p. 5): 
“A proof is only meaningful when it answers the student’s doubts, when it proves 
what is not obvious; - Kline (1973) 
The necessity, the functionality, of proof can only surface in situations in which 
students meet with uncertainty about the truth of mathematical propositions” - 
Alibert (1988). 
 
In equivalent terms, Devlin (1988, p. 148) points out that proof is “a logically sound piece of 
reasoning by which one mathematician could convince another of the truth of some 
assertion.” This notion is further echoed by Coe & Ruthven (1994, p. 42) as follows: “the 
most salient function of proof is that it provides grounds for belief.” Similarly, Hanna (1989, 
p. 20) defined proof in the context of verification as follows: “A proof is an argument needed 
to validate a statement, an argument that may have several different forms as long as it is 
convincing.”   
 
Regrettably, whilst many mathematics educators are still of the view that only proof brings 
conviction (Bell, 1976), they have not yet realized that within actual mathematical research, 
conviction can be achieved by other means than that of logical proof. For example, personal 
conviction can be achieved through a combination of intuition, quasi-empirical verification 
and some form of logical (but not necessarily rigorous) proof. Indeed, an extremely high level 
of conviction can sometimes be realized even in the absence of a proof (see de Villiers, 
2003a), with the still unproved twin pair theorem as a classic example (see Davis & Hersh, 
1983, p. 369). 
 
Furthermore, Bell (1976, p. 24) asserts that “conviction arrives most frequently as the result 
of mental scanning of range of items which bear on the point in question, this resulting 
eventually in an integration of ideas into a judgement,” and proof follows the reaching of 
conviction. Effectively, this means that proof is not necessarily a pre-requisite for conviction, 
but rather that conviction is quite often the pre-requisite for developing a proof (de Villiers, 
2003a). This position of conviction is also articulated by Polya (1954a, p. 83-84) as follows: 
 
“… having verified the theorem in several particular cases, we gathered strong 
inductive inference for it. The inductive phase overcame our initial suspicion and 





have scarcely found the courage to undertake the proof which did not look at all a 
routine job. When you have satisfied yourself that the theorem is true, you start 
proving it.”  
 
 Moreover, Kline (1982, pp. 313-314) asserts that “…Great mathematicians know before a 
logical proof is ever constructed that a theorem must be true…”. Although for many decades 
mathematicians and mathematics educators have felt that proof is just a way to verify the 
truth of a conjecture or generalization, several people working in the area of proof, have in 
recent years developed and advocated a broader perception and view of the role and function 
of proof in the context of mathematics. For example, Bell (1976)  argues that proof serves the 
following core functions within the context of mathematics: 
 
 Verification or justification: Ascertaining the truth of a proposition. 
 Illumination: Develing  insight as to why a proposition is true. 
 Systematisation: Organising results into a deductive system of axioms, concepts and 
theorems.  
 
Through reflecting on the functions of proof suggested by Bell (1976), de Villiers (1990, 
1999, 2002, 2003a) developed the following model to explain the various functions of proof: 
 
 Communication (the negotiation of meaning) 
 Verification (concerned with the truth of the statement) 
 Explanation (providing insight into why it is true) 
 Systematization (the organization of various results into a deductive system of 
axioms, major concepts, and theorems) 
 Discovery (the discovery or invention of new results) 
 Intellectual challenge (the self-realization/fulfillment derived from 
constructing a proof) 
 
Furthermore, Hanna and Jahnke (1996) in addition have suggested the following three 
additional functions of proof: 
 Construction of an empirical theory 






 Incorporation of a well–known fact into a new framework and thus viewing it 
from a fresh perspective. 
  
In addition, Hemmi (2010, p. 273) cites ‘transfer’ as another function of proof, and in this 
respect asserts that the kinds of thought that goes into the construction of a proof, could either 
provide one with techniques that one could utilize to attempt and solve other problems or 
improve one’s chance of understanding an item that deviates in its formulation with respect to 
a familiar (or original) context.  
 
Whilst each of the functions of proof is characterized by a unique action or outcome, they do 
not necessarily exist in isolation from each other in the development of a given proof. For 
example, consider the proof of the following conjecture generalization: the bisectors of the 
angles of a triangle are concurrent at a point equidistant distant from the sides. The proof of 
this concurrency generalization in most high school textbooks, use the congruency approach, 
as follows:  
 
    




Figure 5.4.1: Concurrency - bisectors of angles of triangle  
 
Given:  ∆ABC with the bisectors of   ̂ and B̂ meeting at O. 
To Prove: The bisectors of the angles are concurrent at a point equidistant from the 
 sides. 
Construction: Draw OF, OE and OD perpendicular to AB, AC and BC respectively. Draw 
OC. 
Proof:  In ∆OAE and ∆OAF 
  ̂E   ̂     constr. 
  ̂E   ̂      rt. ’s, constr. 
OA is common 
  ∆OAE   ∆OAF             S     






   
 Similarly, from ∆OBD and ∆OBF it can shown that   
OF = OD 
         OD =OE 
 
 Now, in ∆ODC and ∆OEC 
 OD = OE    proved 
 OC is common 
              ̂     ̂     rt. ’s, constr. 
   ∆ODC   ∆OEC   90
o
HS 
          ̂     ̂   
Thus OC bisects BCA ˆ , and the bisectors of the angles are concurrent. 
 
In principle, we have demonstrated the validity of the conjecture generalization. In other 
words we have proven the conjecture generalization, using previously established accepted 
statements, such as definitions and axioms. Hence, we can now call this proven conjecture 
generalization, a theorem. In abbreviated form, we will refer to this concurrency theorem as 
follows in this text: bisectors of  ’s of ∆ theorem.   
 
The congruency approach to the proof bisectors of  ’s of ∆ theorem definitely contributes to 
a successful demonstration of the truth of the given theorem, through the appropriate use of 
conditions of congruency, in their capacity as axioms. Hence, we can say that the objective to 
purely establish the truth of the conjecture generalization (verification) has been realized. 
Also, on the other hand, the proof exposes the logical relationships between other established 
mathematical statements, such as other theorems, and previously accepted statements such as 
axioms and definitions. For instance, in the proof of the bisectors of  ’s of ∆ theorem, we 
see the building of a deductive system with the conditions of congruency assumed as some of 
our axioms, which is typical of the systematization function of proof. Thus, it is possible that 
the development of a proof of a particular mathematical statement, could underscore more 
than one function of proof, such as verification and systematization, as in the case of 
congruency proof of the bisectors of  ’s of ∆ theorem. Others may also claim, that the 
development of congruency proof for bisectors of  ’s of ∆ theorem, could result in some 






Hence, despite the functions of proof being characterized by particular attributes, which 
makes them distinguishable from each other, they often are ‘alive” and interwoven in specific 
proofs with varying degree of dominance, notwithstanding that in some cases certain 
functions may not feature at all (de Villiers, 2003a, p.10). For instance, the traditional 
Euclidean proof for bisectors of  ’s of ∆ theorem using the laborious congruency approach, 
does not necessarily provide a sense of explanation of why the concurrency result is true. 
However, one can use the symmetry approach, to establish the truth of the concurrency result, 
and also to provide a sense of explanation why it is true (see discussion later in Section 
5.4.1). 
 
Hence, although the explanation and discovery functions of proof are considered and 
discussed as part of the theoretical framework for this study, the chosen examples and their 
corresponding proofs may inevitably embrace or bring to the fore some of the other functions 
of proof as well. 
 
5.4.1 Proof as a means of explanation 
In cases where experimentation in mathematics is accorded the necessary pedagogical 
importance, we find that  individuals (mathematicians, mathematics educators or university 
students or learners at schools) who are able to formulate a conjecture either intuitively, 
inductively or analogically, generally attempt to check out the authenticity of their conjecture 
via further quasi-empirical methods such as constructions and measurements (either using 
pencil and paper or software such as Geometer’s Sketchpad, Cabri or Geo-gebra, etc.), or by 
case–by-case numerical substitution (using perhaps a spreadsheet to create a huge table of 
values).  For example consider the following snap-shot of a lesson, pertaining to the topic: 
The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180
0
: 
 An educator requested learners to draw a triangle, and measure its angles and then 
find their sum, using Sketchpad.  
 All the learners came up with the conjecture, the sum of the angles of a triangle is 
180
0
.   
 Thereafter, the educator requested the learners to drag the vertices of a triangle to 
different positions and observe the sum measure. 








 Through this process, the learners developed an extremely high level of confidence in 
their conjecture, making them believe that the conjecture is always true, and thus 




However achieving such a high degree of confidence (or conviction) in their conjecture 
through quasi-empirical verification, does not provide the learners with necessary reasons as 
to “why” their conjecture is always true. In this sense, we say that all the empirical examples, 
merely raised the confidence ‘bar’, but have not provided any “satisfactory explanation why 
the conjecture may be true” (de Villiers, 1999). In other words, de Villiers (1999, p. 7) claims 
that any number of confirming empirical examples or more, will only increase one’s 
confidence level in their conjecture, but essentially will not  “provide a psychological sense 
of illumination  or insight or understanding into how the conjecture is the consequence of 
other familiar results."   
 
This is true not only in the pedagogical context of the mathematics classroom, but within the 
broader mathematical community. For example, on the basis of the strong “heuristic 
evidence” for the Riemann Hypotheses, Davis and Hersh (1983, p. 369) cited in de Villiers 
(1999, p. 6), concluded that the evidence is “so strong that it carries conviction even without 
rigorous proof.” However, despite all the heuristic evidence in favour of the Riemann 
Hypothesis, it is inevitable that mathematicians have a burning desire for an explanation as 
stated by Davis and Hersh (1983, p. 368) and cited in de Villiers (1999, p. 7): 
 
“It is interesting to ask, in a context, such as this, why we feel the need for a 
proof…It seems clear that we want a proof because… if something is true and we 
can’t deduce it in this way, this is a sign of a lack of understanding on our part. 
We believe, in other words, that a proof would be a way of understanding why 
the Riemann conjecture is true, which is something more than just knowing from 
convincing heuristic reasoning that it is true.” 
 
Thus, in essence, one could say that the provision of insight as to why a particular result is 
true and the ‘thirst’ for sense making of a mathematical result are the ‘drivers’ of   
‘explanation’, which is also why many mathematics educationists like Hanna and Jahnke 
(1996) acknowledge it as an important function of proof. In a similar vein, Schoenfeld (1985, 





‘explain to me why it is true’, and argumentation becomes a form of explanation, a means of 
conveying understanding.”  
 
Also Hafner and Mancosu (2005, p. 218) states that “the old desire to know the reason why” 
motivates mathematicians to look for explanations, and suggests  that the search for 
explanations in the context of mathematics is characterized as a search for: “the deep 
reasons”, “an understanding of the essence”; “a better understanding” “a satisfying reason”: 
“the reason why’; “the true reason”; “an account of the fact” and “the causes of”. For 
example, let’s revert back to the following example below, the sum of the first consecutive 
odd numbers is a square. A proof, by mathematical induction for this mathematical statement, 
has already been provided in the section on generic proving, but this proof does not provide a 
sense of ownership and understanding of why the sum of the first odd numbers is always a 
square.  Thus in the context of the ‘explanatory’ function of proof, a visual-geometric 
approach is now adopted to try and explain, why the sum of the first odd numbers is a square. 







)12( = n2 







)12( = n2. 
First notice that (2i - 1) = (i - 1) + (i - 1) +1. Next observe that the number of blocks in the ith 









 Figure 5.4.1.1: Geometric approach 
 
For example, when i = 3, the number of blocks in the third row combined with third column 
are 2 + 2 shaded blocks plus 1 non-shaded block, for a total of 5 blocks. This situation is 














    
 
 
       Figure 5.4.1.2: Number of Blocks 
 
From Figure 5.4.1.2, one can further observe that the number of blocks in all rows and all 
columns from 1 to n , is n
2
. That is, in a square of n rows and n columns, there are n
2 
elements. Such a square can be obtained by combining all the blocks of row 1, column 1, 
with row 2 column 2, and so on, until one finally includes the blocks of row n, column, n. 
We of have previously observed that the number of blocks in row i, is (i - 1) + (i - 1) + 1= 2i 








)12( = n2. 







)12( = 1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + …+ (2n -1), which is the sum of the 





In essence, the proof by induction (see section on generic proving) can be regarded as a proof 
that proves, and the proof via the visual-geometric approach can be regarded as a proof that 
explains.  
 
In particular, Hanna (1990, p. 9) asserts the following: 
 
“A proof that proves shows only that a theorem is true; it provides evidential 
reasons alone. It is concerned only with substantiation, with what are known as 
rationes cognoscendi, that is, why-we-hold-it-to-be-so reasons. A proof that 






reasons that derive from the phenomenon itself: rationes esseni, or why-it-is-so 
reasons.”  
 
This essentially means that both proofs that prove and proofs that explain, are considered as 
legitimate proofs, particularly because they both provide a coherent set of arguments to 
establish the validity of a statement. However, a proof that explains does more than just 
validating the truth of theorem or conjecture generalization, since it actually also provides an 
essential understanding of why a theorem or conjecture generalization is true. Indeed, “a 
proof that explains, must provide a rationale based upon the mathematical ideas involved, the 
mathematical properties that cause the asserted theorem to be true” (Hanna, 1990, p.  9).  
 
Thus, we use the term, explain, in the context of proof, only when the proof highlights and 
invokes mathematical ideas which motivate it. However, not all proofs have explanatory 
power and on the other hand one can establish the validity of mathematical assertions by 
syntactic considerations alone, wherein the syntactic proof merely shows that a statement is 
true without really bringing to surface the mathematical property that makes it true (Hanna, 
1990). 
 
Hanna (1996, p. 4), also illustrates through examples, the notions of proofs that prove and 
explains as follows: 
“Prove that the sum of the first n positive integers, Sn , is equal to  n(n+1)/2” 
A proof that proves: 
Proof by Mathematical Induction: 
First step: For n =1, we have S1= 1(1+1)/2 = 1, which is true. 
Second step: Assume that the theorem is true for n = k: 
Sk = 1+ 2+3 + … + k =   ………………….  (1) 
Next we must show that the formulae is true for its successor, n = k + 1. That is, we must 
show:  Sk+1 = 1+ 2+3 + …+ k + (k +1) =   =    ………... (2) 
To show (2) we proceed as follows: 
Sk+1      = 1+ 2+3 + …+ k + (k +1)  
     =  + k +1 
  =  





  =  
  =  
 =   
We see the result,  , is the expression on the right side of Sk+1 .Thus by 
mathematical induction, Sn is true for all natural numbers n. 
 
Hanna and Jahnke (1996) acknowledges that a proof by mathematical induction such as given 
above “demonstrates that the theorem is true, but gives the student no inkling why it is true” 
and moreover it “has little explanatory power”.  However, Hanna and Jahnke (1996, p. 904) 
suggests that through the use of symmetry of two representations of the given sum (which 
incidentally is Gauss’s proof), it is possible to explain why the theorem is true as follows: 
 
Sn = 1 + 2  +        3      + ………………….. + n 
Sn = n +(n -1)  + (n-2) + ………………….. + 1  (reversing Sn) 
2Sn = (n +1) +(n +1)+ (n +1) + ………. +   (n +1)                 (Adding) 
      = n(n +1)     (since there are lots of (n +1)) 
 
 
In addition, Hanna and Jahnke (1996, p. 904), provides two more explanatory proofs, using 
triangular numbers and area respectively, which show that the sum of the first n positive 
integers, Sn , is equal to  n(n+1)/2. 
 
 
Triangular Number proof – a proof that explains: 
In this instance, the geometric representation of the first n positive integers takes the form of 
an isosceles right triangle of dots. In particular, the sum of the first n integers can be 
represented as triangular numbers (see Figure 5.4.1.3). 
 
    
 
   
           Figure 5.4.1.3: Triangular numbers 






“The dots form an isosceles triangle containing                   dots. 
Two such sums, Sn + Sn, give a square containing    dots and   additional dots, because the 
diagonal of n dots is counted twice. 
Therefore:    =   +   
               =    
        =   (additional step inserted -numerator factorized)” 
 
Staircase-shaped area – a proof that explains: 
Hanna and  Jahnke (1996, p. 905) suggests that the first n integers can be represented by a 
staircase-shaped area as follows: "a rectangle with sides n and n + 1  is divided by a zigzag 
line (see Figure 5.4.1.4). The whole area is          and the staircase- shaped area, 







    
 
The alternative examples of explanatory proof signposted by Hanna and Jahnke (1996), 
suggest that there exists ample opportunity for mathematics educators to search (or create) 
and present explanatory proofs that better promote understanding. Such explanatory proofs 
are “much more likely to yield not only ‘knowledge that’, but also ‘knowledge why’” (Hanna 
and  Jahnke, 1996, p. 905). However, in reality it is not always possible to find a proof for 
every theorem that performs an explanatory function, but nevertheless one should make the 
most of any possible opportunity to engage with a proof that explains instead of one that 
merely proves. Hersh’s (1993, pp. 396-398) is also of  view that, “what proof should do for 
the student is to provide insight into why a theorem is true” and at the high school level “the 
primary role of proof  is explanation”, rather than just to convince because learners are any 
way usually already easily convinced on the basis of empirical evidence or the authority of 
the teacher or textbook. In particular, Hersh (1993, p. 389) asserts that, “enlightened use of 
 






proofs in the mathematics classrooms aims to stimulate the students’ understanding, not to 
meet abstract standards of “rigor” or “honesty.” 
 
De Villiers (1992, p. 51) gives a proof that explains why the bisectors of the angles of a 
triangle are concurrent at a point equidistant distant from the sides (bisectors of  ’s of ∆), in 
contrast to the concurrency one that was discussed earlier in Section 5.4.  Before we proceed 
with the actual proof that explains, we need to consider the following possible definition of 
the bisector of an angle (illustrated in Figure 5.4.1.5): It is the locus (path) of all the points 






                              
 
 
 Figure 5.4.1.5: A definition of angle bisector 
 
Explanatory Proof : (bisectors of  ’s of ∆): 
 
Figure 5.4.1.6:  Bisectors of  ’s of ∆ 
 
Consider Figure 5.4.1. 6, wherein we are given ∆ABC with the bisectors of Â  and B̂  
meeting at O. Using the meaning of the bisector of an angle as the locus of all the points 
equidistant from both arms (rays) of an angle, we develop an argument as follows using the 
notion of symmetry with reference to Figure 5.4.1.6: 
 
Now, BO is the locus of points equidistant from BC and AB, and also AO is the locus of 











meet, must also be equidistant from BC and AC (through transitivity). Therefore the point O 
must also lie on the bisector of Ĉ (which is the locus of all the points equidistant from BC 
and AC), and which completes the proof of concurrency (see de Villiers, 1992, p. 51). 
 
Explanatory proofs, such as the ones just posited, are in keeping with Hersh’s (1993) 
humanist view of proofs, namely, “Proof is complete explanation”. This essentially means 
that proofs are not just pure mechanistic procedures or obligatory rituals, but rather a process 
that entails understanding, which goes beyond just confirming that all links in a chain of 
deduction are correct (Hanna, 1990). This inherent drive for creating understanding through 
explanatory proofs, provides opportunities to increase students’ understanding of concepts, 
methods and related applications, through some engagement with previous mathematical 
experiences wherever necessary. Furthermore, through well constructed explanatory proofs, 
there exists a greater possibility for students to obtain deeper insight into the connections of 
the network of mathematical ideas leading to the truth of a particular theorem or proposition. 
Anderson (1996, pp. 32-38) also endorses that proof in its explanatory capacity, ought to 
provide a kind of deeper understanding of why a particular result or conjecture generalization 
is always true as follows in his own words: 
  
“Proof should be seen as being about explaining, albeit carefully and precisely. 
It is where instrumental understanding gives way to relational understanding. It 
should be seen as the essence of mathematics and all pupils who study 
mathematics should meet it at some, at some level.” 
 
Furthermore, Hadas and Hershowitz (1998), in their research regarding activities that induce 
the need for explaining and convincing, finds  that the need for explanation is raised by: 
a. A surprise caused by the contradiction between the conjectures and what students get 
(or could not get) while working with a dynamic tool. 
b. A situation where one cannot find any example for a conjecture he or she made 
c. The multiple representations of the situation (geometrical, numerical and graphical) 
and relating these representations or resolving perceived conflicts between them 
 
Indeed the ‘surprise’ element in cases where the results are convincing but surprising, stirs up 
the need to know why the result occurs, i.e. causes the need to understand ‘why?’ Moreover, 
for many mathematicians themselves, the explanation aspect of a proof is far more their 





syntactic methods, are really more interested in the message behind the proof than its syntax, 
and see the mechanics of proof as a necessary but ultimately less significant aspect of 
mathematics” Hanna (1990, p. 12). For example, we have the proof of the famous four colour 
theorem, which Appel and Haken (1976) reduces to a finite (but large) number of alternatives 
which are resolved by the computer. Despite “the impeccable logic in the listing of the 
possibilities and their checking by the computer, the proof itself seems to shed no light as to 
why the theorem is true” (Dubinsky & Tall, 1991, p. 233). 
 
 Moreover, whilst some mathematicians may be happy with a computer checked proof, there 
are other mathematicians who have the dire need to have a kind of insight as to how the 
concept relates to other known results and not just the mere logical deduction from a proof. 
Unless these mathematicians have such insight, a kind of dissatisfaction or even insecurity 
continues to lurk in their minds because they fear that that some minor logical error (perhaps 
linked to errors in programming or comprehension of certain principles in the computer 
environment) may be found, which can then render the argument fallacious (Dubinsky & 
Tall, 1991). A similar kind of notion is also echoed by Otte (1994, p. 310) as follows:  
 
“[T]he mathematician’s reaction shows quite clearly that a proof which does 
nothing but prove in the sense of mere verification must be very unsatisfactory. A 
proof is also expected to generalize, to enrich our intuition, to conquer new 
objects, on which our mind may subsist.”  
 
Thus, mathematics teachers and mathematics teacher educators, should strike at every 
opportunity to provide good mathematical explanations for established conjecture 
generalizations in their classrooms, with focus on the underlying mathematical ideas that 
contribute to the establishment of meaningful truth at all times, with the ultimate goal being 
to provide the much needed insight into why the conjecture generalization is always true. 
 
5.4.2 Proof as a means of discovery 
In the development of a mathematical proof of a conjecture generalization, we find that 
definitions, axioms and previously established theorems, are appropriated and used to 
“deduce the truth of one statement from another” (Tall, 1989, p. 30). This approach helps to 
establish the certainty of a particular conjecture generalization, and also provide possible 
“insight into how and why it works” (Tall, 1992, p. 506). However, depending on the nature 





conjectures could be discovered during the ‘think-tank-time’ phase of the development of its 
proof, without necessarily engaging in any further kind of empirical investigations/actions. 
This means that new results or conjectures can be the spin-off from an attempt to prove a 
particular conjecture generalization or theorem. Thus we say it is possible for new results in 
mathematics to be discovered or invented in a purely deductive manner and not just in an 
intuitive, inductive or analogical manner.  
 
For example, since 1742 numerous attempts have been made to prove the Goldbach 
conjecture, which states that any even number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes 
(Hummel, 2000). Although the Goldbach conjecture has been verified numerically (using a 
computer program) up to 4 x 10
11
 (Saouter, 1998), no one has been able to prove it or provide 
a counter-example, but the search for a proof of the Goldbach conjecture has inevitably led to 
many other discoveries and proofs. The kind of rigour and effort that has been invested in 
search for a proof for the Goldbach conjecture, has earned us other good ‘dividends’, which 
inevitably places the inherent discovery ‘agency’ contained in particular proof making 
activities (such as the ones in the Goldbach case)  at the helm of the construction of knew 
knowledge.  This sentiment is also echoed as follows by Rav (1999) as cited in de Villiers 
(2002, p. 1.):  
 
“Look at the treasure which attempted proofs of the Goldbach conjecture has 
produced, and how much less significant by comparison its ultimate ‘truth value 
might be! ... Now let us suppose that one day somebody comes up with a counter-
example to the Goldbach conjecture or with a proof that there exists positive even 
integers not representable as a sum of two primes. Would that falsify or just 
tarnish the magnificent theories, concepts and techniques which were developed 
in order to prove the now supposed incorrect conjecture? None of that. A disproof 
of the Goldbach conjecture would just catalyze a host of new developments, 
without the slightest effect on hitherto developed methods in an attempt to prove 
the conjecture. For we would immediately ask new questions, such as to the 
number of ‘non-goldbachian’even integers: finitely many? infinitely many? … 
New treasures would be accumulated alongside, rather than instead of the old 
ones, thus and so is the path of proofs in mathematics!”  
 
Just as the search for the proof for the Goldbach conjecture catalyzed a whole new range of 





which states that the equation,                           has no integer solutions when n 
is greater than or equal to 3, has contributed to much important mathematics (Darmon, 
Diamond & Taylor, 1989).  In particular, the search for a proof of FLT, which was first 
conjectured by Pierre de Fermat in 1637 and proved by Andrew Wiles in 1995, stimulated the 
development of algebraic number theory in the 19
th
 century and the proof of the modularity 
theorem in the 20
th
 century (Wikipedia b, 2010). For example, Ernst Eduard Kummer in the 
1840’s as cited in Darmon et al (2007), brought in sophisticated concepts of algebraic number 
theory and theory of L -functions to attempt to prove FLT. In this process the concepts of 
cyclotomic integers and integers were formulated, which undoubtedly made significant 
contributions towards the development of class field theory and abstract algebra (Cox, 1994). 
However, Kummer proved the theorem only for a large class of primes known as regular 
primes. Thereafter, other mathematicians, working on Kummer’s proof, using sophisticated 
computer programs, managed to prove the conjecture for all primes less than four million 
(see Wikipedia, 2010a). The zest for the proof of FLT continued, and in the process  
‘Gerhard Frey’s suggestion to use the modularity conjecture for elliptic curves to prove FLT 
was considerd(Cox, 1994). In particular, Frey worked with the Taniyama-Shimura 
conjecture, which states:  
         “Given an elliptic curve  over , there are nonconstant 
modular functions f(z), g(z) of the same level N such that        
          .” (see Cox, 1994, p. 9) 
 
The Taniyama- Shimura conjecture says that an elliptic curve over  can be parametrized by 
modular functions, and that such an elliptic curve is modular. Frey tried to prove that the 
Taniyama-Shimura conjecture implies FLT (Cox, 1994, p. 9). However, his proof had some 
serious gaps, and Jeane-Pierre Serre saw that a special version of a conjecture (the so called 
epsilon conjecture) he made on level reduction for modular Galois representations would fill 
the gap. Hence, due credit goes to Frey & Serre, for showing that FLT follows from 
Taniyama-Shimura conjecture and the special level reduction conjecture (epsilon conjecture) 
made by Serre. Following this strategy, Ken Ribet in 1986, contributed to the proof of FLT 
by proving Serre’s conjecture (the epsilon conjecture) (see Cox, 1994, p. 9). This meant that 
Taniyama-Shimura conjecture for semistable elliptic curves had to be proved in order to 
complete the proof for FLT. Inspired by this development, Andrew Wiles began to work on 
Taniyama-Shimura conjecture, and seven years later on 23 June 1993, he presented a proof 
that the conjecture is true for semistable elliptic curves (Ribet & Hayes, 1994). In essence, 





a non-modular semistable eliptic curve, whereas Wiles’ proof showed that such elliptic 
curves must be modular. This contradiction implied that there can be no solutions to Fermat’s 
equation, thus proving Fermat’s Last Theorem” (see Wikipedia, 2010a). 
 
Moreover, the research mathematician Gian-Carlo Rota (1997, p. 10) as cited in de Villiers 
(2002) pointed out in no uncertain terms, that the value of the proof of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem goes far beyond the verification of the result itself: 
 
“The actual value of what Wiles and his collaborators did is far greater than the 
mere proof of a whimsical conjecture. The point of the proof of Fermat’s last 
theorem is to open up new possibilities for mathematics….The value of Wiles 
proof lies not in what it proves, but what it opens up, in what it makes possible.” 
 
Moreover, many people working in the field of mathematics education appear to have a 
general misconception that theorems or conjecture generalizations are first discovered 
through intuition and or empirical methods, prior to being verified by construction of logical 
proofs. However, there are many examples in mathematics where new results are discovered 
or invented just via deductive arguments. For example, suppose one was examining the 
properties of isosceles trapezia. Assume that we already knew that in general, as shown as 
shown in Figure 5.4.2.1, that an isosceles trapezium has the following properties, namely:  
PQ//SR; PS = QR; QP ˆˆ  ; RS ˆˆ   and PR = QS. 
 
                          
                                
 
                                         
                                  
 Figure 5.4.2.1  An isosceles trapezium  
   
By considering the known properties, one could easily develop the following kind of 
argument by logically analysing its properties: 
        SP ˆˆ 180
0
 (co-interior angles, PQ//SR) 
      and RS ˆˆ   








                          the isosceles trapezium PQRS is a cyclic quadrilateral.  
Thus, in this particular case, we have discovered new knowledge in a deductive manner and 
not in the conventional inductive manner by first using construction and measurement. 
 
Moreover, a purely analytical approach whereby the properties of given objects are 
deductively analyzed, could in an a priori sense lead to the discovery of new results (see de 
Villiers, 2003a). For example, in Figure 5.4.2.2, we are given PX//TY//SZ and PS, PZ and 
XZ are transversals. 
 
 






   Figure 5.4.2.2: Parallel line cut by a transversal  
 
Without actually engaging in any construction or measurement procedures, we can proceed in 
a deductive manner as follows: 
In ∆PSZ,  
  TW//SZ              (given)  
      ... (1)                   (Proportional Intercept Theorem) 
 
In ∆ZPX,  
  WY//PX    (given)  
      … (2)   (Proportional Intercept Theorem)  
 
From (1) and (2) we conclude that   . 
This basically produces the following result: three (or more) parallel lines cut all transversals 
in the same ratio. 
 
Also, when after succesfully proving a particular theorem or conjecture generalization, it 






particular condition or property stated in the enunciation of the theorem or conjecture 
generalization, is not really necessary, i.e. it may just be a superfluous property, which has no 
pivotal bearing on the construction of the proof. Consequently this provides an ideal 
opportunity to possibly generalize a result across other domains, for example from 
quadrilaterals to pentagons to hexagons to octagons and to a general polygon. For example, 
suppose learners are given the following ready- made script of a kite ABCD on Sketchpad, 
where the connected midpoints form a quadrilateral EFGH as shown in Figure 5.4.2.3, and 
are asked to experiment and then formulate a conjecture regarding the quadrilateral formed 







                 
         Figure 5.4.2.3: Kite ABCD 
 
It so happens that the learners come up with the following conjecture generalization: The line 
segments consecutively connecting the midpoints of the adjacent sides of a kite form a 
rectangle. However, one could provide a deductive explanation of the established conjecture 
generalization using the following set of logical arguments: 
 
Deductive Explanation:  
In ∆ABC, 
BE   = EA  …  (given E is the midpoint of AB) 
and  BF = FC   …  (given F is the midpoint of BC) 
  EF//AC        …. (midpoint theorem)  




Now in Quad EFGH: 
EF//HG … (proved above) 






  Quad EFGH is a parallelogram ….  (both pairs of opp.sides of quad EFGH are parallel 
Since BD AC (property of kite) we also have EF EH.  
   EFGH is a rectangle … (EFGH is a parallelogram with a right angle).  
 
On careful reflection of the aforeconstructed proof, which Polya refers to as “looking back”, 
we observe that the property of equal adjacent sides (or an axis of symmetry through one pair 
of opposite angles) was not used anywhere in the development of the proof. This basically 
means that the result can be immediately generalized to any quadrilateral with perpendicular 
diagonals (a perpendicular quadrilateral) as illustrated in Figure 5.4.2.4 ( see de Villiers, 
2003a). 
 






  Figure 5.4.2.4: Quadrilateral with perpendicular diagonals  
 
Furthermore this generalization is true for the concave and crossed cases as well, and 
demonstrates the real value of understanding why something is true. De Villiers (2003a) 
asserts that the general result did not emanate from any of the empirical investigations or 
verifications associated with the original conjecture. Furthermore De Villiers (2003a, p. 8) 
maintains that “even a systematic empirical investigation of various types of quadrilaterals 
would probably not have helped to discover the general case, since we would have probably 
have restricted our investigations to the familiar quadrilaterals such as parallelograms, 
rectangles, rhombuses, squares, and isosceles trapezoids.” 
 
Just as the previous example highlights the discovery function of proof, Hemmi & Loffwall 
(2011) illustrates the discovery function of proof through looking back at a proof constructed 
to justify the following statement: ‘In a rectangle the midpoints are connected. Then one 
obtains a parallelogram’. In summary, the proof for the aforementioned statement is re-
constructed using the following proportionality theorem in the argument: “If a line divides 
two sides of a triangle proportionally, then the line is parallel to the third side of the triangle” 












Figure 5.4.2.5: Rectangle with midpoints joined 
 
An outline of a reconstructed proof is as follows: 
Given: P, Q, R and S midpoints of sides AB, AD, BC and CD respectively 
To prove: PQSR is a parallellogram 
Construction: Draw diagonals BD and AC. Join PQ,PR, RS and QS. 
Proof:  Consider diagonal BD. 
 Let and , 
then   and        (given P is the midpoint of AB & Q is the 
     midpoint of AD) 
 Now, 
                
        and   
        
                PQ// BD     (line divides two sides of a ∆  proportionately) 
Similarly, RS//BD 
  PQ//RS ……………….. (1) 
Similarly by considering the second diagonal AC,  
 QS// PR …………………. (2) 
(1) & (2)  PRSQ is a parallelogram         (both pairs of opp. sides of quad.PRSQ 
 are parallel) 
 
On reflecting and analyzing the afore-constructed proof, it is quite noticeable that the given 
information about the figure (quadrilateral) being a rectangle was not in any specific way 
used in the construction of the deductive justification. This then suggests that the afore-
constructed deductive justification (proof) is “valid under weaker assumptions” (Hemmi & 
Loffwall , 2011, p .4), which in effect means that the proof produced in this instance holds for 






pertaining just to the rectangle is really a special case of a more general conjecture (or 
generalization), and consequently makes it possible for one to produce a new generalization 
that is much more general in nature, for example: “Connecting the four midpoints of an 
arbitrary quadrilateral, yields a parallelogram” (Hemmi & Loffwall, 2011, p. 4). However, on 
further reflecting on the proof, we see that the proof has been constructed around a special 
proportion, namely   , suggesting that the proof is a special case of a more 
general proof.  In a more general sense, the proof works wells for any proportion, namely   
 , . Such a finding, enables one to reconstruct the original 
conjecture generalization into the following more general generalization: “In a quadrilateral 
the two sides outgoing from a corner are divided in the same proportion. The same proportion 
is also used to divide the two sides outgoing from the opposite corner. Connecting these four 
points gives a parallelogram” (Hemmi & Loffwall, 2011, p. 5). In essence, we refer to the 
latter generalization as a deductive generalization primarily because it was discovered (or 
invented) in a true deductive style upon careful reflection and analysis of the proof that was 
constructed to explain the validity of the initial conjecture (see de Villiers, 1990, 1999, 2003). 
 
In much the same vein, De Villiers (2002, p. 7), discovered and proved the following 
interesting generalization using Sketchpad: “If similar triangles PAC, QDC and RDB are 
constructed on AC, DC and DB of any quadrilateral ABCD with AD = BC so that APC
ASB , where S is the intersection of AD and BC extended, then P, Q and R are collinear” 
(see Figure 5.4.2.6). On carefully looking back at his proof, de Villiers surprisingly realized 
that he had never used the property that AD = BC.  








   
 
This discovery in itself, suggested that the result could be easily generalized to any other 
quadrilateral. Indeed, this re-iterates “the value of an explanatory proof which enables one to 
 
 





generalize a result by the identification of fundamental properties upon which it depends” (de 
Villiers, 2002, p. 7).   
                                         
In a similar vein, de Villiers (2007b) enlightens the discovery function of proof through 
reflecting on some of his experiences he had at a KwaZulu-Natal Olympiad problem solving 
workshop, wherein about 30 teachers were given the following problem (called Cross’s 
theorem) to solve:  
 “Prove that the areas of the four shaded triangles (in Figure 5.4.2.7) are the same” (p. 2). 
 






                               
 
Through reflecting and looking back on the trigonometric proof that was offered as an 
explanation as to why Cross’s theorem is always true, and identifying the fundamental 
property that makes the theorem to be true, De Villiers describes how such deeper insight 
allows one to construct further generalizations to similar parallelograms and similar cyclic 
quadrilaterals, without any necessary need for experimentation. This kind of experience re-
iterates that proof “no longer just plays the role of verification, but rather that of a priori 
discovery” (de Villiers, 2007b, p. 4). 
 
As explicated in the aforementioned examples, the “discovery” function of proof means that 
we can develop new results from already constructed proofs, after “looking back” and 
carefully analyzing the statements and reasons that make up and/or do not make up the proof 
argument contained in the constructed proof in question (Miyazaki, 2000). The process of 
looking back is quite pivotal in the germination of new results, and Polya (1985, p. 15) has 
accordingly stressed its importance through the following words:  
 
“Looking Back: Even fairly good students, when they have obtained the solution of 
the problem and written down neatly the argument, shut their books and look for 
something else. Doing so, they miss an important instructive phase of the work. By 
 
Figure 5.4.2.7: Prove Areas of the Four Shaded Triangles are the Same  






looking back at the completed solution, by reconsidering and reexamining the result 
and the path that led to it, they could consolidate their knowledge and develop their 
ability to solve problems. A good teacher should understand and impress on his 
students the view that no problem whatever is completely exhausted. There remains 
always something to do, with sufficient study and penetration, we could improve any 
solution, and, in any case, we can always improve our understanding of the solution" 
(Polya, 1985, p. 15). 
 
The looking back as conceptualized by Polya has a more recent description in the process of 
‘folding back’ on a learning trajectory in the models of Pirie and Kieran (1994, p.167). They 
argue that the development of understanding of any concept, topic or aspect of the 
mathematics  learning area is really a dynamical to and fro movement through each of the 















Figure 5.4.2.8: The Pirie-Kieren model for the growth of mathematical understanding 
                       (see Pirie & Kieren, 1994, p. 167) 
 
This means that when students encounter a problem whilst being at an outer layer, they may 
fold back into an inner layer with the prime purpose to reflect on their on their prior work and 
existing knowledge to try and build an understanding of the phenomenon or problem at hand 






him/her to solve the problem under the spotlight. In this respect, Pirie & Kieren (1994, p. 72)   
asserts that folding back “allows for the reconstruction and elaboration of inner level 
understanding to support and lead to new outer level understanding”. Within the context of 
this study, folding back means shifting from a task at a higher level (Justification) to prior 
work with something like a GSP sketch exploration. 
 
I believe that the vast array of theoretical issues and insights plus the focus on a number of 
relevant studies presented/discussed in the theoretical chapters can help me address the key 
concerns and contextual aspects of the design of my study. This is what I propose to do in the 
next Chapters. 
 
In particular, the next Chapter (i.e. Chapter 6) provides a discussion on the research design 


























Chapter 6: Research Design and Methodology 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Taking cognizance of the purpose of this study as articulated in Chapter 1, a conceptual 
framework located within a constructivist paradigm, which integrates a combination of 
theoretical considerations and existing theoretical frameworks has been constructed to 
provide a lens through which the following core research questions could be investigated: 
 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers construct a generalization, which says that the sum 
of the distances from a point inside an equilateral triangle to its sides is constant? If so, 
how do they accomplish this generalization (which is commonly referred to as Viviani’s 
theorem)?    
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers support their equilateral triangle generalization 
     with a justification, and if so, how do they construct (or provide) a justification for it? 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers further generalize and extend the Viviani Theorem 
for equilateral triangles to equilateral (convex) polygons of four sides (rhombi), five sides 
(pentagons), and then to equilateral convex polygons in general?  If so, how do they 
accomplish the constructions of such further generalizations? 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers justify each of their extended generalizations to 
equilateral convex polygons (namely, rhombus, pentagon and general equilateral polygon 
generalizations)? If so, how do they accomplish the justification of each of their 
respective further generalizations? 
 
To augment the conceptual framework of this study in order to arrive at meaningful solutions 
to the posited research questions, a qualitative research methodology encompassing a case 
study based research strategy embedded in an interpretive paradigm has been considered. 
This Chapter starts with a discussion about qualitative research methodology, the interpretive 
paradigm and the case study research strategy as applied in this study.  Next, the profiles of 
the participants that were involved in the research project are scrutinised together with data 
collection (production) techniques and tools and  data analysis procedures that were adopted 
for this study. In addition this Chapter discusses some of the design limitations and measures 
taken to ensure a reasonable degree of reliability and validity in respect of the findings of this 
study. Lastly a brief summary of the discussions tabled in this Chapter is provided. The 








































Research Design and Methodology 
Qualitative Approach 
Interpretive Paradigm Case Study 
Data Collection technique Data Collection Tool 
One- to- one task-based interview Semi-structured interview guide (protocol), task-
based worksheet; Snagit onscreen video capture 
and audio recording. 
Observations (observing) Observational note book; Snagit recordings. 
Document (including saved  
Sketches) analysis 
Specific saved Sketchpad sketches (using a 
memory stick) and PMTs completed task-based 
activity worksheets. 
 
          Research Findings 
           Data Analysis 
Analytical–Inductive Method 





6.1 Qualitative Research Methodology 
According to Cresswell (2003, p. 18), a qualitative approach is: 
…one in which the inquirer often makes knowledge claims based primarily on  
constructivist perspectives (i.e. the multiple meanings of individual experiences, 
meanings socially and historically constructed, with an intent of developing a theory 
or pattern) or …participatory perspectives (i.e.,…issue-oriented, collaborative, or 
change oriented. It also uses strategies inquiries such as narratives …, or case studies.  
The researcher collects open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of 
developing themes from the data. 
 
In essence, a qualitative research approach allows the researcher through the use of 
interviews, conversations, field notes, recordings and photographs to observe, interpret  or 
make sense of participants’ engagement/response/behaviour towards a phenomenon (or 
phenomena) under consideration in a given natural setting like a typical  mathematics 
classroom (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995). In other words, qualitative 
research places individual persons or groups at the centre. It focuses on investigating, 
understanding, discovering meaning and explaining particular phenomena through the 
experiences and/or perspectives of the participants, particularly within areas of educational 
thought and practice (Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995; Leedy, 1993; McMillan & Schumacher, 
2010).  Flick (2007, p. ix) is of the view that one could interpret, make sense, explain and 
describe social phenomena ‘from the inside’ in three plausible ways, namely: 
 
“By analyzing experiences of individuals or groups. Experiences can be related to  
everyday or professional practices; they may addressed by analyzing everyday 
knowledge, accounts and stories. By analyzing interactions and communications in 
 the making. This can be based on observing or recording practices of interacting and 
communicating and analyzing this material, by analyzing documents (texts, images, 
films or music) or similar traces of experiences of interactions.” 
 
In this research, the phenomenon of generalization through experimentation and justification 
has been explored. Through conducting one-to-one task-based interviews with pre-service 
mathematics teachers (PMTs) within a dynamic geometric context, the researcher has  
attempted to construct an holistic detailed account of the generalizing and justifying 
experience of PMTs. This was accentuated by recording verbal responses, collecting 





analyzing, interpreting and making sense of the PMTs interactions, communications, 
worksheet responses and onscreen ‘drag moves’. The goal was to capture the complexity of 
the world as it appeared to the subjects in the study and report                                                 
to the events related to their processes of generalizing. Hence through using a qualitative 
approach via a case-based strategy of inquiry that is located within the interpretive paradigm, 
I, as the researcher, attempted to capture, account and give meaning to the PMTs’ 
experiences with construction and justification of a generalization of Viviani’s theorem, in 
anticipation that readers who have not experienced the evolutionary process of generalizing 
from one domain to the next, should then  be able to make sense of it after reading the in-
depth experiences of the subjects that participated in this study. 
 
In qualitative research methodology, the language of the subjects is important. This implies 
that the “actual words of the subjects are thought to be critical to the process of conveying the 
meaning systems of the participants which eventually become the results or findings of the 
research” (Filstead, 1979, p. 37). In other words, whatever the subjects say (during 
interviews) is crucial since it allows the researcher to discover whatever is important and 
meaningful to the subjects in the study. The researcher’s discoveries are presented as the 
findings of the research. These findings are then discussed, and conclusions/implications for 
the study are drawn. 
 
6.2 Interpretive Paradigm 
A feature that makes this study qualitative is its interpretative character. Carrol and Swatman 
(2000) argues that: 
 
“All researchers interpret the world through some sort of conceptual lens formed by 
their beliefs, previous experiences, existing knowledge, assumptions about the world 
and theories about knowledge and how it is accrued. The researcher’s lens acts as a 
filter: the importance placed on the huge range of observations made in the field  
(choosing to record or note some observations and not others, for example) is partly 
determined by this filter”( pp. 118-119).  
 
Through locating oneself within an interpretive paradigm during research activities, one can 
observe the experiences of participants as and when they socially engage in particular tasks or 
events, and then distill the meaning that such experiences have for those who experience it 





attempt to: “describe, analyze, and interpret features of a specific situation, preserving its 
complexity and communicating the perspectives of the participants” (Hilda, Liston, & 
Whitcomb, 2007, p. 4). Furthermore, Denzin (1978) describes the major components of the 
interpretivist view in the following way: 
 
“The social world of human beings is not made up of objects that have intrinsic 
meaning. The meaning of objects lies in the actions that human beings take toward 
them…Social reality as it is sensed, known, and understood is a social production. 
Interacting individuals produce and define their own definition of situations and the 
process of defining situations is ever changing….Second, humans are … capable of 
shaping and guiding their own behaviour and that of others (intentionally and 
unintentionally), and humans learn … the definitions they attach through interactions 
with others” (p. 7). 
 
From this perspective, meanings and actions, context and situation are inextricably linked and 
make no sense in isolation from each other. The ‘facts’ of human activity are social 
constructions; they exist only by social agreement or consensus among participants in a 
context and situation. For example, what counts as conjectures, generalizations, justifications, 
proof, counter-examples and discovery or whatever depends on the ways (and whether) these 
things are defined and used in human groups (compare Bredo & Feinberg, 1982, p. 16). In 
other words, it makes no sense for the interpretivist to do things according to preconceived 
principles and views without giving due attention to the factor(s) supporting the the birth of 
the idea (s) under consideration.  
 
Working in an interpretivsit paradigm, requires the gathering of information that will enable 
the  investigator to “make sense” of the world from the perspective of the participants; that is 
the researcher must learn how to behave appropriately in that world and how to make the 
world understandable to outsiders, especially in a research community. Thus, in this study, I 
have been involved in the activity as an insider and reflected upon it as an outsider (Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison, 2004). Furthermore, as it was critical in this study to capture the pre-
service mathematics teachers’ voice and discourse, I as the researcher-interpretivist   
conducted in-depth one-to-one task-based interviews with each PMT. The one-to-one task- 
based interviews which were conducted in a dynamic geometry context served as the primary 
data source in this study, and were correspondingly augmented and triangulated with data 





artifacts such as the task-based worksheets and the researcher’s observational notes were 
constantly reviewed in association with the video tape and Snagit recordings. As seeking 
meaning in context is the key task of interpretative research, I hoped the data collected in this 
way to be ‘rich’ and more appropriate to answer the research questions.  
 
Furthermore, consonant with methodological underpinnings of using an interpretive paradigm 
the data analysis in this study pursued a recursive process from the start of data collection, 
and the categories, patterns and themes described in this study were developed in  a two- fold 
way. Firstly they were deduced in an analytical manner from the literature study and 
conceptual framework governing this study and secondly were induced from the data scanned 
and reviewed data (compare Hilda, Liston, & Whitcomb, 2007, p. 5). However, as the 
researcher working in an interpretative paradigm I am fully aware that the findings and 
conclusions that I have derived through analyzing my data collected in this study, could very 
well be different from those of other researchers analyzing the same set of data or 
investigating the generalizing phenomenon in the same (if not similar) context as the one 
considered for this study. This means that different researchers might distill different sets of 
conclusions (or findings) for the very same phenomenon under investigation or data 
collected.  
 
Furthermore, like many other interpretivist researchers, Walsham (1993, p. 14) argues that, 
“the most appropriate method for conducting empirical research in the interpretive tradition is 
the in-depth case study.” Taking this into consideration as well as the nature of this study as 
described by the purpose and research questions, I resolved to use the case study research 
strategy, as discussed in section  6.3, to gather data which could be analyzed through using 
the analytical – inductive method and thereby generate possible answers to the research 
questions.  
 
6.3 Case Study 
To develop a holistic understanding of the phenomenon of generalization as described in the 
purpose of this study informed my decision  to use the case study research strategy because of 
its flexible form of inquiry that is most suited to study a particular phenomenon within a 
teacher-education context (compare Yin, 1984, 1994).  According to McMillan & 
Schumacher (2010, p. 485) a case study is “qualitative research that examines a bounded 
system (i.e. a case) over time in detail, employing multiple sources of data found in the 





an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals.” In this study, the case was 
conceptualized as a bounded system made up of eight final year pre-service mathematics 
teachers experiencing the constructions and justifications of a generalization (i.e. the 
phenomenon) of Viviani’s theorem as an evolutionary process across selected domains, 
within a dynamic geometry context in a computer laboratory.  The use of a case study-based 
approach enables a esearcher to get very close to the research participants via observations 
and interviews, and this coupled with key documents completed by participants makes it 
possible for a researcher to construct an intensive in-depth analysis of a case under study 
(Cohen et al., 2002; Cresswell, 2003; McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). Furthermore, through 
using various data collection procedures, such as interviews, observations, task-based 
worksheets it is quite likely that the researcher could get close to subjective factors such as 
participants’ cognition, emotions and expressions (Cohen et al., 2002). 
    
Since I was using the case study based approach supported by task-based interviews, 
observations, documents and video footage, I was able to explore and examine pre-service 
teachers’ generalizing and justifying experiences associated with: (a) the  reconstruction and 
justification of  Viviani’s Theorem for equilateral triangles, (b) the generalization (or 
extension) of Viviani’s theorem to higher order polygons like the rhombus and pentagons 
with  corresponding justifications, (c) the evolution of a generalization of Viviani’s theorem 
for any equi-sided polygon with a logical explanation.  
 
McMillan & Schumacher (2010, p. 345) in citing Stake (1995) argues that case studies are 
“intended to   provide detailed, specific accounts of particular circumstances rather than 
offering broad generalizable findings.” By using the case study approach, I was able to 
develop thick descriptions, use selected pieces of dialogues and quotations to provide 
compelling and rich representations of pre-service mathematics teachers’ generalizing and 
justifying experiences, which ultimately led to the discovery of a generalization of Viviani’s 
theorem and its proof. Hence, this case study can be regarded as an instrumental case study 
(compare McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 345). 
 
According to Hitchcock and Hughes (1995, p. 332) as cited in Cohen, Manion & Morrison 
(2002, p. 182), a case study has several hallmarks, namely:  
 
“It is concerned with a rich and vivid description of events relevant to the case;  it 





description of events with the analysis of them; it focuses on individual actors or 
groups of actors, and seeks to understand their  perceptions of events; it highlights 
specific events that are relevant to the case; the researcher is integrally involved in the 
case; an attempt is made to portray the richness of the case in writing up the report.” 
 
Hence, through using a case study approach a researcher can capture salient features of the 
research activity that could help to make sense of the phenomenon under investigation or 
examination (Nisbet & Watt, 1984 as cited in Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2002, p. 184 ). 
 
Although the case study research strategy has advantages, many researcher investigators have 
expressed some weaknesses about it. For example, Nisbet & Watt (1984) as cited in Cohen, 
Manion & Morrison (2002, p. 184) makes the following claims: 
 
“The results may not be generalizable except where other readers/Researchers see 
their application; they are not easily open to cross-checking, hence they may be 
selective, biased, personal and subjective; they are prone to problems of observer bias, 
despite attempts made to address reflexivity.” 
 
Given the investigative nature of this study, the research questions, the first decisions on the 
focus of the research and the theoretical framework, my duty and responsibility for data 
collection was to: 
 Develop and select materials which could be used during the one-to-one task-based 
interviews. 
 Make observations and make video recordings of students’ conversations whilst  they 
were involved with the tasks;  
 Keep discussions focused on the topics, which appeared on the worksheets; 
 Take observational notes during the whole implementation process for triangulation  
purposes. 
6.4 The Sample (sample) 
Newman (2000, p. 198) argues that “purposeful sampling occurs when a a researcher wants 
to identify particular types of cases for in-depth investigation.” In the same vein, Cohen et al., 
(2002, p. 103) says: “In purposive sampling, researchers handpick the cases to be included in 





researcher takes the purpose of their study into account, and consequently builds up a sample 
that is a required for a specific study. As the primary purpose of this study was to actively 
engage pre-service mathematics teachers in an evolutionary process of generalizing and to 
investigate how they constructed and justified their  generalizations extended from one 
domain to the next, this study employed the purposeful sampling strategy.  
 
In particular, I selected the final year pre-service mathematics teachers (PMTs) who were 
doing Mathematics Methods modules in the School of Science and Mathematics Education 
(SSME) within the Faculty of Education, University of Western Cape (UWC).  UWC is 
located approximately 30 km north of Cape Town, South Africa. As there were just five 
students doing the Bachelor of Education (B.Ed) Undergraduate Program, the researcher 
picked all five. To supplement this number of PMTs, I also included the three PMTs, who 
were the only students doing the Post Graduate Certificate in Education (PGCE) and 
specializing in mathematics at UWC. In total eight PMTs participated in this research study. 
These two groups had much in common, for example they all completed pure Mathematics 
courses up to at least 2
nd
 year University level, which were offered by the department of 
mathematics in the Faculty of Science at UWC. These modules included differential and 
integral calculus; linear algebra; differential equations and statistics. All eight PMTs 
completed their grade 12 at urban schools and obtained good passes in higher grade 
mathematics. Furthermore, whilst all  eight PMTs were doing their mathematics methods 
courses, they were also participating in micro-teaching and school based teaching practice 
activities organized by the Faculty of Education. 
 
Both the B.Ed and PGCE programmes are designed to provide the prospective mathematics 
educators with sufficient depth of knowledge and skills to enable life-long learning and 
systematic learning in schools from grades 7 to 12. The mathematics methods course covers a 
range of learning theories, teaching and learning strategies as well as assessment issues.   The 
emphasis of the mathematics methods courses is on developing the pedagogical content 
knowledge of the pre-service mathematics teachers which they can use in conjunction with 
their mathematical content knowledge to execute effective teaching and learning in their 
prospective mathematics classrooms. The ultimate goal is to develop the PMTs into specialist 
mathematics teachers, who will be  well grounded in the knowledge, skills and principles 
appropriate for mathematics specialization and the phase(s) they may teach. All eight pre-
service mathematics teachers were computer literate as they were compelled to do the 





PMTs were exposed to Sketchpad during their final year of study, whilst doing their 
mathematics method courses with me as their lecturer. Thus they were conversant with the 
dynamic geometric environment and the features of Sketchpad. The students needed to be 
conversant with the basic properties of triangles and other polygons, but this seemed to be a 
challenge in some instances. 
 
6.5 Data collection (Data generation) 
Data refers to the information collected by a researcher from which interpretations and 
conclusions are drawn with respect to a particular phenomenon under investigation 
(McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 486). An important part of methodology is gathering data 
that is both reliable and valid, which could  in this instance only be realized through the use 
of appropriate and purposively structured instruments that would contribute to answering the 
research questions of the study under consideration (Maxwell, 2005, p. 92). Some of the 
commonly used instruments in qualitative research encompassing a case study research 
strategy located with an interpretative paradigm are questionnaires, in-depth open-ended 
interviews, observations and documents (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2002, p. 184; 
Labuschagne 2003; McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 486). In this study, data has been 
gathered through one-to-one task-based interviews, observations and documents (see Sections 
6.5.1, 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 for detailed discussion). It is hoped that the triangulation of the various 
instruments and data sets would yield a more reliable and valid picture of the phenomenon of 
generalization as experienced by the pre-service mathematics teachers from a construction 
and justification perspective than other verifying strategies (compare Maxwell, 2005).  
 
The associated tools used to collect the data as per data collection technique employed in this 
study are included in Figure 6.2. The one-to-one task-based interviews, observations, and 
documents in this study revolved largely around a set of task-based activities embedded in a 
Sketchpad context. All tasks used in this study, for example Task 1 explained in Appendix 1 
and Tasks 2, 3 and 4 explained in Appendix 2, have been conceptualized within a 
constructivist view of learning. In so doing, the design of the tasks took into consideration the 
following theoretical constructs and processes: experimentation, conjecturing, generalizing, 
refutation via counter-examples, cognitive conflict, conceptual change, justification and 
proof. The curriculum material, which served as a basis for the construction of one-to-one 
task-based interviews and associated observations, has been based on the activities in the 
book, Rethinking Proof with The Geometer's Sketchpad (de Villiers, 2003a). Much of Task 1, 





26). Tasks 2-4, focus on the extension of the Viviani generalization for equilateral triangles, 
respectively to the rhombus, pentagon and any equi-sided polygon, and capture many of the 
processes and structures that are exemplified in Task 1, but with a focus on extending the 
generalization across domains in an evolutionary manner. Based on these results emanating 
from this study, it is envisaged that the material as represented in Tasks 1- 4 may have to be 
reviewed or re-designed. This explains the need for a classroom environment that promotes 
students interacting with developed curriculum materials, careful observation and thereafter 
reflection.   
 
Data Collection technique Data Collection Tool 
One- to- one task-based 
interview 
Semi-structured interview guide (protocol), task-
based worksheet; Snagit onscreen video capture and 
audio recording. 
Observations (observing) Observational note book; Snagit recordings. 
Document (including saved 
Sketches) analysis 
Specific saved Sketchpad sketches (using a memory 
stick) and PMTs completed task-based activity 
worksheets. 
         Figure 6.2: Data collection techniques & tools 
 
All the task-based activity sessions were facilitated by me, who is alternatively referred to as 
the researcher (facilitator) throughout the study. The task-based activity created an 
opportunity for me as the researcher to engage pre-service mathematics teachers in some of 
the core processes of mathematics ranging from generalizing through experimentation to 
generalizing via deductive reasoning whilst being engaged in authentic mathematical 
problems (as described in Tasks 1-4) in a realistic mathematical context using Sketchpad. 
Particularly the tasks aimed:  
 to provide opportunities for students to experiment  and create generalizations,  
 to encourage students to develop appropriate justifications (arguments) for their 
generalizations and test their generalizations;  
 to provide opportunities for students to develop proofs for their generalizations 
through appropriate justifications;  






Each student participated in the developed task-based activities via one-to one task-based 
interviews, which were held on two separate days that were almost 4 days apart from each 
other. As Task 1, which is described in Appendix 1, provides an opportunity for PMTs to re-
construct Viviani’s theorem for equilateral triangles through experimentation and proof, 
which can then serve as a generalization that can possibly be extended to other domains (like 
rhombus, pentagon, any equi-sided polygon), the researcher limited the first one-to-one task-
based interview session to just the equilateral triangle problem (i.e. Task 1). Furthermore, it 
was anticipated that PMTs would take approximately 30 to 45 minutes to complete Task 1, 
and about 40 to 60 minutes to complete Tasks 2-4 as described in Appendix 2-6. As one may 
not necessarily concentrate adequately when a one-to-one task-based interview runs for more 
than an hour, as the researcher I felt it was prudent to hold the one-to-one task-based 
interview for each PMT over two separate sessions (referred to as the first one-to-one task-
ased interview session and the second one-to-one task-based interview session in this study). 
Hence, the first one-to-one task-based interview session with each PMT focused on Task 1, 
the equilateral triangle problem. As there were eight PMTs participating in this study, and 
taking into account the possible time that it may take to complete the first one-to-one task- 
based interview through using the interview protocol as described in Appendix 3 in 
conjunction with Task 1, the researcher elected to hold just two sets of one-to-one task-based 
interviews per day. Hence, one-to-one task-based interviews for the first session spanned over 
4 days. Thus, the second one-to-one task-based interview session, which spanned over four 
days as well, started only on the fifth day of the data collection phase. This in essence, 
explains why the data from each PMT was collected via one-to-one task-based interviews on 
two separate days. In fact, the recorded time schedules for one-to-one task-based interviews 
conducted in this study, show that that time taken to complete a one-to-one task based 
interview in the first session ranges between 25 to 50 minutes, and the time taken in the 
second session ranges between  45 minutes to 80 minutes. 
 
In particular, the first session related to the development of a generalization linked to an 
equilateral triangle in the context of Viviani’s theorem and the development of a proof for the 
established generalization. The second one-to-one task-based interview session focused on 
generalizing the Vivaini result further to and across other domains through a range of ways, 
namely:  (a) exploration and experimentation, (b) inductively, (c) analogically, and (d) 
deductively; inclusive of appropriate kinds of justifications focusing  on the development and 
construction of logical explanation(s) that explained why the extended generalization holds 





based activities took place in a computer laboratory on 8 consecutive school days. The one-
to-one task-based interviews served as the primary data collection technique in this study, and 
was supported by observational notes and documents (i.e. completed task-based worksheets 
and saved Sketchpad sketches). 
 
I conducted the one-to-one task-based interview with each PMT, and made observational 
notes about PMTs gestures, surprised looks, misconceptions, ‘aha’ moments, struggles and 
successes as each action  played out during task- based interviews. However, in order not to 
disturb the flow of interactions of the PMT with the Sketchpad-based task and myself as the 
interviewer/interviewee, I made the observational notes at the end of a given task-based 
interview and also whenever a PMT was busy providing a written response to particular items 
on the task-based worksheet. The Snagit software (as described in Section 6.4) served a dual 
purpose: firstly it was used to capture the onscreen ‘drag moves’ of each PMT as they 
explored and experimented with a given problem in using Sketchpad; secondly it was used to 
audio record the task-based interview from start to beginning in tandem with ‘drag moves’ as 
they occurred during the task-based interview. In addition through using the Snagit software, 
students were encouraged to save specific strings of sketches that could support their 
assertions/claims. 
 
The data from the one-to-one task-based interviews consist of direct quotations from students 
related to their experiences, responses, opinions, feelings and knowledge pertaining to the 
specific Sketchpad task-based activities. The data from observation consist of detailed 
descriptions of participants’ behaviours and the full range of their interactive actions during 
the one-to-one task-based interviews as well as during their silent moments when they were 
responding in writing to some of the task-based activities. The document analysis yielded 
excerpts, quotations, or entire passages from the task-based worksheets as well as scripts in 
the form of pictures or saved sketches (compare Labuschagne, 2003). Hence, with the use of 
qualitative research methodology for this particular study, the researcher was able to extract 
rich and corroborating data concerning the development of generalization(s) and 
corresponding justifications thereof.  
 
6.5.1 One-to-one task-based Interviews 
A qualitative research interview, which is considered as one of the major approaches used to 
generate data, “attempts to understand the world from the subject’s point of view, to unfold 





explanations” (Flick, 2008, p. xvii). The purpose of an interview includes, among others, 
obtaining present constructions of persons, experiences, events, activities, feelings, claims, 
motivations, feelings, concerns, and also be used to reconstruct past experiences or predict 
the future of such aspects (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 268-270). However, there exist various 
research interview forms that are useful for different purposes, and they include forms such 
as the following: factual interviews, conceptual interviews, focus group interviews, narrative 
interviews, discursive interviews, one-to-one task-based interviews, (Davis, 1984; Flick, 
2008; Golden, 2000, 2002). 
 
In this study, I used one-to-one task-based interviews to generate data forthe research project.  
The basic idea associated with a task-based interview is that: “a student is seated at a table, 
paper and pens are provided, and the student is asked to solve a particular mathematics 
problem; one or more adults are present collecting data” (Davis, 1984, p .87). In addition, 
Davis (1984) is of the view that although paper and pens are minimum kinds of entities or 
equipment required, the equipment used during task-based interviews could also include 
rulers, compasses, hand held calculators, computers, textbooks, graph paper, geoboards, 
Cusenaire rods. In this study, each pre-service mathematics teacher had the opportunity to be 
seated behind a computer in the computer laboratory and work on series of connected 
problems dealing with the generalizing phenomenon by using a dynamic geometry software 
program called Sketchpad, and the researcher conducted the task-based interview to collect 
the data. Davis (1984) argues that the one-to-one task-based interview can vary from context 
to context, for example the level of participation by the interviewer could vary from high to 
low.  Generally if the participation of the interviewer is curtailed (i.e. low) the problem is 
posed to the student, and the student is left to work on the problem with virtually no 
assistance from the interviewer. However, whether the interviewer participation is high or 
low, the student is asked beforehand and is expected to: “talk aloud, explaining in as much 
detail as possible what he or she is doing, why they have decided to do it, and so on” Davis 
(1984, p. 87). In this study, given the nature of the research questions, it was essential to 
engage the PMTs in four problems as contained in Tasks 1-4 (see Appendix 1 & 2), but with 
a moderate level of intervention from the researcher as guided by the semi-structured 
interview protocols (see Appendices 3-6)  designed for each of Tasks 1-4  respectively 
According to Davis (1984, p. 88), an interviewer may intervene or question the student’s 





 “…in order to pose a further question, in order to provide a hint, or in order to correct 
an error or misunderstanding; they may also be intended to provide more motivation 
or perhaps some encouragement; … the interviewer may pose a new problem, after 
seeing what the student does with the first problem.” 
 
In this study, during the one-to-one task-based interview, I as the interviewer, intervened in a 
variety of ways including inter alia the following: providing a hint, correcting a 
misconception; posing a new problem, or just probing further to seek clarification or more 
insight as to how or what a particular PMT is thinking and/or  generalizing, arguing and 
justifying his/her claims. Furthermore, Davis (1984, p. 89) asserts that during task-based 
interviews: “the student is expected to verbalize their thoughts as much as possible as they 
work at the task, or such verbalizing may take place immediately after the mathematical task 
has been solved… the depth of probing can vary a great deal.” In this study, through 
appropriate probing as guided by the semi-structured interview protocols linked to each task- 
based activity, the PMTs were given sufficient opportunity to verbalize their thoughts and 
experiences and were probed to reasonable extents whenever it was deemed necessary by me 
as the interviewer. Through using the Snagit Software (which is described in Section 6.4), I 
was able to capture in great detail the thought processes, sense-making, reasoning, arguments 
and explanations of each PMT hroughout the task-based interview as they endeavored to 
construct a generalization of Viviani’s theorem. In particular, this method allowed me as the 
interviewer more opportunity to observe and track how each student moved through the 
Viviani related tasks, as expressed by  Novak and Gowin (1984, p. 12):  
“For this reason most psychologists prefer to do research in the laboratory, where 
variation in events can be rigidly prescribed or controlled. This approach clearly 
increases the chances for observing regularities in events and hence for creating new 
concepts.” 
 
As alluded to earlier, and reflected upon in the respective interview protocols spanning across 
Appendices 3, 4, 5 and 6, the interviews were semi- structured through the use of open-ended 
questions related to the task-based worksheets as contained in Appendices 1 & 2. Open–
ended questions are considered to have advantages because they allow persons being 
interviewed to take whatever direction and use whatever words they want to express what 





believed to allow flexibility, clarification, and probing of the interviewee responses. 
However, through using the one-to-one task-based interview, the number of external 
variables are reduced and the focus is narrowed, hence “giving generalizations based on 
findings during task-based interviews greater credibility” (Mudaly, 1998, p. 55). Davis 
(1984) argues that during task-based interviews, the observer needs to establish rapport with 
the student as this can enable the observer to probe the student further and obtain deeper 
insights or better data about the students dduring the process.  Hence, during each of the task-
based interviews for this study, I tried to maintain a good level of rapport with each PMT 
through providing scaffolded support to each person whenever the need arose. 
Furthermore, Davis (1984, p. 87) says at the end of a task-based interview session, 
Researchers will have: 
 an audiotape or videotape of the session; 
 the paper on which the student has written; 
 various written notes made by the observer(s) during the session. 
This study consisted of eight task-based interviews. Consistent with Davis’ (1984) 
aforementioned outputs, each task-based interview was audio and video recorded using 
Snagit (see Section 6.4 for detailed discussion), supported by the collection of completed 
written task-based worksheets and saved Sketchpad sketches, as well as observational notes. 
Furthermore, a debriefing session was held with each PMT after a one-to-one task-based 
interview was completed. 
 
6.5.2 Observations 
Observations in qualitative studies supplement interviews and are often unstructured and free 
flowing (Daniel, 1997; Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2002). This means that whatever one 
cannot grasp through an interview, one may add through observation, and thus enrich 
understanding of the phenomenon under study (McMillan and Schumacher 2010, p. 76).  
Cohen et al.(2002, p. 305)  argues that “observational data  affords the researcher an 
opportunity to gather ‘live data from ‘live’ situations. Observations in this study  provided 
me, as the researcher, with the opportunity to look at how the processes of generalization and 
justification unfolded in situ rather than second hand, with adequate focus on the following 
aspects: PMTs responses, reactions, interpretations, reflections, claims, explanations  of the 
task-based worksheet items; PMTs’ experimental exploration using Sketchpad; the kinds of 





and successes experienced by PMTs  (compare Elliot, 1981, p.10;  Patton, 1990, pp. 203-
205).   
 
In other words, observations in this study focused primarily on gathering data on the 
interactional aspects as they  unfolded with a PMT’s interaction when he/she was: (a) 
working through the task-based worksheet; (b) experimenting and exploring using Sketchpad; 
(c) probed by me, the Researcher (Compare Morrison, 1993; Patton, 1990). The observational 
notes were documented in my ‘observation note book’ at various instances, namely:  whilst 
PMTs were busy completing the written components of the task-based worksheets; at the end 
of each task-based interview session, or even after re-playing the Snagit audio-video 
recording. In particular, the Snagit audio-video recordings were revisited in an effort  to 
support or validate pertinent observations related to the research questions as well as to 
extend the network of critical observations.  
 
Cresswell (2003, p. 186) describes four optional roles that a researcher can assume during 
observations, namely: complete observer; observer as participant; participant as observer or 
complete participant. In this study, by assuming the role of a participant observer whilst 
facilitating every one-to-one task-based interview session related to the construction and 
justification of a generalization of Viviani’s theorem, I was able to understand why the PMTs 
generalized and justified in the way they did and “to see things as those involved see things” 
(Denscombe, 1998, p. 69 ).  May (2001, p. 174) acknowledges that: 
“ participant observation is not an easy method to perform, or to analyse, but despite 
the arguments of its critics… if performed well, greatly assists in the understanding of 
human actions and brings with it new ways of viewing the social world.” 
The video recordings were  looked at  to support/authenticate pertinent observations related 
to the research questions and to extend the network of critical observations.  
 
6.5.3   Documents (including saved Sketches) 
The following documents supported the data gathering and analysis phase: the PMTs’ 
completed task-based worksheets; observational notes recorded in my observational note 
book and PMTs’ saved Sketchpad sketches. The saved Sketchpad sketches generally 
comprised of the sequential set of “dynamic sketches” which was constructed and used to 





or refute their generalization during the testing phase. In addition, each PMT saved the 
sketches that they used to construct a logical explanation to justify their respective 
generalizations as they moved from one domain to the next. The analysis of these 
aforementioned documents in this study served to supplement the information obtained via 
other methods, particularly when the reliability of evidence gathered from the one-to-one 
task-based interviews or observations had to be checked.  Cresswell (2003; p. 187) argues 
that documents as a data collection type has the following advantages in research studies: 
  The researcher can have easy access to the kind of language and words the 
participants used; 
  Serves as an unobtrusive source of information, which can be visited and re-visited 
by a researcher at convenient times. 
  Represents data that are thoughtful, in that research participants would have given 
due attention and consideration to compiling. 
  Time and expense for transcribing are saved since the data is provided in written 
form. 
 
6.5.4 Snagit : Audio and visual material  
Creswell (2003, p. 188) says qualitative data can also consist of audio and visual material, 
and that such a category of data may take the form of photographs, videotapes, art objects, or 
any form of sounds. To capture all the verbal proceedings/interactions/discussions that 
occurred during the task-based interviews in a synchronized manner with corresponding 
‘drag moves’ that each PMT engineered whilst experimenting, conjecturing, generalizing, 
refuting and justifying within a Sketchpad  context, the researcher used  the computer 
software program called Snagit. This computer software program can capture the video 
display (i.e. computer onscreen visuals) and audio output (such as oral discussions and 
communications during task-based interviews) simultaneously. Through using the Snagit 
software I was able to audio record all the verbal communications that took place during each 
one-to-one task-based interview and simultaneously capture all the visual drag moves of each 
PMT as they  happened during the one-to-one task-based interview session 
(www.faculty.fairfield.edu/dgrignano/documents/SnagItFAQ.pdf; 
http://download.techsmith.com/snagit/docs/onlinehelp/enu/9/default.htm?url=snagittechnicalr
eferenceguide.html.). Hence, I was able to produce a verbatim transcript for each one-to-one 
task-based interview that was in situ with each PMT’s dynamic constructions and drag 





Having he audio recording synchronized with onscreen visual drag moves, made it possible 
for me as the researcher to replay the Snagit recording numerous times to reflect on what 
occurred during specific generalizing and justifying episodes, and hence limit the birth of 
premature inferences and conclusions. As Snagit was used to capture the interactions as they 
happened, it was much easier for me, as the researcher, to relive the interactive experiences at 
my own convenience. This became very valuable when I was analyzing the data since it was 
possible to rewind (backwards or forwards) the Snagit recording again and again to not only 
capture the details that I might have missed in the initial play of the Snagit recording, but also 
to do much more in-depth analysis of PMTs’ verbal response(s) or interaction(s) within the 
context of their visual dynamic ‘drag moves’ (compare Ratcliff, 2006). Through using  Snagit 
to capture the deliberations during the task-based interview as well as the onscreen visuals, 
observation note taking during the task-based interview was minimized and hence 
distractions were minimized (compare Gillham, 2000). 
 
6.6  Data Analysis  
According to Hitchcock & Hughes (1995, p. 295) “Analysis involves discovering and 
deriving patterns in the data, looking for general orientations in the data and, in short, trying 
to sort out what the data are about, why and what things might be said about them.” This 
means that the process of data analysis involves continual reflection on collected data with a 
goal to develop a deeper understanding and meaning of such data in relation to the context of 
the study and theoretical underpinnings, and hence develop conclusion(s)/responses to the 
postulated research questions (Creswell, 2003, p. 190; Newman, 2000, p. 426).  Furthermore, 
McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 367) asserts that qualitative data analysis is: “a relatively 
systematic process of coding, categorizing, and interpreting data to provide explanations of a 
single phenomenon.” In the main such a systematic process is facilitated via inductive 
analysis, which McMillan and Schumacher (2010, p. 367) describes as: “the process through 
which qualitative researchers synthesize and make meaning from the data, starting with 
specific data and ending with categories and patterns.” Through using inductive analysis, one 
could have more general themes and conclusions emerging from data itself rather than being 
imposed prior to data collection. 
 
However, the data analysis for this study was grounded in an inductive-analytical method, 
which is consonant with the qualitative data analysis processes employed in case studies 





247; Spradley, 1999, p. 94). The inductive-analytical method of analysis makes provision for 
the development of categories or themes linked to specific codes to be developed prior to the 
collection of data, as well as the development of categories/themes through the use of new 
codes as and when the data are being examined. Codes in the context of this study are 
considered as “words, phrases, patterns of behavior, subjects’ ways of thinking, and events 
that repeat or stand out” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998, p. 171).  In this study the apriori 
categories were derived from the theoretical considerations and theories underpinning the 
conceptual framework, and are also motivated by the literature review conducted for the 
study. For example, Figure 6.6.1 represents the categories as to how pre-service mathematics 
teachers could possibly construct their generalizations as well as the core process involved in 
the construction of an inductive generalization, which the Researcher derived prior to data 
collection, and planned to use to code the data.  
 
Type of  
Generalization 
Processes 
Inductive Generalization Formulating a conjecture Observe particular cases, notice patterns, make a 
statement about all possible cases but with element of 
doubt 
Validating the conjecture Testing whether the conjecture is valid for new particular 
cases, but not in general 
Generalizing the conjecture Based on a conjecture which is true for some particular 
cases, and having validated the conjecture for such new 
cases, students might hypothesize that the conjecture is 
true in general 
Refining (modifying) or  
Refuting the conjecture  
generalization  through the use of 
 counter-examples 
A counter-example is a particular case which disproves a 
conjecture. Indeed a single counter-example is sufficient 
to refute a false statement. Alternatively, after careful 
interrogation of the counter-example, the conjecture could 
be modified by inserting conditions into the conjecture. 
Analogical generalization Use of some sort of similarity  
Deductive generalization 
 
Make a conjecture generalization on 
logical grounds, but require visual 
confirmation in a GSP context. 
 
 
Make a conjecture generalization 
immediately on logical grounds only 





Similarly, Figure 6.6.2  represents the type of justifications with qualifiers/descriptors that the 
Researcher envisaged to use to code the data, and hence establish how the PMTs justified 
their respective generalizations.  In other words, Figures 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 to a large extent 
served as analytical frameworks for this study. 
 
The coding process began by using the category descriptors as described in the frameworks 
reflected in Figures 6.6.1 and 6.6.2. However, as the researcher was scanning, interrogating 
the data and reflecting on his observational notes, other categories emerged from the data, 
and this necessitated the proposal for new codes. For example, with regard to the 
development of deductive generalizations, it was found that some pre-service mathematics 
teachers (PMTs) developed their generalizations on logical grounds but with the aid of 
analogical reasoning, and this had to be coded. Furthermore, with regard to the generalization 
to any equi-sided polygons, the data suggested the PMTs saw the general through the 
particular, hence were able to make their generalization to any equi-sided polygons. Also the 
data with regard to justifications showed the PMTs were able to see the structure of the proof 
for their pentagon conjecture generalization and also for the equi-sided polygon 
generalization through the structure of their algebraic-structured proofs for their earlier 
equilateral and rhombus conjecture generalization. Thus the emergent categories of 
generalizations and justifications like the ones described were added to the analysis. 
 
Prior to starting the coding and categorizing processes, the researcher prepared the data by 
making a verbatim transcript of each of the pre-service mathematics teachers one-to-one task-
Justification Level Description 
Level 0: No justification Responses do not address justification 
Level 1: Appeal to external 
authority 
Reference is made to the correctness stated by 
some other individual or reference material. 
Level 2: Empirical evidence Justification is provided through the correctness 
of particular examples. 
Level 3: Generic example Deductive justification is expressed in a 
particular instance. 
Level 4: Deductive Justification Validity is given through a deductive argument 
that is independent of particular instances. 





based interviews as was recorded on the video tape. In doing so the time-ordered sequence of 
the video-taped task-based interviews was preserved for each PMT. In addition to the 
transcription of PMTs’ and researcher’s utterances as per video recorded task-based 
interview, the researcher also captured each PMT’s gestures and facial expressions as they 
surfaced during their task-based interview. Furthermore, the transcriptions and associated 
gestures and expressions derived from the video tapes, could be supplemented with the 
onscreen dynamic sketches and moves that were recorded using the Snagit software.   
Thereafter episodes capturing the interaction between each PMT and the researcher were 
created from segments of the video and the  Snagit onscreen-video capture. The episodes 
provided the Researcher with a broad contextualized perspective as to how the PMTs’ 
constructed generalizations, refuted generalizations via counter-examples, justified their 
generalizations and extended their generalizations across domains. The initial analysis was 
managed in an orderly manner by assigning an initial code to every unit of complete 
conversation (or interaction) between the researcher and PMT, and a complete set of 
Sketchpad moves.  
 
The second step proceeded to include video-transcript analysis, wherein the PMT– researcher 
utterances, students’ gestures and dynamic sketches were supplemented with analyses 
pertaining to observational notes and student responses to the worksheet item completed 
during the task-based interviews.  In constructing the aforementioned transcript analysis in 
combination with data supported from other sources, the researcher used a two- column table  
to assist with the coding and categorizing of the data. The first column was used to capture 
PMT responses, and the second column was used to capture the researcher’s comments. 
Figure 6.6.3, illustrates a typical use of the two-column table. 
 
The video transcript analysis via the use of  a two-column table made it possible for the 
Researcher to code and analyse a range of dimensions in the data, such as PMTs’ exploratory 
moves within a dynamics geometric context, PMTs’ reasoning, generalizations and 
justifications, researcher’s responses, the ensuing dialogue between PMT and researcher. 
Through using the two-column table, the researcher was able to scan and clean the data. This 
made it possible for the researcher to read the data and then identify data that was irrelevant, 
inconsistent, inaccurate or even incomplete; and also to recognize preliminary trends in the 
scanned data, which were then used in some or the other way to facilitate the meaningful 





data analysis, and develop the required foundation to support his claims and also extend such 
claims with greater degree of accountability (compare Dorit, 2000). 
 
PMT’s responses Researcher’s comments 
SHANNON: 
The sum of the distances from a point inside 
the equilateral triangle is always the 
same…Yes. So it doesn’t matter where she 
builds her house. 
Through experimental exploration using 
Sketchpad, Shannon discovered that point 
can be located anywhere inside the 
equilateral triangle to yield a constant 
distance sum. 
PMT: Shannon 
…So if I’ve got a point P here, it should 
always … it’s not always drawn from the 
midpoint, no. But the line here is always 
perpendicular. (… silence for about 3 
minutes, probably trying to figure what to 
do). …Can you give me a hint, yes 
please! 
To justify her equilateral triangle 
conjecture generalization, Shannon 
requested a hint from me. She was 
provided with a scaffolded worksheet to 
assist with her development of a logical 
explanation that justifies her conjecture 
generalization. 
 
            Figure 6.6.3: Example of a two column table used to capture PMTs responses 
                                and researcher’s comments 
 
As mentioned earlier, the afore-decribed process was supplemented by the analysis of 
observational notes and documents. The document analysis of the data in this study 
encompassed reading and re-reading of the pre-service mathematics teachers’ written work 
(completed worksheets), the viewing and re-viewing of saved Sketchpad scripts as well as 
continuous reference to the researcher’s observational notes. A description of the insights 
gained from the read-reread and view-review process pertaining to the broad research 
questions was formulated and presented as a summary narrative of the sessions. Raw data 
obtained via observations were analyzed on the basis of the completed observation notes. A 
summary reporting  on what took place or did not take place in the Sketchpad context 
(laboratory environment) in relation to conjecturing, generalizing, justifying, refutation via 
counter-examples as well as instances of confusion and surprises was completed. 
 
During the third step of data analysis, the researcher proceeded to distill the common patterns 
and constructs through grouping similar and common responses into designated apriori 





and categories were refined. However, in instances where the apriori set of categories could 
not accommodate particular data or sets of data the researcher subsequently constructed new 
categories. The data for each PMT was then re-visited, interrogated and recoded, taking the 
new categories into account. Thereafter the categories were reviewed against the data sets 
that emanated from the one-to-one task-based interview, observational notes, Snagit dynamic 
sketches and moves as the worksheet response items, until a level of theoretical saturation 
prevailed. In the main, the researcher visited the respective data sets at least three times to try 
and ensure that categories are stable, reliable and valid. Overall the recognized patterns, 
themes and constructs were used by the esearcher to gauge the degree of consistency and 
commonality  through consistent and frequent repetition across and within data sources. 
Finally, the patterns, constructs and themes that emerged through the process of analytical-
inductive analysis are represented through tables, selected quotations and boxes in this study. 
This rich thick description enabled me as the researcher to convey my findings in a valid way 
( compare Creswell, 2003; Maxwell, 2005). 
 
6.7 Design Limitations  
    The study has the following limitations: 
 The study was conducted with one cohort of pre-service mathematics teachers and 
one mathematics teacher educator who was also the researcher, and the sample was 
not representative of any whole mathematics teacher- educator population or 
mathematics pre-service teacher population. 
 The activities used to facilitate the construction of a generalization of Viviani’s 
theorem in this study was designed with the use of Sketchpad in mind, and it is  not 
certain as to what extent a research participant would proceed toward the construction 
of a generalization of Viviani’s theorem  by using a non-dynamic context.  
 The study was limited to the development of generalizations in geometry. Although 
some algebraic techniques have been used to build up a logical explanation to justify 
constructed generalizations in this study, the phenomenon of generalization does not 
necessarily include other areas of the mathematics curriculum such as  trigonometry 
and analytical geometry. 
 The accuracy of the data collected relies on the extent to which the participants 
engaged honestly with the activities and the degree of completeness provided. Since 
the research involves human subjects it is possible that they may have given incorrect 





6.8 Validating the accuracy of the findings (Trustworthiness of findings) 
Cresswell (2003, p. 195) argues that validity is a “strength of qualitative research” and helps 
to ascertain if the findings that emerge from a study “are accurate from the standpoint of the 
researcher, the participant or the readers”.  In a parallel way, the term ‘trustworthiness’ is 
used instead  of ‘validity’ in a qualitative paradigm  (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985, 2000; Trochim, 2008).  In terms of trustworthiness, Sapsford & Jupp (1996, p. 1) 
argues  that what has to be established is whether the data: 
 
“Do measure or characterize what the authors claim, and that the interpretations do 
follow them. The structure of a piece of research determines the conclusions that can 
be drawn from it and, most importantly, the conclusions that should not be drawn 
from it.” 
 
To realize the trustworthiness of the findings that emerged from my qualitative research 
study, I employed the following strategies from the list of strategies recommended by 
Cresswell (2008, p. 196): triangulation, member checking, provision of thick description(s); 
clarified researcher bias, and spent sufficient time with research participants. Triangulation 
involves the use of different data sources or collection processes to corroborate data, which in 
turn serves as evidence to build a coherent justification for a particular finding or set of 
findings. For instance, in this study in which the generalizing and justifying experiences of 
eight pre-service-mathematics teachers were investigated and reported on, I as a Researcher 
used a one-to one task-based interview strategy and recorded the discourse and interactions as 
they transpired using the Snagit recorder. The Snagit audio recording was transcribed and 
hence there was a verbatim transcript produced for each one-to-one task-based interview. 
Although the Snagit recorder captured the audio and visual data and stored it permanently, 
and made it possible for me as the researcher to re-visit the data  as many times as possible 
when I needed to, the data as per Snagit recordings  of each  one-to-one task- based interview 
was triangulated with the following sets of data: data from the observational notes 
documented during and after each one-to-one task-based interview, and also the written 
responses of each PMT to the task-based worksheets that were used to facilitate the 
construction of a generalization of Viviani’s  theorem within a dynamic geometric context.   
 
Through Chapters 7 to 10, which deals with data analysis, results and discussions, the 
researcher provided rich and thick descriptions of the discourses and discussions as  they  





responses to task-based worksheet items. It is hoped that in this way the readers of this report 
can be transported to the research setting and context and thus give the discussion of the 
findings an element of shared experiences (compare Creswell, 2003, p. 196). 
 
Furthermore, as reported in Section 6.5.1, enough time was spent with each PMT during each 
task- based interview. In this way, I as the researcher developed an in-depth understanding of 
the phenomenon of generalization under study, and also generated data that enabled me to  
describe in detail the generalizing and justifying experiences of each PMT. In this way 
credibility to the narrative accounts supporting the findings has been made possible in this 
study. 
 
I am relatively known to the participants because I teach them in the Method of Mathematics 
Module 401. However, I was able to establish relations of trust with interviewed PMTs 
during the task-based interview sessions. Furthermore, as a pre-service teacher educator I 
hold the view that knowledge can be discovered or created and one  of my areas of interest is 
the development and justification of generalizations within a dynamic geometric context. 
Thus, to minimize my bias about the phenomenon (or topic) under study, I consulted the 
literature extensively to distill alternative views and positions on generalizing and justifying. 
Furthermore, during the one-to-one task-based interviews, the Researcher tried to minimize 
any bias thorough not letting his personal beliefs and knowledge influence the discourse and 
discussions. In particular, I tried as far as possible not to allow my own assumptions, feelings 
and disposition direct the interview, but instead allowed for the PMT’s responses to lead the 
way as guided by the semi-structured interview protocols (see Appendices 3-6). Moreover, 
through constant questioning of my practice, critical alertness and attitude toward the 
interpretation of the data, and through triangulation of my data, I tried to minimize the effects 
of any bias. 
 
To also determine the accuracy of the findings of this study, I as the Researcher took specific 
descriptions of the task-based interview discourses and discussions as well as my 
interpretations of them (i.e. the descriptions) back to the PMTs who participated in the 
research. The purpose of this member checking exercise was to establish whether the given 
descriptions and interpretations  are accurate representations of PMTs articulations, responses 
and interactions as expressed during the respective one-to-one task- based interviews 





6.9 Ethical Considerations 
In view of the nature of my qualitative research being premised largely around one-to-one 
task-based interviews with pre-service mathematics teachers (PMTs) at UWC, I had to write 
to the head of Research and Development at UWC, outlining the purpose of my study and 
requesting permission to conduct the research using my pre-service mathematics teachers as  
research participants. As part of the application, I had to brief my PMTs about the details of 
my study so that they could give their consent to participate in my study from an informed 
position (McMillan and Schumacher, 2001, p. 198). In doing so, I described to the PMTs the 
purpose of my study, research questions, and the methodology that I planned to use in this 
study. Furthermore, I informed all the PMTs about their role in my study and that their 
anonymity would be respected and thus no participant will be referred to by his/her own 
name in the research report or future publications. Pseudonyms will instead be assigned to 
each of them.  The PMTs were also advised that any information collected from them will be 
held in confidence. This agreement was reinforced through creating an understanding with 
the PMTs that the information will only be used for the purpose of this study, and not to do 
any harm to them or their institution. The PMTs were also informed that the participation is 
voluntary and they could withdraw at any stage from the research project if they wished to do 
so. After receiving the necessary consent from the PMTs that they were willing to participate 
in my study as per signed consent forms, I then completed the UWC Ethical Code of Conduct 
Form and submitted it to the head of Research and Development at UWC. After receiving the 
permission and ethical clearance from the head of Research and Development at UWC, I 
submitted my application for Ethical clearance and permission to the University of KwaZulu 
Natal (UKZN). After receiving the ethical clearance from UKZN, I had a brief meeting with 
all the PMTs during which I informed them about the day and time on which the one-to-one 
task-based interview will be conducted with each of them. At the same meeting they were 
briefed about the venue and set-up for the one-to-one task-based interview and also given an 
opportunity to ask any questions about the projected task-based interviews or seek 
clarification on any particular concern (De Vos, 1998, p. 26). 
 
Furthermore, the process of interviewing, observing, transcribing and analysis of data was 
done transparently. Upon conclusion of this research, the researcher reported the findings of 
this research to PMTs that participated in this research (compare McMillan and Schumacher, 
2001, p. 198). It is hoped that this study has mutually benefited the participants by equipping 
them with necessary skills and methodology to model the teaching of generalizations in their 





tapes, observation notes and confidential documents have been kept in a secure place (in my 
office locker) during the period of the study, and will be kept for a further period of five years 
under lock and key as required by UKZN policy. Thereafter the Snagit recordings, transcripts 
of one-to-one task-based interviews,  observational notes and diaries as well as documents 
like worksheets will be shredded and disposed to the waste centre. The Snagit recordings, 
which have been stored on DVDs will be incinerated and disposed to the waste centre.  
 
In summary, this Chapter provided an overview of the methodology aspects of the research 
which are underpinned by a qualitative paradigm located within a constructivist framework. 
It also explained the various data collection techniques and accompanying  tools that were 
used to arrive at the findings. These research tools included one-to-one task-based interviews, 
observations and document analysis. To try and maintain the validity of the findings of this 
study, I as the researcher used the following strategies: triangulation, member checking, 
provision of thick description(s), clarified researcher bias, and spent sufficient time with 
research participants. The design limitations of the study as well as the ethical considerations 
governing this study were also discussed. 
 
The next Chapter, focusses on the data analysis, results and discussion with regard to the 





















Chapter 7: Equilateral Triangle (Viviani) Problem: 
  Data Analysis, Results and  Discussions 
 
7.0 Introduction 
In this Chapter, the data and findings related to PMTs making and justifying conjecture 
generalization(s) with particular reference to the Viviani task as described in Task 1 (see 
Appendix 1 for details) are  presented in Section 7.1 and Section 7.2 respectively. In addition, 
Section 7.3 present the data and findings related to the generalization of the  Viviani result by 
PMTs to other kinds triangles (which are non-equilateral). 
 
For the purpose of convenience the Viviani problem will be repeated: 
 
“Sarah, a shipwreck survivor manages to swim to a desert island. As it happens, the 
island closely approximates the shape of an equilateral triangle. She soon discovers that 
the surfing is outstanding on all three of the island’s coasts and crafts a surfboard from a 
fallen tree and surfs every day. Where should Sarah build her house so that the total sum 
of the distances from the house to all three beaches is a minimum? (She visits them with 
equal frequency)”. 
 
7.1 Making a conjecture generalization (inductive  generalization)  
In this Section, the data and findings related to PMTs making an  initial conjecture in a non-
Sketchpad context, and then a conjecture generalization by empirical induction from dynamic 
cases, are presented in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 respectively. This is then followed by the 
presentation of the data and findings in relation to: 
 PMTs certainty in their conjecture generalizations in Section 7.1.3 
 PMTs heuristic counter-example experience and their search for counter-examples in 
Section 7.1.4. 
 PMTs need for an explantion as to why their conjecture generalization is always true 
in Section 7.1.5 
 PMTs need for guidance with construction of logical explanation in Section 7.1.6. 
7.1.1  Making an initial conjecture in a non-Sketchpad context 
Although the focus of the study is on the development of conjecture generalization through 





specific restriction on the process. This means each PMT was given an opportunity to 
develop an initial conjecture before engaging with Sketchpad, either through explanation, 
belief, experience, deductive proof, or generalization.  
 
Hence, initially the following question was posed to each PMT after each one read the 
Viviani problem: 
“Before you proceed further, locate a point in the triangle at the point where you think  
Sarah should build her house?”        
 
                 
         Figure 7.1.1.1 : Equilateral Triangle 
       
All eight of the PMTs located a point in the centre of the triangle, but provided no 
explanation or reasoned argument for their choice, as illustrated by the responses of two of 
the PMTs, Renny and Victor,  
 
Case: Renny 
RENNY:  I think it’s right in the middle. 
RESEARCHER: Okay, you think it’s right in the middle, hm? 
RENNY:  Yes. 
 
 
















RESEARCHER: Read the question, Task 1(a)( i),  and do the first part of the activity.  
VICTOR:  Okay, there. (points to centre of triangle)  
   
    
 
 





Figure 7.1.1.3: Victor’s initial response to Ship Wreck problem 
 
The PMTs’ unanimous choice of the centre of the equilateral triangle as the position where  
Sarah should build her house, was also a unanimous choice of the grade 9 learners that  
participated in the same kind of activity in Mudaly’s (1999) study. The PMTs choice of the 
centre as a point where Sarah could build her house is indeed one of the correct positions 
amongst many others.   
 
After each of the PMTs located a common position, the centre, where Sarah should build her 
house, the following question  was posed (see Task1(a) (ii)) of the Viviani worksheet in 
Appendix 1):   Why did you choose that position? Explain or justify your choice.  
 
Logan, Victor,  and Renny seemed to come up with the incorrect argument that the distances 
to the sides should be equal to minimize the sum, but it is likely some of the others intuitively 
were thinking along similar lines. However, Victor is confusing sides with vertices – he is 
looking at the distances to the vertices instead of the sides. This was frequently observed also 
among my B.Ed Honours and PGCE students. The following three excerpts are representative 
of the PMTs attempted justifications that displays the misconception that the three distances 











LOGAN: I think it should be there. Almost in the middle of the triangle… 
because she has to move equal distances to all this. If she wants to go 
to beach a or beach b or c, it will almost be the same. 
RESEARCHER: Is that your reason for choosing the middle? 
LOGAN:                Yes, that is my reason, because they ask, where Sarah should build her 
house so that the total sum of the distances from the house to all the 
beaches is a minimum. 
 
Case: Victor 
RESEARCHER:  …in the middle. Okay… alright. Now why did you place it  there? 
VICTOR: I just wanted it to be in the middle - in order for the lines from   to    
okay, from   to the point  , from   to the point   – I wanted all those 
lines to be equal so that this can be in the middle so that I can get the 
minimum distance from all the points of the triangle. 
 
Case: Renny 
RESEARCHER: Alright, maybe you want to tell me why you chose that position (the 
middle)? 
RENNY: I think …okay this is an equilateral triangle…okay so if at this point 
the distance from here to there is equal to the distance from here to 
there, and this. 
RESEARCHER: Okay, so you’re saying that the distance from the centre to each of the 
sides will be equal? 
RENNY: If she wants to reach all the coasts, but she wants to - but one distance 
shouldn’t be further than the other, so I think this will … 
 
The remaining five PMTs offered no reason why they chose the centre. Two of these five 
remaining PMTs, Shannon and Tony, did not answer the question,  just attempted to explain 
where the centre was (or how it could be located ) by utilizing their knowledge associated 
with the concurrency theorems that they learnt at high school. However, Shannon and Tony 
did not say WHY they thought the minimum would be at the centre.  For example, Shannon 








SHANNON:  - but I don’t need to do any calculations? 
RESEARCHER: I don’t know.  
SHANNON:  I don’t think so. I think it would be more or less here. 
RESEARCHER: More or less where? 
SHANNON:  you draw a line from here to there … from halfway between the two 
sides – between the sides – and where the point meets.  
RESEARCHER: So are you saying that you found the midpoint of BC? 
SHANNON:  Yes.  
RESEARCHER: And then what did you do? 
SHANNON: The midpoint of BC, the midpoint of AB and the midpoint of AC. 
RESEARCHER: And then what did you do? 
SHANNON: And then construct a line towards … so that it meets angle, or point B. 
And until it meets all the angles. 
RESEARCHER: So are you saying that you drew BC – you drew this line from the 
midpoint of BC to the vertex A? 
SHANNON: Yes. From the midpoint of AC to vertex B, and the midpoint of AB to 
vertex C. And then where all three lines meet that would be the equal 
distance. 
 
On reflecting on Shannon’s response of drawing the median to locate the required centre, one 
can conjecture from her mentioning the ‘equal distance’ that it is the ‘equality’ (or symmetry) 
misconception that was at play here once more, which also surfaced more clearly later in the 
rhombus activity.  
 
In general an argument from symmetry would suggest that if there is a minimum, the points 
holding this minimum should have the symmetries of the equilateral triangle (3-fold rotation 
and mirrors). So, if there is only one point, there are good general principles suggesting this is 
the centroid. However, none of the PMTS offered symmetry as a reason for their initial 
choices. 
 
7.1.1.1 Findings based on Section 7.1.1- Making an initial conjecture 
1. All the pre-service mathematics teachers (PMTs)  located an optimal solution at the  





and this finding is similar to the finding that emerged in Mudaly’s (1998) research 
which involved grade 9 learners. 
2. Only three pre-service mathematics teachers voiced reasons why they chose the 
centre, and displayed a misconception that the distances have to be equal in order to 
minimize the sum. 
3. Five pre-service mathematics teachers offered no reasons why they chose the centre, 
but two of these five pre-service  teachers explained how it could be located using 
their previous knowledge about the concurrency of the medians of the triangle. 
4. In the main, none of the PMTs offered symmetry as a reason for their initial choices.  
 
7.1.2 Making a conjecture by empirical induction from dynamic cases in a Geometry 
          Sketchpad (GSP) context 
This Section first discusses PMTs’ construction of their conjecture by empirical induction 
from dynamic cases, and then discusses their validation of their conjecture for new particular 
cases in Section 7.1.2.1, and formulations of their conjecture generalizations in Section 
7.1.2.2. The findings with respect to this Section is presented in Section 7.1.2.3. 
 
PMTs were each asked to open the sketch Distances.gsp, which was a ready-made sketch 
containing an equilateral triangle with a point P inside the triangle representing a possible 
position of the house. In addition, the sketch included a button which showed the distance 
sum from point P to the sides of the given equilateral triangle. Each student was asked to drag 
point P to experiment with their sketch (see Task 1(b) in Appendix 1 for details). 
 
In particular, each  PMT was  asked  to solve the following problem: Press the button to show 
the distance sum. Drag point P around the interior of the triangle. What do you notice about 
the sum of the distances? 
 
By dragging point P around the interior of the equilateral triangle predominantly through 
directed dragging, each  PMT essentially constructed a visual continuum of cases, but with 
each having a different location of point P. This provided an opportunity for each PMT to 
observe a continuity of visual cases, and identify the invariant property in the dynamic 
situation.  The PMTs were quite surprised to find that the total sum of the distances from 





represented all three beaches, remained constant irrespective of the position where point P 
was dragged to. This surprising result and new experience, which was made possible through 
experimental exploration in a dynamic geometry context, contradicted the PMTs assumption 
in their initial conjecture (which was made in a non-Sketchpad context) that the centre point 
(midpoint or centroid) of the equilateral triangle was the only possible point creating the 
minimum distance, and not that this  centre point (midpoint or centroid) failed to produce the 
minimum distance. This in a sense means that the PMTs limited choice of the centre as the 
only possible position is being contradicted, and not what the student actually claimed as a 
conjecture.  
 
This new dynamic result seems to have created some cognitive conflict within their cognitive 
structures and hence disturbed their cognitive equilibrium - their state of mental balance 
(Berger 2004; Piaget 1978, 1985).  This in turn means that  through the process of 
accommodation (see Section 4.6) the PMTs’  existing schema could be reconstructed and 
reorganized  to accommodate the new idea, and thereby achieve the necessary cognitive 
equilibrium.  
 
Although all PMTs were surprised by their observations, namely the sum of the distances 
from point P remains constant irrespective of the position of point P within the triangle, they 
appeared to have achieved this ‘cognitive equilibrium’ as they were now able to impove 
(modify) their initial correct conjecture to embrace any point within the equilateral triangle, 
and be convinced about it, as shown in the following representative excerpt from the one-to-
one task-based interviews with the PMTs: 
 
Case: Shannon 
RESEARCHER:   Okay. Alright. So I want you to … uuum … now open this – so if you 
 read the first question there, it says ‘press the button to show the 
distance sum and drag Point P around the interior of the triangle. What 
do you notice about the sum of the distances?’ 
SHANNON:  It always stays the same (with a very surprised expression on  her face)  
RESEARCHER: What stays the same? 
SHANNON:  The sum of the distances is constant from all the points. 
RESEARCHER: When you say all the points, you mean from…? 
SHANNON:   The sum of the distances of a point inside the equilateral triangle, is  





RESEARCHER: So the sum of the distances from point P to the sides will always be the 
 same? 
SHANNON:  Yes. So it doesn’t matter where she builds her house. 
 
The “drag” effect, allowed the PMTs to see many empirical examples in a short space of   
time,  and  notice that the sum of the distances h1 , h2  and h3 always remains the same, whilst 
the  individual distances h1 , h2  and h3 vary. Furthermore, it appears that the carefully 
designed empirical investigative task, which provided opportunities for dynamic 
visualization, as well as the necessary facilitation by  the researcher, assisted the PMTs to 
discover that Sarah could build her house anywhere inside the equilateral triangle since  the  
total sum of the distances from the house to all  three beaches is a constant.  
 
7.1.2.1 Validating the conjecture for new particular cases 
In the next task (see Task 1(b) (ii) on the worksheet in Appendix 1), which required the 
PMTs to test whether their conjecture was valid for new particular cases, each PMT was 
asked to do the following: “Drag a vertex of the triangle to change the triangle’s size. Again, 
drag point P around the interior of the triangle. What do you notice?” 
 
When the PMTs enlarged the size of the equilateral triangle, they were quick to notice that 
the sum of the distances from point P to the sides increased or decreased in correspondence 
with the size of the triangle. However, when they again dragged point P inside the already 
enlarged or decreased figure, they noticed with great satisfaction that the sum of distances 
from point P to the sides remained unchanged or constant. Moreover, the PMTs’ observations 
remained consistent for a wide range of equilateral triangles created by the “drag” effect, 
which means they had succeeded in validating their observations for more new particular 
cases. The following two task-based interview excerpts are representative of the PMTs’ 
moves and observations: 
 
Case: Shannon 
RESEARCHER:  Now look at Question (ii). It says: drag the vertex of the triangle to 
change the triangle’s size. Again drag point P around the interior of the 
triangle, and what do you notice?  
SHANNON: I’m dragging point P to change the size of the triangle. It could be any 
size. Okay, and then the distance… 





SHANNON: The distance sum will increase if I increase the size of the triangle. But 
when I drag point P around the interior of a triangle, the sum still stays 
constant. 
RESEARCHER: The sum of the distances from point P to the sides remains constant. So 
you increased the size of the triangle, okay. Now I want you decrease 
the size of the triangle …. 
  Now what happened to the total sum?  
SHANNON:  It’s also changing. It’s getting less. It’s decreasing. 
RESEARCHER: But now investigate what happens to the sum when you drag point P 
inside this smaller size triangle? 
SHANNON:  It still stays constant.  The sum of the distances from point P to 
                                     the sides of a triangle (referring to an equilateral triangle) still 
                                     stays constant.   
 
Case: Tony 
RESEARCHER: Look at Question Question (ii). It says: drag the vertex of the triangle 
to change the triangle’s size. Again drag point P around the interior of 
the triangle, and what do you notice? 
TONY  It also doesn’t actually change. 
RESEARCHER: When you increased the size of the triangle, what actually happened to 
the sum? 
TONY  It increased. 
RESEARCHER: So, once you increased the size of the triangle, the sum increased, but 
if you drag P around inside that same triangle, what happens to the 
sum? 
TONY  Stays the same. 
RESEARCHER: So, make the triangle smaller. Drag A inwards. What do you notice 
about the sum now? 
TONY  It shrinks. 
RESEARCHER: Now drag point P  and see what happens. 
TONY  It is still the same thing 
RESEARCHER: What is still the same thing? 
TONY  The distance doesn’t actually change.  





TONY … the total sum of the heights (pointing to h1 , h2  and h)3 doesn’t 
actually change. 
 
7.1.2.2 PMTs’  formulations of their conjecture generalizations 
Based on their empirical observations which were true for some particular cases, and having 
validated them empirically for new particular cases, the PMTs were asked to write down their 
discoveries so far as one or more conjectures (which are considered as conjecture 
generalizations in this report), using complete sentences. All of the PMTs managed to capture 
the salient aspects in their conjecture as reflected in the following typical responses: 
 
Case: Shannon 
SHANNON: The discovery is the total sum of the distances from a point inside a  
 equilateral triangle to the sides of a triangle is a constant, irrespective of 
where the point is in the triangle. 
 
Case: Trevelyan 
TREVELYAN: For any equilateral triangle, if you take a point inside that triangle, then  
the sum of the distance from the point, say the point is P, from P to all 
three sides, stays the same irrespective of where that point is located 
inside the triangle. 
 
7.1.2.3 Finding based on Section 7.1.2 - GSP context : 
1. Similar to Mudaly’s (1999, p. 66) finding, all  PMTs were quite surprised to find that 
point P, which represented a position of where Sarah could build her house, could be 
located anywhere inside the triangle to yield a constant result, namely the sum of the 
distances from the house to all three beaches remains constant. 
2. The cognitive conflict they experienced between their initial conjecture and their new 
observations seemed to have served as a driving force in getting the  PMTs to quickly 
modify their initial non-Sketchpad conjecture  (which is correct) to capture their new 
experience, namely from any position of point P within the equilateral triangle, the 
sum of the distances remains constant. 






7.1.3 Certainty  
This section fouses on the certainty PMTs expresses or had in their conjecture generalization. 
 
Although the PMTs were quite surprised that Sarah’s house could be built anywhere as a 
result of experimentation in a Sketchpad context, their expressions and use of phrases like 
“irrespective of where the point is in the triangle”  suggested that in most cases the PMTs 
were reasonably confident that their conjecture was true in general.  Nevertheless, to check 
their level of certainty, every PMT was subjected to the following question (s): 
 
You can probably think of times when something that always appeared to be true turned out 
to be false sometimes. “How certain are you that you conjecture is always true? Record your 




Responses from the PMTs indicated that four out of eight students were 100% certain 
(convinced) that their discovered conjecture generalization was always true without any 
desire for further experimentation. Three out of the eight PMTs expressed  high levels of 
conviction  (85%; 75%; 70%)  and one PMT,  who expressed  a  medium level of conviction 
(50%), said he/she would move on to expressing a 100%  level of certainty in his/her 
conjecture generalization level, only after a little further experimentation and probing.  
 
The following response by Shannon is representative of the responses of those four PMTs 
who were fully convinced of their conjecture generalization without the need for any further 




RESEARCHER: …You can probably think of times when something that always 
appeared to be true, turned out to be false some time, right. How 
certain are you that your conjecture is always true. Record your level 
of certainty on the number line and explain or justify your choice – 
from your observation, of course. 






RESEARCHER: Are you sure? 
SHANNON;  Yes. 
 
Within the group of PMTs who wanted to experiment further, two PMTs, Logan & Victor, 
just wanted to experiment further with the given equilateral  triangle, and this entailed either 
dragging the  vertex of the given equilateral triangle and/or  point P to further different 
positions within the given equilateral triangle. It seems more supporting empirical examples, 
with the invariant property being maintained, were necessary to fully convince these two 
PMTs that their CG was true for equilateral triangles. For example, the following extract 
from the task-based interview with Logan, represents his set of actions and responses, which 
moved him from an 85% conviction level to a 100 % conviction level: 
 
Case: Logan 
LOGAN:  So I must indicate how true I think it is? So I must make a dot where I 
 think it  is. I’ll say I’m 85% certain. 
RESEARCHER: If you suspect your conjecture is not always true, try to supply a 
counter-example. Do you want to investigate more? Do you want to 
experiment further? 
LOGAN:   I just want to take another point of this… Okay. We used only point A  
   to change the shape, so I thought I’d try another point to see. [Logan  
dragged point B and increased the size of the equilateral triangle, and 
then dragged point P around the interior of the equilateral triangle] 
RESEARCHER: And now? 
LOGAN:  I’m 100% convinced. 
RESEARCHER::  So what is your response to Question 2? 
LOGAN:  At this point I agree 100%. I don’t have a counter-example. 
 
The other two  PMTs, Tony and Alan, did not initially express a 100% certainty in their 
conjecture generalization, because they were not completely sure as to whether their  
conjecture generalization was also true for non-equilateral triangle cases, namely isosceles 
triangles and scalene triangles. After experimenting within the context of isosceles triangles 
and/or scalene triangles  both PMTs realized that their conjecture generalization only holds 
true for equilateral  triangles, and consequently expressed a 100% level of certainty in their 
respective initial posited conjecture generalizations, which  were restricted specifically to 





for other types of triangles, should logically have no effect on their certainty about the truth 
of the conjecture for equilateral triangles. The conjecture is about equilateral triangles, e.g. If 
an equilateral triangle…, and this says nothing about other triangles and certainty in that 
proposition ought not to be influenced about whether it is true for other triangles or not. So it 
seems more likely that it was not the conjecture about equilateral traingles that they were 
uncertain about, but about its generalization to other triangles. Of course, it could be that 
these two students  were not making a distinction between a statement and its converse; and 
thought the converse also needed to be true, ie. if the sum of  perpendicular distance to sides 
are constant, then the triangle is equilateral. 
 
The following excerpts from the task-based interview with Tony captures the gist of the 
PMTs’ transition to a 100% level of certainty that their conjecture generalization is always 
true for the  case of equilateral triangles only: 
 
Case: Tony 
RESEARCHER: So you have an isosceles triangle, and now you have the sum of the 
measurements from point P. Drag point P and see what happens to the 
sum.   
TONY:   It’s changing … 
RESEARCHER: So the sum of the distances is changing. 
TONY:  Yes.  
RESEARCHER:     So what do you conclude then? You said you wanted to see if the 
  result is also for an isosceles triangle, so what is  your conclusion? 
TONY:  … I think this theory that the total sum of the distances - it only applies  
   for equilateral triangles.  
 
Tony’s last remark in the above excerpt, “… I think this theory that the total sum of the 
distances – it only applies for equilateral triangles”,  suggests that he  realized his conjecture 
generalization does not hold true for isosceles triangles. However, the use of the word, 
“think”, prompted the Researcher to suspect that Tony was not 100 percent convinced of his 
assertion.  Hence, the Researcher, asked Tony “Do you still want to investigate further?” 
 
TONY    Let’s try the scalene, but I think it will still do the same thing 
that was done with the isosceles.  The remainder of the task-based 





RESEARCHER:  Do you still want to check? 
TONY   Ja. 
RESEARCHER: Here is a scalene triangle … So now we have the 
 measurements of the  heights, and the sum shown. Drag point P. 
TONY   It actually changes very fast.  
    
This experience convinced Tony that it was necessary for the triangle to be equilateral for the 
result  to hold. 
 
 
7.1.3.1 Findings based on Section 7.1.3 – Certainty  
Four out of eight PMTs were 100% certain about their conjecture generalization after their 
initial set of experimental explorations, whilst two PMTs required further experimentation 
within the context of equilateral triangles and two PMTs wanted further experimentation 
outside the context of  equilateral triangles (such as isosceles and scalene triangles) before 
pronouncing at a 100% certainty level that their CG was true only for equilateral triangles. 
The latter two students were either looking at a generalization to all triangles or the converse 
as discussed earlier. 
 
7.1.4  Heuristic counter-examples 
According to a Mathematical dictionary for schools (Bolt & Hobbs, 2004), a counter-example  
is a particular case which disproves a conjecture or claim. In other words a global counter- 
example is an example that shows that a given statement (conjecture, hypothesis, proposition,  
rule) is false. Indeed a single counter-example is sufficient to refute a false  statement. A 
heuristic  counter-example on the other hand, in the Lakatosian sense, may just necessitate 
the reformulation or refinement of the given conjecture (de Villiers, 1996, 2004, 2010). 
Generally, though not always, counter-examples are produced largely by empirical testing  
rather than deductive reasoning. 
  
With regard to counter-examples, the following two aspects are discussed in this section: 
 Refinement/modification of a PMT’s initial non-Sketchpad claim to his/her final 
conjecture (called conjecture generalization) in Section 7.1.4.1  






7.1.4.1 Refinement/modification of a PMT’s  initial non-Sketchpad conjecture 
The first empirical example constructed through dragging point P  within the interior of the 
equilateral triangle within Sketchpad, served as a heuristic counter example to the PMTs 
assumption that mid point (centroid or centre) of the equilateral triangle was the only point 
that produced the minimum distance (as per their initial conjecture that was made in a non–
Sketchpad context). The further empirical examples that were constructed through the 
dragging of point P around the interior of the equilateral triangle, acted not as heuristic 
counter-examples any more, but as supporting evidence for the improvement (modification)  
their correct intial non-Sketchpad conjecture to encompass any point within the equilateral 
triangle to produce the minimum distance sum or generate a constant distance sum  (i.e. 
Sarah could build her house anywhere). Actually the heuristic  counter-example instilled a 
sense of surprise in the PMTs and with the further supporting empirical examples forced 
them to modify (refine) their  initial conjecture that Sarah should build her house in the 
centre,  and hence generalized to a new conjecture (or improved conjecture), which says that 
Sarah could  build her house anywhere inside the equilateral triangle shaped island. The 
following two  PMTs’ responses are representative of the group responses: 
7.1.5  PMTs’  need for explanation (or need for understanding why the result is true) 
To ascertain whether the PMTs , who all signalled a 100% certainty level in their conjecture 
generalization,  exhibited a need  for an explanation of the conjecture generalization they 
each constructed after experimental exploration in a dynamic geometric context, the 
following question was posed to each of the PMTs  during the one–to-one task-based 
interviews:  
“ If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture generalization, do you still 
have a need for an explanation (i.e. do you want to know why it is true?) – see  Task 
2(c)3 of Appendix 1. In equivalent terms, the researcher, wanted to know if the PMTs 
had an inner desire for a deeper understanding despite being already thoroughly 
convinced by the supporting empirical examples that were generated through the 
‘drag effect’  in a Sketchpad context. 
 
Similar to the finding of Mudaly (1998, p. 85), all eight PMTs signaled an independent need 
for explanation despite having expressed a 100% certainty level in their conjecture 
generalization earlier on. Seven PMTs responded immediately in an eager tone that they 







RESEARCHER: So with respect to that statement you made now, are you fully 
convinced of the truth of your conjecture and do you still have a need 
for an explanation?  
ALAN:  Ja, I’d like to know why it is true. 
 
Case: Logan 
RESEARCHER: Number 3: If you are fully convinced and you don’t have a counter- 
   example, do you still have a need for an explanation? In other words, 
  do you want to know why it is true? 
LOGAN:  Ja, I would actually love to know why. 
 
Only one of the PMTs, namely Tony, took some time to express his actual need for an 
explanation. This was probably due to a misconception that the series of supporting empirical 
examples by itself constituted an explanation as suggested by his response: 
 
Case: Tony 
RESEARCHER If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture, do you still 
have a need for an explanation?’ 
TONY  I think we explained it. 
RESEARCHER: Who explained it 
TONY   We tried to tackle the same problem 
RESEARCHER: Ja, we tackled the problem, in the sense we experimented only. You 
only investigated more and more, and you only confirmed how you 
feel about it and that your level of conviction is 100%. But does it 
explain to you why your result is true? 
TONY   Why is it actually true? 
RESEARCHER: Can you explain to me why it is true? 
TONY   No 
RESEARCHER: Do you want to know why it is true? 
TONY   Yes 
 
However, after some probing, Tony realized that the empirical examples  themselves did not 
provide the desired explanation and then expressed a desire to know why his conjecture 





The aforementioned responses, suggest that the PMTs were intrigued by their discovery as 
articulated in their respective conjecture generalizations, and consequently expressed a  
burning desire to really ‘understand’ the solution to the ship wreck problem despite the 
overwhelming amount of empirical evidence. Similarly, but in a non-dynamic context, De 
Villiers (1991, p. 25) found that: “Pupils who have convinced themselves by quasi-empirical 
testing still exhibit a need for explanation, which seems to be satisfied by some sort of 
informal or formal logico-deductive argument”.   
 
7.1.5.1 Findings based on Section 7.1.5 – PMTs need for explanation: 
Similar to Mudaly’s (1998, p. 85) finding in a dynamic context and that of De Villiers’ (1991, 
p. 258) finding in a non-dynamic context, all eight PMTs in this study appeared to have 
displayed some desire and need for an explanation, that is, a need to know why their 
conjecture generalization is always true, despite being fully convinced by quasi-empirical 
testing. 
 
7.1.6  PMTs’ need for guidance with regard to construction of a logical explanation: 
Although all PMTs expressed some intrinsic desire for an explanation,  none of them  could 
produce a logical explanation when given the opportunity do so and seemed to have wanted 
some guidance to proceed with the construction of a logical explanation. Furtheremore, as all 
the points in the equilateral triangle holds the minimum distance sum to the sides of the 
equilateral triangle, they should also have the symmetries of the equilateral triangle. 
However, this notion of symmetry for the equilateral traingles was not considered as an build 
an explanation for their modified conjecture. 
 




RESEARCHER: So try. Then I’ll help you. 
SHANNON: …So if I’ve got a point P here, it should always … it’s not always 
drawn from the midpoint, no. But the line here is always perpendicular. 
(… silence for about 3 minutes, probably trying to figure what to do). 






7.1.6.1 Findings based on Section 7.1.6- PMTs’ need for guidance - logical explanation 
1. Similar to Mudaly’s (1999, p. 101) finding, none of the PMTs were able to come up with 
their own informed logical explanations (proofs). They showed a  definite need for guidance 
to develop an explanation for why their conjecture generalization is always true.  
 
7.2  Justifying a Conjecture Generalization 
This section firstly discusses PMTs justification via an empirical argument in Section 7.2.1, 
and then elaborates on how the PMTs developed a logical explanation for her/his equilateral 
conjecture generalization via a scaffolded guided approach in Section 7.2.2.  Thereafter 
Section 7.2.3 focuses on the presentation of  the logical explanation developed via a 
scaffolded approach as a coherent argument in paragraph form or two column form. Lastly, 
Section 7.2.4 focuses on the meaningfulness of the guided logical explanation. 
 
7.2.1 Empirical evidence: Justification is provided through the correctness of particular 
         examples 
As mentioned with reference to the preceding finding (Finding 1 of Section 7.1.6.1), when 
PMTS were asked to support their conjecture generalization with a justification in the form of 
a  logical explanation none could do so, but  seven of the eight PMTs initially attempted to 
provide an empirical kind of justification (argument). The following is a typical response 
from several cases: 
 
Case: Inderani 
When Inderani  was asked to explain why her conjecture was always true, she  responded as 
follows: 
 
INDERANI:  Why I said 100% is because no matter how I rotate the angle – no  matter how 
big or small I make it (referring to the triangle) – the distances to point P still 
add up to the same. So, in this equilateral triangle, the interior distances add up 
to 7,03 cm, no matter where I move point P to.  If I change the equilateral 
triangle’s size, these distances add up to 6,43 cm if the point was there, or 
whether the point was there, or there. 
  
It was quite evident from Inderani’s response, that she concluded that her conjecture 





dynamic context. She thus provided a kind of empirical argument, which really  was an 
argument that provided inconclusive evidence for the truth of her conjecture generalization 
(Stylianides, 2008). Hence, the Researcher realized that the PMTs who attempted to offer an 
empirical kind of argument like Inderani, should all be provided with scaffolded guidance as 
and when necessary to develop a logical explanation for their respective conjecture 
generalizations( see Section 7.2.2) 
 
7.2.2 Developing a logical explanation through a scaffolded guided approach 
The basic purpose of this sub-activity was to investigate whether PMTs could construct their 
own logical explanations through scaffolded guidance. The design of the scaffolded guidance 
took the form of a worksheet (see Task 1(d) of Appendix 1).  
     
Although the levels of facilitation and intensity of probing varied as each PMT worked 
through each of the questions on their worksheet, all  eight PMTs  were able to construct a 
logical explanation that both justified and explained the truth of their conjecture 
generalization by making use of the scaffolded questions. The excerpts from the respective 
one-to-one task-based interviews with  three PMTs,  Shannon, Trevelyan and Alan, as well as 
the corresponding extracts from their respective worksheets capture the salient moves and 
responses that enabled each of them to construct their logical explanations, and equivalently 
represent the typical responses of the remaining five PMTs.  
 
The case of Shannon will first be presented with relevant commentary, and thereafter the 
cases of Trevelyan and Alan will be  presented respectively. 
Case: Shannon 
Shannon was requested to press the button to show the small triangles in their sketch, an 
example of which is shown in Figure 7.2.2.1. The Researcher asked Shannon to drag the 
vertex of the original triangle, and explain why the three different sides  were all labelled a. 
Shannnon was able to explain why through more questioning as illustrated in the interview 
extract below: 
 
RESEARCHER: …drag your vertices of the triangle, why are your sides all labelled ‘a’, 
right? 





RESEARCHER: Their lengths are all equal, yes that is part of the answer, but why ‘a’, 
and not seven or six? 
SHANNON: Because ‘a’ represents a variable and it doesn’t necessarily refer to a 
specific value. ‘a’ can be any value and the sides will always be equal, 








      
Figure 7.2.2.1 : Equilateral triangle divided into three smaller triangles 
 
Thereafter, I,  the  Researcher,  directed  the attention of Shannon to the small triangles within  
the equilateral triangle, and requested her to write down the area of small     , using ‘a’ 
 and the variable h1. 
 
RESEARCHER: …So can you see the small triangles in there? 
SHANNON:  Yes. 
RESEARCHER: We have a brown one, a yellow one and a green one. So the brown 
triangle is … how would you label the brown triangle? 
SHANNON: How will I label it? ABP.  
RESEARCHER: Good –     , right? So this question says here: ‘Write an expression 
for the area of the small     , using ‘a’ and the variable h1. If you 
look at your worksheet…. Can you read out what you wrote? 
SHANNON: Okay, the area of      = ½ a × h1 
RESEARCHER: Okay. And then, … which can also be, if you write it ½ ah1, then you 
don’t need the multiplication sign, alright? 
 
Similarly, Shannon proceeded to express the areas of remaining triangles in terms of a and  







RESEARCHER: …The second one? Write an expression for the area of the small 
      
SHANNON:     …The area of      is a ½ ah2. 
RESEARCHER: Now write an expression for the area of small        
SHANNON: Okay, the area of triangle      is ½ ah3 
 
It is quite noticeable that Shannon had a clear conceptual understanding of area of a triangle. 
With this confirmation, Shannon proceeded with the next question as shown in Figure 7.2.2.2  





Figure 7.2.2.2: Shannon’s response to Task 1(d) (v) 
 
Immediately thereafter, Shannon proceeded with the questions (vi) and (vii) on her worksheet 
as shown in Figure 7.2.2.3. 
 
   
 Figure 7.2.2.3: Shannon’s response to Task 1(d) (vi-vii) 
 
The following extract captures the critical/crucial moments of clarification and discussion 
between the Researcher and Shannon with regard to the two interrelated responses to 






RESEARCHER: ..Question (vi) – reads: ‘How is the sum in question (v) related to the 
total area of the equilateral triangle? and, ‘Write an equation to show 
the relationship, using A for the total area of the equilateral triangle.’  
SHANNON: This is the sum in question (v) is - the total area of the equilateral 
triangle because the equilateral triangle consists of the three triangles. 
RESEARCHER: Yes, that’s the first part, good.  
SHANNON: Okay, then we can say, we know the area of ΔABC. Is this basically 
what you need? 
RESEARCHER: Okay, so what did you write here? 
SHANNON:  The area of      = ½  (h1 + h2 +  h3) 
RESEARCHER: And what is the area of     ? 
SHANNON: It’s A. 
RESEARCHER: Okay, so? 
SHANNON: You just want me to say A +… 
 Because the area of a triangle will always be constant, the sum of these 
will always be constant. 
RESEARCHER: Ja, yes … I need you to explain it further. What you’re saying is 
correct so far. You want to talk more about that? You can go ahead – 
do Question (vi) as well – it’s fine – and then talk to me about it. 
SHANNON:  Well, all I have concluded or derived, proved is that the area of  
ΔABC is ½  (h1 + h2+ h3) and that the sum of these … (h1 + h2 + h3) 
should be the length of the perpendicular line of the triangle from the 
base to the vertex at the top here.    
RESEARCHER: What are you saying about h1 + h2+ h3 … 
SHANNON: It should be equal to the perpendicular height of the triangle. 
RESEARCHER: Of which triangle … 
SHANNON: … of the equilateral triangle, of the big triangle, because the area of a 
triangle is ½  × the base length × the perpendicular height. 
RESEARCHER: Okay, so let’s say the perpendicular height is capital H – if you want to 
use that, right? You can drag point P to the vertex A… 
RESEARCHER: So are you talking about that length? 
SHANNON: Yes. 
RESEARCHER: Okay. Alright.  Now I want … You got the expression, right? Now can 
you explain to me, from what you’ve been telling me now, why h1 + 





SHANNON: Well, the way I see it that is because the area of a triangle – we can say 
that h1 + h2+ h3 can be capital H, and the area of a triangle will always 
stay constant, and for triangle ABC, the big A, the area, the small ‘a’ 
which is the length of a side will always be the same, it won’t change, 
and the H also can’t change because the area of the big triangle is a 
constant. If we change any of the three points (measurements) in h1 + 
h2+ h3, it should still add up to be H …so this makes more sense to me 
algebraically. 
 
Shannon seemed to argue that h1 + h2+ h3 is constant using two kinds of arguments: 
 




          




  is a constant 
                         
 
Argument 2:  
h1 + h2+ h3  = H 
but H is constant  (because it is the height of the fixed equilateral ΔABC) 
Therefore h1 + h2 + h3  is constant. 
 
Furthermore, Shannon confirmed her appreciation and sense making of the latter algebraic 
explanation, by making the following remark during the interview: “So this makes more 
sense to me algebraically.” 
Case: Alan 
RESEARCHER: Let’s just proceed with this task here (referring to Task 1-(d)). To 
 explain why we have to go back to the original sketch we’ve been 
working with-  It says, “Press the button to show the small triangles in 
your sketch. Drag the vertex of the original triangle. ‘Why are the sides 






After Alan explained the use of the  variable “a”, the researcher drew the attention of Alan to 
the small triangles within the dynamic equilateral triangles, and requested him to write down 
the area of each small triangle, using a and the variables h1, h2  and h3 respectively as  
indicated in the excerpts below: 
 
RESEARCHER: Let’s proceed to number (ii); it says, ‘Write an expression …’ Can you 
see the small triangles…? 
ALAN:  This is one, this is two, this is three. 
RESEARCHER: The first one is: ‘Write an expression for the area of the small ΔAPB, 
using a and the variable h1.’ 
ALAN:  ΔAPB and the variable h1 … Is h1 perpendicular to AB? 
RESEARCHER: So h1 in this case, is the perpendicular distance, and similarly h2, and 
h3.When we talk about distance, we talk about perpendicular distance. 
Does that help you now? 
ALAN: So the question says here, ‘Write an expression for the area of the 
triangle …it’s ½ of base × height; and the height of the triangle is h1 
  …it’s ½ of base, which is ½ of a, times height, which is h1. 
RESEARCHER: Good. Now write an expression for the small ΔBPC. 
  What did you write? 
ALAN:  ½ of ah2. And the area of this triangle will be ½ of ah3. 
 









           Figure 7.2.2.4: Alan’s response to Tasks 1(d) (ii—iv) 
 
The extract in Figure 7.2.2.4, demonstrates that Alan was able to apply the area formula 






scaffolded guidance with carefully selected hints, then he/she can proceed and succeed in 
developing a required logical explanation. 
 
The Researcher, then asked Alan to proceed to 1 (d) (v) on the worksheet; 
RESEARCHER: And number (v)? It says, ‘Add the three areas and simplify the 
expression by taking out any common factors.’ 
ALAN:  It’s a over 2 into (h1 + h2  + h3). 
 






Figure 7.2.2.5 Alan’s response to Task 1(d) (v) 
 
The researcher, then posed (vi) to Alan: 
 
RESEARCHER: Question (vi) says: ‘How is the sum in Question (v) related to the total  
   area of the equilateral triangle?’  
Write an equation to show the relationship, using A for the total area of 
the equilateral triangle.    
 








The researcher attempted to clarify the meaning of the equation that Alan wrote, with 
particular reference to the use of h, in the above equation. The excerpts below show that Alan 










ALAN: From ‘a’ to here, can we call that h  (he used h to represent the height 
of the equilateral triangle ? 
RESEARCHER: Yes. 
ALAN:  Using big A? 
RESEARCHER: Yes, using big A for the area of the equilateral triangle. 
ALAN:  If we use A, then A will be ½ of a times h… 
RESEARCHER: What is this h here? 
ALAN:  It’s the height from any of these points.  
RESEARCHER: So are you saying h is the height of the equilateral triangle? 
ALAN:  Yes. 
 
Immediately thereafter, the researcher, asked Alan: ‘Use the equation from Question (vii),  
to explain why the sum of the distances to all three sides of a given triangle is always  
constant.’ Alan then responded as follows: 
 
ALAN: It’s because the height has to remain constant, because (should have read 
therefore) h will always be constant. So the sum of any heights (referring to h1 
+ h2  + h3)   inside that equilateral triangle should be equal to h and h is always 
constant. 
 
Alan’s explanation, revealed a sense of insight and understanding in that he appeared to have  
realized probably through dragging that the height of the equilateral triangle is equal to the 
sum of the heights of the 3 smaller triangles. Hence, on the basis of the fact that height of a 
fixed equilateral triangle is constant he rationalized that (h1 + h2  + h3)  must also be constant. 
This effectively contributes to his explanation of why the sum of the distances to all three 
sides of a given equilateral triangle is always constant. 
 
Thereafter, the Researcher requested Alan to write his explanation as a coherent argument. 
 
7.2.2.1 Findings based on Section 7.2.2 – Scaffolded guided approach 
Whilst none of the PMTs were able to provide a logical explanation on their own when given 
the opportunity to do so, it was found that all eight PMTs were able to construct a logical 
explanation of their conjecture generalization by working through the scaffolded steps on the 





Mudaly’s (1998, p. 101) finding, namely: “If given proper guidance, pupils were able to 
construct a logical explanation for the conjecture.” 
 
7.2.3 Presentation of explanation as an argument in paragraph form or two-column 
           proof  
After having developed the explanation through the use of a guided scaffolded approach, 
each  PMT was given an opportunity to provide a coherent holistic explanation. The actual 
opportunity was phrased as follows: 
 
“Summarize your explanation/justification of your original conjecture. You can use 
questions (i)-(vii) to help you. You may write your explanation/justification as an 
argument in paragraph form or in a two-column format. Use the back of this page, 
another sheet of paper, a Sketchpad sketch, or some other medium.” 
 
Three out of eight PMTs produced a correct and coherent logical explanation using the two-
column format that is frequently used at secondary schools. In the use of the two- column 
format, one often spells out the following: What is given; what is required to be proved; the 
required constructions; and then the development of the logical argument containing 




In her attempt to construct her coherent logical explanation, Shannon described to the 
interviewer her main conceptualization of the problem and what she was expected to prove as 
follows: 
SHANNON: Okay, so I’ve basically written down now what I was given,  what I 
think I need to prove. So I was given ΔABC, with AB, BC and AC 
equal lengths, and I’ve named the lengths ‘a’, or I labelled the lengths 
‘a’ because they are all the same, and a point P in the interior of a 
triangle – so it can be anywhere in the interior of the triangle, with h1, 
the line from B, and it’s perpendicular to BC, h2, the perpendicular on 
AB, and h3, the perpendicular on   . And then I must prove that h1 + 
h2 + h3 are always a constant. 
RESEARCHER: Yes, good. 






Shannon then completed by writing down her logical explanation on her worksheet as 


















          




As illustrated in Figure 7.2.3.2, Trevelyan’s argument and conceptualization corresponded to 






























             Figure 7.2.3.2: Trevelyan’s  explanation for equilateral CG 
 
On the other hand, four out of eight PMTs attempted to construct their logical explanation 
using the paragraph format. In the development of their respective logical explanations the 
PMTs indicated that A and   were constant, but did not explicitly give the reason, namely 
that the triangles was fixed. The handwritten response of Tony  (see Figure 7.2.3.3) is  typical 



















7.2.3.1 Findings based on Section 7.2.3: Explanation in paragraph or two column proof 
 form 
1. It seems that the PMTs’ prior engagement with the scaffolded worksheet assisted  
seven  of the eight PMTs to write down a complete coherent logical explanation for 
their conjecture generalization using either the two-column format or the paragraph 
format. Three PMTs produced their logical explanation in a two- column form in 
which the following aspects were clearly described: The given information; what was 
required to be proved; the necessary constructions; and the main body which showed 
the development of the logical argument with necessary and sufficient reasons. Four 
PMTs provided their logical explanation in paragraph form. 
 
7.2.4 Meaningfulness of the guided logical explanation 
When a PMT completed the guided logical explanation, piece-wise or coherently, the 
Researcher probed each  PMT to try and establish whether they found the guided logical 
explanation meaningful. In particular, the Researcher wanted to ascertain if the guided logical 
explanation satisfied their earlier expressed need for explanation and understanding. All eight 
PMTs expressed a view that the guided logical explanation provided the necessary 
explanation and understanding as to why their conjecture generalization was true, and in fact 
satisfied their need for ‘explanation’. The following excerpts are representative of these  
PMTs’ expression of satisfaction: 
 
Case : Logan 
RESEARCHER: …do you understand this explanation? 
LOGAN:  Ja. 
RESEARCHER: Are you satisfied? 
LOGAN:  Ja. 
 
Case: Shannon 
RESEARCHER: … So do you understand the explanation that you wrote? 
SHANNON: Yes. It makes sense.  








RESEARCHER: So you now found out that h1 + h2+ h3 is a constant.  
TREVELYAN: Ja, I did. 
RESEARCHER: So you now explained the result. 
  Are you satisfied? 
TREVELYAN: I am. 
 
 
7.2.4.1 Findings based on Section 7.2.4: Meaningfulness of the guided logical 
            explanation. 
1. Similar to Mudaly’s (1998, p.103) finding, the guided logical explanation seems to have 
satisfied the PSTEs earlier expressed need for explanation and understanding. 
 
7.3 Generalizing to other kinds of triangles 
During the session that focused on the development of their conjecture generalization, two 
students, Alan and Tony, expressed their desire to experimentally explore other kinds of 
triangles such as the scalene and isosceles triangles to see if their conjecture  generalization 
also remained true for those cases. The researcher provided the necessary scalene and 
isosceles triangles for the experimental exploration within the dynamic geometry context. 
Both  students realized through the empirical evidence that their conjecture generalization 
cannot be applied to either scalene or isosceles triangles. The following excerpt from the task 
based interview with Alan captures his experiences with the isosceles triangle case: 
 
Case: Alan 
RESEARCHER:  Here is an isosceles triangle. The measurements of AB and    are 
given. Check that it’s isosceles. And there’s point P.  
ALAN: You see it varies (referring to the sum of the distances). It doesn’t vary 
that much, but it varies because at some point you get … [breaking off]  
ALAN: I just wanted to check, that’s why I said 50% because I thought we 
were generalizing.    
RESEARCHER: So what is your statement? What do you want to say now?  
   Can you read out what you wrote? 
ALAN: The conjecture is only true for equilateral triangles. You can’t reach 





RESEARCHER: That is after the experimentation? 
ALAN: Yes. 
 
See section 7.1.3 for the excerpt representing a similar kind of response from Tony after 
experimental exploration. Furthermore, during the latter part of the task-based interview, each 
PSTE was provided the following challenge, which was constructed as follows: “In this 
session you may have observed, conjectured and logically explained the following result: In 
an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a point inside the triangle to its sides is 
constant: 
1. Do you think that the above result might be true for other kinds of triangles? 
2. If not, why not? Or if so, why?” 
Six out of eight PMTs appeared to have reflected on the structure of their already  constructed 
logical explanation of their conjecture generalization for the equilateral triangle case to 
conclude, argue and  explain why their conjecture generalization will not hold for other 
triangles such as scalene and isosceles. In particular, the six PMTs signaled that their 
conjecture generalization may not hold for other kinds of triangles like the isosceles and 
scalene triangles, because they may not be able to pull “a” out as part of the common factor. 
The following two cases, namely Logan and Shannon, illustrate the typical responses from 
the six PMTs. 
 
Case: Shannon 
The following excerpt can serve as evidence that can help explain why Shannon thinks the 
result for the equilateral triangle cannot apply to any other kind of triangle.  
 
RESEARCHER: So now what you have just observed, conjectured, and logically 
explained is that in an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances 
from the points of the triangle to its sides is constant. That’s what 
you’ve just explained.  
SHANNON: Yes? 
RESEARCHER: Okay – for that equilateral triangle – am I right?  
 The question is: ‘Do you think that the above result might be true for 
other kinds of triangles, and why?  If not, why not? If so, why? Other 





SHANNON: No, I don’t think so. I don’t think it will be true for other kinds of 
triangles. 
RESEARCHER: Why? 
SHANNON: Because the lengths of the sides aren’t going to be equal, which means 
that the common factor ‘a’ which we took out of the equation here, 
won’t exist. There won’t be a common factor between the lengths of 
the heights. So your sum will basically be - if we have to redo this - is 
that what you want me to do – to redo it? 
RESEARCHER: No. 
SHANNON: No, I just want to clarify it for myself. Because you’ll basically end up 
with say an ‘a’…. 
RESEARCHER: Take an isosceles triangle if you want to. 
SHANNON: Because you’ll basically end up with an ‘a’, a ‘b’ and a ‘c’ here 
…Well you said any kind of triangle. (Note: Shannon works with a 
scalene triangle) 
RESEARCHER: Oh, okay. 
SHANNON:  … where ‘a’ is not equal to ‘b’ is not equal to ‘c’. 
RESEARCHER: What kind of triangle is that then? 
SHANNON: It’s a scalene. 
RESEARCHER: Okay. Good. 
SHANNON: And then we will basically end up with – if we had to redraw this the 
same way, with your triangles. 
RESEARCHER: You can just explain it to me in words, it’s fine. 
SHANNON: No, but I want to … I don’t know how to explain it in words… 
 You’ll just end up with a ½ × …you’ll end up with… because you 
don’t have a common factor here. You can take the half out, so it will 
be ah1+ bh2 +… [writing] …There is nothing that I can see that will 
stay common. Or that will stay constant. You can’t further simplify 
this.  
RESEARCHER: Okay. Thank you very much.  
 
Figure 7.3.1 represents a copy of what Shannon wrote in her worksheet, referred to during the  

















Figure 7.3.1: Shannon’s Explanation – CG cannot apply to other triangles 
 
The excerpt from the one-to-one task- based interview with Shannon and the accompanying 
extract from her worksheet, serve as evidence of Shannon’s over-generalization of the 
structure of the proof, since she used the structure of the proof as a basis to argue why the 
result will not hold for any other kind of triangle. In particular, she was using an inverse kind 
of argument to justify why the result will not hold for other kinds of triangles. The inverse 
argument in this instance can be characterized as follows: 
Equal sides ⇒ constant sum             ….. established and logically explained result 
Not equal sides ⇒ not constant sum …. inverse argument 
 
Her argument, is of course logically incorrect as the original statement does not say anything 
about whether or not the ‘constant sum’ result is true for any triangle.  All it says is that if it 
were true (which it is not incidentally) then the same proof would not apply. The same kind 
of inverse argument, where the proven result, namely “equal sides ⇒  constant sum”, was  
interpreted as logically equivalent to: “not equal sides ⇒ non-constant sum” by five other 
PMTs as illustrated in the excerpt from the one-to-one task-based interview with Logan: 
 
Case: Logan 
The following excerpt brings evidence that explains why Logan thought the result for the 
equilateral triangle cannot apply to any other kind of triangle.  
 
LOGAN:  (You mean) like for an isosceles triangle? 






LOGAN: I will say no, because I assume that all the sides must be the same, 
which means if I take an isosceles triangle, two sides are the same, and 
there’s one side that is not equal in size; it’s different from the other 
two, which means that the basis will be different. In this case (referring 
to the equilateral triangle) we marked all three small ‘a’ because we 
knew that the side length of all three was the same. That’s why we 
labelled it ‘a’.  
RESEARCHER: So you’re saying that in an equilateral triangle, all the sides are the 
same, and you can have a. And you’re saying that in the case of an 
isosceles triangle that’s not the case.  
LOGAN: Ja, because what we did here is, in this equilateral one, with all the 
sides being the same, we could actually take out the common factor. 
We could say ½ × a  and take it out  from ½ a (h1) + ½ a (h2) + ½ a 
(h3). . But in terms of the isosceles, we can’t say half times a and take 
it out as the common factor because there’re only two sides that are the 
same.  
RESEARCHE R: So you’re talking about this here. 
LOGAN: I’m talking about this here – about that ‘a’ which represents all three 
sides. 
RESEARCHER: So you’re saying that in an isosceles triangle you will not be able to 
pull out that a? 
LOGAN: No, because two sides will be the same, and one side will be different. 
RESEARCHER: … and in a scalene triangle? 
LOGAN:  Also (meaning it will not be true for a scalene triangle);  
                                     because the sides are not equal. 
RESEARCHER: So are you sure? 
LOGAN:  I believe so. 
RESEARCHER: Do you want to investigate or check your result? 
LOGAN:  No, I strongly believe that. 
 
7.3.1 Findings based in Section 7.3- Generalizing to other kinds of triangles 
1. Two PMTs, after experimentally exploring with scalene and equilateral triangles at 






2. Six out of eight PMTs argued that their conjecture generalization, which they 
had justified through the construction of a logical explanation, will not hold true for 
non-equilateral triangles, because the sides will not all be equal and thus they would 
not be able to pull out the common factor “a”. It seems that in this instance, the 
majority of the PMTs overgeneralized by looking back at the structure of their already 
developed explanation (or proof), even though in this case their incorrect logical 
reasoning happens to give the correct result. They seemed to be using an inverse kind 
of argument, namely equal sides ⇒ constant sum is logically equivalent to not equal 
sides ⇒ non-constant sum, which of course is incorrect, to justify why their conjecture 
generalization will not hold for other kind of triangles like isosceles and scalene 
triangles. Though not explored further in this study, it is likely that this type of 
reasoning would in the context of the following Rhombus activity lead them to  
conclude that only if a quadrilateral was a rhombus, would the sum of the distances 
from a point to the sides be constant. But in the case of quadrilaterals, the result is 
more generally true for any parallelogram, and all sides do not have to be equal for 
the result to hold. This might be worth investigating further in a follow-up study. 
 
 
The next Chapter, focusses on the data analysis, results and discussion with regard to the 























In this Chapter, we look at the generalization of the Viviani result for an equilateral triangle 
to the rhombus, which is a different context. The rhombus enjoys a status of being irregular, 
since all its sides are equal, but angles are not necessarily equal. However, the rhombus can 
be dragged to become a regular figure, namely a square (as all regular rhombi are squares). In 
particular, the consistent property across both the equilateral triangle and rhombus is that of 
having equal sides. The challenge during the research programme was to engage the PMTs to 
generalize their established result for the equilateral triangle to the rhombus. The planned 
questions for the rhombus task (see Appendix 2 for Task 2: Rhombus, and Appendix 3 for the 
Rhombus interview schedule) did not differ much from those asked in the equilateral triangle 
task. However, the questions were used selectively, depending on how a given student 
responded to a given question at a given instance. 
 
The data and findings related to making and justifying conjecture generalization(s) with 
particular reference to the rhombus task are presented in this Chapter.  In Section 8.1, the 
analyses of the data associated with making a conjecture generalization are described, and in 
Section 8.2 the level of certainty expressed by the PMTs towards their conjecture 
generalization are described.  Section 8.3 describes the PMTs need for an explanation as to 
why their conjecture generalization is always correct, and Section 8.4 describes the kinds of 
justifications that the PMTs advanced in attempting to explain why their conjecture 
generalization is always true.  
 
8.1 Making a conjecture generalization 
The Rhombus Task 2(a), which was fore-grounded in a non-Sketchpad context, provided 
the following opportunities for the PMTs: 
 Opportunity to construct an initial conjecture, but a general one, via analogy, which 
they could later confirm (or refute) through experimentation in a GSP context if they 





 Opportunity to construct an initial conjecture, but a general one, on logical grounds, 
which they could later confirm through experimentation in a GSP context if they elect 
to do so, using the guidelines provided in Task 2(b). 
 To provide those PMTs, who did not see the similarity of the rhombus problem with 
the equilateral problem, an opportunity to make an initial conjecture through either 
their own intuition or spontaneity, which may not necessarily be correct, but could 
later be tested via experimentation in a Sketchpad context as outlined in Task 2(b). 
Although the design of Rhombus Task 2(b), was designed for PMTs to specifically use 
Sketchpad  to develop a conjecture generalization  related to the rhombus problem through 
inductive reasoning, it also provided an opportunity for PMTs to test and validate their initial 
non-Sketchpad conjectures/conjecture generalizations within a Sketchpad context and 
experience a global counter-example in the process.  
 
The next few subsections of this subsection 8.1 entail a discussion on how the PMTs 
constructed their conjecture generalizations with respect to a rhombus. Firstly, the discussion 
in subsection 8.1.1 focuses on the PMTs’ construction and justification of an initial 
conjecture in a non-Sketchpad conjecture. The remainder of the sub-sections focuses 
primarily on the construction of PMTs’ conjecture generalizations as observed during the 
one-to-one task-based interviews, and are presented in the following order: 
 
Sub-section 8.1.2: Producing a conjecture generalization by empirical induction from 
dynamic cases in a GSP context; 
Sub-section 8.1.3: Producing a conjecture generalization immediately on analogical grounds 
and did not require experimental confirmation with GSP; 
Sub-section 8.1.4: Producing a conjecture on logical grounds but then requiring experimental 
confirmation in GSP context; 
Sub-section 8.1.5: Producing a conjecture generalization immediately on logical grounds. 
 
8.1.1 Making an initial conjecture in a non-Sketchpad context 
At the start of the one-to-one task-based interview, each PMT was first presented with the 
rhombus worksheet, and was then requested to attempt the initial rhombus task , namely Task 





opportunity to develop an initial conjecture on his/her own, before engaging with Sketchpad, 









Figure 8.1.1:  Rhombus Task 2(a) 
 
With regard to Task 2(a), two PMTs, Shannon and Alan, seemed to have noticed the 
similarity with an equilateral triangle and conjectured that point P can be located anywhere 
inside the rhombus ABCD (see Section 8.1.3 for a detailed presentation of the data analysis 
related to the construction of their conjecture generalization via analogy and Sections 8.4.4.1 
and 8.4.4.2 for their justifications). On the other hand, the remaining six PMTs, Trevelyan, 
Tony, Inderani, Victor, Logan and Renny, nominated just one point within the rhombus 
where point P can be located to minimize the sum of the distances to the sides of the 
rhombus. Alternatively, one could only assume that they have limited their search for the 
only point respecting both mirror symmetries of the rhombus shape. Again the expanded set 
of the whole interior also has the property of being invariant under both the mirrors. 
However, it is not clearly evident if they used the latter strategy of symmetry. 
The remainder of the data analysis in this section 8.1.1, describes the latter six PMTs’  initial 
conjecture in a non-Sketchpad context.  
 
Four of the PMTs, Trevelyan, Tony, Inderani and Victor, conjectured that point P should be 
located at the centre (or middle) of rhombus. When asked to justify their choice, it seemed 
they exhibited the ‘equality misconception’ that the sum of the distances would be a 
minimum when the four distances to the sides would be equal to each other. The following 
task-based interview excerpts, which are presented case-wise, are representative of these 










When the Researcher, posed Task 2a (i) to Trevelyan, which he had to do initially without 
using Sketchpad, he responded as follows: “For the start I could choose the most central 
point, this is the point (pointed to centre of figure that was contained in Task 2a, which was 
on the hardcopy worksheet) at which I will start – making sure that I minimize the 
distance…” Furthermore, when asked why he chose the centre, he replied, “I am using 
common sense”. This “common sense” relates to the following understanding stated by 
Trevelyan, “If you are at the centre, that means you’ll travel the minimum distance to each 
side.” Though it could be that Trevelyan misunderstood the question by thinking that only the 
individual distances were to be minimized, it might well be that he had the misconception 
that to minimize the sum of the distances h1 + h2  + h3 + h4 the four distances have to be equal. 
In other words, he was somehow thinking about or visualizing this minimum point as the 
centre of the rhombus. 
 
Whatever the case may be, his responses clearly showed that he did not immediately 
recognise the link with the previous equilateral triangle case. The Researcher then got 
Trevelyan immersed into the Sketchpad Rhombus task to experimentally explore his 
conjecture (see section 8.1.2 for details of analysis with regard to this particular aspect) 
 
Case: Inderani 
The following excerpt from the one-to-one task based interview with Inderani, represents her 
conjecture as to where point P should be located and her accompanying justification thereof: 
  
RESEARCHER: Consider the rhombus ABCD. Where should we locate point P in the 
rhombus ABCD to minimize the sum of the distances to all four sides 
of the rhombus? 
INDERANI:  -Uuum…Okay, let’s say in the centre. 
RESEARCHER: You say in the centre. Wherein the centre? Mark it… 
INDERANI: Let’s say there (see inserted Figure 8.1.2 for plotted                                     
position)    
RESEARCHER: Why did you choose that position? 
INDERANI: - because it seems as though the distances from the point to the sides 
are equal.  















Inderani clearly  seemed to also have the ‘equality’ misconception that the sum of the four 
distances, h1, h2 , h3 and h4, would be a minimum when the four distances are equal. This 
showed that Inderani did not immediately recognise a link with the previous equilateral 
triangle case. The researcher then engaged Inderani with the Sketchpad Rhombus task, as 
illustrated in the interview excerpts and worksheet extracts in Section 8.1.2) 
 
Case: Victor 
The following excerpt from the one-to-one task-based interview with Victor, can illustrate his 
conjecture and associated justification: 
 
RESEARCHER: Task 2(a)(i): Consider the rhombus ABCD below. Where should you 
locate point P in the rhombus ABCD to minimize the sum of the 
distances to the sides of the rhombus? 
VICTOR:  I think it can be here in the middle – at the centre. 
RESEARCHER: At the centre..? Why do you choose that position? 
VICTOR: Must I write it? 
RESEARCHER: You can tell me. 
VICTOR: - to ensure that the distance between any sides of this rhombus are 
equal – so that can be in the middle – to ensure that the distance from 
this point to the middle of AC is equal to the distance from this point to 
the middle of AD and the rest. 
RESEARCHER: So you say that position will minimize the distance to all four sides? 
VICTOR: Yes, yes. 
 
Victor also seemed to exhibit the ‘equality’ misconception and thought point P should be 
located in the middle (centre) of the rhombus, and clearly saw no link or similarity to the 
 





equilateral triangle case.  Further to this, Victor also erroneously thinks that the perpendicular 
to the side will b eat the midpoint of the side. The researcher then proceeded to engage Victor 
in the empirical Rhombus task-based activity using Sketchpad (see section 8.1.2 for details 
and analysis).  
 
Note that in contrast to the cases just presented, one PMT, Logan, conjectured that point P 
should be located very close to vertex C, and another, Renny, conjectured that point P should 
be located very close to side AD.  These two PMTs, Logan and Renny, seemed to have 
confused distances to the sides with distances to vertices in the justification of their choices. 
The following excerpt from the task-based interview excerpts with Logan  indicative of these 
PMTs’ conjectures and justifications: 
 
Case: Logan 
The sketch in Figure 8.1.3, scanned from Logan’s worksheet, illustrates where Logan located 









Figure 8.1.3: Logan’s response to Rhombus Task 2(a)(i) 
 
When the researcher asked Logan, “Can you describe where you located that point?”,  he 
replied: “I’ve located the point… not in the middle, almost nearest to the side of AD, but I 
didn’t locate the point in the middle.” It is not clear at all why Logan located the point there. 
He attempted to justify his choice as follows: “because they’ve asked me to locate the point 
so as to minimize the sum of the distances, which means the distances from point P are not 
equal for all the sides. Thus, the distance from point P to D is perhaps shorter than the 
distance from point P to B”. However, here he seemed to be confusing distances to the sides 
with distances to the vertices. The Researcher then proceeded to engage Victor in the 
empirical rhombus task-based activity within a Sketchpad context (see section 8.2 for details 






8.1.1.1 Findings as per Sub-section 8.1.1: Making a conjecture generalization 
1. Two PMTs, Shannon and Alan, appeared to have superficially seen the similarity with 
the equilateral triangle case and thereby proceeded to make the generalization that 
point P can be located anywhere inside the rhombus P since the sum of distances to 
the sides of the rhombus is constant (see section 8.1.3 for further discussion). These 
two PMTs, did not express any desire to confirm their conjecture generalization by 
means of experimental exploration with the aid of Sketchpad.  
2. While limited to conjecturing in a non-Sketchpad context, six PMTs,  Trevelyan, 
Tony, Inderani, Victor, Logan and Renny, were not able to generalize the result from 
the equilateral triangle case to the rhombus. 
3. Four of the six PMTs, Trevelyan, Tony, Inderani  and Victor, who were not able to 
generalize the result from the equilateral triangle case to the rhombus, exhibited the 
‘equality misconception’, namely that the sum of the distances would be a minimum 
when the four distances are equal to each other.  
4. Two of the six PMTs, Logan and Renny, who were not able to generalize the result 
from the equilateral triangle case to the rhombus, seemed to have been confusing 
distances to the sides with distances to vertices in the justification of their choice for 
the location of point P, which is also a misconception. 
 
 
 8.1.2  Producing a conjecture generalization by empirical induction from dynamic cases 
           in a GSP context 
In the engagement of the PMTs with Rhombus Task 2(b), which is shown in Figure 8.1.2.1, 
the conjecturing and generalizaing steps that were suggested by Canadas et al. (2007), have 
been taken into consideration. 
 
The six PMTs , who did not conjecture that point P can be located anywhere in the rhombus 
to minimize the sum of the distances to the sides of the rhombus when restricted to a non-
Sketchpad context as per Rhombus Task 2(a), were then given an opportunity to use 
Sketchpad to experimentally explore the location of point P. Through dragging point P, the 
PMTs constructed several empirical examples that demonstrated that point P need not be at 
the centre to minimize the sum of the distances to the sides of the rhombus, since the sum 
produced was always constant. As before, the initial empirical example served as a heuristic 





point (midpoint) was the only point creating the minimum distance. In essence, it was only 
the latter assumption that was contradicted and not conjecture the student actually claimed. 
This invariably caused each PMT to refine her/his initial non-Sketchpad conjecture (see De 
Villiers, 2004; Houston, 2009; Lakatos, 1976). However, the latter corroborating empirical 
examples did not act as counter-examples anymore, but instead influenced each PMT to 
accept the heuristic counter-example to their the assumption encompassingtheir initial non-











  Figure 8.1.2.1: Rhombus Task 2(b) 
 
The experienced contradiction appeared to have challenged the PMTs’ established schemata 
and disturbed their cognitive equilibrium, i.e. it brought about cognitive disequilibrium, 
which is commonly known as cognitive conflict. In an attempt to resolve their internal 
cognitive conflict, the PMTs modified their initial non-Sketchpad conjecture and hence 
produced a new conjecture, which embraced point P as a point that could be located 
anywhere within the rhombus, since the sum was always constant as per their experimental 
observations (see Lee et al, 2003; Piaget, 1978, 1985). Hence, the heuristic counter-example 
functioned as a driving force for the PMTs to construct a more embracive conjecture ,which 
can be considered to be a new conjecture in a sense. 
 
Through further dragging, each PMT successfully validated his/her newly constructed (or 
modified) Sketchpad conjecture. On the basis of their new Sketchpad conjecture, which was 
true for some cases, and having validated it  for new cases, each PMT went on hypothesize 
that the newly constructed conjecture was true in general (i.e. they made their conjecture a 
generalization). As each PMT was able to generalize his/her conjecture, it thus seems that 
through the process of accommodation each PMT adapted his/her cognitive structure, namely 
Task 2(b): Using Sketchpad to develop a conjecture related to a 
rhombus  
        Open the sketch Rhombus.gsp.  
1. Press the button to show the distance sum. Drag point P around the interior of 
the rhombus. What do you know about the sum of the distances? 
 
2. Drag vertices A, B or D of the rhombus to change the rhombus’s size or shape. 
Again, drag point P around the interior of the rhombus. What do you notice? 
 






the ‘rhombus schemata’, to the new idea (i.e. PMTs  changed their cognitive structure to fit 
their new Sketchpad experience), and thereby re-established his/her cognitive equilibrium 
(see Berger, 2004; Piaget, 1978, 1985).  
  
Furthermore, the PMTs’ modification (or abandonment in a sense) of their initial non-
Sketchpad conjecture and sub-sequent construction of a new Sketchpad conjecture to capture 
their new experiences, is consistent with constructive perspective on learning and its 
endorsement of cognitive   conflict as a key driver for conceptual change (see Ausubel, 1968; 
di Sessa, 2006; Biemans & Simons, 1999; Duit, 1999; Lee et al., 2003). 
 
The following task-based interview excerpts, which are presented case-wise, are 
representative of the PMTs’ aforementioned Sketchpad experiences and moves that made it 
possible for each of them to construct their own conjecture generalization: 
 
Case: Trevelyan 
The Researcher got Trevelyan immersed into the Sketchpad rhombus task 2(b), as illustrated 
in the following excerpts: 
 
RESEARCHER: Okay, let’s open the sketch. Open the Rhombus Distance.gsp.  
That’s point P there. Click the button to show the perpendicular 
segments. You can see the perpendicular segments. 
TREVELYAN: Ja, I can. 
RESEARCHER: What are they? 
TREVELYAN: h1 , h2  , h3, h4 
RESEARCHER: So they represent the … 
TREVELYAN: … the distance from point P to any side of that quad. 
RESEARCHER: And what is the sum at the moment, there? 
TREVELYAN: The sum is 13.730 cm 
RESEARCHER: Investigate and see where point P can be located to give the minimum 
distance sum to the sides of the rhombus. Drag point P around the 
interior of the rhombus. (In retrospect, the Researcher should have 
asked the PMT here: What do you notice?, before following  up with 
the next instruction). Drag vertex A.  
TREVELYAN: - to? 





   You can drag vertex B if you want to. 
 
After manipulating the situation dynamically through a continuity of cases, including 
dragging some of the vertices, made possible by the dragging feature, the researcher 
requested Trevleyan to refer to his observations, and then write down his discoveries as one 
or more conjectures. When the Researcher asked Trevelyan to read out what he wrote, he 
responded in a rather surprising tone as follows: 
 
TREVELYAN: What I have is: I have noticed that if one drags one vertex of a  
rhombus then the sum ceases to be constant. But if you drag a point 
inside the rhombus, then the sum of the distances is constant.  
 
The element of surprise contained in Trevelyan’s response could possibly be attributed to him 
realizing that the empirical examples constructed through dragging point P around the 
interior of the rhombus, were actually contradicting his assumption governing his initial non-
Sketchpad conjecture, namely  that the point P should be at the centre. Although Trevelyan 
was faced with a set of examples that contradicted his underlying assumption that shaped his  
initial non-Sketchpad conjecture, it is quite plausible that the first contradicting example 
acted as a heuristic  example, and the latter empirical examples supported the heursitc 
example to an extent that he had to accept the heuristci example. It is plausible that the 
encountered heuristic-counter example and corroborating empirical examples would have 
stirred up some cognitive conflict within his cognitive structure, namely the ‘rhombus 
schemata’, and consequently disturbed his cognitive equilibrium. This state of cognitive 
conflict must have been the inner force that pushed Trevelyan to refute his initial non-
Sketchpad conjecture and construct his new Sketchpad conjecture, namely: “if you drag a 
point inside the rhombus, then the sum of the distances is constant”. 
 
Case: Inderani 
The researcher engaged Inderani with the Sketchpad Rhombus task 2(b), as illustrated in the 
excerpts below. 
 
RESEARCHER: Let us open the Rhombus.gsp. 
Press the button to show the distance sum. Drag point P around the 






INDERANI:  So, I notice that the sum of the distances remains constant no matter  
   where the point in the rhombus is. (Inderani had a surprised look on  
   her face) 
 
It seems that through dragging point P around the interior of the rhombus within a Sketchpad 
context, Inderani continuously witnessed that the sum of distances remained constant for 
different positions of point P, and this could have surprised her. It is quite plausible that the 
observation of the aforementioned regularity did not reconcile with her assumpions in her 
earlier non-Sketchpad conjecture and would have created some perturbation in the PMT and 
disturbed her cognitive equilibrium (see Hadas, Herskowitz and Schwartz, 2000). In 
retrospect, the first empirical example could have served as a heuristic counter-example, and 
the remaining empirical examples thereafter could merely have strengthened the case of the 
heuristic counter-example.  
 
To enable Inderani to validate her observation of the invariant property, namely the sum of 
the distances is constant irrespective of the location of point P within the rhombus, the 
researcher requested Inderani to continue with her experimental exploration as follows:  
“Drag the vertices A, B or D of the rhombus to change the rhombus’s size or shape. Drag 
point P around the interior of the rhombus again. What do you notice?”  After experimenting 
as per researcher’s request, Inderani convincingly responded as follows: 
 
INDERANI: No matter what size or shape the rhombus is, the sum of the distances  still  
  remains the same from the sides to the point. 
 
The further empirical examples constructed by dragging point P within each of the newly re-
sized rhombi, supported Inderani’s earlier observed regularity (or counter-example and 
corroborating examples), and this may have assisted her to convincingly accept and reaffirm 
her observed regularity (or counter-example status). It is quite apparent that after the latter set 
of experiences and further corroborating empirical examples, the PMTs would have 
reconstructed their existing ‘rhombus schemata’ to accommodate the new idea, and thereby 
achieved their cognitive equilibrium (see Piaget, 1978, 1985). 
 
When the researcher requested Inderani to write down her discoveries as one as one or more 











Figure 8.1.2.2: Inderani’s Rhombus Conjecture Generalization 
 
Thereafter, the researcher asked Inderani as to whether her conjecture was in made with 
reference to any rhombus or not, and Inderani responded as follows: “that’s for any 
rhombus”.  Although Inderani generalized her conjecture to any rhombus, she did not refer to 
perpendicular distances and hence her formulation of her conjecture was inadequate. 
Furthermore, her generalized conjecture was written in a way that spoke about the distances 
from the sides to the point, which actually is the wrong order. The point is the variable and 
the distances are drawn from it perpendicular to the sides. Confusing the order, as Inderani 
did , could have been influenced by her past experience of perpendicular bisectors where the 
midpoint of side is the starting point, and the perpendicular is drawn to the side at the 
midpoint.. However, it is not the case with altitudes where perpendiculars are dropped from 
the vertices to the sides. It might also be that this student did not regard the order as important 
and believed it be be “commutative’. Thus, the source of this apparent misconception, if any,  
was  not clear.  
 
Case: Logan 
The researcher engaged Logan with the Sketchpad Rhombus task 2(b), as illustrated in the 
following excerpts: 
 
RESEARCHER: Let’s move on to Task 2(b) which says, ‘Using Sketchpad to develop a 
conjecture related to a rhombus. So open the sketch Rhombus.gsp.’  
Press the button to show the distance sum. What is the distance sum 
there? 
LOGAN:  The distance sum there is 13.73cm.  
RESEARCHER: Now, drag point P around the interior of the rhombus. What do you 
notice about the sum of the distances?  
LOGAN: I can see that it remains constant. It doesn’t change. The distance sum 







After dragging point P around the interior of the rhombus, Logan had an expression of 
surprise on his face, more so when he announced his observation of the following invariant 
property: the sum of the distances from point P to the sides remained the same. It seemed that 
he was surprised to see a different result to that which he expected to see. This noted 
contradiction may have created some cognitive conflict in his mind, and disturbed his 
cognitive equilibrium. 
 
To test whether his claim was valid for new particular cases, he changed the rhombus by 
dragging a vertex, and when the Researcher asked Logan, “What do you notice?” Logan 
replied as follows: 
“Okay, what I’ve noticed is that if I drag the one vertex – in this case I dragged the  
  vertex B. And then the total distance sum it actually changes because it was 13,72  
 and now it’s 14,239, but when I went back to point P, the point indicated inside the  
 rhombus, the total sum – the distance sum – didn’t change. Which means if you draw  
 the vertex, the sum changes, the distance changes, but if you drag the point inside the  
 rhombus, the distance remains the same, is constant, doesn’t change even though the  
 individual distance to sides like from point A to D might change if you drag point B  
 around, but the whole distance sum remains constant.” 
 
From, the above response of Logan, it is quite evident he validated the invariant property 
through empirical investigation. Hence, the Researcher requested Logan to write down his 
discoveries as one or more conjectures, using complete sentences, which he eventually read 
out very confidently as illustrated in the following excerpts: 
            
LOGAN:   What I discovered is that if you locate and draw a point inside  rhombus, and drag 
that particular point anywhere inside the rhombus, the distance sum to all the 
sides remains the same. However, if you drag any vertex of the rhombus, there is 
a change in the distance sum. 
 
Thereafter, the researcher asked Logan to compare his latest conjecture with his initial non- 
Sketchpad conjecture, and then state his final response with regard to his CG. Indeed, very 
confidently, Logan replied, “It doesn’t matter where you locate that point inside the rhombus, 
the distance sum will remain constant – it won’t change”. Its seems that the empirical 
examples assisted Logan to reconsider and modify  his initial non-Sketchpad conjecture about 





that through the process of accommodation he could have corrected his initial perception, 
namely point P should be located closer to side AD, and thereby adapted his so called 
‘rhombus’ schemata to his newly discovered idea, and consequently achieved his cognitive 
equilibrium.  
 
8.1.2.1 Findings as per Section 8.1.2: Empirical induction form dynamic cases 
1. Through experimental exploration within a Sketchpad context, the six PMTs 
experienced (lived through) an empirical example that served as a heuristic  counter-
example to their their assumptions governing the development of their initial non-
Sketchpad conjecture. Through further dragging they experienced several 
corroborating empirical examples, which not only surprised them but forced them to 
accept the encountered heuristic counter-example. It seems that the experienced 
contradictions caused some internal cognitive conflict within the mind of each of the 
PMTs. and consequently disturbed their cognitive equilibrium. In an effort to restore 
their cognitive equilibrium, the PMTs were forced to modify their initial non-
Sketchpad conjecture and hence construct a new conjecture. Each PMT’s new 
conjecture appears to affirm that point P could be located anywhere inside a rhombus 
since it gives a constant sum of the distances to all sides of a rhombus.  
2. Through further empirical testing, all six PMTs validated their conjecture for new 
particular cases, which were constructed by first  changing the size of the rhombus by 
dragging vertices, A, B or D and then dragging point P within the newly sized 
rhombus, and consequently generalized their conjecture,  i.e. made their conjecture 
generalization. 
 
8.1.3  Producing a conjecture generalization through superficial analogical reasoning  
         and did not require experimental confirmation with GSP. 
As discussed in Sections 2.1.3 and 4.4, learning by analogy is the mapping of knowledge 
from one domain (i.e. the base domain) over to the target domain, where it could be applied  
to solve problems, develop concepts further, discover new ideas or  just understand new 
mathematical ideas (see Alwyn & Dindyal, 2009; Gentner, 1983,1989; Polya, 1954a; 
Vanlehn, 1986).  In the case of the Rhombus problem, two PMTs, Shannon and Alan, seemed 





equilateral triangle example, and did not require experimental exploration to confirm (or 
validate) their conjecture generalization.  
 
Such development of conjecture generalizations via analogy-making has been supported and 
encouraged by both Polya (1954a) and Lakatos (1976) for fruitful mathematics learning to 
occur, and also has assisted mathematicians to discover new mathematical concepts and 
methods to solve problems (Lee & Sriraman, 2011). The following task-based interview 
excerpts, which are presented case-wise, are representative of the PMTs responses that 
suggest they were conjecturing through the possible use of  analogical reasoning but at a 
superficial level. The reason for this, is that as reported later in Section 8.3, it is clear that 
their analogical generalization was fairly superficial as they needed an explanation and could 
not see the same argument as for the equilateral triangle  would apply in this instance. 
 
Case: Shannon 
The following excerpt brings evidence for how Shannon produced her conjectured 
generalization: 
 
RESEARCHER: …In the previous session you observed, conjectured and logically 
explained that an in an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances 
from a point inside the triangle to its sides is constant. You proved that.  
Now, I want you to look at this activity (Referring to the initial 
Rhombus task – see Appendix 2) 
SHANNON: Well, I think, using my knowledge from the previous exercise, that you 
would probably still have a point P, …uum… anywhere within the 
sketch …it we draw a line from P… point P can be anywhere.  And it 
will still minimize the sum of distances from all sides. 
RESEARCHER: Are you sure? 
SHANNON:  Yes. 
 
It seems that the act of reflecting on her experiences with the prior equilateral triangle activity 
and thereby seeing the similarity between the equilateral triangle case and the rhombus, 
enabled her to articulate with a good degree of certainty that point P can be located anywhere 
in the rhombus, since the sum of the distances to the sides of the rhombus is constant. In 
retrospect, it is plausible to say that when Shannon was confronted with the rhombus 





accommodated idea for the equilateral triangle case, which in turn was further modified to 
accommodate the rhombus case. The aforementioned linking and anchoring of the new 
information, namely rhombus data, firstly to relevant aspects of her existing cognitive 
structure, namely the ‘equilateral triangle’ schemata, is consonant with one of the processes 
of meaningful learning as propounded by Ausubel’s Assimilation theory, namely 
Subsumption (see Section 4.5). 
 
Ssee section 8.4.4 for a continuation of the analysis of the one-to-one task-based interview 
responses from Shannon). 
 
Case: Alan 
When the researcher presented Alan with a hardcopy sketch of rhombus ABCD and asked 
him where he should locate point P in the rhombus ABCD so that the sum of the distances to 
all four sides of the rhombus is a minimum, he responded as follows:  
 
ALAN: .. I can locate it anywhere inside the rhombus.… I locate point P inside the 
 Rhombus (he was pointing across the interior of the rhombus). 
 
It seems that when Alan was posed with the rhombus problem, he saw the analogical 
similarity with equilateral triangle, and was thus able to assimilate the rhombus case into the 
previously accommodated equilateral triangle idea. After that it seems that he was able to 
make his conjecture generalization by merely modifying his previous accommodated 
equilateral triangle idea to accommodate the rhombus.   
 
In retrospect, I as the researcher should have asked both Shannon and Alan to explain why 
they thought that the point P can be located anywhere, as hearing this answer is really crucial 
to knowing whether they had really used analogy from the equilateral triangle case.   
However, the researcher did not  ask tthem to explain why?, and I, as the researcher, 
acknowledge this as a shortcoming on my part. 
 
8.1.3.1 Finding as per subsection 8.1.3: Superficial analogical reasoning and no  
 experimentation 
1. Two  PMTs were able to generalize Viviani result pertaining to the equilateral  
triangle to the rhombus by superficially seeing an analogical similarity with the 





 8.1.4 Producing a conjecture on logical grounds and then requiring experimental 
          confirmation in GSP context  
1. None of the PMTs  produced a conjecture on logical grounds and then required 
visual confirmation in a GSP context. 
 
8.1.5  Producing a conjecture generalization immediately on logical grounds  
      1. None of the PMTs argued by using a logical explanation to produce a 
 conjecture generalization (or generalization). 
 
 
8.2 Level of Certainty expressed by PMTs in their conjecture 
       generalizations 
In this section, the level of certainty expressed by the group of six PMTs, who constructed 
their conjecture generalization through exploration are discussed as well as the two PMTs 
who constructed their conjecture generalization via analogy-making, are discussed in 
Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 resepctively. Section 8.2.3  present the findings that emerged as per 
data analysis regarding PMTs’ level of certainty in their rhombus conjecture generalization. 
 
8.2.1 Level of certainty expressed by PMTs that constructed their CG by empirical 
            induction from dynamic cases 
All six PMTs, who constructed their conjecture generalization for the rhombus through 
experimentally exploring with several dynamic cases within a Sketchpad environment, 
expressed a hundred percent certainty in their conjecture generalization. The following two 
cases, namely Trevelyan and Inderani are representative of typical responses from this group 
of PMTs: 
Case: Trevelyan 
When the researcher asked Trevelyan “How certain are you that your conjecture is always 
true?” he replied “I’m sure – 100 percent sure.” When the researcher probed his high level 
certainty in his conjecture generalization, he reaffirmed his certainty in his conjecture by 
responding as follows: “I’m sure that my conjecture is right. Okay, the sum of the distances 





Trevelyan suggests that he believes that there is no counter-example to his newly constructed 
(modified) conjecture generalization. 
 
Case: Inderani 
With regard to her conjecture generalization, Inderani also expressed a high level of certainty  
because she had tried many different cases and found no counter-examples.  The following 
one-to-one task-based interview excerpt is representative of Inderani’s response:  
 
RESEARCHER: How certain are you that your conjecture is always true? Record your 
level of certainty on the number line and explain your choice. 
INDERANI:  Let’s say one hundred. 
RESEARCHER: A hundred percent? 
INDERANI:  Hundred percent because I tried different shapes and sizes and  
   the sum of the distances remains the same. 
 
8.2.2 Level of certainty expressed by the two PMTs that constructed their CG via 
            analogy (superficially) with the equilateral triangle case:  
The two students, Alan and Shannon, who seemed to have made their generalizations to the 
rhombus on analogical grounds, did not express any desire to empirically test the validity of 
their analogical generalizations (or conjecture generalizations), but  they did express high 
levels of certainty in their analogical generalizations, as illustrated in the case of Alan.   
 
Case: Alan 
ALAN:  I can locate it anywhere inside the rhombus… 
RESEARCHER: Are you certain about that? 
ALAN:  Yes.  
RESEARCHER: How certain are you? 
ALAN:  I’m hundred percent.  
 
Immediately thereafter, the researcher posed the following question to Alan, “If you suspect  
your conjecture is not always true, can you give me a counter-example”. Alan responded very 
confidently (and almost arrogantly): “But I’ve recorded my level of certainty as a hundred  






8.2.3 Findings  as per Section 8.2: Level of Certainty 
1. All six PMTs, who constructed their conjecture generalization for the rhombus 
through experimentally exploring with several dynamic cases within a Sketchpad 
environment, expressed a hundred percent certainty in their conjecture generalization. 
It seems that the confirming visual empirical examples provided the necessary 
warrants that enabled all six PMTs to become absolutely convinced that there were no 
counter-examples to their conjecture generalization. 
2. The two PMTs, who seemed to have made their generalizations to the rhombus on 
analogical grounds, did not express any desire to empirically test the validity of their 
analogical generalizations (or conjecture generalizations), but did express high levels 
of certainty in their analogical generalizations. 
 
8.3 PMTs’ need for an explanation 
An explanation helps an individual to make sense of a mathematical result, which he/she 
could have obtained through conjecturing and generalizing. In other words, an explanation 
could provide a student with a psychological sense of illumination or insight as to why 
his/her conjecture generalization is true (see Schoenfeld, 1985, p. 172; de Villiers, 1999, p. 
7). In retrospect, the experience of a contradiction by a student to one of his/her conjectures 
or previously known results could cause some cognitive conflict within his/her mind, and this 
could spark an interest in him/her and cause him/her to want to understand “why?” (see for 
example Hadas, Hershkowitz, & Schwartz, 2000; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1988; Zaslavsky, 
Nickerson, Stylanides, Idron, & Landman, 2012). In order to sharpen their understanding of 
“why?”, students search for explanations for their observed results.. According Piaget (1975) 
as cited in Balacheff (1991, p. 89),  this searching for explanations propels the construction of 
new knowledge in the minds of the learner, which is consistent with the constructivist theory 
of learning. 
 
Thus, after each of the six PMTs (as reported in Findings 1 and 2 of Section 8.1.2.1 and 
Finding 1 of Section 8.2.3) developed their conjecture generalization for a rhombus by means 
of empirical induction from dynamic cases in a GSP context, the researcher asked each of 
them if they needed an explanation as to why the sum of the distances from any point P 
inside a rhombus to its sides remained constant (i.e. if they wanted know why their conjecture 
generalization is always true). All six PMTs expressed a desire for an explanation, and it is 





that the sum of the distances from point P to the sides of the rhombus were always remaining 
constant. This experienced contradiction could have challenged the students established 
‘rhombus’ schemata, and disturbed their cognitive equilibrium, i.e. caused cognitive conflict. 
It is plausible, that this experienced cognitive conflict could have sparked an interest in the 
students to want to know “why” the sum of the distances remained constant in all dragged 
cases.  
 
The following excerpts, presented case-wise, are representative of the responses of the 
aforementioned group of six PMTs (i.e. Group B): 
 
Case : Inderani: 
 
RESEARCHER: If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture, do you still 
have a need for an explanation (i.e. do you want to know why it is 
true?) 
INDERANI:  Okay. Yes.  
 
Case: Victor 
RESEARCHER: Do you still have a need for an explanation? 
  Do  want to know why it is true – why the result is always true? 
VICTOR:  Yes! 
 
Case: Renny 
RESEARCHER: Right. If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture, do 
you still need an explanation? 
RENNY: Ja, I want to know why it’s true. 
 
Furthermore, the two PMTs, Shannon and Alan, who developed their conjecture 
generalization by means of analogy with the equilateral triangle (see Finding 1 of Section 
8.1.3.1 and Finding 2 of Section 8.2.3), also expressed a desire for an explanation as to why 
their conjecture generalization is always true. Judging by this, it seems that their analogical 
generalization was rather superficial and not on logical grounds; in other words, seeing 
immediately that the same argument for the triangle would apply to the rhombus. The 







Alan expressed absolute certainty in his CG, which states that point P can be located 
anywhere inside the rhombus.  
 
RESEARCHER: Are you sure. Okay, if you’re fully convinced of the truth of your 
conjecture, do you still have a need for an explanation for why it is 
true? 
ALAN:  Ja, I would like to know. 
 
8.3.1 Finding as per Section 8.3 (PMTs’ need for an explanation) 
1. The six PMTs, who developed their conjecture generalization by means of empirical 
induction from dynamic cases in a GSP context, as well as the two PMTs who did so 
by analogy-making between the rhombus and equilateral triangle, expressed a desire 
and a need for an explanation as to why their conjecture generalization is always true. 
 
8.4 Justifying a Conjecture Generalization 
As discussed in Section 8.1 there were the two PMTs, Shannon and Alan, who were able to 
initially construct a conjecture generalization, namely point P can be located anywhere inside 
the rhombus to minimize the sum of the distances to the sides, whilst being restricted to work 
in a non-Sketchpad context as per Task 2(a). It appears that they could have generalized this 
result to the rhombus by means of analogy having seen the similarity with the equilateral 
triangle case (see Finding 1 of Section 8.1.3.1 and Finding 2 of Section 8.2.3). These two 
PMTs constructed a logical explanation for their conjecture generalization on their own 
accord by using the ‘distance between parallel lines is constant’ algebraic strategy. However, 
both of them were also able to provide an alternative explanation by seeing that the structure 
of the proof for the equilateral triangle case wherein the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic strategy was 
used could also be similarly applied to the rhombus case (see Section 8.4.4 for presentation of 
data and analysis). 
 
On the other hand, there were six PMTs, Trevelyan, Tony, Inderani, Victor, Logan and 
Renny, who did not initially conjecture that point P can be located anywhere inside the 
rhombus whilst limited to a non-Sketchpad context. Hence these latter six PMTs were given 





Through experiencing the first empirical example, which served as a heuristic counter – 
example to their assumption that there was only one point creating the minimum distance as 
described in their respective non-Sketchpad initial conjectures, and also experiencing through 
dragging further supporting empirical examples to the  heuristic counter-example, the six 
PMTs modified (refined)  their initial conjecture and thereby produced a new conjecture, 
which  indicated that point P could be located anywhere inside the rhombus since the sum of 
the distances to the sides was constant.  Through further experimentation the PMTs validated 
and generalized their newly constructed conjecture. For the purpose of the presentation of the 
data in this section, the former two PMTs (Shannon and Alna)  will be considered as 
belonging to group A and the latter  six PMTs (Trevelyan, Tony, Inderani, Victor, Logan and 
Renny) to group B. 
 
Three PMTs from group B, Tony, Inderani and Logan, were not able to develop a logical 
explanation on their own accord and were therefore provided with scaffolded guidance as 
presented in Section 8.4.1. Two PMTs from group B, Victor and Renny, managed to 
construct a logical explanation by using the conception that distance between the parallel 
sides are constant. Although these two PMTs were able to construct a logical explanation for 
their conjecture generalization, they were also provided an opportunity to develop an 
alternative explanation that employed the similar kind of ‘triangle-area’ algebraic strategy 
that was used for the equilateral triangle case, but with the aid of scaffolded guidance (see 
Section 8.4.2 for the presentation regarding Victor’s and Renny’s justifications). One PMT 
from group B, Trevelyan, spontaneously realized that a proof structure similar to the 
‘triangle- area’ proof structure, which was used to construct a logical explanation for the 
equilateral triangle case, could be used to construct a logical explanation for the rhombus 
case, and hence proceeded to construct his logical explanation with no guidance (see Section 
8.4.3 for discussion). 
 
8.4.1 Deductive Justification for Rhombus Empirical Generalization through 
            scaffolded guidance  
This section describes the development of a logical explanation (deductive justification) 
through scaffolded guidance for a rhombus conjecture generalization that was produced by 






One way of supporting PMTs’ constructions of logical explanations, particularly when they 
are faced with challenges, may be through the provisioning of external scaffolding (compare 
Belland et al., 2008, p. 407). As discussed in Section 4.2.2, scaffolding is the support 
provided by an educator, lecturer, peer or other source to enable students to make progress 
with tasks, which they are unable to do solely on their own, i.e. independently (Wood, 
Bruner, & Ross, 1976). According to Puntambeka & Hubscher (2005) as cited in Belland et 
al. (2008, p. 408), “The goal of scaffolding is two-fold: first, to provide temporary support to 
students as they perform tasks that they have difficulty performing unaided, and second, to 
help students gain competency in the scaffolded tasks such that they can perform the tasks 
unaided.” 
 
With regard to the latter goal, the researcher is of the view that scaffolding should go beyond 
just developing competency. In particular, scaffolding should provide an opportunity for 
students to develop the necessary insight and understanding why a particular result is true, so 
that they can solve similar problems or extended problems via analogical transfer. Further to 
this, it seems the weakness as illustrated by the PMTs apply more to the first task involving 
the triangle. Here their weekness seems to be in not seeing the connection between the 
rhombus and the triangle, and thinking of trying the same reasoning strategy. On of Polya’s 
(1985) heursitics is: Do I know how to solve a related problem? Clearly more than anything, 
they were not about the logical explanation for the equilateral triangle spontaneously, and 
trying to see if the same approach workd here. 
 
During the one-to-one task-based interviews, three PMTs, Tony, Inderani and Logan were 
not able to construct a logical explanation on their own to support their conjecture 
generalization. The nature of the scaffolding that the Researcher provided to these PMTs took 
the form of both soft and hard scaffolds. The hard scaffolds comprised the structured 
worksheet linked to the dynamic rhombus sketch within a Sketchpad context. The question 
prompts, which were outlined on the worksheet as shown in Figure 7.11, served as procedural 
guidelines and were designed to make the PMTs think about specific issues, concepts, ideas 
and build mini arguments (or assertions) that could finally contribute towards the 
development of a coherent logical explanation.  In particular, the worksheet was designed to 
assist each PMT to construct an explanation (justification) in a logical and sequential manner 






Although PMTs had the scaffold questions, which were related to the dynamic sketch, the 
Researcher also provided soft scaffolding whenever he noted that a PMT was struggling to 
respond positively when s/he was probed during the one-to-one task-based interview. Also 
through differentiated probing during the one-to-one task-based interview, the Researcher 
was able to diagnose what additional support a specific PMT required in order to be able to 
accomplish a sub-task at hand, he then provided just the right amount of support at the 
appropriate time to enable a specific PMT to successfully move on with the development of 
his/her explanation. 
 
However, an exposition of the use of scaffolding that enabled the PMTs, Inderani, Tony and 
Logan, to construct a coherent logical explanation is presented case-wise. 
 
Case: Inderani 
Inderani showed understanding as to why each of the sides of the given rhombus was labelled 
with the variable a, and proceeded to complete her worksheet as shown in Figure 8.4.1.1 with 


















Thereafter, the researcher requested Inderani, to reflect on the above scaffolded steps, and 
then summarize her explanation /justification of her conjecture generalization. It was 
 





encouraging to note that Inderani was able to produce a well justified coherent argument in 

















Figure 8.4.1.2:  Inderani’s Justification of Rhombus CG 
  
Case: Logan 
When the researcher asked Logan, “ Can you support your conjecture with a logical 
explanation or justification?”, he responded as follows: 
   
LOGAN: The way I see it is because of the lines drawn from point P to the respective 
 sides of the rhombus are perpendicular – I think this is why the distance sum 
remains the same. And because, the shape of… even though you drag point P 
inside the rhombus, the initial shape of the thing remains the same. There’s no 
change. That is why the distance sum remains the same – because the shape of 
the rhombus remains constant.  
 
Logan attempted to provide an explanation, by merely describing some of his observations or 
some properties of the figure which in fact was not complete. Hence, the researcher, gave 
Logan scaffolded guidance via the use of the  Rhombus worksheet as described  in Appendix  






 represents what Logan wrote on his scaffolded worksheet: 
 
 













Figure 8.4.1.3: Logan’s scaffolded justification of Rhombus CG 
 
When was asked to summarize his  responses as shown in Figure 8.4.1.3 into coherent logical  
























8.4.2 Deductive justifications for Rhombus Empirical Generalization: Two  
 approaches  
This Section discusses two approaches that Renny and Victor used to develop logical 
explanations (deductive justifications) for their Rhombus conjecture generalizations, which  
were produced by empirical induction from  dynamic cases in GSP context (as reported in 
Section 8.1.2). Firstly Section 8.4.2.1,  presents  the  deductive justification, wherein  the idea  
of the distance between the parallel sides is constant, was seemingly used to logically explain 
their Rhombus empirical generalization on their first attempt. Then Section 8.4.2.1, presents 
an alternative kind of deductive explanation that each of these PMTs developed through 
scaffolded guidance embracing the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanatory steps as outlined in 
the worksheet contained in Task(2d) of Appendix 2. 
 
8.4.2.1 Deductive Justification for Rhombus Empirical CG by using the  
           conception of the distance between parallel sides is constant  
This section discusses the development of a logical explanation (deductive justification) for a 
conjecture generalization produced by empirical induction from dynamic cases in GSP 
context by using the conception of the distance between parallel sides is constant.  
 
Two of the PMTs from group B, Renny and Victor, developed their logical explanation 
(deductive justification) for their conjecture generalization, which they produced by empirical 
induction from dynamic cases in a GSP context. They used the conception that the distance 
between parallel sides is constant through their own initiative, and with no assistance from 
the researcher during the task-based interview.  Although both PMTs provided their own 
logical explanations, the researcher also provided them with an opportunity to construct an 
alternative explanation via the use of the ‘area-triangle’ algebraic strategy. In the latter case, 
the researcher provided both PMTs with the worksheet as contained in Task 2(d) of Appendix 
2.The PMTs were asked to use the worksheet by making use of their onscreen dynamic 
rhombus sketch.  The moves and deliberations that occurred during the one-to one task-based 
interview with and Victor are presented case-wise as follows: 
 
Case: Renny 
RESEARCHER: Right. If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture, do 
you still need an explanation? 





RESEARCHER: Tell me why it’s true. 
  










Figure 8.4.2.1 (a): A copy of  Renny’s onscreen dynamic sketch  
 
With reference to a rhombus sketch like that shown in Figure 8.4.2.1(a), Renny supported his 













     
Renny’s explanation was correct because he was referring to distance between parallel sides 
being constant. With the same argument one could also prove why it is true for a 











After Renny had logically explained why his conjecture generalization (CG) is always true, 
the Researcher provided him with an opportunity to construct an alternative explanation, 
which was similar to the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanation that was developed for the 
equilateral triangle case. In this instance the Researcher provided scaffolded guidance to 
Renny via the use of a scaffolded worksheet. 
 
 Case: Victor 
When asked to support his conjecture generalization through a logical explanation 









  Figure 8.4.2.1(c): Victor  justification of Rhombus CG 
 
It seemed that Victor had a hunch that his result could be easily explained in terms of 
opposite sides parallel, and proceeded to construct an explanation along those lines. 
However, the Researcher, should have explored further to establish what he meant, and in 
fact ascertaining whether he was referring to the distances between opposite parallel sides 
being constant, which would be a correct explanation (proof). For example, if one considers 


















 h1 + h2  = constant   …… distance between parallel lines 
 h3+ h4 = constant    …… distance between parallel lines 
⇒  ∑   = constant       QED. 
 
The researcher thereafter decided to provide Victor with scaffolded guidance to develop an 
 alternative logical explanation for his CG by using the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic strategy. 
 
8.4.2.2  Alternative deductive justifications for Renny and Victor using the ‘triangle- 
 area’ algebraic strategy through scaffolded guidance 
The researcher provided Renny with scaffolded guidance to develop an alternative 
explanation for his conjecture generalization. The scaffolded guidance embraced the same 
kind of steps contained in Task 2(d) of the worksheet  in Appendix 2. Renny proceeded 
through each of the guided steps smoothly and efficiently, and came to also understand why 
his rhombus conjecture generalization is true through alternatively using the ‘triangle-area’ 
algebraic strategy. Hence, when asked during the one-to-one task-based interview to reiterate 
his explanation as to  why h1 + h2  + h3+ h4    were constant by referring to what he wrote on 
his worksheet, Renny explained as follows, by possibly drawing an analogy with the 
explanation of the equilateral triangle case:   
 
RENNY: The area will not change (pointing to A in his equation)… They will remain 
constant (pointing  to the sides of the rhombus on his dynamic sketch). This 
will be constant – which is a, which is the side, then that will be constant 
(referring to a in his equation). So if that is constant (referring to the number 2 
in his equation), then these two are constant (referring to the numerator 2A and 
the denominator a of the expression on the right hand side of the equation) and 
then that means that that side will also be constant (referring to h1  + h2  + h3 + 
h4) which is on the left hand side of the equation 
 
Thereafter, the Researcher requested Renny to proceed with Task 2(e), which required him to 
summarize his explanation for his conjecture generalization as an argument.  Renny then 



































The researcher directed Victor to the worksheet containing Task 2(d), and guided him 
through the worksheet.  After discussing the reason for labelling each of the sides of the  
rhombus with  the variable a, Victor proceeded through the scaffolded questions (ii) to (v),  





























Figure 8.4.2.2(b) Victor’s responses to scaffolded questions 
 
By referring to his equation,                 
  
 
, as shown in step (v) in Figure 
8.4.2.2(b), Victor then went on to complete his explanation as to why                
are constant  as follows during the one-to-one task-based interview with the Researcher: 
 
VICTOR: Okay… Now I have: h1 + h2  + h3+ h4 = 2A which is the area of the rhombus  
(referring to just A and not 2A), over a  which is the side of the rhombus. A, 
which is the area of the rhombus is constant when you drag … [indistinct] 
…and 2 is the number that is always constant, and a which is the size of the 
side, is also constant. Therefore, h1 + h2  + h3+ h4, they are also constant.  
 
Thereafter, the researcher requested Victor, to reflect on the above scaffolded steps, and then 
summarize his explanation /justification of his conjecture generalization. It seems that when 
Victor was expected to write his explanation as coherent argument, he focused on explaining 















Figure 8.4.2.2(c): Victor’s incomplete justification 
 
His written response appeared to  suggest that Victor was merely reiterating his response to 
Q(v) of the worksheet Task 2(d) only, and consequently  did not consider assimilating the 
earlier scaffolded parts into a coherent argument. 
 
8.4.3    Deductive justification of Rhombus Empirical Generalization through using 
 analogical reasoning  
This section focuses on the development of a logical explanation (deductive justification) for  
a conjecture generalization produced by empirical induction from dynamic cases in a GSP 
context by noticing that the ‘triangle-area’ proof structure for the equilateral triangle case can 
be applied to the rhombus case. This is analogical reasoning. 
 
Case: Trevelyan 
As outlined earlier (see Section 8.2.1), Trevelyan was fully convinced about the truth of his 
Rhombus conjecture generalization. When the researcher asked Trevelyan “Can you give me 
an explanation as to why it (referring to Rhombus conjecture generalization) is true?,” he 
replied, “something like a proof!”. Trevelyan’s response, confirmed that he knew that there is 
some link between an explanation and proof, at least that of logical reasoning. For instance, 
when the researcher acknowledged “yes”, he immediately continued  that there was a 
connection between the explanation for the equilateral triangle case and the rhombus case, 
and that it was plausible to similarly use the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic strategy to construct an 
explanation for his conjecture generalization with respect to the rhombus. The following 








TREVELYAN: Firstly, the sides are constant (referring to the given Sketch on the 
screen) – all the sides of a rhombus are the same, so that sum (referring 
to the distances from point P to the sides of the rhombus) should be the 
same, irrespective of where that P is. The connection to the exercise 
that we did the last time … the equilateral that we were working 
with… the sides of the equilateral are all the same. Then we observed 
that if we took a distance anywhere in the equilateral, then the sum 
would be the same. And we constructed a proof based on that. 
RESEARCHER: So what are you saying about the proof for this one? 
TREVELYAN: The proof for this one – ja – I think I might use/start the same way, 
constructing the small triangles inside such that those h1, h2,….… are 
the perpendicular heights of each triangle that I am constructing.  
 
Trevelyan’s response indicated that he realized that he must divide the rhombus into small 
triangles, and use the “triangle-area” algebraic strategy to produce an explanation for his 
Rhombus conjecture generalization. His response suggests that he has seen the similarity 
between the equilateral triangle problem and the rhombus problem, and consequently felt that 
his  explanation  for his rhombus conjecture generalization could be developed by similarly 
using the structure of his explanation for the equilateral triangle conjecture generalization.  
 
On proceeding with the one-to-one task-based interview, the researcher requested Trevelyan 
to click on the button, “Show small triangles”. Then with limited probing from the 
Researcher, Trevelyan provided the following verbal description of his explanation with a 
great amount of ease and confidence, which indeed bore very close resemblance to the kind 
of argument that was used for the equilateral triangle case. 
 
RESEARCHER: Okay, click on the sign: ‘Show small triangles.’ 
  So here you have your small triangles constructed. 
TREVELYAN: Then I can calculate the area of each of these small triangles  
and when you add all those areas, it should give us the area of the 
rhombus. Then if I can find that H is constant… 
RESEARCHER: How will you explain the fact that H is constant? 
TREVELYAN: H would be constant based on the fact that firstly the area of this whole 





constant. Then H must be constant – of which H will be the sum of 
these distances (referring to h1 + h2  + h3 + h4). 
 
The researcher, realized that Trevelyan had an overview of his explanation (proof), and hence 




















           Figure 8.4.3.1: Trevelyan’s deductive justification for Rhombus CG 
 
Indeed Trevelyan, produced a coherent argument, with a clear structure as outlined in the 
extract contained in Figure 8.4.3.1. Trevelyan’s response showed that he was successful in 
producing a coherent explanation for his Rhombus conjecture generalization. In retrospect, it 
seemed that Trevelyan, having seen a similarity between the equilateral problem and the 
rhombus problem, was able to reflect on the proof for the equilateral triangle case and see the 
proof for the rhombus problem via analogical mapping. This cognitive experience by 
Trevelyan, can illustrate his experience of the discovery function of proof, which is discussed 







8.4.4 Deductive justifications for analogical Rhombus Conjecture Generalization 
This Section discusses the development of a logical explanations (deductive justification) for 
a conjecture generalization produced on analogical grounds. As discussed in Sections 8.1.1 
and 8.1.3, two students, Shannon and Alan, seemed to have produced their conjecture 
generalizations on analogical grounds.  Section 8.4.4.1,  presents  the  deductive justification  
that each of these two PMTs constructed on their own accord by using the idea  that the 
distance between the parallel sides is constant, whilst section 8.4.4.2 presents an alternative 
kind of deductive explanation that each of these PMTs developed by seeing  structure of the 
proof from the previous equilateral triangle case.  
 
8.4.4.1 Deductive Justification for analogical Rhombus CG using using the conception  
            of the distance between parallel sides is constant  
As discussed in Sections 8.1.1, and 8.1.3, Shannon and Alan seemed to have produced their 
respective conjecture generalizations immediately on analogical grounds, meaning they have 
seen the similarity with the equilateral triangle case and proceeded to make their conjecture 
generalizations along the same lines. When asked to justify their conjecture generalizations, 
each of them proceeded to provide a correct explanation by referring to the distances between 
the opposite parallel sides being constant with no guidance. So the analogy they ‘saw’ was 
not between the equal sides of an equilateral triangle and that of a rhombus, but only about 
the conclusion (the sumof the distances will also be constant). They could have anticipated or 
guessed since the sum of the distances were constant for the first case, then it will also be so 
for the next case (the rhombus). Shannon and Alan’s cases are presented with supporting 
excerpts from their one-to-one task-based interviews to demonstrate the development of their 
respective logical explanations (or deductive justifications).   
 
Case: Shannon 
Shannon immediately generalized her result to the rhombus, namely that point P can be 
located anywhere in the Rhombus to minimize the sum of the distances to the sides of the 
rhombus, probably on analogical grounds, without requiring any visual or experimental 
confirmation. When the researcher probed Shannon as to how certain she was about her 
conjecture generalization, she expressed a high level of sureness by stating “quite sure”. 
Moreover, when the researcher posed the following question to Shannon, “Do you want to 
investigate, or …Can you explain to me why it’s true, then?” she chose not to investigate, but 
instead started to explain why her generalization was true by making reference to her 





GSP rhombus sketch to clarify her representation of the given distances on her hard copy 
sketch and enable discussion, it was surprising to note that she still never dragged point P to 
empirically verify/validate her claim, but proceeded to offer her explanation. As 
demonstrated in the following excerpts, Shannon provided an explanation as to why her claim 
was true, which was quite different from the structure of the explanation that was used in 
equilateral triangle case. In particular she did not use the “triangle-area” algebraic strategy, 
but rather used the “distance between parallel lines” algebraic strategy.   
 
RESEARCHER: Can you explain why it is true? (pause)…  
SHANNON: …because these lines are parallel – this line and this line. I  know how 
to say it, but … because this line here is parallel and this line… ow! 
these two lines here are parallel – BC and AD is (sic) parallel, and BA 
and CD is (sic) parallel, so it doesn’t matter where you move point P 
…uum….h2 + h4 are always going to be the same. And h1 + h3 are 
going to be the same. 
RESEARCHER:  Ja. We know that. But why is the sum of all four constant? Why is the 
sum of all four constant? You’re quite right. This distance will remain 
the same. 
SHANNON: - because h2 and h4 (it doesn’t matter where you move the point P) are 
always going to be constant, and h1 +  h3 are always going to be 
constant, it doesn’t matter where you move point P.  It’s always going 
to be the same. 
 
In presenting her explanation, Shannon provided core ideas of her argument, despite the fact 
she did not finalize her explanation with the following kind of expected conclusion: 
“Therefore, h1 + h2 + h3+ h4 are constant (equal to the sum of the two constant distances 
between the pairs of opposite sides).”   




Alan generalized his result to the rhombus probably by means of analogy having seen the 
similarity with the equilateral triangle, and then proceeded to give a logical explanation 





you support your conjecture with a logical explanation?” he did not respond immediately (he 
probably was thinking of a strategy on how to develop a logical explanation). After about two 
- three minutes had passed, he drew the following sketch as shown in Figure 8.4.4.1 on his 
worksheet. In the development of his logical explanation Alan continuously referred to his 









   
 
Figure 8.4.4.1:  Alan’s working Figure 
 
The excerpts from the task-based interview, illustrate that Alan seemed to be using the 
property that the  opposite sides of the rhombus are parallel, and that the distance between 
each pair of parallel sides is always constant, irrespective of the position of P. 
 
ALAN: …Let’s say, given a rhombus, and we know that all the sides are equal. 
So, if you draw a line … you have ABCD [indistinct] …if you draw a 
line perpendicular to both …sides …so that means if you have this 
point P anywhere here, this is the shortest distance from point P to here 
and from point P to here, even if P is somewhere there. This is the 
shortest distance from there, and then the shortest distance from 
something there. It’s because if you have a perpendicular line that line 
will be perpendicular to both two opposite sides. And on this … on this 
line, the length of this line will remain the same. You can put P 
anywhere on the line and it will always remain the same. 
RESEARCHER: That line? (referring to the perpendicular line from P to a pair  
  of opposite parallel sides) 
ALAN: Yes. Even for this case, you can put P anywhere. The line will remain 






RESEARCHER: Yes, I know that is the same, and that is the same – constant. Those 
facts are correct. But why is the sum of those distances constant? 
ALAN:  It’s because when you add these two lines, they give you h.  
RESEARCHER: Which h? What is that h? 
ALAN:  The h is the shortest distance – the sum of the distances.   
RESEARCHER: So are you saying if you add these lines (pointing to the two lines 
between the two pairs of opposite sides), this will give you the sum of 
the distances: h1, h2, h3, h4 ? 
ALAN: Yes. So whenever you rotate, you drag this point. It will move with 
those lines. So, the sum of them will always remain the same.  
RESEARCHER: Ummm… okay, that’s interesting. 
 
8.4.4.2  Alternative deductive justifications for Alan and Shannon 
This section presents Alan’s and Shannon’s alternative deductive justifications for their 
Rhombus conjecture generalization, which was constructed as a result of them being able to 
anlogically discern (i.e. see) its structure from their earlier ‘triangle-area’ algebraic 
explanation, which they constructed to logically explain their equilateral triangle conjecture 
generalization. 
Although Shannon and Alan provided correct explanations for each of their conjecture 
generalizations, the researcher also provided an opportunity for them to develop an 
alternative explanation. In each of the cases, as soon as the researcher presented the PMTs 
with a dynamic sketch, which showed the division of the rhombus into four triangles and 
their respective heights, they immediately assimilated their explanations into their previously 
accommodated explanations for the equilateral triangle case, and then modified it to 
accommodate the rhombus case. The PMT responses, which are  presented case-wise are 
representative of the aforementioned aspects:  
Case : Shannon 
Although Shannon provided a logical kind of explanation of why her claim was true, the 
Researcher also provided Shannon an opportunity to explore another type of logical  
explanation, which involves the “area” strategy, where the rhombus is divided into four 
smaller triangles in particular. The researcher presented Shannon with a Rhombus.gsp sketch. 





with their respective heights, she immediately claimed that the proof for the equilateral 
triangle case can be similarly applied to produce a proof for the rhombus case.  The following 
except from the one-to-one task-based interview represents her assertion: 
 
RESEARCHER: … But now let’s look at another way of showing or explaining the 
result. Can you click on ‘show small triangles’? 
 So… can you…You want to show that h1 + h2 + h3+ h4 are constant, 
right? 
 So does that help you now to come up with a …(an explanation) ? 
SHANNON: Yes. Similarly you can use the same proof as we did for the triangle  
using the area. 
 
Thereafter, the researcher gave Shannon an opportunity to construct her proof (logical 
explanation),  and in so doing she similarly used the ‘triangle-area” strategy that was 
employed for the equilateral triangle case to generate her  proof for the rhombus case. It 
seemed that Shannon was able to reflect on the structure of her proof for the equilateral 
triangle case and to see the  proof for the rhombus case (i.e. by looking at the structure of the 
proof for the equilateral case she was able to mirror a similar kind of proof for the rhombus 
case). In terms of Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory, which is discussed in Section 4.4.2, it 
can be accepted that Shannon analogically mapped the structure of the ‘triangle-area’ proof 
for the equilateral triangle case onto the rhombus case. The following excerpt is 
representative of the construction of Shannon’s logical explanation in combination with 
analogical reasoning: 
.          
RESEARCHER: Using the same proof as we did for the triangle…? 
 You want to write it down? 
SHANNON: (writing) … So, is what are we’re going to do – using the area of all 
the triangles? You didn’t label the lengths – can I just use any 
variable? 
RESEARCHER: You must make a statement on the side that you’re doing that. 
SHANNON: Yes. (continued writing) So you just want to see that this is a constant, 
and this is exactly the same as … so h1 + h2  + h3+ h4 = 2A over a 
(which are all constants: the big A is a constant, the small a is a 
constant)  and you can make h1 + h2  + h3+ h4  a big H. 





 Okay, so, basically, what have you concluded in this result? 
SHANNON: - that the sum of all the distances from all sides of a rhombus will be 
constant, it doesn’t matter where point P …  it doesn’t matter where 
the point inside the rhombus is.  
 
More importantly, Shannon very succinctly summarized her explanation/justification as an 
argument in a kind of paragraph form as indicated in the extract in Figure 8.4.4.2  which is 











Although Alan provided a logical kind of explanation of why his claim was true, the 
Researcher also provided Alan with an opportunity to explore another type of logical 
explanation, which  involved the “triangle -area” algebraic strategy, where the rhombus is 
divided into four smaller triangles, in particular. Alan produced the explanation as shown in 
Figure 8.4.4.3, with a distinctive sense of ease, confidence and accuracy, using his own 
sketch, which he  drew on his worksheet. 
 
It also seemed that Alan had now seen the similarity (analogy) with the equilateral triangle  
case and then proceeded to construct his logical explanation by analogically mapping the  
structure of the ‘triangle-area’ explanation for the equilateral triangle case onto the rhombus  
case. Thus, it seemed that Alan also looked at the structure of the logical explanation (proof)  
for the previous equilateral  case and then mirrored a similar kind of proof for the rhombus  
case through the process of cognitive blending (see Section 4.4.3). 
 
In hindsight, maybe I should NOT have given them the opportunity to do an alternative 
explanation, but recorded what happened to them in the pentagon case next where the 
 





‘opposite sides parallel strategy’ will not work, and to see if they then made the connection 























Figure 8.4.4.3: Alan’s deductive justification 
 
8.4.5 Finding  as per Section 8.4 ( Justifying a Rhombus conjecture generalization) 
As discussed earlier, six PMTs (referred to as group B) needed experimental exploration to 
make the general conjecture, and two PMTs (referred to as group A), Shannon and Alan, 
seemed to have made the generalization only on analogical grounds. The findings in relation 







1. Three of the six PMTs (from group B), Tony, Inderani and Logan, who required 
experimental exploration to make the general conjecture, needed scaffolded guidance to 
construct their logical explanation for their conjecture generalization. 
2. Two of the six PMTs (from group B), Victor and Renny, who required experimental 
exploration to make the general conjecture, appeared to have explained why their result 
was true for a rhombus in terms of opposite sides parallel on their own accord. 
However, when they were exposed to an alternative explanation, namely the ‘area-
triangle’ algebraic strategy, via a scaffolded worksheet, they proceeded through the 
worksheet with relative ease. This suggested  that the prior experience with the 
scaffolded activity in the equilateral triangle case developed their competency, insight 
and understanding of how to use the so called ‘area-triangle’ algebraic strategy, i.e. 
analogical transfer, was enhanced. 
 
3. One of the six PMTs (from this group), Trevelyan, who required experimental 
exploration to make the general conjecture, spontaneously saw a similarity between the 
equilateral problem and the rhombus problem, and then proceeded to use a similar kind 
of proof structure, namely ‘triangle-area’ algebraic structure, to construct a logical 
explanation for his conjecture generalization for a rhombus, without any assistance from 
the researcher. This suggested that in seeking to construct an explanation for his 
rhombus conjecture generalization, Trevelyan discovered, via analogical reasoning, a 
strategy on how to explain his rhombus conjecture generalization. This discovery in 
itself is an example of the discovery function of proof. In retrospect, it seemed that via 
analogy-making, Trevelyan first assimilated his explanation into his previously 
accommodated explanation for the equilateral triangle case, and then subsequently 
modified it to accommodate the rhombus case. 
 
4. The two PMTs (referred to as group A), Shannon and Alan, who seemed to have made 
the generalization only on analogical grounds, constructed a logical explanation 
(deductive justification) for their conjecture generalization rather spontaneously by 
using the ‘distance between parallel lines is constant’ algebraic strategy, without 
receiving any assistance from the Researcher. 
 
5. When the researcher provided both group A students, Shannon and Alan, an opportunity 
to develop an alternative explanation, he first asked each of them during the one-to- one 





show the small triangles. As soon as each of these PMTs saw the rhombus being broken 
into small triangles, they immediately suggested that they could similarly use the ‘area-
triangle’ algebraic strategy, which they used for the equilateral triangle case, to 
construct a logical explanation for their rhombus conjecture generalization.  Both 
students proceeded to complete their alternative explanation with both speed and 
accuracy and with no assistance. This suggested that their earlier scaffolded activity, 
which enabled these PMTs to develop a logical explanation for their conjecture 
generalization for a equilateral triangle, enhanced both their competency and insight  on 
using the ‘area–triangle’ algebraic strategy in other warranted or eligible cases such as 
the rhombus case, for example.  
 
The next Chapter, focusses on the data analysis, results and discussion with regard to the 






















Chapter 9: Convex Pentagon Problem:  
Data Analysis, Results and  Discussion 
9.0 Introduction  
In this chapter, we look at whether pre-service mathematics teachers (PMTs) could generalize 
the following results further to a pentagon, and if so, how they accomplished this 
generalization. 
(a) In an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a point inside the triangle to its 
sides is constant ; and  
(b) In a rhombus the sum of the distances from a point inside the rhombus to its sides is also 
constant. 
 
The presentation of the data analysis and findings related to making and justifying conjecture 
generalization(s) with particular reference to the Pentagon task as described in Task 3 (see 
Appendix 2 for details), has been divided into the following four subsections in this chapter. 
Firstly, Section 9.1, presents the analyses of the data and findings associated with the making 
of a pentagon conjecture generalization, and this is followed by Section 9.2, which describes 
how the PMTs justified their respective pentagon conjecture generalizations. Section 9.3, 
describes how PMTs experience a heuristic counter-example (Mystery pentagon activity) to 
their initial conjecture generalization and consequently refine (or modify) their initial 
conjecture generalization as reported in Section 9.1, and finally Section 9.4 describes how 
PMTs justify their refined conjecture generalizations.  
  
9.1 Pre-service mathematics teachers producing a pentagon (convex) 
conjecture generalization 
As discussed in Sections 1.7 and 2.1, the making of a conjecture generalization can be 
facilitated via inductive reasoning and analogical reasoning. “Inductive reasoning is the 
process of reasoning from specific premises or observations to reach a general conclusion or 
overall rule […] It usually refers to the given instances and does therefore reach conclusions 
that are not necessarily valid for all possible instances” (Christou & Papageorgiou, 2007, p. 
56). The kind of conjecture generalization that is developed through the process of inductive 





On the other hand, Polya (1954a) argues that a conjecture generalization can also be 
constructed through analogical reasoning, which is a method of processing information that 
compares the similarities between an already known problem (or general idea or concept or 
fact) with a new problem (or general idea or concept or fact) and then using the identified 
similarities to gain an understanding of the new problem (or idea or concept).  
 
The analogical reasoning process begins by an individual determining the new problem or 
new idea (usually called the target domain) that needs to be explored, solved or explained. 
This new problem or idea is then compared to a known problem or idea (called the source 
domain) so long as some trace of similarity exists between the new problem and the known 
problem. On the basis of understanding that the two problems (or ideas or concepts or 
objects) are alike in a certain respect, one then conjectures that they alike in other respects, 
and thus attempts to solve a new problem by structurally mapping the solution from the 
source problem onto the target problem or attempts to understand a new idea (or concept or 
object) by drawing plausible parallels between the known idea (or concept or object ) and the 
new concept (or idea or object) (see Lee & Sriraman, 2011; Richland, Holyhoak & Stigler, 
2004). As analogical reasoning makes it possible to understand what is likely to be true, it can 
be considered as a form of inductive reasoning and not deductive reasoning. However, the 
conjecture generalization produced through analogical reasoning is called an analogical 
generalization (see discussion in Section 1.7.3 and 2.1.3).  
 
Taking cognisance of plausible ways to construct conjecture generalizations, the Pentagon 
Task 3(a): Generalizing a pentagon, which was fore-grounded in a non-Sketchpad context, 
provided the following opportunities for the PMTs: 
 Opportunity to construct an initial conjecture generalization, but a general one, via 
inductive reasoning or analogy, which they could later confirm (or refute) through 
experimentation in a GSP context if they elected to do so, by using the guidelines 
provided in Task 3(b) of Appendix 2. 
 Opportunity to construct an initial conjecture generalization, but a general one, on 
logical grounds, which they could later confirm through experimentation in a GSP 
context if they elected to do so, using the guidelines provided in Task 3(b) of 
Appendix 2. 
 To provide those PMTs, who did not see the similarity of the pentagon problem with 





equal the sum of distances is constant’ through inductive reasoning, an opportunity to 
make an initial conjecture through either their own intuition or spontaneity or by just 
guessing, which may not necessarily be correct, but could later be tested via 
experimentation in a Sketchpad context as outlined in Task 3(b) of Appendix 2. 
Although Pentagon Task 3(b), was designed for PSTEs to specifically use Sketchpad  to 
develop a conjecture generalization  related to the pentagon problem through inductive 
reasoning, it also provided an opportunity for PSTEs’ to test and validate (or refute either 
fully or partially) their initial non-Sketchpad conjecture generalization within a Sketchpad 
context. 
 
As a result of the analyses of the PMTs approach to the construction of their initial pentagon 
conjecture generalization via Task 3(a) and /or Task 3(b) during the one-to one task based 
interviews, this section has been organized into five sections to present the analyses of the 
data and the findings, as follows:  
 
Section 9.1.1: Producing a conjecture generalization by empirical induction from dynamic 
cases in a GSP context. 
Section 9.1.2: Producing a Regular Pentagon conjecture generalization, through analogical or 
inductive reasoning, and requiring some experimental confirmation or conceptual 
clarification in GSP context. 
 Section 9.1.3: Producing a Regular Pentagon conjecture generalization, on inductive or 
analogical grounds without requiring the use of Sketchpad. 
Section 9.1.4: Producing a Regular Pentagon conjecture generalization, plausibly through 
either using inductive reasoning or analogical reasoning of a fairly superficial level or pure 
guessing, and without requiring the use of GSP in either of the cases. 
Section 9.1.5: Producing an Equilateral Pentagon conjecture generalization which is correct 
analogical reasoning. 
Section 9.1.6: Summarizes the findings as per discussions in Sections 91.1- 9.1.5. 
 
9.1.1 PMTs producing a conjecture generalization by empirical induction from dynamic  
         cases  
1. None of the PSTEs formulated their conjecture generalization to a pentagon initially 






9.1.2  PMTS producing a Regular Pentagon conjecture generalization through  
          analogical or inductive reasoning  
This section focuses on pre-service mathematics teachers producing a Regular Pentagon 
conjecture  generalization through analogical or inductive reasoning and requiring some 
experimental or confirmation or conceptual clarification in a GSP context 
 
Three students, namely Inderani, Tony and Victor, seemed to have made their conjecture 
generalizations on analogical or inductive grounds without initially using Sketchpad. When  
the researcher probed Inderani’s level of certainty in her conjecture generalization, she 
expressed some uncertainty and requested to experimentally test her conjecture generalization 
by using Sketchpad. On the other hand, Victor, who expressed 75% certainty in his 
conjecture generalization, did not request to experimentally explore the extent of the validity 
of his conjecture generalization. Hence, in Victor’s case the Researcher requested him to 
experimentally explore (test) his conjecture generalization by using Sketchpad.  
 
Through dragging point P around the interior of the regular pentagon, and seeing that the sum 
of the distances to the sides of the regular pentagon was always remaining constant, the 
conviction level of Inderani and Victor in their respective conjecture generalizations 
increased to an extent that resulted in them expressing a 100% level of certainty. However, 
Tony’s level of doubt was linked to his having not seen a pentagon with unequal sides. In this 
instance, Tony  with the guidance of the tesearcher was requested to construct a pentagon by 
using Sketchpad. After having done so, and ‘seeing’ that a pentagon with unequal sides was 
possible, Tony moved from a 75% certainty level in his conjecture generalization to a 100% 
level of certainty.  
 
The following cases of Inderani, Victor and Tony are presented with supporting excerpts 
from their one-to-one task based interviews and/or worksheets to demonstrate the 




With regard to Task 3(a) – Q 1.1, Inderani responded as follows (see Figure 9.1.2.1) in her 

















Figure 9.1.2.1: Inderani’s initial pentagon generalization 
 
It seems that Inderani just used inductive reasoning, i.e. noticed the pattern that if ‘sides are 
equal’ the sum is constant, or analogical reasoning.  In reference to Inderani’s written 
generalization, the researcher asked her “are you sure? How certain are you?”, and she 
replied, “Maybe after looking at Sketchpad I’ll be more confident”. This response showed 
that Inderani wanted to confirm her claim through visual experimentation. Consequently, the 
researcher remarked, “So you want to test or confirm your conjecture?”, and Inderani 
responded saying, “yes”. The researcher on seeing that Inderani confined her written 
conjecture generalization to a regular pentagon, probed Inderani to see if she indeed really 
wanted to restrict her conjecture generalization to just regular pentagons, by asking her, “did 
you say regular pentagon here?” Inderani responded by saying, “Yes, regular pentagon”.  
Immediately thereafter, the researcher provided Inderani with an opportunity to dynamically 
experiment with a regular pentagon, as illustrated in the following excerpt from the one-to-
one task based interview: 
 
RESEARCHER: Let’s open a regular pentagon. Here’s a regular pentagon. 
INDERANI: ‘Show pentagon sides’ … it’s all constant; ‘show distance sum’ 
…okay… so let’s see, if I moved around - that’s constant (she was 
dragging point P around numerous times) – the sum of the distances 
remains constant… h1 + h2  + h3 + h4 + h5 remains constant. And this is 
a regular pentagon.  
  
As Inderani manipulated the situation dynamically through a continuity of cases, by dragging 





distances from point P to the sides of the regular pentagon remained constant irrespective of 
the location of point P. The latter series of observations tallied with her initial pentagon 
conjecture generalization (i.e. her pentagon conjecture generalization restricted to a regular  
pentagon), which she made prior to her Sketchpad investigation. It is apparent that Inderani’s 
experimental experience boosted her level of conviction in her conjecture generalization, 
because when the Researcher presented Task (3c) (1) to her, she responded as follows in her 







Figure 9.1.2.2: Inderani’s level of certainty in her regular pentagon CG 
 
Immediately after the aforementioned response, the Researcher asked Inderani to respond to 







             
It seems that through dragging point P around the interior of the regular pentagon within a 
Sketchpad context and having continuously seen that the sum of the distances remained 
constant for all of her different chosen positions of point P, Inderani came to believe that 
there is no counter-example to her regular pentagon conjecture generalization.  
 
Although Inderani formulated her conjecture generalization  by restricting it to the  
regular pentagon, the Researcher proceeded  to seek clarity on Inderani’s understanding  
of the concept of regularity, as illustrated in the following dialogue: 
 











INDERANI: Yes. The angles are equal (she made this statement without measuring 
the angles) and the sides are equal.  
 
Inderani’s aforementioned response suggests that she  seems to think that ‘regular’ is a 
necessary condition for equal sides.   
 
Case: Victor  
When the researcher asked Victor to read out his written response to Task 3(a) – Q 1.1, he 
responded as follows without any reference to or use of a dynamic Pentagon Sketch:  
 
VICTOR: I said, in a pentagon, the sum of the distances from a point inside the 
pentagon to its sides is also constant.  
 
On further probing as to the kinds of pentagons that his aforementioned conjecture 
generalization would hold true for, Victor responded as follows: 
 
VICTOR: I think it can be a regular pentagon.  
RESEARCHER: Do you want to test or confirm your conjecture generalization   with 
respect to the regular pentagon? 
VICTOR: …aaah… No.  
 
It seems that Victor was able to generalize from his previous equilateral triangle and rhombus 
conjecture generalizations on either inductive or analogical grounds, without  expressing any 
for the need for visual or experimental confirmation. However, when the researcher probed 
his level of certainty, he initially indicated 75% and later conceded to 100%. The latter 
response by the student, as evident in the following one-to-one task based interview excerpt, 
seemed more an effort to please the Researcher, and it seems doubtful the student was really 
100% certain. 
 
RESEARCHER: So are you certain that your conjecture with regard to the regular 
pentagon is always true? Record your level of certainty  on the number 
line. 
VICTOR:  75% (student reads out his response from his worksheet) 





VICTOR: Because the sum of the distances inside the pentagon will be fixed 
from any position inside (he means the sum of the distances from point 
P to the sides of the regular pentagon is constant) 
RESEARCHER: So you’re 75% sure? Why are you not 100% sure? 
VICTOR:  Okay, I’ll take 100%. 
 
Since the researcher was not convinced by Victor’s response of “100%”, he decided to give 
Victor some empirical investigation, although Victor himself did not request to empirically 
test his conjecture generalization. The following excerpt from the one-to-one task based 
interview with Victor, demonstrates how through experimental exploration, he did 
convincingly move to a 100% certainty level in his conjecture generalization: 
 
RESEARCHER: Okay.  Can you open the sketch of the pentagon? 
Here is the regular pentagon. You say you are 75% certain – I want 
you look at the angle measurements and measure the pentagon’s sides.  
  By looking at the measure of the angles, are they equal?  
VICTOR:  Yes. 
RESEARCHER: And are the sides all equal? 
VICTOR:  Yes. 
RESEARCHER: Is it a regular pentagon that you’re talking about? 
VICTOR:  Yes. 
RESEARCHER: Now can you see the distances from point P – how many distances are 
there?  
VICTOR:  Five. 
RESEARCHER: Now click on ‘show the distance sum’.  
VICTOR:  The distance sum is 18.77cm. 
RESEARCHER: Now, for that fixed pentagon, drag point P and see what happens.  
VICTOR: I see the distance sum doesn’t change. It stays constant. It stays 
18.777cm. It’s only the distances that change, but the sum of them all 
doesn’t change.  
RESEARCHER: What is your level of certainty in your conjecture generalization now? 
VICTOR: 100% (says quite convincingly)  
 
Victor’s final observations, “I see the distance sum doesn’t change. It stays constant. It stays 





his convincing expression of “100%” certainty in his conjecture generalization, made the 
researcher feel that Victor was absolutely sure about his conjecture generalization for any 
regular pentagon. Victor has limited his conjecture generalization by confining it to the 
regular pentagon. It is plausible that the latter confinement could be as a result of a 
misconception that Victor holds, namely that only regular pentagons have equal sides. 
 
Case: Tony 
The following excerpt illustrates how Tony extended his earlier conjecture generalizations for 
the equilateral triangle and rhombus cases to the pentagon case through either using 
analogical or inductive reasoning: 
 
TONY If a pentagon’s sides are all equal, then the conjecture above should be 
the same (referring to the conjecture generalizations for the 
equilateral triangle and rhombus cases).  
RESEARCHER: Can you phrase that conjecture for me? 
TONY Therefore the sum of the distances from the point– inside the pentagon 
- should be the same if all sides of the pentagon are the same. 
 
Reflecting on his previous experiences with the equilateral triangle and the rhombus, Tony 
correctly identified that “sides all equal” as a sufficient condition, for the sum of the distances 
from a point inside the pentagon to its sides to remain constant all the time. However, when 
the Researcher asked Tony, “How certain are you?”,  he replied, “According to these, I am  
actually seventy-five percent certain.” Then, as illustrated in the following excerpt, the  
Researcher probed Tony as to the reason for his 75% certainty level: 
  
RESEARCHER: Do you have a counter example? 
TONY A counter-example – not really. 
RESEARCHER: So, why did you say seventy-five percent? 
TONY I’m not sure if the sides of a pentagon are always equal. 
RESEARCHER: Can you get a pentagon with sides that are not equal? 
TONY I haven’t seen one. 
 
Tony’s latter response, “I haven’t seen one”, demonstrates how limited his conceptions are of 
polygons beyond triangles and quadrilaterals. This suggests that in terms of the Van Hiele 





provided Tony with an opportunity to use Sketchpad to construct a pentagon with sides not 
being equal. After seeing his dynamically constructed pentagon with unequal sides, Tony 
reaffirmed his initial conjecture generalization with a hundred percent certainty level, as 
illustrated in the following excerpt: 
 
TONY …Now, my conjecture would actually hold if the pentagon has all its 
sides equal. So, the distances from the point inside the pentagon to the 
sides would be equal if the pentagon had the same sides. 
RESEARCHER: Okay. So how certain are you now?  
TONY If the sides are equal, I’m a hundred percent sure.  
 
Tony’s absolute certainty in his conjecture generalization, prompted the researcher to probe 
Tony as to whether his conjecture generalization was limited just to the regular pentagons or 
not, as illustrated in the following excerpt: 
 
RESEARCHER: Okay, that’s fine. So we’re looking at the regular pentagon – so you’re 
saying your result holds for the regular pentagon only? 
TONY Ja. 
RESEARCHER: Do you think it will hold true for other pentagons? 
TONY Because you won’t have that common a, it won’t hold true. 
  
Tony shows the same misconception as Inderani and Victor, in that he thinks that only 
regular pentagons have equal sides: more specifically that equality of sides implies the 
equality of the angles. 
 
9.1.3 PMTs producing a Regular Pentagon CG through analogical or inductive 
         reasoning, without using GSP. 
This sections focuses on re-service mathematics teachers producing a conjecture 
generalization through analogical or inductive reasoning, without using GSP. 
 
In the case of the pentagon problem, three  PMTs, namely Shannon, Trevelyan and Renny 
seemed to have produced their conjecture generalization by means of analogical or inductive 





their conjecture generalizations, without expressing a need to use Sketchpad to experiment 
and test their conjecture generalization.  
 
The following cases of Shannon and Trevelyan, which are presented with supporting excerpts 
from their one-to-one task based interviews and/or worksheets, are representative of how this 
group of three PMTs (namely, Shannon, Trevelyan and Renny), constructed their conjecture 
generalizations and expressed their levels of certainty. 
 
Case: Shannon 
As demonstrated in the following excerpt, it seems that Shannon like Inderani and others,  
made her conjecture generalization via analogical or inductive grounds. 
 
RESEARCHER: …in the previous activities we observed, conjectured and logically 
explained the following results: 
(a) In an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a point 
inside the triangle to its sides, is constant, right?; and also 
(b) That in a rhombus, the sum of the distances from a point inside the 
rhombus to its sides is also constant. 
 
How would you generalize the above results to pentagons? 
 
SHANNON: Well, it would have to be… the result would have to be the same for a 
pentagon, but it would only be the same for a regular pentagon, 
meaning that all the sides are equal – that the sides and angles are 
equal so that the pentagon has got five …(indistinct mumbling). So, 
this is your pentagon, with five sides, all the sides have got to be equal, 
and all the angles have got to be equal. Then point P can be anywhere 
within the figure, and that the sum of the distances to the sides of the 
pentagon – the regular pentagon – will be constant.  
 
Shannon very emphatically acknowledged that the result would have to be the same for the 
pentagon, provided it meets the following specific conditions: (a) all the sides have got to be 
equal, and (b) all the angles have got to be equal. This demonstrates that Shannon appears to 
have the same misconception as the other students that for a pentagon, equal sides imply 





claim on the knowledge and experience she gained from her previous activities. More 
importantly, her claim that point P can be anywhere is also premised on the fact that the sum 
of the distances to the sides of the regular pentagon will be constant.  
 
Shannon like others, for example Inderani, noticeably  did not make an analogous connection 
with the previous activity, where the rhombus was not necessarily regular, i.e. whose sides 
were all equal but whose angles were not necessarily all equal. Shannon, just like Inderani 
and others, seem to think that ‘regular’ is a necessary condition for a pentagon to have equal 
sides, and this could have caused her to  construct her conjecture generalization as illustrated 
in her responses in the afore-cited excerpt. 
 
This misconception of the regularity concept provides an apt opportunity to show students a 
pentagon with equal sides that is not regular as a counter-example to refine their pentagon 
conjecture generalization and also remedy their alleged misconception. This kind of didactic 
move is typically associated with diagnostic teaching, which requires that a facilitator 
intervenes at critical moments in the teaching/learning sequence to correct misconceptions, 
false/deficit conjectures, proofs and arguments in general. 
 
Case: Trevelyan  
When Trevelyan was asked by the Researcher as to how he would generalize the equilateral 
and rhombus results (see Q1.1 of Task 3(a)), he responded as follows: 
 
TREVELYAN: I can generalize in such a way: We observed that in an equilateral, 
since the sides are equal the sum was also equal (meaning the sum of 
the distances remains constant). We also saw that on the rhombus that 
the sides were equal. That means that in a pentagon, that means the 
sides are all the same, then it should be the same (apparently meaning 
the sum of the distances remain constant) 
 
As discussed with reference to inductive reasoning in Sections 1.6.1 amd 2.1.1., when 
observations are made one tends organize them in a way that enables one to construct 
conjectures (or conjecture generalizations) about the behaviours of mathematical objects 
under the ‘microscope’ or about particular phenomena. One such procedural move is to look 
for a pattern that exists amongst already made observations (or phenomena), and thereby 





In this respect, it seems that Trevelyan reflected on his previous equilateral triangle and 
rhombus conjecture generalizations, and having singled out in both instances that the figures 
had equal sides and their distances sum were also constant, detected the following pattern: ‘if 
sides are equal’ then the sum is constant. Hence, it is plausible that when Trevelyan was 
asked to generalize his equilateral triangle and rhombus results (i.e. conjecture 
generalizations), he could have thought that he was also dealing with a pentagon with equal 
sides and hence inductively or analogously argued on the grounds of his detected pattern that 
the result would be the same for the pentagon (i.e. the distance sum for a pentagon with equal 
sides would also be the same as for the equilateral triangle and rhombus cases). 
  
However, when the researcher probed Trevelyan further, as illustrated in the following 
excerpt, he said that he was absolutely certain that his conjecture generalization would hold 
only for regular pentagons. 
 
RESEARCHER: Do you think it will only hold for regular pentagons, or will it hold for 
other kinds of pentagons? 
TREVELYAN: I think only the regular. 
RESEARCHER: Only the regular. …Are you certain about the regular pentagon? How 
certain are you? 
TREVELYAN: Hundred percent. 
 
It seems that Trevelyan like the others is thinking that ‘regular’ is a necessary condition for 
equal sides, despite having demonstrated that he knows that a regular figure has the equal 
sides and equal angles, as illustrated in the following task-based interview excerpt: 
 
RESEARCHER: When you say regular, what do you mean by ‘regular’? 
TREVELYAN: I mean the sides are all the same – are equal. 
RESEARCHER: Now, there are two important conditions to be met in order for a 
polygon to be regular: 
TREVELYAN: and the angles should be equal. 
 
It seems that Trevelyan’s deficit conjecture was also influenced by limited or absent 






9.1.4  PMTs producing a Regular Pentagon CG using inductive reasoning or guessing or  
           superficial analogical reasoning, without using GSP. 
This section focuses on pre-service mathematics teachers producing a conjecture 
generalization, plausibly through using inductive reasoning or superficial analogical 
reasoning or guessing, and without the use of Sketchpad in either of the cases  
 
There was just one student, namely Logan, who seemed to have constructed a Regular 
Pentagon conjecture generalization through either using inductive reasoning or analogical 
reasoning at a  superficial level, or by guessing. The case of Logan is hereby presented with 
representative excerpts from his one-to-one task based interview with the Researcher: 
 
Case: Logan 
As illustrated in the following excerpt, it seems that Logan at first glance generalizes to any 
pentagon.  
 
RESEARCHER: How would you generalize the above results to a pentagon? 
LOGAN: I would say that, given the two foregoing statements, in a 
pentagon the sum of the distances from inside the pentagon to 
its sides is constant… 
 
When the researcher, as illustrated in the following excerpts, further probed Logan to 
establish whether his conjecture generalization applied to any pentagon or not, it was realized 
that Logan was restricting  his conjecture generalization  to just ‘regular’ pentagons.  
 
RESEARCHER:  Okay, reading what you wrote here, you said in a pentagon the sum of 
the distances from a point inside the pentagon to its sides is constant. 
For what pentagons would that conjecture hold true? Or which 
pentagons are you referring to?  
LOGAN: I’m talking about a fixed pentagon and a regular pentagon. 
RESEARCHER: to any fixed pentagon? 
LOGAN: Yes. 
RESEARCHER: What do you mean by regular? 
LOGAN: What I mean by regular is that the inside angles of the pentagon are all 





RESEARCHER: So, is that the only condition for a pentagon to be regular? 
LOGAN: No. All the sides are also equal. 
RESEARCHER: So the pentagon that you’re referring to here, you say is a regular 
pentagon? 
LOGAN: It’s a regular pentagon, which means all the sides are the same; or all 
the inside angles are all equal.  
RESEARCHER: You said ‘or’? 
LOGAN: I meant ‘and’. For it to be a regular pentagon, it has to have those two 
characteristics.  
RESEARCHER: So you’re saying this result that you’re talking about applies to a 
regular pentagon? 
LOGAN: Yes, to a regular pentagon (seems to have a misconception, namely 
only regular pentagons have equal sides) 
 
Taking cognisance of Logan’s apparent misconception, namely ‘only regular pentagons have 
equal sides’, which could have probably caused  him to  construct his conjecture 
generalization, the Researcher probed Logan as to the level of certainty he had in his regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization. As illustrated in the following excerpt, Logan expressed 
absolute certainty in his conjecture generalization, and did not even want to check out the 
validity of the regular pentagon conjecture generalization via experimental exploration using 
Sketchpad. 
 
RESEARCHER: How certain are you? 
LOGAN: I’m a hundred percent sure.  
RESEARCHER: Do you want to test or confirm the conjecture that you just spoke 
about? 
LOGAN: No, I’m sure. 
RESEARCHER: …So you don’t want to investigate that result? 








9.1.5 Producing an Equilateral Convex Pentagon CG immediately on logical grounds  
        Plausibly with the aid of analogical reasoning. 
 
The analysis of the task based interview responses from the PMTs, has shown that only 
student, namely Alan, seems to have generalized to any equilateral pentagon on logical 
grounds with reasoning by analogy (i.e. cognitive blending) as a plausible aid to the 
development of his conjecture generalization. The case of Alan is represented with 



















Figure 9.1.5.1: Alan reasoning deductively prior to making his CG 
 
When Alan was presented with Task 3(a) by the Researcher, he immediately responded in the 
worksheet by drawing a pentagon and marking all its sides equal as shown in Figure 9.1.5.1. 
Without any assistance or use of Sketchpad, he continued to construct a written argument in 
the worksheet as illustrated in Figure 9.1.5.1. The act of Alan marking the sides of the 
pentagon as being equal, seems to suggest that he has singled out the property, namely ‘equal 






equilateral triangle and rhombus generalizations to a prospective pentagon. However, before 
announcing a generalization, Alan  on his own chose to first construct a logical argument (see 
Figure 9.1.5.1) that was premised on the property, ‘equal sides’, to see if he could explain 
why the sum of the distances from a point inside a pentagon to its sides is always constant. In  
doing so, Alan similarly used the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic strategy that he had  previously 
used in the construction of the explanations  for both the  equilateral triangle and rhombus 
conjecture generalizations, and hence reached the desired conclusion, namely the sum of the 
distances is constant. 
 
When the researcher asked Alan to explain what he had written in his worksheet, he 
responded as follows: 
 
ALAN: Aaaah….You have a pentagon (referring to his pentagon with equal sides) and 
you construct a point P inside pentagon. Then you draw lines that are 
perpendicular to each side. After drawing those lines you construct a triangle – 
so in this case we have five triangles – and you find the area of each small 
triangle and they have a common factor of a over 2. So the sum of all the 
heights of …uum..the triangles, is h. So you have h which is going to be equal 
to h1 + h2  + h3+ h4+ h5.. So, the total area that you are going to have is going 
to be the small a over 2 × h. So when we want to prove that h is always 
constant, we make h the subject of the formula, so h = 2 times the area (A) 
over a. And we know that area (A) is constant because we have a fixed 
pentagon, and we have a (small a) is constant as it’s the length of each side. 
So we have proved that h (h here represents the sum of the distances, i.e. h1 + 
h2  + h3 + h4 + h5)  equals a constant.  
 
Alan’s aforementioned response suggests that he has plausibly made the conjecture 
generalization to the pentagon with equal sides on logical grounds with the aid of analogical 
reasoning.  Nevertheless, the researcher probed Alan to see whether he realized that the 
pentagon did not need to also have equal angles (i.e. be regular) for the result to be true. 
 
RESEARCHER: Now that is for this pentagon that you have got here where all the sides 
are equal (referring to Alans’ hardcopy as shown in Figure 9.1.5.1). 
Let us just go to the diagram. The pentagon that you’re talking about, 





or do they have different measurements in terms of what you’re 
representing? I know you said the sides are all equal. That is fine. 
These angles (Researcher pointing to angles    ;    ;    ;    
and    ) are they equal in your case or not? …So I’m asking, is this 
angle BAE, angle ABC and all those angles – are they equal or not? 
ALAN:  They are not equal. 
RESEARCHER: Okay, so you’re saying this result that you have here (referring to his 
explained result in Figure 9.1.5.1), is for a pentagon whose sides are 
equal, and whose angles are not equal? 
ALAN: Ja. 
 
Alan’s responses as presented in the aforementioned excerpt, suggests clearly that he 
understands that his conjecture generalization will hold for equilateral pentagons that are not 
necessarily equiangular. To further check his understanding, the researcher asked Alan, 
“What happens if the angles are all equal and the sides are all equal? Will the result still 
hold?” He immediately responded by saying, “Ja, it will hold”. Alan’s latter response, 
suggests that he has figured out that ‘equal sides’ is a critical property to have in a pentagon 
in order to get a constant distance sum.  
 
When the researcher asked Alan, “Will it (referring to his result deduced in Figure 9.1.5.1) 
hold for a pentagon whose sides are not equal?”, he responded by saying “No, it won’t hold”. 
The latter response by Alan, seems to reaffirm that he has identified ‘equal sides’ as a critical 
property that should be present in a pentagon in order to make the continual generalization 
from the earlier cases (equilateral triangle and rhombus) to the pentagon cases. Thus he has 
intimated that ‘equal sides’ is a sufficient property a pentagon (or maybe any polygon) needs 
to possess to produce a constant distance sum.  
 
After all the deliberations and discussions presented above, the Researcher asked Alan, “Can 
you now formulate the kind of generalization for respective pentagons?”, and he verbally 
responded as follows:  
ALAN: The h (referring to the sum : h1 + h2  + h3+ h4+ h5 ) is constant, if, and 
only if, the sides of the pentagon are all equal. 
 
However, in expressing the required condition as an “if, and only if” condition, the student is 





condition as the result is also true if all the angles are equal. However, in this instance it is 
understandable from his experience so far, particularly with the equilateral triangle 
explanation, and lack of experience of considering other types of pentagons. 
 
9.1.6 Findings as per Section 9.1 (PMTs producing a pentagon CG) 
        
1. Only one student, namely Alan, appeared to have made his conjecture generalization to 
any equilateral pentagon (not just a regular pentagon) on logical grounds, apparently with 
the aid of analogical reasoning (cognitive blending), and expressed full certainty in his 
pentagon conjecture generalization, after giving a deductive argument. 
 
2. Three PMTs, namely Shannon , Trevelyan, and Renny, appeared to have considered their 
previous equilateral and rhombus  conjecture generalizations and made their conjecture 
generalization to a regular pentagon by means  of either inductive reasoning, i.e. noticed 
the pattern that if ‘sides are equal’ the sum is constant, or analogical reasoning.  
Furthermore, these three PMTs did not make any request to experimentally confirm their 
initial conjecture generalization, and expressed a 100% certainty in their pentagon 
conjecture generalization. 
 
3. One student, namely Inderani, seemed to have also made her conjecture generalization to 
a regular pentagon by means of either inductive reasoning or analogical reasoning, but 
later required some experimental confirmation or clarification using Sketchpad to boost 
her level certainty in her conjecture generalization to 100%. 
 
4. One student, namely, Victor, appeared  to have also to made his conjecture generalization 
to a pentagon by means of either inductive reasoning or analogical reasoning, but did not 
on his own accord express a need to experimental confirm his conjecture generalization 
by using Sketchpad. However, the Researcher on seeing that Victor was only 75% sure 
about his conjecture generalization, provided an opportunity for him to explore his 
conjecture generalization using Sketchpad. Through the experimental exploration, Victor 
was able to see that his conjecture generalization was always true, and this made him 
100% certain in his regular pentagon conjecture generalization. 
 
5. There was one student, namely Tony, who after making his initial pentagon conjecture 





clarification as to whether there existed a pentagon with unequal sides. Hence the 
researcher provided him with an opportunity to construct such a pentagon by using 
Sketchpad coupled with relevant guidance. Only after seeing a pentagon with unequal 
sides, did Tony move from a 75% level of certainty in his pentagon conjecture 
generalization to a 100% certainty level in his regular pentagon conjecture generalization. 
 
6. One student, namely, Logan, seemed to have produced his initial conjecture 
generalization to the regular pentagon through either using inductive reasoning or 
guessing or analogical reasoning of a fairly superficial level, and without the use of 
Sketchpad in either of the cases. However, he did not request experimental confirmation 
using Sketchpad, but expressed 100% certainty in his conjecture generalization. 
 
7. As described in Findings 2-6, there has been a perceptible/distinct  increase in the number 
of students forming their initial conjecture generalizations on the basis of inductive or 
analogical reasoning, without any need for experimental confirmation. In fact none of the 
PMTs formulated their initial conjecture generalization for the regular pentagon by using 
Sketchpad,  but only one student, namely Inderani, who formulated her conjecture 
generalization on inductive or analogical grounds, needed further experimental 
confirmation with Sketchpad. 
 
8. All 7 PMTss (as described in Findings 2-6), namely Shannon , Trevelyan,  Renny, 
Inderani, Victor, Tony, and Logan, limited their generalization to the pentagon by 
restricting it to the regular pentagon, and in so doing showed a misconception that equal 
sides imply equal angles. In other words, these seven PSTEs misunderstood that equal 
sides automatically imply equal angles, and vice versa. Having seen that the property 
‘equal sides’ also prevailed in the previous rhombus and equilateral cases, they went on to 
claim that their conjecture generalization will hold only for regular pentagons. This 
misconception of  thinking that ‘all sides equal”  imply ‘equal angles’ or is a sufficient 
condition for a polygon (or pentagon) to be regular is surprising given that even for 
quadrilaterals it is not true that ‘equal sides’ imply regularity, for example the rhombus is 
a counter-example. Moreover, none of the students could themselves provide an example 







9.2 Pre-service mathematics teachers justifying their pentagon conjecture  
generalization 
As discussed in Section 9.1, there were seven out of the 8 PMTs, namely Inderani, Victor, 
Tony, Shannon, Trevelyan, Renny and Logan, who formulated their conjecture generalization 
for the pentagon by restricting it to the regular pentagon, apparently through having a 
misconception that equal sides imply equal angles. However, in the construction of their 
regular pentagon conjecture generalization, three PSTEs, namely Inderani, Victor and Tony, 
seemed to have made their generalization from the previous cases to a pentagon on inductive 
or analogical grounds and then required some use of Sketchpad to attain a hundred percent 
certainty level in their respective regular pentagon conjecture generalizations (see Findings 3-
5 in Section 9.1.6). On the other hand 3 PMTs, namely Shannon, Trevelyan and Renny, 
seemed to have made their generalization from the previous cases on inductive or analogical 
grounds as well, but they did not require experimental confirmation with GSP (see Finding 2 
of Section 9.1.6). Furthermore, Logan, as discussed in Section 9.1.4, seemed to have made 
his regular pentagon conjecture generalization through either guessing, or using inductive 
reasoning or using analogical reasoning at a rather superficial level.  Nevertheless, there was 
one student, namely Alan, who seemed to have constructed his conjecture generalization to 
the equilateral pentagon on logical grounds plausibly with the aid of analogical reasoning, 
and did not limit it to just the regular pentagon (see Finding 1 of Section 9.1.6) 
 
In contrast, Alan seemed to have spontaneously seen that the structure of the ‘triangle-area’ 
algebraic explanation, which he had previously advanced for the equilateral triangle and 
rhombus cases, could similarly be applied to the pentagon case. Hence, he first produced a 
logical kind of explanation and then announced his equilateral pentagon conjecture 
generalization. This cognitive experience of Alan, suggests that via analogical reasoning he 
first assimilated the pentagon explanation into his previously accommodated explanation(s) 
for cases such as the equilateral triangle and rhombus, and then subsequently modified the 
explanation to accommodate the pentagon case.   
 
The remainder of this section will focus on the kinds of justifications produced by the 
remaining seven PMTs, namely Inderani, Victor, Tony, Shannon, Trevelyan, Renny and 
Logan, to explain their pentagon conjecture generalization which they confined to a regular 
pentagon. With regard to the latter seven PMTs, there was just one PMT, namely Logan, who 





Section 9.2.1, was thus provided with scaffolded guidance and an opportunity to experiment 
in a Sketchpad context, and this seemed to have enabled him to develop a logical explanation 
for his regular pentagon conjecture generalization. The remaining six students (see Sections 
9.2.2 and 9.2.3  for discussion) seemed to have been able to develop a logical explanation for 
their regular pentagon conjecture generalization through being able to see that  that  the 
‘triangle-area’ explanatory proof structure that was used to explain their previous  equilateral 
and rhombus conjecture generalizations, could also be applied to the regular pentagon case..  
 
As discussed in the preceding paragraph, the justification(s) in the form of logical 
explanations that were developed by PMTs via guided scaffolding is (are) presented in 
Section 9.2.1. The justifications in the form of logical explanations that were developed by 
the three PMTs Inderani, Victor and Tony Victor (as decribed in Findings 3-5 of Section 
9.1.6) and the three PMTs Shannon, Trevelyan and Renny (as as decribed in Finding 2 of 
Section 9.16) through seeing the general through the particular possibly with the aid of 
analogical reasoning, are presented in Sections 9.2.2 and 9.2.3. respectively.  
 
9.2.1 The development of a logical explanation for a regular pentagon CG via 
scaffolded guidance and experimentation  
This section discusses the  development of a logical explanation for a regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization produced by either guessing, inductive reasoning, or superficial 
analogical reasoning, through the use of scaffolded guidance and some experimentation 
within  a Sketchpad context. 
 
Case: Logan 
When the researcher asked Logan to support his conjecture generalization with a justification 
in the form of a logical explanation, Logan replied as follows: 
LOGAN: Without doing anything? …I see it’s a bit difficult… in the previous exercise, 
I could drag the stuff and see exactly what happened. So, I would actually just 
like to drag .. 
 
It seemed that Logan, probably wanted to visually/experimentally see if his result is always 
true. Hence, the Researcher afforded Logan an opportunity to experiment with his regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization and validate it. Despite this experimentatal confirmation 
(i.e. through dragging) in a Sketchpad context, he was not able to construct a logical 





logical explanation. In fact when, the Researcher asked Logan to support his regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization, he responded by saying, “this is what I wrote (i.e. pointed to his 






Figure 9.2.1.1: Logan’s failed attempt at supporting his conjecture generalization 
 
Despite the previous two activities, the student appears to have been distracted by the 
properties of a regular pentagon, and have ignored the result about the sum of the distances to 
the sides. Hence, the Researcher had to draw the attention of Logan to the task at hand, and 
provide him with some scaffolded guidance, which could enable him to construct a logical 
explanation. The scaffolded guidance was facilitated via a worksheet task, namely Task 3(d) 
of the Pentagon activity (see Appendix 2).  
 
As per Task 3(d) of Appendix 2,, Logan was first asked to “Press the button to show the 
small triangles in your sketch”. Immediately thereafter he was asked to proceed to do the 
activities in the scaffodled worksheet as contained in Task 3d. With regards to the question 
(ii) of the  scaffolded worksheet, and Logan then produced the following response (see Figure 






           Figure 9.2.1.2: Logan’s response to Task 3(d) (ii) 
 
The researcher on seeing that Logan was able to express the area of each small triangle 
correctly in terms of a and the variables h1, h2 , h3, h4 and  h5, then requested Logan to 
proceed to question (iii). As shown in the excerpt from his worksheet  (see Figure 9.2.1.3), 
Logan on his own was able to add the five areas and simplify his expression by taking out the 















   
 Figure 9.2.1.3: Logan’s response to Task 3(d) (iii) 
 
The researcher further requested him to proceed with question (iv) from the scaffolded 
worksheet. The following excerpt,  captures the dialogue between the researcher and Logan,  
that enabled Logan to finally write down the required equation as shown in Figure 9.2.1.4. 
 
RESEARCHER: Proceed to the next question: How is the sum in Question (iii) related 
to the total area of the pentagon? Write an equation to show the 
relationship using A for the total area of the pentagon.  
LOGAN: The total area of the pentagon = ½ × a (h1 + h2  + h3+ h4+ h5) which 
means the total area of the pentagon equals all the areas of the 
triangles, added up.  
RESEARCHER: And what is the total area? What letter will you use to indicate the total 
area? 








Upon observing that Logan was coping and responding well, the Researcher requested Logan 
to proceed to question (v) of  scaffolded worksheet, which read as follows:  
 
“Use your equation from Question (iv) to explain why the sum of the distances to all five 
sides of a given pentagon is always constant”. Logan then produced the response as shown in 
Figure 9.2.1.5 in his worksheet: 
 
 












Figure 9.2.1.5: Logan’s explanation for his conjecture generalization 
 
In his response (as shown in Figure 9.2.1.5), Logan seems to have remembered from his two 
previous activities that he should first express his equation, A = ½a (h1 + h2  + h3 + h4 + h5), 
which he produced in question (iv), into the form 
  
 
  (h1 + h2  + h3+ h4+ h5). However,  
Logan seemed not to have quite finished off his explanation with a logical argument. Hence, 
the Researcher intervened and through further probing, Logan then produced the following 
written explanation (see Figure 9.2.1.6), using his statement 
  
 






Figure 9.2.1.6: Logan expanding on his logical explanation 
 
Logan’s continuation of his explanation, as shown in Figure 9.2.1.6, seems to have shown a 
deeper understanding as to why the left hand side of the equation, namely 
  
 
 , is constant. 
Although Logan did not conclusively end his argument by stating ‘therefore the right hand 
side, namely (h1 + h2  + h3 + h4 + h5), is constant’, it is plausible that is what he meant since the 
task was to explain just that. 
 
9.2.2 Logical explanation by Inderani, Victor and Tony for regular pentagon CG by 
eeing the general through the particular 
This section focusses on the  development of a logical explanation for a regular pentagon 
(convex) conjecture generalization produced by either analogical or inductive reasoning and 







analogically seeing that the ‘triangle-area’ proof structure for the previous equilateral triangle 
and rhombus cases could also be applied to the regular pentagon case: 
 
Two students, namely Inderani and Victor, who constructed their conjecture generalizations 
for a pentagon and restricted it to a regular pentagon by thinking that ‘regular’ is a necessary 
condition for equal sides, used Sketchpad to confirm their initial regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization.  However, Inderani on her own accord requested to use Skecthpad to test and 
confirm her conjecture generalization (see Finding 3 of Section 9.1.6), whilst this was not the 
case for Victor. In fact, the researcher on seeing that Victor did not express full certainty in 
his conjecture generalization when initially asked, gave Victor the opportunity to engage in 
some experimentation within a Sketchpad context (see see Finding 4 of Section 9.1.6) . On 
the other hand, Tony who also made his conjecture generalization on the grounds of the 
‘sides of a pentagon are equal’, expressed some reservations in his conjecture generalization, 
primarily because he had not seen a pentagon which was not regular. Hence, in this instance, 
the researcher asked Tony to use Sketchpad and construct a pentagon by first plotting any 
five points and then joining them. Through, this Sketchpad construction Tony came to realize 
that not all pentagons have equal sides, and subsequently expressed 100% certainty in his 
initial Sketchpad conjecture generalization (see Finding 5 of Section 9.1.6 for details). 
 
Although, the three students, namely Inderani, Victor and Tony, engaged with Sketchpad 
from different standpoints to arrive at full certainty in their regular pentagon conjecture 
generalizations, they seemed to have constructed their logical explanations for their regular 
pentagon conjecture generalizations by analogically seeing that the ‘triangle-area’ proof 
structure for the previous equilateral triangle and rhombus cases could also be applied to the 
regular pentagon case. The representative justifications that were constructed by Inderani, 
Victor and Tony during the one-to-one task based interviews are presented case-wise with 
accompanying dialogues and worksheet excerpts as follows. 
 
Case: Inderani 
When the Researcher asked Inderani to explain why her conjecture regular pentagon 
generalization was true, she replied as follows: 
 
INDERANI:  Using the small triangles? Because the sides of a pentagon are equal, 
thereforeall the bases of the small triangles inside the pentagon are all equal. 





bases, all the sides of the pentagon are equal, and using the same principle as 
before, if you divide the total area of the pentagon by the bases, it will be a 
constant over a constant – this will give you a constant. And it’s always true, 
because the bases (referring to the sides of the regular pentagon) of any 
regular pentagon are always the same – always equal. 
 
It seems that when Inderani was constructing her logical explanation, she analogically 
mapped each step and idea onto the steps and ideas that was previously used to construct her 
logical explanations for her respective equilateral triangle and rhombus conjecture 
generalizations. Although her assertion that the sides of any regular bases are always equal is 
correct, it is plausible that she is not yet aware that one could get a pentagon with equal sides 
















When the Researcher, asked her to write down her explanation in the given worksheet, she 
explicitly limited her explanation to regular pentagons, and not for any other kinds of 
pentagons, as can be seen in the worksheet extract contained in Figure 9.2.2.1. This again 
suggests that she has not seen or is not aware that one could have an equilateral pentagon that 











When the researcher asked Victor as to whether he wanted to know why his regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization is true, he replied “yes”. Victor’s ‘yes’ response confirmed that he 
needed an explanation. When the researcher asked him “can you explain it for me?”, he 
immediately without any guidance produced the following insightful explanation verbally: 
 
VICTOR: Since point P is inside the fixed pentagon with constant sides (meaning equal 
sides), if I can make the construction of triangles, I can have triangle EPD, 
triangle DPC, triangle CPB, triangle BPA and triangle APE, the sum of the areas 
of these triangles would – if A was the area of the pentagon – equal the area of 
triangle EPD, triangle DPC, triangle CPB, triangle BPA and triangle APE. Since 
all sides are equal, I can label them with a. Then, I can have A = ½ ah1 + ½ ah2 + 
½ ah3 + ½ ah4 + ½ ah5. Then I can take out the common factor which gives me: A 
=  ½ a (h1 + h2  + h3 + h4 + h5). Then I can simplify that and get h1 + h2  + h3 + h4 + 
h5 = 2A over small a. A will be the area of the pentagon, which is fixed (meaning 
constant); a is the length of the distance of the pentagon, which is constant. 
Therefore h1 + h2  + h 3+ h4 + h5 is also constant.  
 






















Victor’s explanations suggest  that he was able to look at the structure of his explanations for 
his previous conjecture generalizations (i.e. folding back), namely an equilateral triangle and 
a rhombus, and mirror a similar kind of explanation for the regular pentagon case. In other 
words, it seems that Victor, like Inderani, first assimilated his explanation into the previously 
accommodated explanations for either (or both) the equilateral triangle case of rhombus case, 
and then subsequently modified it for the regular pentagon case.  
 
Case: Tony 
When the researcher asked Tony to explain why he was 100 percent sure about his conjecture 
generalization, he spontaneously produced the following explanation: 
 
TONY:  We can make those small triangles inside but, if we make the small triangles 
 inside, then that would mean we would have about five triangles inside with 
the same base and which we can call a. And then we can take that a when we 
find the sum of the area – meaning we find the total area of the pentagon – we 
can take that half of a out, and then we have that sum as being the constant. 
 
The researcher could see that Tony was attempting to structure his explanation by similarly 
using the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic strategy that he had previously used to construct  logical 
explanations for his equilateral triangle and rhombus conjecture generalizations respectively. 
The researcher then requested Tony to write down the main parts of his explanation in the 
worksheet. Figure 9.2.2.3 represents the explanation Tony produced in his worksheet. 
 
It seems that Tony like others such as Inderani & Victor, after progressing through the 
previous equilateral triangle and rhombus problem, had seen the similarity between the 
pentagon problem, although regular in this instance, through the ‘equal’ sides property. 
Hence, it is plausible that Tony, like the others, was able to see his  logical explanation for his 
regular pentagon conjecture generalization through the ‘eyes’ of his  earlier ‘triangle-area’ 
logical explanations for his equilateral triangle and/ or rhombus conjecture generalizations 
via the connecting special property ‘equal sides’. The earlier equilateral triangle conjecture 
generalization explanation and/ or rhombus conjecture generalization explanation semed to 
have served as a generic example(s) or generic proof(s), and thus enabled him to construct a 
logical explanation (a particular proof in the context of the general Viviani problem) for 























Figure 9.2.2.3: Tony’s logical explanation of his regular pentagon CG 
 
A generic example enables one to see the general through the particular as described by 
Mason & Pimm (1984), and in the process enables one to move from one particular proof to 
another particular proof  by transferring the generic argument from one particular instance to 
another particular instance. Furthermore, as seen in the case of Tony and others like Inderani, 
Victor, it seems that logical explanations for equilateral triangle and/ or rhombus conjecture 
generalizations conforms to the notion of a generic example as described by Rowland (1998), 
since each provided the mentioned PMTs with insight as to why their conjecture 
generalization for another instance, namely a regular pentagon, held true for (see section 
5.3.1 of Chapter 5). 
 
9.2.3 Logical explanation by Shannon, Trevelyan and Renny for regular pentagon CG  
by  seeing the general through the particular 
This section focusses on the development of a logical explanation for a regular pentagon 
(convex) conjecture generalization (which they developed through either analogical or 






analogically seeing that the ‘triangle-area’ proof structure for the previous equilateral triangle 
and rhombus cases can also be applied to the regular pentagon case. 
 
The three PMTs, namely Shannon, Trevelyan and Renny who produced their conjecture 
generalizations through either analogical or inductive reasoning, seemed to have seen analogy 
with the equilateral triangle and rhombus cases respectively, and hence proceeded to 
construct their  ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanations for the regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization by analogically mapping the structure of their previous triangle-area’ algebraic 
explanations  for the equilateral triangle and rhombus case onto the regular pentagon.  The 
following cases of Shannon and Tony, which are representative of the PMTs justifications in 
this group, are presented with supporting dialogue excerpts  and worksheet excerpts from 
their one-to one task based interview sessions to illustrate the typical development of logical 
explanations amongst this group of PMTs (namely, Shannon, Trevelyan, and Renny). 
 
Case: Shannon 
When the Researcher asked Shannon to explain why her regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization was true, she replied as follows: 
SHANNON:    Because you can also divide it into triangles, and do exactly the same 
as you did there…uum… (Referring to the Rhombus proof) 
 
However, the researcher was curious to see if Shannon could quickly articulate what she 
meant by “do exactly the same”. The following interview excerpts, which makes  reference to 
both her hardcopy sketch (see Figure 9.2.3.1) and onscreen dynamic sketch, clearly 
demonstrate that she was able to discern with a great degree of confidence and certainty that 
the ‘triangle area” proof technique that she used to previously construct logical explanations 
for her respective equilateral triangle and rhombus conjecture generalizations, could similarly 















RESEARCHER: Okay, let’s open the sketch. Let’s open the regular pentagon. Enlarge 
the screen. Okay, you said you can do exactly the same; can you 
briefly tell me – just describe what you’re going to do? 
  You can use the buttons if you want to. 
SHANNON: Yes, you would draw a triangle. Can I use the small triangle button? 
You would use the pentagon with five triangles that the pentagon 
consists of, and being given the altitude of each triangle; you can prove 
it exactly the same as you did for the previous ones.  
RESEARCHER: Ja, okay, I understand what you’re saying, but can you just talk more 
… when you say ‘the same’ …? Take me through the process. 
SHANNON: Well, the area of a pentagon is made up of the five triangles, as shown 
here (see Figure below), and then you can write down that the area of 
Figure ABCDE = the Area of each specific triangle – the five triangles 
you would name, respectively;  write down what the formula for the 
area is: ½ times a  (and the lengths of all the sides are the same) times 
h, and you would come to the conclusion that the area of this pentagon 
=  ½ times one of these lengths of the sides, times (in brackets) (h1 + h2  
+ h3+ h4+ h5), and the conclusion then is h1 + h2  + h3 + h4+ h 5 = 2A 
(which is your area), over small a which is the length of the sides. And 
I suppose you can carry this on for a polygon of six sides, seven sides – 
and all the areas would be the same.  
 
As illustrated in the tail- end of the afore-cited excerpt, Shannon confidently suggested that 
the same kind of explanation would extend to other polygons like a six sided polygon and 
seven sided polygon. Although, the Researcher did not seize the  opportunity to ask Shannon 
whether she was referring to a regular polygon or not, there exist a strong possibility that she 
could have been thinking strictly of regular polygons only. This, nevertheless illustrates her 
level of certainty in her regular pentagon conjecture generalization and associated 
explanation (or proof) thereof. 
 
Furthermore, as described for the cases of Inderani, Victor and Tony  in Section 9.2.2, it 
seems for Shannon (as well others described in this section 9.2.3), the logical explanations for 
the  equilateral triangle and/ or rhombus conjecture generalizations seemed to have served  as 





Shannon like others were able to construct a proof, although a particular proof in the context 
of the Viviani Problem, with the adequate insight as to why their regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization holds true for them. By reflecting and considering the mentioned  generic 
examples, Shannon like the other PMTs were able to carry the ‘sameness’ to another specific 
instance, namely the construction of  a logical explanation for the regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization (see discussion on generic proving in 5.3.1). 
 
Case: Renny 
After Renny affirmed  that his conjecture generalization would only hold for regular 
pentagons, the Researcher asked him to write down a coherent explanation for his regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization in the provided worksheet. The worksheet extract in 




















Figure 9.2.3.2: Renny’s logical explanation of his regular pentagon CG 
 
It seems that Renny, like the other 5 PMTs, was able to construct his logical explanation for 






the primary processes of learning in which new material (or new problems) is related to 
previous knowledge or relevant in the existing cognitive structure (see Ausubel, 1978; Aziz et 
al., 2009). In particular, it seems that Renny’s cognitive structure, like the other 5 PMTs, on 
having seen a similarity between the rhombus problem (and/or equilateral problem) and the 
pentagon problem (although a regular one in this instance as a result of an apparent 
misconception) on the grounds of seeing that ‘equal sides’ property manifested itself in all 
three problems, was triggered to correlatively subsume the regular pentagon problem (i.e. the 
construction of logical explanation for his regular pentagon conjecture generalization) into 
his earlier conceptual ‘triangle-algebraic’ explanatory structure for the rhombus (or 
equilateral triangle) conjecture generalizations. Through the process of correlative 
subsumption, Renny seemed to have made the cognitive link between his new problem (i.e. 
the construction of logical explanation for his regular pentagon conjecture generalization) and 
the existing ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanation for his rhombus (equilateral) conjecture 
generalization, with aid of analogical reasoning, and then modified his ‘existing ‘triangle-
area’ algebraic explanation for his rhombus (equilateral) conjecture generalization to 
accommodate his ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanation for his new regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization. 
 
9.2.4 Findings as per Section 9.2 (PMTs justifying their pentagon CG) 
1. One PSTE, namely Logan, who seemed to have produced his conjecture 
generalization to a pentagon (convex) through either guessing, inductive reasoning or 
superficial analogical reasoning, but restricted it to a regular pentagon – a 
misconception on the grounds of thinking that equal sides imply equal angles. He 
struggled to put together a justification in the form of a logical explanation for his  
regular pentagon conjecture generalization on his own, and hence was provided with a 
scaffolded worksheet and necessary probing (and facilitation) by the researcher to 
enable him to develop a logical explanation. However, Logan was able to complete all 
parts of the worksheet with great ease and confidence, and it is plausible that his 
previous experience with a similar kind of scaffolded worksheet that was used for the 
construction of logical explanations for his equilateral triangle and rhombus 
conjecture generalizations, could have helped him to complete the worksheet with 
virtually no hurdles. This suggests that the earlier scaffolded activities had to an 
extent enhanced both his competency and insight on using the ‘triangle-area’ 






2. a.  The three students, namely, Shannon, Trevelyan and Renny, who seemed to have 
produced their conjecture generalization on either inductive of analogical gounds, but 
restricted it to a regular pentagon conjecture generalization and required no 
experimental confirmation, seemed to have analogically seen that the ‘triangle-area’ 
proof structure that they had previously used to explain their conjecture 
generalizations for the equilateral triangle and rhombus cases could also apply to the 
pentagon since it also had ‘equal sides’, and hence similarly constructed a logical 
explanation for their regular pentagon conjecture generalization. 
b. One PSTE, namely Inderani, who formulated her conjecture generalization on 
either inductive or analogical grounds, restricted it to a regular pentagon and 
required experimental confirmation. Like Shannon, Trevelyan and Renny, she 
seemed to have analogically seen that that the ‘triangle-area’ proof structure that 
had  previously used to explain for the equilateral triangle her conjecture 
generalization and rhombus her conjecture generalization could also apply to the 
pentagon since it also had ‘equal sides’, and hence  constructed a logical 
explanation for their regular pentagon conjecture generalization along similar 
lines. 
c. One PSTE, namely Victor, who formulated his conjecture generalization on either 
inductive or analogical grounds, restricted it to  a regular pentagon, and did not 
request to experimentally confirm his conjecture generalization. However, the 
Researcher on seeing Victor showing some degree of uncertainty in his regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization, requested him to experimentally explore his 
conjecture generalization, and only after seeing that the distance sum remained 
constant, did Victor express full certainty in his conjecture generalization. After 
the aforementioned experience, Victor like  Shannon, Trevelyan Renny, and 
Inderani,  seemed to have produced his logical explanation for his regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization by mapping the structure of ‘triangle-
algebraic’ explanation that he produced previously onto the structure of the 
explanation for the regular pentagon conjecture generalization. 
d. One PSTE, namely Tony, formulated his conjecture generalization on either 
inductive or analogical grounds, restricted it to a regular pentagon, but wanted to 
know if there existed a pentagon with unequal sides. The latter request by this 
students demonstrates how limited his conception are of polygons beyond 
triangles and quadrilaterals. The researcher subsequently provided an opportunity 





constructed pentagon with unequal sides confessed 100 certainty in his regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization. However,  like  Shannon, Trevelyan Renny, 
Inderani and Victor, Tony seemed to have the ‘regularity misconception’, and  
also analogically saw that the structure of the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanation 
that was offered for  both the equilateral and rhombus conjecture generalization 
could also be used to construct a logical explanation for  his regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization, and hence went ahead to successfully produce a logical  
triangle-area’ algebraic explanation for his regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization via analogical structural mapping. 
 
3. As discussed in Findings 2 (a-d) in the preceding paragraphs, it seems that these six 
PMTs , namely Shannon, Trevelyan Renny, Inderani and Victor, Tony, having seen a 
similarity across the equilateral triangle, rhombus and pentagon problems, were then 
able to reflect on the ‘triangle-area’ explanations raised for the equilateral triangle and 
rhombus cases respectively, and see the logical explanation for the regular pentagon 
case with the aid of analogical mapping. This latter experience by six PMTs appears 
to demonstrates that in searching or cognizing about the logical explanation for a 
given conjecture generalization, it is plausible for one to discover the desired 
explanation via analogical mapping. Furthermore, it demonstrates that a logical 
explanation for a given conjecture generalization can be constructed with the aid of 
analogical reasoning. 
 
Moreover, it means that these six PMTs have ‘seen’ the proof for the regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization through a set of particular proofs (i.e. proofs for equilateral 
triangle conjecture generalization and rhombus conjecture generalization 
respectively), i.e. they have seen the proof through particular proofs, which is an 
inductive generalization of a proof in a sense. 
 
4. All six PMTs as described in Findings 2 (a-d) seemed to have assimilated their 
explanations for the regular pentagon into their previously described explanations for 
the rhombus and equilateral triangle conjecture generalizations, and then modified it 
to accommodate the regular pentagon cases. The aforementioned assimilation –
accommodation of the logical explanations, is equivalent in nature to Ausubel’s 
theory of correlative subsumption, because it seems that in conceptualizing the logical 





already existing idea, namely the ‘triangle area’ algebraic explanation for the rhombus 
conjecture generalization and/or equilateral triangle conjecture generalization, which 
was then modified to produce (or accommodate) the logical explanation for the 
regular pentagon case (see discussion of correlative subsumption in Section 4.5.1). 
 
5. As described for the cases of Inderani, Victor, Tony  in section 9.2.2,  and Shannon 
and Renny  in section 9.2.3, without the exclusion of Trevelyan,  it seems that the 
logical explanations for the  equilateral triangle and/ or rhombus conjecture 
generalization seemed to have served  as generic example(s) for  each PMT and 
pointed to a more general truth. Hence, each of the mentioned PMTs were able to 
construct a proof  for their regular pentagon conjecture generalization, with the 
necessary insight as to why their regular pentagon conjecture generalization holds true 
for them. By reflecting on and considering the mentioned  generic example(s), the 
stated PMTs were able to carry the ‘sameness’ to another specific instance, namely 
the construction of  a logical explanation for the regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization (see discussion on generic proving in Section 5.3.1). Thus, it appears  
that a generic example enables the mentioned PMTs to see the general through the 
particular as described by Mason & Pimm (1984), and hence was able to move from 
one particular proof to another particular proof  by transferring the generic argument 
from one particular instance to another particular instance 
 
6. Since Alan produced his pentagon conjecture generalization for any pentagon 
immediately on logical grounds (as discussed in Section 9.1.5), he was not asked by 
the researcher to justify his pentagon conjecture generalization in this section, and 
hence there is no report on him. However, on reflecting on the argument that he used 
to make his pentagon conjecture generalization, it would appear that he assimilated 
his argument into the previous ‘triangle-algebraic’ explanations for the rhombus and 
equilateral triangle conjecture generalizations, and then modified it to accommodate 
his thought processes. I hasten to suggest that one could also construct conjecture 
generalizations, immediately on logical grounds with the aid of analogical reasoning 
as has been argued by De Villiers (2008). It seems that his earlier logical explanations 
for his equilateral triangle conjecture generalization and rhombus conjecture 
generalization acted as generic examples and thereby provided him with the necessary 






9.3 Pre-service mathematics teachers facing a Heuristic counter example 
(Mystery Pentagon)  
This section focuses on PMTs facing a heuristic counter example (Mystery Pentagon) to 
restrictive assumption(s) embodying their  regular pentagon (convex) conjecture 
generalization, and their subsequent modification of their pentagon (convex) CG. As 
discussed in Section 9.1., 7 out of 8 of the PMTs formulated their pentagon conjecture 
generalization  by restricting it just to the regular pentagon, apparently on the grounds of 
having a misconception that only regular pentagons have equal sides. To try and correct this 
misconception, the researcher engaged all 7 PMTs in the Mystery Pentagon activity as shown 














             Figure 9.3.1 : Mystery Pentagon Activity (Task 3(c): 4 and 5 of Appendix 2) 
 
Furthermore, the aim of the Mystery pentagon activity was to get PMTs to experience a 
heuristic counter-example (critical example)  to their  restrictive assumptions implicit in their 
conjecture generalization, which seemed to have caused them to restrict their CG to regular 
pentagons only, and consequently force them to  modify their conjecture generalization to 
hold not only for regular pentagons, but rather any pentagon that has all its sides equal (i.e. to 
include an irregular pentagon that has all its sides equal, but not all angles equal). The 
aforementioned questions as shown in Figure 9.3.1 were not necessarily posed in the linear 
order as described, but rather was used as a guide to probe a PMTs response that s/he 
produced at a given moment during the task-based interview.  For example, alternate question 
Mystery Pentagon Activity 
4(a) Do you think the result might be true for other kinds of pentagons? 
        If not, why. If so, why? 
        (Alternate Question 4a: Does your generalization hold true only  
          for  regular pentagons) 
    (b) Do you want to test or confirm your response to Q 4 (a)? 
    (c) Open the sketch Mystery Pentagon.gsp. Investigate whether your 
          generalization explained in Question 3(b) holds true or not . 
   (d) What special property must a pentagon have so that it can yield the  
         following result: the sum of the distances from an interior point in the 
         pentagon to its sides remain constant?  
 
5. Consider your response to 4(d) and then write down your final 
generalization with respect to the sum of the distances from an interior 







4a, was posed to PMTs that restricted their conjecture generalization to regular pentagons 
through  thinking that only regular pentagons had equal sides. In retrospect, Q4(a) and/or 
Q4(b), was posed to some PMTs in the previous activities as reported in Section 9.1, to try 
and capture the kind of immediate thoughts that a specific PMT had in his/her mind when 
s/he made a specific assertion or statement, rather than leaving it to be probed at some later 
point in the task-based interview. Hence, there was some fluidity as to the use of the 
questions as shown in Figure 9.3.1. 
 
The experience of this group of seven PMTs  are represented case-wise via the following four 
cases: Shannon, Trevelyan, Tony, Victor. Each of the accompanying case presentations 
contains dialogue excerpts and worksheet excerpts as it unfolded during each of the one-to-




After Shannon had demonstrated that she managed to logically explain (i.e. prove)  (see 
Section 9.2.3) her conjecture generalization, namely that the point P can be positioned 
anywhere in a regular pentagon so that the sum of the distances to the sides remains constant, 
the researcher asked her: “Do you think the result might be true for other kinds of 
pentagons?”. Shannon responded immediately and confidently by saying “Not necessarily”, 
without doing any empirical investigations. When the researcher asked Shannon “why?”,  
Shannon replied as illustrated in the following excerpt, by referring to the structure of the 
proof that she provided for the regular pentagon.  
 
RESEARCHER: Why? 
SHANNON: (pause) … Oh yes, because for other pentagons, the length of the sides 
will not be equal – the sides aren’t equal. And then you can’t simplify 
your equation to get to a result of h1 + h2  + h3+ h4+ h5 
RESEARCHER: Why wouldn’t you be able to simplify the other result? 
SHANNON: Because all the lengths of the sides   , will not necessarily be equal to 
BC would not necessarily be equal to    would not necessarily be 
equal to DE would not be equal to   . Because if it isn’t a regular 






Shannon clearly is set on  thinking that only regular pentagons have equal sides, and hence 
thinking the result will not hold for irregular pentagons. Cleary she does not realize that an 
irregular pentagon could be one that has: 
a) Equal sides but unequal angles, or 
b) Unequal Sides but equal angles, or 
c) Unequal sides and unequal angles. 
 
The researcher then provided her with an irregular pentagon Sketchpad sketch as shown in 
Figure 9.3.2, but Shannon (like others)  at this point in time was not informed that the given 
pentagon was irregular or anything of that nature. The irregular pentagon in this instance had 
equal sides but unequal angles. Shannon, like the other PMTs, came to realize that the 
mystery pentagon had equal sides and unequal angles, through clicking on the buttons on the 
pre-contsructed dynamic sketch, and seeing that the measurements of the respective sides of 
the mystery pentagon were equal whist the measure of its respective angles were not all 
equal. The purpose for this activity was primarily to see if the PMTs could isolate a special 
property that must be present in a given pentagon so that a point could be placed anywhere 
inside the given pentagon such that the sum of the distances from the placed point to all sides 









                Figure 9.3.2: Irregular pentagon with equal sides but unequal angles 
 
Thus, when the Mystery Pentagon Sketch activity was presented to Shannon (and also to the 
other PMTs) she was not informed as to whether it was regular or irregular.  However, 
through questioning, Shannon as illustrated in the following one-to-one task based interview 
excerpts, was able to discover that she was dealing with a pentagon which had equal sides but 







RESEARCHER: Okay, so you’re saying your result holds only for regular pentagons. 
Okay. Now let’s look at… just open the mystery pentagon. Here is the 
pentagon, there. You can click on the button to show the measure of 
sides. What can you tell me about the sides? 
SHANNON: The sides are all equal? (Although the measurements displayed, 
Shannon seemed to have made this judgement on visual grounds)  
RESEARCHER: Okay. And can you click on the button that shows ‘angle  
   measurements’? 
SHANNON:  The angles aren’t equal.  
 
Immediately thereafter, the researcher engaged Shannon with the empirical investigation in a 
Sketchpad context.  After manipulating the situation dynamically through a continuity of 
cases, Shannon observed an invariant property (or result) in the situation, and she stated with 
an expression of surprise: “So, it (the sum of the distances to the sides) stays the same. But 
it’s not necessarily a regular pentagon, but its sides are all equal, but its angles are different”. 
This self discovery exhibited by Shannon, prompted the researcher to ask Shannon the 
following question: “Now looking at this result, what is your conjecture?’ Shannon 
responded as follows: 
 
SHANNON: The conjecture is we’ve shown the area (just to get this right in my 
mind … Area = ½ times the side length times (h1 + h2+…) but your 
angle was never part of the formula in the first place! So, the angle 
never played any role. So as long as the sides are equal – of your 
polygon (in this case she was referring to a pentagon) – the sum of the 
distances from the sides to a point P in the polygon (in this case she 
was referring to a pentagon), would be constant.  
RESEARCHER: Okay.  
SHANNON: So it doesn’t necessarily have to be a regular pentagon, or a regular 
polygon … just all the sides must be equal.  
 
Shannon’s comments as reflected in the above excerpts, appear to indicate that she has finally  
realized that “all sides equal” on its own is a sufficient condition to ensure that the sum of the 
distances from a given point to the sides of the pentagon  to  remain constant. She also 





she has come to realize that  her conjecture generalization could be extended to irregular 
pentagons so long as all its sides are equal. Thus in a way, Shannon’s responses as illustrated 
in the afore-cited excerpt, demonstrates how the appropriate  pedogogical use of a heursistic 
counter example to restrictive assumptions such as ‘all regular penatgons are equilateral’  and 
‘distance is constant only for regular pentagons’ can enable a student to move beyond a given 




As discussed in section 9.1.3, Renny confirmed that his conjecture generalization would hold 
for regular pentagons, and subsequently as indicated in section 9.2.3 was able to provide a 
justification for his regular pentagon conjecture generalization in the form of a logical 
explanation by analogically using the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic strategy that was used 
previously to construct a logical explanation for the equilateral triangle and rhombus 
conjecture generalizations respectively. However, the researcher taking cognizance of 
Renny’s earlier pentagon conjecture generalization, which he restricted to a regular pentagon 
seemingly on the grounds of having a misconception that ‘regular is a necessary condition for 
equal sides’, asked Renny, “…for what other kind of pentagons do you think the results will 
hold true?”. Renny’s apparent silence and then a later hesitant response, “…its …  a regular 
pentagon”, appears to suggest that he thought that his conjecture would hold true only for 
regular pentagons. Hence, the Researcher used this opportune moment to engage Renny in 
the heuristic counter-example activity, known as the Mystery pentagon activity, as illustrated  
in the following task based interview excerpts and commentary by the Researcher. 
 
Firstly, the researcher asked Renny to recap “what is a regular pentagon?”, and Renny 
responded by providing the following correct definition:  “the sides are equal and the angles 
inside the pentagon are equal”. Thereafter the researcher engaged renny with the Mystery 
pentagon as indicated in the following dialogue excerpt: 
  
RESEARCHER: Open the Mystery  pentagon 
RENNY:  Okay, (working) 
RESEARCHER: Okay…, show the measurement of the sides there (the Researcher was 
requesting Renny to click on the button the shows the measure of the 
sides of the pentagon) and show the angle measurements (the 





measure of the angles of the pentagon)…. Now looking at the 
measurements of the sides, are the sides all equal?  
RENNY:  Yeah! 
RESEARCHER: and the angles?  
RENNY:  No… they are different, not same. (seemed surprise) 
 
Renny seemed to be quite surprised at having seen a pentagon with equal sides and angles not 
equal. The researcher then proceeded with the one-to-one task based interview session as 
follows: 
 
RESEARCHER:      This pentagon that we are looking at, at the moment, its sides are equal 
and its angles are not equal? Let’s see now what happens…, can you 
show the distances now?   
RENNY: Yes…..(Renny clicks on the button to show distance sum) 
RESEARCHER: Drag point P. .. What did you observe about the distance sum now?  
RENNY: The distances sum are the same (was rather suprised). 
 
The above excerpts, illustrate that through empirical investigation, Renny had experienced a 
visual heuristic counter- example to the following set of restrictive assumptions underlying 
his earlier CG which he though was true for only regular pentagons: ‘all regular penatgons 
are equilateral’  and ‘distance is constant only for regular pentagons. Renny was rather 
surprised at his discovery. The researcher used this moment of surprise to enable Renny to 
distill a pentagon property that could be sufficient enough to allow the sum of the distances 
from a given point inside a pentagon to its respective sides to remain constant. The researcher 
facilitated this distillation process by subjecting Renny to a comparative task as illustrated in 
the following excerpt:  
 
RESEARCHER: Now…, if you’re looking at that pentagon right (pointing to the 
Mystery Pentagon), okay? And you’re looking at your initial 
conjecture (referring to the CG for regular pentagon), you first said that 
it only holds true for regular pentagons? Now, this pentagon here is 
irregular. So, what is the important property that the pentagon must 
have, so that we get the result?   






As illustrated in the aforementioned excerpt, Renny seems to have discovered that equal sides 
is a sufficient condition for a pentagon to produce a constant distance sum from any point  
 
inside a pentagon to its respective sides. When the researcher asked Renny to write down his 












Figure 9.3.3: Renny’s conjecture after facing a heuristic counter-example 
 
Despite the aforementioned written expression of Renny’s discovery as shown in Figure 
9..3.3, the researcher wanted to make sure about Renny’s position regarding the property, 
“equal angles”, and hence proceeded to ask Renny, “Do we need the angles to be equal?”. 
Renny, immediately responded , “No…, the angles doesn’t need to be equal, but the sides 
must be equal”. The latter response re-affirms that Renny had finally come to realize, through 
experiencing a heuristic counter-example to his assumption(s),  that ‘equal sides’ is all that a 
pentagon needs to have to produce a constant distance sum.  Nevertheless, the researcher 
proceeded to probe Renny further as to a special property that a pentagon should have in 
order to produce a constant distance sum, as illustrated in the following excerpts: 
 
RESEARCHER: Now, you’ve seen from the regular pentagon and the Mystery pentagon 
– what is important for the sum of the distances to be constant? 
RENNY: The five sides of the pentagon must be equal.  








Renny, who verbally acknowledged that  ‘all sides of the pentagon equal’ is a special 
property that a pentagon should have to produce a constant distance sum, also produced the 










Figure 9.3.4: Renny singled out the special pentagon property after facing a heuristic  
                           counter-example 
 
The researcher on seeing that Renny was now quite sure that ‘all sides equal’ was a sufficient 
property for a pentagon to have in order for the sum of the distances from an interior point in 
the pentagon to its sides to remain constant,  purposively  provided an opportunity for Renny 
to refine the statement of his pentagon conjecture generalization that he had initially limited 
to regular pentagons only, as illustrated below: 
 
RESEARCHER: So if you look at the first generalization you made with regard to a 
regular pentagon and your discovery with regard to the Mystery 
pentagon, right, I want you to see if you want to reformulate that 
generalization and conjecture – looking at the regular pentagon, and 
looking at the mystery pentagon.Can you answer that question 
(Researcher pointing to Q5 of Task 3c)? 
 
Renny, subsequently responded as shown in  Figure 9.3.5 in his worksheet. As illustrated in 
Figure 9.3.5, it seems that the experience of the heuristic counter-example has helped Renny 
to refine his earlier convex pentagon conjecture generalization, which was limited to just 
convex regular pentagons, to  now be applicable to pentagons that just possess the following 
sufficient property: ‘all sides equal’. Thereafter, the researcher asked Renny to provide a 



























Figure 9.3.5: Renny’s refined pentagon conjecture generalization  
 
Case: Inderani 
Although it was found, as described in Section 9.1.2., that Inderani confined her earlier 
pentagon conjecture generalization to a regular pentagon probably by thinking that only 
regular pentagons had equal sides, the researcher nevertheless asked her, “… now you spoke 
about the regular pentagon, do you think the result may be true for other kinds of 
pentagons?”. Inderani responded as follows:  
 
INDERANI: I don’t think so because the sides are not equal for irregular pentagons, so  
therefore the bases will differ. If this was irregular and I had to draw five 
triangles in an irregular pentagon, you would get the bases of each triangle 







Inderani’s response, like the other PMTs, re-affirms her misconception that only regular 
pentagons have equal sides. Hence, the Researcher probed Inderani further about her 
conceptions of regular and irregular as illustrated in the following excerpts: 
 
RESEARCHER: You spoke about an irregular pentagon – what do you mean by 
‘irregular pentagon’? 
INDERANI: A regular pentagon means that all the sides are equal; in an irregular 
pentagon, all sides are not equal, and the angles are not equal. So in an 
irregular pentagon, the sides won’t be equal, and therefore if I were to 
draw triangles inside that irregular pentagon, the bases will not be 
same, whereas for a regular pentagon all the bases are the same; in an 
irregular, the bases won’t be the same. 
 
The researcher continued to probe her understanding of regularity by referring her back to 
one of earlier dynamic sketches that she worked with, as illustrated in following excerpt:  
  
RESEARCHER: Now, this is the pentagon (referring to Inderani’s regular pentagon 
sketch) that you just worked with and explained before. I’m just 
checking before we proceed to the next sketch – here we have the 
measure of the sides, and we have the measure of the angles. Are the 
angles equal in this one?  
INDERANI: The angles are all equal and the sides are all equal. So it’s a regular 
pentagon.  
RESEARCHER: So what are the properties of a regular pentagon? 
INDERANI: A regular pentagon is a five-sided polygon; all five sides must be 
equal; and all the angles are equal.  
 
Inderani, seems to have demonstrated correct understanding of the conception of regularity 
with the aid of a dynamic sketch, but it was still uncertain as to whether Inderani was aware 
that having an equi-sided pentagon does not necessarily mean that the pentagon is 
equiangular. Hence, the researcher engaged Inderani in the Mystery pentagon activity, as 
illustrated in the following series of excerpts: 
 
RESEARCHER: Let us investigate. You can open this polygon here – the mystery 





(referring to the dynamic sketch with the measure of the angles and 
sides being shown). 
INDERANI: This is an irregular polygon (referring to the pentagon), because all the 
angles are not equal but the sides are equal (she sounded rather 
surprised). 
 
Inderani appeared rather surprised to see a pentagon with equal sides but unequal angles. In 
the spirit of surprise, the Researcher asked Inderani to drag point P around the interior of the 
Mystery pentagon. After dragging point P around the interior of the Mystery Pentagon, the 
researcher asked Inderani, “…and what is happening to the sum of the distances?”. Inderani 
immediately responded as in the following way: 
 
INDERANI: It remains the same, the sum of the distances remains the same no 
matter where point P is positioned. But the angles are different, yet the 
sides will be the same. The sum of the distances remains constant. 
(sounded surprised).  
 
Although Inderani, did not say she was surprised, her tone and expression on her face 
suggested that she was surprised. It seems that she did clearly not expect to see what she saw 
on the Sketchpad screen after dragging point P, and this could have caused some conflict in 
her mind that manifested itself in an expression of surprise both in her tone and facial 
expression.  Although Inderani accepted the invariant property after what she saw and 
experienced in a Sketchpad context, she seemed to have already accommodated the new idea 
into her schemata, because when the researcher asked her to write down her discovery, she 















However, when the Researcher, asked Inderani to read out what she wrote, she included the  
phrase, “no matter where P is positioned”, and this as indicated in the following excerpt, 
confirmed her level of confidence in her claim that articulates ‘equal sides’ as a sufficient  
condition for the sum of the distances to be constant. 
 
INDERANI: In a pentagon where the sides are equal, but the interior angles are not, 
the sum of the distances from point P in the interior of the pentagon to 
the sides remains constant no matter where P is positioned.  
 
Furthermore, it seems that the heuristic counter-example has helped Inderani to see that 
‘equal sides’ is a sufficient condition for a pentagon to have a constant distance sum. The 
researcher also used this opportunity to get Inderani to reflect on her earlier response (or 
claim) to Q4 (a) of Task 3(c), and comment on its status, as illustrated in the following 
excerpt: 
 
RESEARCHER: When you were asked if this result may be true for other pentagons, 
you said ‘no’. You said it wouldn’t be true for irregular pentagons, and 
now we have that case. So does your discovery here (referring to her 
announced discovery after the experience of the heuristic-counter-
example), confirm or refute that response you made earlier (referring 
to her earlier response to  Q4(a) of Task 3(c) of the worksheet)? 
INDERANI:  It refutes it. 
 
Inderani’s response suggests that her heuristic counter-example experience prompted her to 
reflect on the conditions governing her original claim. In retrospect the heuristic counter-
example did not refute Shannon’s conjecture generalization for a regular pentagon in its 
entirety but rather only refuted the condition part, meaning that the pentagon  does not need 
to have equal angles and equal sides, but  instead could just have all sides equal to produce a 
constant distance sum. The researcher proceeded to use Inderani’s heuristic counter-example 
experience to enable her to modify her initial pentagon conjecture generalization, which was 
restricted to just regular pentagons, to be applicable to any pentagon so long as all its sides 
are equal. The following responses are representative of the dialogue that occurred between 






RESEARCHER: So now looking at these two cases here (referring to the regular 
pentagon case and the irregular pentagon case), what special property 
must a pentagon have so that it can yield the following result? 
INDERANI:  The sides of the pentagon must all be equal.  
RESEARCHER: Considering your response to this question, can you edit or rephrase 
your initial conjecture? 
INDERANI: It says, ‘In a pentagon where all the sides are equal, the sum of the 
distances from a point inside the pentagon to its sides remains 
constant.’ So it’s changed now to a pentagon where all the sides are 
equal.  
 
Immediately, thereafter the researcher requested Inderani to support her refined conjecture 
generalization with a logical explanation (deductive justification) – see Section 9.4 for 
Inderani’s response.   
 
Case: Victor 
After Victor had demonstrated that he could logically  explain (see Section 9.2.2) his 
conjecture generalization that the point P can be positioned anywhere in a regular pentagon  
so that the sum of the distances to the sides is minimum (or remains constant), the researcher 
asked Victor,  “Do you think a pentagon other than a regular pentagon will give you the same 
result”. Victor replied, very confidently and quickly, “No, it won’t hold for other pentagons 
because a won’t be the same in all other pentagons”.  The reason , “a won’t be the same in all 
other pentagons”, provided by Victor  to substantiate  why  his CG for the regular pentagon 
will not hold for other pentagons, shows that he could have reflected on the structure of the 
proof for the regular pentagon case, and  assumed that if the pentagon was not regular, then 
the sides would not be equal, and thus there would be no common “a” to pull out as a 
common factor. This misconception of equal sides implying regularity is the same 
misconception that was manifested by the other 6 PMTs. 
 
However, when researcher asked Victor, “Would you want to test to confirm that response?”, 
he loudly replied “No”. The Researcher became curious and asked him “Why?”, and Victor 
responded as follows: 
 






Victor’s response, “because I know that will be impossible if the sides are not equal”, suggest 
that he firmly believed that “all sides equal” is not only sufficient for his CG to hold true but 
a sufficient condition for a polygon to be regular.  
 
The researcher through further probing could see that Victor was aware that a regular 
pentagon has both equal sides and equal angles.  Hence, the Researcher proceeded to ask 
Victor: “ Do you think a pentagon other than that (referring to a regular pentagon) will give 
you the same result (i.e. constant distance sum)”. Victor replied with a great deal of 
confidence and certainty, “No, it won’t give me the same result”. 
 
The researcher then gave Victor the Mystery Pentagon task, which considered a pentagon 
with equal sides but unequal angles. After Victor  clicked on the buttons to show the measure  
of the pentagon sides and the measure of the pentagon angles at the request of the researcher,  
the researcher asked Victor, “What do you observe in this sketch?”. On seeing the displayed 
measurements, Victor who seemed to very much surprised, responded as follows: “ I see that 
the sides are equal, but the angles are not qual”.  This surprised look could possibly be a 
manifestation of  a deeper inner cognitive conflict, which could have resulted from him 
seeing what he did not expect to see, namely a pentagon with equal sides and unequal  angles. 
Nevertheless, it is quite plausible that the purposefully designed heuristic counter-example 
could have helped Victor to correct his misconception concerning the regularity concept, i.e. 
equal sides does not necessarily imply equal angles. 
 
The researcher then proceeded with the one-to-one task based interview, and asked Victor to  
drag point P within the interior of the pentagon, which had equal sides but unequal angles, 
and to “investigate whether the sum of the distances from an interior point of the pentagon to 
its sides remained constant or not”. After Victor experimented with his dynamic irregular 
pentagon, the  researcher asked him, “what did you find out about the distance sum?”, and 
Victor with a disturbed look on his face, replied  “ the distance sum stays constant”. It seems 
that this observation may not have reconciled well with his expectations and previous ideas, 
and could have stirred up some cognitive conflict within an established schemata, and hence 
disturbed his cognitive equilibrium, i.e. brought about cognitive disequilibrium. It is quite 
plausible that the  latter disequilibrium could have been the  underlying cause for the  
perturbed look on Victor’s face. The researcher then asked Victor to write down his 
discoveries as one or more conjectures using  complete sentences in his worksheet, and  










   
 
 
Figure 9.3.7: Victor’s conjecture after facing a heuristic counter-example 
 
Although Victor seemed to have captured the core ideas of his discovery in his response, the 
researcher was not at ease with the construction of his last sentence since (as shown in the 
excerpt contained in Figure 9.3.7) it does not clearly articulate that the sum of the distances is 
from point P to its sides. Hence, the researcher probed Victor to clarify as to whether he  
meant “the sum of the distances from point P to the sides is constant”,  and Victor responded 
by saying “yes”. 
 
The researcher moved on with the task-based interview as shown in the following dialogue  
excerpt:  
 
RESEARCHER: What special property must a pentagon have so that it can yield the 
following result: the sum of the distances from an interior point in the 
pentagon to its sides remains constant? I.e. by looking at your first 
result (referring to CG for the regular pentagon), and looking at this 
(referring to observations for the mystery pentagon), what special 
property must the pentagon have? 
VICTOR:  I think it must have equal sides. 
 
Victor’s response suggests that heuristic counter-example has helped him to see that equal 
sides is a sufficient condition for a pentagon to have in order to ensure that the sum of the 
distances from an interior point in the pentagon to its sides remains constant. Since, Victor 
was able to distill ‘equal sides’ as a sufficient pentagon property for the given problem, the 
Researcher proceeded with task-based interview session by asking Victor to refer to his 
worksheet containing Task 3(C) and respond to Q.5 (see Appendix 2 for details). Victor 













Figure 9.3.8: Victor’s refined pentagon conjecture generalization 
 
Immediately after Victor rephrased his CG, the researcher asked Victor “So are you saying 
that if any pentagon’s got equal sides only, then the result will hold?”, and Victor confidently 
responded with a resounding “Yes”. On reflecting on Victor’s responses, it seems that the 
heuristic counter-example acted as  a driving force that enabled Victor to modify and refine 
his initial pentagon conjecture generalization, which was limited to regular pentagons 
because of an apparent  misconception regarding regularity, to a pentagon conjecture 
generalization that was premised on a sufficient condition, namely ‘equal sides’. Thereafter 
the researcher asked Victor to describe how he would go about explaining why his refined 
CG was always true either verbally or in writing? However, Victor responded he preferred to 
write ( see Section 9.4. for his written logical explanation). 
 
In conclusion, through the enactment of the aforementioned Mystery pentagon activity, all 7 
PMTS experienced a heuristic counter-example to the restrictive assumption(s) governing 
their  regular pentagon conjecture generalization, such as: ‘only regular pentagons have equal 
sides’ or ‘all equilateral pentagons are regular’; and/or ‘the distance is constant only for 
regular pentagons’. In retrospect, the heuristic counter-example did not invalidate their 
conjecture generalization for a regular pentagon, but was rather a heuristic counter-example 
to their restrictive assumptions underlying the regular pentagon conjecture generalization and  
not a counter-example the regular pentagon conjecture generalization itself. This experience 
of a heuristic counter-example helped the PMTs to correct their misconception that only 
regular pentagons had equal sides, and thereby modify their previous pentagon conjecture 
generalizations, which was restricted to regular pentagons, to also be applicable to pentagons 
that just have all it sides equal only. In other words, through the heuristic counter–example 
experience,  all the PMTs came to realize that ‘all sides equal’ is a sufficient condition  for a 
pentagon to have in order to enable the sum of the distances from any point inside such a 






was not regular ( but was still convex) opened up a conjecture generalization but these were 
not counter-examples to the regular pentagon conjecture generalization.  
 
9.3.1 Findings as per Section 9.3 (PMTs facing a heuristic counter-example)  
1. As discussed in Sections 9.1.2-9.1.4, seven students generalized to a pentagon from 
their previous equilateral and rhombus conjecture generalization on either inductive 
grounds (i.e. noticed the pattern from the previous cases that if ‘the sides are equal’ 
the sum is constant) or analogical grounds (i.e. having seen the pentagon has equal 
sides then they could have plausibly reasoned that their result for the pentagon should 
also be similar to the rhombus (or equilateral) conjecture generalization. Furthermore, 
seven students restricted their conjecture generalizations to the regular pentagon, 
showing a misconception that only regular pentagons have equal sides, and hence 
thinking the result will not hold for any irregular pentagons (see Finding 8 of Section 
9.1.6). However, when the researcher requested each PMT to experiment with a 
pentagon (called a critical example or heuristic counter-example - see Section 9.3), 
which they initially did not know had equal sides but unequal angles, each of them 
were very surprised by the existence of such a pentagon. 
2. It seemed that none of seven PMTs expected to see a pentagon with equal sides and 
unequal angles, and this may have not reconciled well with their previous idea of a 
pentagon with equal sides. This seemed to have caused some internal conflict in the 
mind of each of PMT , i.e. disturbed their cognitive equilibria, which manifested itself 
in the ‘surprise’ kind of expression on the face (or tone)  of each of the seven PMTs. 
This heuristic counter-example in the Mystery Pentagon case, seemed to have helped 
the PMTs to correct their misconception that ‘equal sides’ imply equal angles (i.e. it 
seemed to have corrected their thinking that only regular pentagons had equal sides). 
3. When each of the seven PMts experimented further with the irregular pentagon that 
was still convex (called the Mystery Pentagon), which had equal sides but unequal 
angles, they were surprised to also find that the sum of the distances from an interior 
point of the pentagon to it sides remained constant.  
4. After each of the seven PMTs discovered that a constant distance also prevailed for 
the case of a pentagon with equal sides and unequal angles, they were questioned as to 
which special property a pentagon must have to yield a constant distance sum, and 





5. Each of the seven PMTs’ recognition of ‘equal sides’ as the special property a 
pentagon (not necessarily a regular pentagon) must have to yield a constant distance 
sum, suggests that they each had discovered ‘equal sides’ as a ‘sufficient’ pentagon 
property that would enable the sum of the distances from any interior point of any 
pentagon, and not necessarily a regular pentagon, to its sides to be constant. 
 
6. On seeing the heuristic counter-example (or critical example), each of the seven 
PMTs were able to modify (refine) the initial pentagon conjecture generalization, 
which was restricted to just regular pentagons, to embrace any pentagon which simply 
possessed the ‘special’  property (i.e. sufficient property),  namely ‘equal sides’. For 
example, one of PMTs produced the following refined conjecture generalization: “If 
the sides of the polygon (pentagon) are equal, the sum of the distance from an interior 
point P to the sides of the pentagon, will not change (meaning the distance sum will 
remain constant)”. So essentially the heuristic counter-example in the Mystery 
Pentagon case served as a driving force for each PMT to waive the restrictive 
assumptions and hence refine her/his initial pentagon conjecture generalization. In 
particular, the examples of the Mystery equilateral pentagon that was not regular but 
still convex opened up a generalization but were  not counter-examples to the regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization itself. 
 
7. The heuristic counter-example  appears to have caused some internal conflict in their 
respective minds, but they subsequently accommodated the new ideas, namely: (a) not 
only regular pentagons have equal sides, and (b) ‘equal sides’ is a sufficient condition 
that can be possessed by any pentagon, and not just a regular pentagon, to enable the 
production of a constant distance sum. 
 
8. It seems that engagement of the PMTs in a dynamic learning environment coupled 
with an exploratory task (i.e. Mystery Pentagon task) enabled the PMTs to encounter  
a critical example, which together with necessary intervention by the facilitator  and 
the use of  appropriate questions, like Q4 (d): “what special property must a pentagon 
have so that it can yield the following result: the sum of the distances from an interior 
point in the pentagon to its sides remain constant”, and Q5: “Consider your response 
to 4(d) and then write down your final generalization with respect to the sum of the 
distances from an interior point in pentagon to its sides”, provided an apt opportunity 





their initial regular pentagon conjecture generalization, but rather made them see that 
there was a counter-example to the restrictive assumption  that only regular pentagons 
had equal sides. 
 
9.4. Pre-service mathematics teachers (PMTs) justifying their refined 
pentagon (Mystery pentagon) conjecture generalization 
As discussed and illustrated in section 9.3 of this chapter, all seven PMTs (namely Inderani, 
Victor, Tony, Shannon, Trevelyan, Renny and Logan), who experimented with the Mystery 
Pentagon within a dynamic context, experienced a heuristic counter-example that enabled 
them to single out a sufficient property that a pentagon could possess to allow the distances 
from an interior point of such a pentagon to its sides to remain constant all the time. More 
importantly, the heuristic counter-example experience seemed to have helped the PMTs to 
modify and refine their initial pentagon conjecture generalization, which had been restricted 
to just regular pentagons, to a pentagon conjecture generalization that was premised on a 
sufficient condition, namely ‘equal sides’. By refining their conjecture generalization in the 
latter way, the PMTs were saying that their conjecture generalizations could apply to any 
pentagon with equal sides and not just regular pentagons. 
 
When each of the seven PMTs, namely Inderani, Victor, Tony, Shannon, Trevelyan, Renny 
and Logan,  were asked to provide a justification in the form of logical explanation (proof) 
for their newly refined conjecture generalization, they responded as follows: 
a. Three PMTs, namely Shannon, Tony and Trevelyan, verbally acknowledged in their 
own tones that they would use their earlier proof they had produced to justify their 
regular pentagon conjecture generalization also as a proof to justify their refined 
conjecture generalization. Hence, the Researcher on hearing the respective responses 
from Shannon and Tony, did not ask them to produce a written logical explanations. 
However, he nevertheless asked Trevelyan to verbally describe how he would go 
about constructing his logical explanation (proof).  
b. The four other PMTs, namely Inderani, Victor, Renny, Logan, responded by 
immediately producing a written logical explanation which was more or less the same 







The following two cases, namely Tony and Trevelyan, are representative of those three PMTs 
who verbally expressed their justifications for their refined pentagon conjecture 




The researcher asked Tony to prove his refined CG, after experiencing the Mystery Pentagon 
counter-example. Tony replied, with utmost confidence, “I just proved it”. In actual fact Tony 
was referring to his proof that he wrote for the regular pentagon case. This indeed shows that 
Tony could look at the structure of a given proof for a given problem and use it to generalize 
the proof for a similar problem. 
 
RESEARCHER: So, to prove that for this pentagon with equal sides, how will you 
prove it? Just talk to me; you don’t have to write. 
TONY That the sum of the distances is constant! I just proved it (referring to 
the proof of the regular pentagon case) 
RESEARCHER: You say you just proved it? 
TONY  Yes. 
 
Case Trevelyan:  
When the researcher asked Trevelyan, “Briefly tell me how you’ll prove it (referring to his 
refined pentagon conjecture generalization”, he confidently and categorically responded by 
saying, “I would do the same proof”.  Despite seeing the confident expression on Trevelyan’s 
face, the researcher asked him to briefly describe how he would actually go about to prove 
his conjecture generalization, as illustrated in the following excerpt: 
 
RESEARCHER: Briefly tell me how you’ll prove it. 
TREVELYAN: I would do the same proof  - of constructing the small triangles such 
that each of these triangles has a perpendicular height which is the 
distance from point P to the side of that small triangle, the side of the 
pentagon. And then from there I would do the sum of each of these 
triangles. Once I’d got the sum of all of those triangles, the sum of the 
area of all of those small triangles, then that sum should be equal to the 
area of the whole pentagon. And then from there I can show that the 





RESEARCHER: How would you show it? 
TREVELYAN: I’ll use the fact that each side is constant; and the area of the pentagon 
is also constant; and that the height of the sum should also be constant, 
based on that.  
RESEARCHER: So are you saying to me the proof is similar to the previous  proof. 
TREVELYAN: It is.  
 
Trevelyan’s responses as illustrated in the afore-cited excerpt, appear to demonstrate that he 
had a clear plan of how to use his ‘triangle-area’ algebraic structure  justification for his 
regular pentagon conjecture generalization to construct a logical explanation for his refined 
conjecture generalization in just the same way. One could conjecture that Trevelyan on 
seeing that ‘equal sides’ is a special property that a pentagon should possess for its distance 
sum to be constant and having just proved the regular pentagon conjecture generalization 
through the use of the ‘equal sides’ property, may have hence realized that the proof will be 
the same in both cases (i.e. for regular pentagon and irregular pentagon with equal sides).  
 
The following three cases, namely Inderani,  Victor and Renny,  are representative of how the 
four PMTs (namely Inderani,  Victor,  Renny,  and Logan)  constructed their written logical 
explanations for their refined pentagon conjecture generalization by directly adopting  the 
‘triangle-area’ algebraic structure  explanation  that they had earlier produced to justify their 
regular pentagon  conjecture generalization. 
 
Case: Inderani 
When the Researcher asked Inderani to provide a justification in the form of a logical 
explanation for her refined conjecture generalization, she proceeded with no guidance to 
support her refined conjecture generalization with the following logical explanation in her 
worksheet. The explanation as shown in Figure 9.4.1, was more or less the same kind of 
explanation that she had provided for her regular (convex) pentagon conjecture generalization 

























When the Researcher asked Victor to explain why his refined CG was always true, he  
immediately responded as in his worksheet as shown in Figure 9.4.2,  with no guidance. 
 It seems that Victor, like the others, supported his refined pentagon conjecture generalization 
by advancing  more or less the same kind of ‘triangle-area’ logical explanation that he had 
constructed for his regular pentagon conjecture generalization earlier on (compare Figure 
























Figure 9.4.3 represents the written logical explanation Renny produced in his worksheet 
during the one-to-one task based interview session. It is also evident Renny, like the others, 
had used more or less the same logical explanation structure as for his regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization to construct a logical explanation for his refined pentagon 




























Despite the different ways (i.e. verbal and written) of expressing that their logical 
explanations is the same (or more or less the same), it seems that all seven PMTs have looked 
 





back at their logical explanations that they developed for their earlier regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization (source problem). 
 
Upon seeing that the property ‘equal sides’ was the only pentagon property that was used in 
construction of their logical explanation  for the regular pentagon conjecture generalization 
(source problem)  and that the very same property also defined their refined pentagon 
conjecture generalization (target problem), their cognitive structures seemed to have 
automatically subsumed  the development of the logical explanation for the refined 
conjecture generalization under a relevant and more inclusive conceptual scheme, namely 
their  earlier logical explanation for the regular pentagon conjecture generalization, as 
propounded by Ausubel’s Theory of Meaningful learning (see detailed discussion in Section 
4.5). In particular, Ausubel (1962, p. 217) asserts that when one encounters new information 
or a problem, the natural first processes is to “subsume the new information (or problem) 
under a relevant and more inclusive conceptual scheme”, and “the very fact that a new 
information (or a given problem) is subsumable (i.e. relatable to stable element in the 
cognitive structure), accounts for its meaningfulness and makes possible perception of 
insightful relationships”.   
 
In retrospect, on comparing the kinds of logical explanations produced by the PMTs for their 
earlier regular pentagon conjecture generalizations and their refined pentagon conjecture 
generalizations, it is plausible to conjecture that this involved a particular kind of 
subsumptive (subsumption) process called derivative subsumption. According to Ausubel 
(1978, p. 68), in derivative subsumption “new information (or a new problem) is linked to a 
superordinate idea A and represents another case or extension of A. The critical attributes of 
the concept A are not changed, but new examples are recognized as relevant”. This essentially 
means that the new cases or examples that learners comprehend or understand, are part and 
parcel or just mere examples of an established system of concepts or propositions that that 
learners have already learned or are familiar with, or “it is just supportive or illustrative of a 
previously learned concept or proposition” (Ausubel et al., 1978, p. 58).  Furthermore, 
Ausubel et al.(1978, p. 58) asserts that “in either case the new material to be learned is 
directly and self-evidently derivable from or implicit in an already established and more 
inclusive concept or proposition in a cognitive structure.” 
 
Hence, through having linked their new target problem (i.e. the construction of a logical 





logical explanation for their regular pentagon conjecture generalization) via the ‘equal sides’ 
property, it seems that all seven PMTs were then able to  structurally map the relational 
structure of the ‘triangle-algebraic’ logical explanation for their source problem onto their 
target problem by using analogical reasoning, and thereby produced a logical explanation for 
their refined conjecture generalization. For example, if we look at Victor’s ‘triangle- area’ 
algebraic explanation of his regular pentagon conjecture generalization in Figure 9.2.2.2 and 
his ‘triangle- area’ algebraic explanation for his refined pentagon conjecture generalization in 
Figure 9.4.2, one sees a  structural consistency, i.e. there is  a one to one kind of 
correspondence between the elements that exist between the two representational structures 
(see Gentner Strcture Mapping Theory discussed  in Section 4.4.1; also see Section 4.4.2)..  
 
9.4.1 Findings as per Section 9.4 (PMTs justifying refined pentagon CG) 
 
1. Two PMTs, namely Shannon and Tony verbally expressed that their logical 
explanation for their refined logical explanation would be the same as their logical 
explanation for their earlier conjecture generalization, and hence did not actually 
produce a written explanation. On account of the confidence displayed in their 
assertion, the Researcher did not request a written explanation . 
 
2. One of the  PMTs, namely Trevelyan, verbally expressed that his logical explanation 
for his refined logical explanation would be the same as his logical explanation for his 
earlier regular pentagon conjecture generalization. Although the Trevelyan also 
sounded very confident, the Researcher asked him to produce a written explanation. 
The written explanation Trevelyan produced for his refined conjecture generalization 
was more or less the same as his logical explanation for his regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization.  
 
3. Four PMTs, namely Inderani, Victor, Logan and Renny, when they were asked to 
justify their refined pentagon conjecture generalization, immediately without any 
hesitation produced a written logical explanation, which was more or less the same as 






4. It seems that the seven PMTs, who are referred to across Findings 1-3, succeeded to 
construct a logical explanation for their refined pentagon CG on the grounds of the 
following experiences and links:  
 They already worked with a pentagon though regular and constructed a logical 
explanation using ‘equal sides’ to explain why distance sum is constant; and 
 Plausibly saw a similarity (or link)  between their regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization (source problem)  and their refined pentagon conjecture 
generalization (target problem) through the ‘equal sides’ property; and  
 Hence automatically subsumed the target problem (i.e. the construction of  a 
logical explanation for their refined pentagon conjecture generalization) under 
an existing but relevant explanatory structure, namely the ‘triangle-area’ 
algebraic explanatory structure for their regular pentagon generalization 
(source problem). 
Furthermore, it seems that in this instance that a particular kind of subsumption 
occurred, namely derivative subsumption.  In the case of derivative subsumption the 
solution of a new problem can be derived from an already established problem 
solution so long as a link can be made between the solution of the source problem and 
target problem (see discussion of derivative subsumption in Section 4.5.1). It seems 
that the PMTs were able to see seen a link or relationship between the source an target 
problem through the ‘equal sides property, and hence succeeded in constructing an 
explanation for their refined pentagon conjecture generalization (target problem) by 
plausibly transferring the explanatory steps from the source problem onto the 
explanatory steps of the target via analogical structural mapping. 
 
The next Chapter, focusses on the data analysis, results and discussion with regard to the 













Chapter 10: Equi-Sided Polygon (Convex) Problem: 
                      Data Analysis, Results and Discussion  
10.0 Introduction  
In Chapters 7, 8 and 9 the following generalizations were constructed and justified within the 
context of convex polygons:  
(a) In an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a point inside the triangle 
to its sides is constant;   
(b) In a rhombus the sum of the distances from a point inside the rhombus to its sides 
is also constant; 
(c) In any equi-sided pentagon, the sum of the distances from a point inside the 
pentagon to its sides is also constant. 
 
In this Chapter, the question is whether pre-service mathematics teachers (PMTs) could 
generalize or further generalize these results or generalizations further to any equi-sided (i.e. 
equilateral) convex polygon, and if so, how they accomplished and justified this further 
generalization. 
 
The data analysis and findings related to making and justifying conjecture generalization(s) 
with particular reference to the equi-sided convex polygon task-based activity as described in 
Task 4 of Appendix 2 are presented case-wise in this Chapter 10. For each case, the 
researcher presents the data analysis as to how a specific PMT constructed and/or justified 
his/her conjecture generalization in a continuous form. Hence in this regard the structure of 
presentation of the data analysis is slightly different from the structure of the presentation of 
the data analysis presented in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 wherein the production of generalizations 
was presented first followed later  by the justifications of generalizations. 
    
10.1  Pre-service mathematics teachers producing and justifying a 
conjecture generalization to any equi-sided convex polygon  
The findings of the pentagon-task base activity, as discussed in Chapter 9, showed that one 
PMT, Alan, was able to construct a generalization for any equi-sided convex pentagon 





PMTs managed to experience a heuristic counter-example to restrictive assumption(s), which 
then forced them to refine their regular pentagon conjecture generalization. The latter seven 
PMTs, as discussed in Chapter 9, seemed to have analogically seen that the structure of their 
‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanations that they advanced (or produced) for their earlier 
regular pentagon conjecture generalizations, could similarly be used to the construct a logical 
explanation for their equi-sided pentagon conjecture generalizations, and hence justified their 
refined pentagon conjecture generalization accordingly. In fact three PMTs verbally 
expressed that they would justify their refined pentagon conjecture generalization (i.e. equi-
sided pentagon) by using the same kind of ‘triangle-area’ algebraic proof, which they had 
advanced for the regular pentagon conjecture generalization, and four PMTs actually wrote 
down the more or less the same kind of ‘triangle- area’ algebraic proof that they had 
advanced for the regular pentagon conjecture generalization. 
 
Soon after each PMT demonstrated that they could produce a logical explanation for their 
refined pentagon conjecture generalization as discussed in Section 9.4, each of them was 













          
Figure 10.1.1: Task 4(a): Generalizing to any equi-sided convex polygon 
 
As per data analysis, which is presented case-wise, all 8 PMTs through reflecting on their 
earlier generalizations for specific convex polygons with equal sides (i.e. equilateral triangle, 
rhombus, and equilateral pentagon) were able to extend the ‘constant distance sum’ 
generalization to any equi-sided convex polygon on logical grounds, without expressing any 
Task 4(a): Generalizing to any equi-sided polygon 
1. Below are a set of generalizations that you may have developed 
     earlier: 
 G1: In any equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a  
         point inside the triangle to its sides is constant, and 
 
G2:  In any rhombus the sum of the distances from a point  
        inside the  rhombus to its sides is also constant. 
 
G3: In any equi-sided pentagon, the sum of the distances from 
        a point  inside the pentagon to its sides is also constant. 
 
Consider the above set of generalizations. Can you generalize to 






explicit need for visual / experimental confirmation in a Sketchpad context (or by using  
Sketchpad). In this respect, six PMTs on seeing that they were dealing with any  polygon 
characterised by the sufficient property, namely ‘equal sides’, immediately extended the same 
chain of ideas that prevailed for the equilateral, rhombus and equilateral pentagon 
generalizations across to the case of any equi-sided convex polygon.  
 
One  PMT (namely Shannon),  first decided to construct a logical argument that was 
premised on the property, ‘equal sides’, to see if she could explain why the sum of the 
distances from point inside a equi-sided convex polygon to it sides is always constant. In 
doing so, Shannon similarly used the ‘triangle area’ algebraic strategy that she had previously 
used in the construction of her explanations for the equilateral triangle, rhombus and 
pentagon generalizations, and hence reached the desired conclusion, namely the sum of the 
distances is constant. Furthermore, one PMT, namely Alan, tried to use an inverse kind of 
argument to show that the  ‘constant distance sum’ does not hold for polygons with unequal 
sides but in the process demonstrated that he realized that any polygon needs to have ‘equal 
sides’ for the distance sum to be constant.   
 
Despite the variations in the PMTs logical approach, which governed the construction of their  
generalization for any equi-sided convex polygon, each  PMT’s ‘constant distance sum’ 
generalization for any equi-sided polygon can be regarded as a deductive generalization (see 
Section 1.6.2  for discussion on deductive generalizations, and the case-wise data analysis in 
this Chapter 10). When each PMT was asked to support their deductive generalization with a 
logical explanation (i.e. justification) as per question 4 of Task (4b) of Appendix 2,  all 8 
PMTs produced a deductive justification with no guidance. In doing so, each PMT used the 
similar kind of ‘triangle-area’ algebraic proof structure that was used to construct 
explanations for each of their previous particular generalizations, namely pentagon, rhombus 
and equilateral triangle conjecture generalizations. Hence, it seems that through reflecting on 
their earlier proofs for their earlier ‘constant distant sum’ generalizations for specific 
polygons that had equal sides, all PMTs saw a ‘common proof structure’ prevailing amongst 
the set of particular proofs, and without going through any stressful cognitive change (see 
Tall, 1991, p. 12), similarly extended the same ‘common proof structure’ to  construct  a 
‘general proof’ for their  equi-sided convex polygon generalization.  
 
The prominence of the extension of  the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic structure explanation from 





generalization, re-affirm the researcher’s assertion that each of the eight PMTs have managed 
to generalize to any equi-sided convex polygon on logical grounds. For example, on seeing 
that the equi-sided convex polygon has the critical property, ‘equal sides’ (a sufficient 
condition for a constant distance sum), each PMT immediately concluded logically that the 
distance sum is constant.  
 
The case-wise presentation that follows entails an analysis of how each PMT accomplished 
and justified their further generalization to any equi-sided polygon. Each of the 
accompanying case presentations contains dialogue excerpts and worksheet excerpts as it 
unfolded during each one-to-one task-based interview session, during which each PMT was 
engaged with the equi-sided convex polygon problem activity. 
 
Case: Shannon 
As per Task 4(a) described in Figure 10.1.1, when the researcher asked Shannon during the 
one-to-one task-based interview, “Can you generalize the result to any other polygon?”, she 
immediately and spontaneously proceeded as shown in Figure 10.1.2, to first ascertain via 
logical argument as to whether she could also extend her earlier refined pentagon conjecture 
generalization (or previous equilateral triangle and rhombus generalization) in general to any 
equi-sided convex polygon. Only after seeing through her logical argument as shown in 
Figure 10.1.2, that it is possible to extend her previous refined pentagon generalization to any 
equi-sided convex polygon, did she confidently reply with a “Yes” to the researcher’s initial 
question: “Can you generalize the result to any other polygon?” Although, Shannon 
immediately engaged with developing an algebraic proof based on area considerations on her 
own in her worksheet as illustrated in Figure 10.2, she did so without engaging with any 
dynamic sketch of an equi-sided convex polygon using Sketchpad. 
 
When further probed by the researcher as illustrated in the following task-based interview 
excerpt, Shannon  re-affirmed and verbally explained that the distance sum will be constant 
for all polygons with equal sides by making reference to her written logical explanation as 
shown in Figure.10.1.2.  The kind of logical explanation that Shannon advanced for her equi-
sided convex polygon conjecture generalization, was similar in structure to the ‘triangle-area’ 
algebraic explanation she gave to support her refined pentagon conjecture generalization. 
 
SHANNON: Yes. You can generalize the area of a polygon – like I said here -  is 





the distances from the sides, depending on how many sides there are, 
will always be 2A over  a, and will always be a constant.  
RESEARCHER: So you’re saying it will hold for other polygons as well? 
SHANNON:  All polygons where the sides are equal. 
 
 
Figure 10.1.2: Shannon’s algebraic proof for her equi-sided polygon CG 
 
Although Shannon substantiated her conjecture generalization for all equi-sided polygons 
with both written and verbal logical explanations as demonstrated so far, the Researcher 
nevertheless requested her to write down her logical explanation as a coherent argument. On 
this note, Shannon produced a coherent written logical explanation as shown in Figure 10.1.3, 
which in fact was an improvement on her earlier written logical explanation as shown in 
Figure 10.1.2, in that it explained in much more detail as to why the distance sum is constant. 
 
Although, Shannon proceeded easily with the development of a coherent algebraic argument 
her equi-sided convex polygon conjecture generalization through triangle-area  
considerations, her statement “and area of polygon, side length and 2 is constants” provided 
the necessary warrants of why she concluded that  (h1 + h2  + h3+ …+ hn) is a constant. More 
importantly, Shannon’s last set of statements, “and the area of polygon, side length and 2 is 
constant, then that  (h1 + h2  + h3+ …+ hn) is a constant”, illustrated her understanding of the 







Figure 10.1.3:  Shannon’s improved algebraic proof for her equi-sided polygon CG 
 
However, when the researcher attempted to probe Shannon as to whether she was satisfied 
with her logically constructed explanation as shown in Figure 10.1.3, she unwittingly posed 
the question with reference to any polygon instead of any equi-sided polygon. Nevertheless, 
as illustrated in the following excerpt, Shannon was quite forthright and explicit in her 
response, and actually stated “Not for any polygon – the polygon where all sides are equal”.  
 
RESEARCHER: So are you satisfied with the explanation of why the result is true for 
any polygon? 
SHANNON: Not for any polygon – the polygon where all the sides are equal.  
RESEARCHER: Yes. 
SHANNON:  So, you can say equal-sided polygon. 
 
Shannon’s responses as illustrated in the afore-cited excerpt, demonstrates that she has 
successfully accommodated the idea: ‘all sides equal is a sufficient condition for any polygon 









Although Trevelyan did not experiment with a polygon beyond a pentagon, he confidently 
stated the following conjecture when the question in Task 4(a) was asked.  
 
TREVELYAN: My conjecture is that given any polygon, if the sides of the polygon are 
the same, then the sum of the distances from a point to each side of the 
polygon, it should be constant. 
 
Since Trevelyan had already discovered and proved for previous particular equi-sided 
polygons (like the equilateral triangle, rhombus and equilateral pentagon) the sum of the 
distances is constant, he seemed to have now accommodated the idea of ‘equal sides’ as a 
sufficient property to yield a constant distance sum’ within his cognitive structure.  Hence, on 
seeing a polygon that had all its sides equal, he logically deduced that the sum of the 
distances from an interior point of ‘any polygon with equal sides’ would also be constant. In 
particular this generalization from his earlier generalizations and its associated proofs is a 
good example of the ‘discovery’ function of proof described in Section 5.4.2, whereby the 
deductive identification of the characterising property, like ‘equal sides’ in this instance, was 
considered to be sufficient to enable further generalization of the ‘constant distant sum’ 
generalization to any polygon. 
 
Although Trevelyan seemed to have constructed a generalization for any equi-sided convex 
polygon on logical grounds, the Researcher nevertheless asked him : “How will you go about 
proving that one (referring to his equi-sided polygon generalization)?”, and also referred him 
to a ready made dynamic Sketch of an equi-sided convex polygon on Sketchpad, thinking that 
he would use it to explore whether his conjecture generalization was true before proceeding 
to the construction of proof (or a logical explanation). However, Trevelyan did not drag point 
P nor show any intention to drag point P to empirically verify his conjecture generalization, 
but immediately replied, “I can do the same proof”, and went on further to produce a written 
explanation is his worksheet as shown in Figure 10.1.4. 
 
Trevelyan’s written logical explanation as shown in Figure 10.1.4, demonstrated that he had 
used the layout of a two-column proof, ranging from what is given, to what is required to 
prove, to the requisite construction, and the development of a logical argument under the 
subsection called proof. As can be seen in the write up of his two column proof, Trevelyan 





has equal sides, then the sum of the distances from any interior point of the polygon to its 
sides is constant”. To prove his conditional statement is true, he assumed that the first part of 
the conditional statement is true, by writing down, “Suppose that we have a polygon with n 
sides that are equal”. Then he immediately wrote down under RTP (which means ‘required to 
prove’), “We need to show that the sum of the distance from any interior point to the polygon 
to each side of it is constant”, which is equivalent to the second part of the conditional 
statement. Clearly Trevelyan  is aware that he must demonstrate that the antecedent implies 
the consequent. Furthermore, he realized that certain constructions needed to be done on his 






















Figure 10.1 4: Trevelyan’s written logical explanation for his equi-sided polygon  CG 
 
The development of Trevelyan’s logical argument under the section he calls “Proof”, 
demonstrates his familiarity in the use of deductive arguments in the development of an entire 






Reflecting on Trevelyan’s written logical explanation for his ‘equi-sided convex polygon’ 
generalization, it is evident that there is a connection between his earlier set of logical 
explanations for each of his particular generalizations (namely, equilateral triangle, rhombus 
and equilateral pentagon) and his logical explanation for the general case (i.e. ‘equi-sided 
polygon’ generalization). In this context, his earlier set of logical explanations for specific 
equi-sided convex polygons (like equilateral triangle, rhombus and equilateral pentagon) can 
be seen to be the underlying ‘driver’ that facilitated his transition from particular to general 
logical explanations.  In other words, by reflecting (i.e. folding back) on the logical 
explanations of the earlier equilateral triangle, rhombus and equilateral pentagon 
generalizations, Trevelyan like others, saw a common proof structure (i.e. ‘triangle-area’ 
algebraic proof structure)  permeating all the  particular proofs (logical explanations), and 
used that common proof structure to develop and construct a general proof that logically 
explained his ‘equi-sided convex polygon’ generalization.  
 
Case: Inderani 
When, the Researcher referred Inderani to Task 4a as shown in Figure 10.1, and asked 
Inderani, “Can you generalize to polygons with a similar property?”, she immediately wrote 
the following generalization as shown in Figure 10.1.5 in her worksheet, without expressing 







Figure 10.1.5: Inderani’s equi-sided convex polygon conjecture generalization 
 
It appears that Inderani made her generalization to any equi-sided convex polygon on logical 
grounds as well. For example, from her previous generalization cases, Inderani seemed to  
have discerned that ‘equal sides’ is a sufficient property for a polygon to have in order to 
yield a constant distance sum, and hence on seeing that she was asked to generalize to 
polygons with ‘equal sides’, she logically concluded that the sum of the distances is also 
constant in such polygons. When the researcher asked Inderani to do Task 4(b)- Q.1, which 
probed her level of certainty in her equi-sided polygon conjecture generalization, she 











Figure 10.1.6: Inderani’s level of certainty in her equi-sided polygon CG 
 
Furthermore, when the researcher posed the following question to Inderani, “If you suspect 
your conjecture is not always true, try to supply a counter-example”, she replied as shown in 








On seeing that Inderani thought there was no counter-example to her deduced equi-sided 
convex polygon generalization, the researcher took the opportunity to ask Inderani to justify 
her generalization  via a written logical explanation. Immediately thereafter, Inderani 
produced a  written explanation in her worksheet as shown in  Figure 10.1.8. 
 
Her development of a proof, seems to suggest that she has a firm grip on how to develop 
logical relationships and arguments. For example, she has ascertained that the area of the big 
equilateral polygon is equal to the area of the smaller constructed triangles, thus she was able 
to confidently make the following logical conclusion, “A = ½ a (h1 + h2 +… + hn)”. 
Furthermore, Inderani argued that the sum of the heights, h1 + h2 +… + hn , is constant on the 
basis of the following warrants: A is constant; and the bases are constant, which means that 
“a” is constant. Although she did not mentioned that ½ is also a constant, this is implicit in 
her statement. Moreover, she exhibited a strong use of a propositional relationship in her very 
last statement, “if the left hand side is constant, the right hand side is constant”, in order to 
























 Figure 10.1.8: Inderani’s written explanation for her equi-sided convex polygon CG 
 
It seems that since Inderani was able to carry out the process of justifying each of her specific 
generalizations (namely equilateral triangle, rhombus and equi-lateral pentagon problems) by 
using the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanatory structure, she was able to generalize 
(expansively) to the proof for her equi-sided convex polygon generalization without much 
difficulty (see Tall, 1991, p.12). In fact, Inderani was able to construct her ‘triangle–area’ 
algebraic proof for her equi-sided convex polygon generalization plausibly through 
structural-analogical mapping, which  is also referred to as cognitive blending (see Section 
4.4.3). This kind of expansive approach  can be regarded as generic in nature, since the PMT 
constructed a general proof (i.e. a proof for the general case) by referring to particular proofs 
(i.e. proofs for the equilateral triangle, rhombus and pentagon generalizations). According to 
Tall (1991, p.12), “such a generic approach (i.e. seeing the general proof through particular 
proofs) is seen both an easy method of generalization because it applies a well known process 
in a broader context and also a first step towards formal abstraction as it does not involve 
major cognitive reconstruction”.  
 
Case: Tony 
When the researcher probed Tony, as per Task 4(a) in Figure 10.1.1, as to whether he could 
generalize from the set of already established generalizations to polygons with a similar 
property, Tony replied: “It will hold that the sum of the distances from the interior point to 






generalization to polygons in the form of a conditional statement as follows: “if it is an equi-
sided polygon then the sum of the distances (meaning the sum of the distances from the 
interior point to the sides of the polygon) will remain constant”. 
 
It seems that Tony, like Trevelyan, Inderani and others, extended his generalization to equi-
sided convex  polygons on logical grounds.  Although the Researcher provided Tony with a 
dynamic sketch of an equi-sided convex  hexagon, it was noted that he never showed any 
interest to investigate empirically whether his equi-sided convex polygon generalization is 
really true. It seems that Tony, like the other PMTs, was able to reflect on his ‘constant 
distant sum’ generalizations made for specific equi-sided convex polygons, such as the 
equilateral triangle, rhombus and equi-lateral pentagon, and thereby abstracted that the 
‘constant distant sum’ will also prevail for any polygon so long as it is equi-sided. On the 
basis of his abstraction, Tony like the other PMTs,  extended his  ‘constant distant sum 
generalization’ to the class of polygons constituting any equi-sided polygon, without 
expressing any need for experimental confirmation by using Sketchpad . This kind of logical 
deduction on the part of Tony and also other PMTs, characterizes the progression of the 
PMTs from the making of generalizations through experimentation, inductive reasoning or 
analogical reasoning to the making of generalization based on logical argument. Thus Tony, 
like the other PMTs,  progressed to make his generalization to any equi-sided  polygon on 
logical grounds, and drew away from the use of non-deductive processes to make such a 
generalization. Freudenthal (1973, p. 451) refers to this change in one’s thought processes, as 
the “cutting of the ontological bonds”. This cutting of the bond with experimental reality, 
demonstrates that the PMTs have cognitively grown in the construction of generalizations 
through the processes of generalizing and abstracting (see Tall, 2002; Tall et al., 2012).  
 
When the researcher asked Tony, “Can you give me a proof of that (referring to his equi-
sided polygon generalization)?”, Tony spontaneously and verbally indicated that the proof he 
would make, would be similar to the logical explanation he had constructed earlier for his 
pentagon conjecture generalization, as illustrated in the following one-to-one task based 
interview excerpt: 
 
RESEARCHER: Can you give me a proof of that (referring to his equi-sided polygon 
generalization)? 
TONY The only proof that I can make is that  (referring to the pentagon 





try to find the total sum of the areas of the smaller triangles inside the 
polygon; take out that a the way that we did earlier. Work it out … so 
it should hold for all polygons.  
RESEARCHER: What have you explained here? 
TONY Instead of a pentagon, I would say a polygon because we are now 
talking about a figure that has more sides than five.  
RESEARCHER: How many sides? 
TONY  An infinite number of sides.  
RESEARCHER: n sides? 
TONY  Yes.  
 
The Researcher on seeing that Tony was seeing the structure of his general proof through the 
structure of his earlier proof for his refined pentagon conjecture generalization probed him a 
little further about his verbal explanation regarding the figure under consideration, as follows: 
 
RESEARCHER: What is the thing (referring to Tony’s considered figure i.e. polygon) 
you explained here? 
TONY Instead of a pentagon, I would say a polygon because we are now 
talking about a figure that has more sides than five.  
RESEARCHER: How many sides? 
TONY  An infinite number of sides.  
RESEARCHER: n sides? 
TONY  Yes.  
 
After hearing Tony’s description of the figure under consideration, the Researcher asked him 
to write down his logical explanation for his conditional conjecture generalization. Tony 
subsequently produced in his worksheet the written explanation as shown in Figure 10.1. 9. 
 
It seems that Tony has also been able to discern the structure of general proof for any-equi-
sided convex polygon from the structure of the proof for his earlier refined convex pentagon 
conjecture generalization. This is quite evident in his description of the construction of the 
small triangles, “… we can draw small triangles inside the polygon…”, and from the slip in 
referring to a pentagon instead of a polygon in line 4 of his explanation. The latter mentioned 
slip (i.e. the use of the term ‘pentagon’ instead of ‘polygon’) demonstrates that Tony may 





and simultaneously modifying each step of his refined convex pentagon conjecture 
generalization (source) to accommodate a logical explanation for his equi- sided convex 
polygon generalization (target). Hence in the process, he appears to have just ‘slipped up’ by 


















The aforementioned kind of parallel transfer of information from the source to the target is in 
consonance with Genter’s Structure Mapping Theory (SMT), as described in Section 4.4.2, 
which asserts that: ‘in interpreting an analogy people seek to put the objects in the base in one 
–to-one correspondence with the objects in the target so as to obtain the maximal structural 
match”, and more importantly, “  objects are placed in correspondence by virtue of their like 
roles in the common relational structure” (see Gentner, 1989,  p. 201). This is equivalent to 
cognitive blending (see Section 4.4.3). 
 
In his deductive justification, Tony considered the antecedent or the given aspect 
appropriately at the start of his explanation by writing, “If we have a polygon with all its 
sides equal, we….”.  Moreover, he confidently ascertained that the area of the big equilateral 
triangle is equal to the area of the smaller constructed triangles, i.e.“  AT = ½ a (h1 + h2 +… 
+ hn)”. Then Tony argued that the sum of the heights, h1 + h2 +… + hn ,  is constant on the 
basis of the following warrants: A is constant, a is constant and ½ is constant. 
 







The following excerpt is a representation of the task-based interview  between the Victor and 
the researcher in relation to Task 4a as shown in Figure 10.1.1. 
 
RESEARCHER: Consider the above set of generalizations. Can you now generalize to 
polygons with a similar property? For example, can you generalize the 
result for a hexagon? Will the result hold true for a hexagon? 
VICTOR: Yes. 
RESEARCHER: And a heptagon?  
VICTOR: It can go through for all   
RESEARCHER: - an octagon? 
VICTOR: Yes, still. For all polygons with similar properties the results can apply. 
RESEARCHER: So which is the property you are talking about? 
VICTOR: If they all have constant sides – if all sides are equal.  
 
Victor’s response, “If they all have constant sides – if all sides are equal”, seems to suggest 
that through his earlier equilateral triangle, rhombus and equilateral pentagon generalizations 
and associated justifications thereof, he has now generalized the specific property, ‘all sides 
equal’, as a sufficient condition for the sum of the distances to remain constant in a given 
specific polygon, and thereby assimilated the established idea into his cognitive structure. 
The kind of deductive generalization exhibited by Victor, demonstrated that he had seen the 
general result through particular results.  
 
The following one-to-one task based interview shows that Victor has seen that the kind of 
‘triangle–area’  algebraic strategy which he used to provide a deductive justification for his 
earlier equilateral triangle, rhombus and pentagon generalizations could also be used to 
justify his generalization to the hexagon, heptagon, octagon and finally any equi-sided 
polygon 
 
RESEARCHER: How will you prove it – that it will hold true for a hexagon or an 
octagon? (Researcher is referring to equi-sided hexagons and 
octagons) 
VICTOR: Based on my explanation there, my previous explanation (referring to 





– if the sides are all equal – that means I can take out a as a common 
factor. But this I can prove. 
RESEARCHER: So if it’s six-sided…? 
VICTOR: If it’s six-sided that means I can have h1 , h2  , h3 , h4 ,h5 and h6  = to 2A 
over a.  That can make the sum of the distances from point P constant. 
RESEARCHER: and if it’s eight-sided, how will you do it? 
VICTOR: If it’s eight-sided that means I can have h1 + h2  + h3+ h4 + h 5+  h6 + h7 
+ h8 =  2A over a. That can make sum of the distances from point P be 
constant. 
RESEARCHER: And for an n-sided polygon, then? 
VICTOR: Then I’m going to have h1 , h2  , h3 up until I have hn, which is equal to 
2A over a. Which means all the polygons with similar properties which 
is those with constant sides.  
RESEARCHER: So are you certain about that? 
VICTOR: Yes. 
 
Figure 10.1.10 represents the logical explanation (or proof) , which Victor eventually wrote 






















The following one-to-one task based interview excerpt provides an in-depth  description as to  
how Victor engaged with the development of the writing of his proof: 
 
RESEARCHER: Can you read out what you’ve written there, please?   
VICTOR: Okay. A is a fixed area of a polygon – which I labelled A. The sides are 
all equal. I can label them with a. If I can construct the triangles, I can 
have triangle A1P A2 into triangle A2P A3 into triangle A3P A4 up until 
by single sequence I can have triangle An-1 PAn. Then the sum of the 
areas of the triangles – I can have the area of a triangle A1P A2 + 
triangle A2P A3 + triangle A3P A4 + triangle A4P A5 - I can add them up 
until I get  to triangle of An-1 PAn.  
 
When I add them together, since I said I labelled the sides by a, I’m 
going to have ½ ah1 +  ½ ah2 + ½ ah3 + ½ ah4 –up until I add them up 
until I get to ½ a hn. Then I take out the highest common factor which 
is ½ a. I’m going to have: A = ½ a into h1 + h2  + h3 + the number of h’s 
up until I get hn. Then I simplify this, then I get 2A over a, which is 
equal to h1 + h2  + h3 + up until I get hn. Since a is fixed, it means it is 
always constant, and a is also a constant. Therefore h1 + h2  + h3 + up 
until I get hn is also constant. This means the sum of the distances from 
point P to the sides of any equi-sided polygon is constant.  
 
Although Victor, did not label the sub-parts of his explanation proof, he has identified what is 
given, by writing down, “A is a fixed area of  n
th 
 polygon = A,  the sides of the polygon are 
all equal then I can label them with a”. Furthermore, he has made the effort to describe his 
construction of the small triangles, “If I can construct the triangle I can have ∆A1P A2 + ∆ A2P 
A3 + ∆ A3P A4 + … + ∆ An-1 PAn
”.  
Victor, successfully added the areas of all the small 
triangles, and logically equated it to the area of the polygon itself, which after simplifying, 
resulted in the following equation:“2A/a = h1 + h2  + h3 +…+ hn”. Then he logically argued 
that the sum of the heights, h1 + h2 +… + hn , is constant  on the basis of the following 
warrants: A is constant, a is constant, and finally concludes: “This means that the sum of 
distances from point P to the sides of any-equi-sided polygon is constant”.  
 
The  steps in Victor’s logical explanation, shows that there is reasonable degree of parallel 





generalization and, for example, his logical explanation for his refined convex pentagon 
conjecture generalization (compare Figure 9.4.2 in Section 9.4 of  Chapter 9), i.e. there is 
some structural consistency between the two logical explanations.  
 
It seems that Victor, like the other 7 PMTs, was able to construct his logical explanation for 
his equi-sided convex polygon generalization through a process of correlative subsumption, 
which is one of the ways in which a new problem (or a variation of a given problem) is 
related to previous or relevant knowledge in the existing cognitive structure (see Ausubel, 
1978; Aziz, 2009). In other words, Victor on seeing a similarity between the ‘any’ equi-sided 
convex polygon generalization and his respective generalizations for the previous three 
convex cases via the ‘equal sides’ property, was cognitively triggered to correlatively 
subsume the construction of his logical explanations for his ‘equi-sided’ convex polygon 
generalization into his earlier conceptual ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanatory structure. 
Consistent with the correlative subsumptive process as posited by Ausubel (1978), with the 
aid of analogical reasoning, Victor modified his existing ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanation 
for his refined pentagon generalization  (or other  particular generalization) to accommodate 
his triangle-area’ algebraic explanation for his new equi-sided polygon generalization. 
 
Case: Alan 
The Researcher, as per the question in Task 4a (see Figure 10.1.1), asked Alan the following 
question, “Can you generalize the result to other polygons?”. Alan replied, “You can’t 
generalize it until you prove to those which don’t have the equal sides – then the case is the 
same – then you can generalize it from there”. 
 
It seems clear from the afore-cited statement that Alan is aware that one cannot generalize it 
to ‘any’ polygon unless one has proven that it is also true for polygons with unequal sides. 
With the statement “then the case is the same – then you can generalize it from there”, he 
seems to indicate that he has realized that the polygon needs to have equal sides. In this 
sense, Alan’s response was insightful and relevant, more particularly because the researcher 
referred to just “other polygons” instead of “other polygons with a similar property” in his 
question. 
 
Alan then continued by attempting to explain why the result might not hold for polygons with 
different sides. He in fact drew the sketch, which is shown in Figure 10.1. 11, at the back of 














Figure 10.1.11: Alan’s sketch used to explain why the result will not hold for irregular  
               pentagons.  
 
The following excerpts from the one-to-one task-based interview, illustrates how Alan made 
use of his sketch as shown in Figure 10.1.11, to logically argue why the result will not hold 
for irregular pentagons, which do not have equal sides: 
ALAN: … we need to have, to try it in irregular polygons that don’t have equal 
sides,… …so let’s say this is a, this is b, this is c, this is d and this is e. 
So we have different sides. So we draw a line there, and we have a 
point which is going to be perpendicular to there, and then 
perpendicular to there, perpendicular to there and to there etc. So they 
all come to the same point P. And then if you have a, b, c, d, e – then 
for each we have h1 , h2  , h3, h4, h5. So now they will have one thing in 
common: which is going to be ½.  
RESEARCHER: What is common? 
ALAN: the ½. So A is going to be this ½(ah1+ b h2 + c h3 +  d h4 + e h5)  
  So, in this case … these vary.  
RESEARCHER: Yes. So what is your point now? What are you trying to show? 
ALAN: For a different-sided…uuuh… pentagon (…pause…) we can’t find a 
constant a.  
RESEARCHER: So what are you saying then? You cannot find a constant a – so what is 
that saying to you? What does it say about the result? 
ALAN:  Then h varies.  
RESEARCHER: Ja, a is different here. 






RESEARCHER: ….. does the result hold true for a pentagon whose sides are not equal? 
(…pause…) Will the result – the sum of the distances from a point 
inside the pentagon to its sides – be constant? Would it hold if the sides 
of the pentagon have different measurements? 
ALAN:  No, it won’t.  
 
The argument presented by Alan, as to why his result will not hold for irregular polygons 
with different (or unequal) sides, seems to rest on the fact that he would not be able to extract 
a common “a”, which is the variable used to represent the equality of all sides in the polygon, 
as part of the common factor, ½ a. Indeed, it is possible that Alan looked at the general proof 
for the irregular pentagon with equal sides, as his reference, and thus argued that if there is no 
common side, a, then the general proof will not hold true in this case. It appears that Alan is 
overgeneralizing the structure of the proof of the irregular pentagon case with equal sides. 
Since there is no common factor ½ a, and he cannot get an equation as before: A=  ½ a( h1 + 
h2  + h3+ h4 + h5 +  h6 + h7 +  ….+ hn), and hence cannot explain why ( h1 + h2  + h3+ h4+ h5+ + 
h6 + h7+  ….+ hn)  should be constant in such a case.  
 
His reasoning of course, is incorrect as all his ‘proof’ pointedly show is that if the sides of a 
pentagon, or polygon, were not equal and the sum of the distances to its sides were constant, 
then it could not be explained (proved) in this manner. For example, we know the sum of  the 
distances from a point to the sides of any equi-angular polygon or of a 2n –gon       with 
opposite sides parallel, are also constant, and these results cannot be explained (proved) in the 
same way as the equilateral polygon. 
 
When the Researcher later asked the question again, but this time being more specific to  
polygons with a similar property, the response was as follows: 
. 
RESEARCHER: Will it hold for any equi-sided polygon? We don’t know how many 
sides it has, but it has n sides. 
ALAN:  Yes, it will.  
RESEARCHER: Are you sure?  
ALAN:  Yes 
RESEARCHER: Can you just tell me why you think it will work for any equi-sided 
polygon . You don’t have to write it down. 





RESEARCHER: Okay.  
ALAN: So if you put a point inside it, it doesn’t matter how big it is, so all the 
sides of that are equal, so if you put point P inside and then you 
construct triangles with lines that are perpendicular to each side, then 
we can have h from h1 up until hn. And when we collect them together, 
they have got a common factor of a over 2. And at the end of the day 
you have an area which is a over 2 into h1 to hn (it depends on how 
many sides you have on that second point) and then at the end of the 
day you have h being 2A over a, which is a constant, as we’ve already 
proved. So it doesn’t matter how many sides you have.  
  
Furthermore, when the researcher asked Alan to write down his logical explanation to justify 
his equi-sided convex polygon generalization, he proceeded spontaneously to produce the 
written logical explanation shown in Figure 10.1.12. 
 
Alan used a kind of logical format, to write down his explanation. The sequence of his layout 
reflects his logical though processes. In particular, it is evident that he has identified the 
‘given’ aspect of his conjecture or conditional statement by writing the following as given, 
“n-equi-sided polygon”. Having identified the antecedent (given) part, Alan drew a diagram, 
which is a common requirement in most geometry proofs, and then went on to describe his 
set of constructions, and labelled his diagram with appropriate justifications. For example, he 
wrote, “it is already given that all sides are equal, then you can label each side a”. 
Immediately, thereafter he logically deduced that the area of the big equilateral polygon is 
equal to sum of the areas of the smaller constructed triangles, and thus made the following 
logical deduction, “A = a/2 (h1 + h2 +… + hn) “.He then manipulated the equation and 
simplified it to get h = 2A/a, where h actually represented h1 + h2 +… + hn.  Then, on the basis 
of the data in his equation, h = 2A/a, Alan concluded, “therefore h is a constant”, on the basis 
of the following warrants: A is constant and a are constant. Using his claim, “therefore h is a 
constant” as a premise, Alan made the following conclusion,” we can conclude that this holds 
true for any n-equi-sided polygon”. The overall representation and layout of Alan’s 
explanation, suggests that he has developed the necessary skill and knowledge of how to 

























Alan’s verbal explanation and written logical argument, suggest that he has seen the structure 
of the general proof through the lens of the structure of the earlier particular proofs for the 
equilateral pentagon, rhombus and equilateral triangle cases. He then went on to complete his 
general proof by analogically mapping the structure of the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic proofs for 
the previous cases onto it. It appears that Alan first assimilated his explanation into the 
previously accommodated explanations for the equilateral pentagon, rhombus or equilateral 
triangle cases, which was then subsequently modified to accommodate the equi-sided convex 
polygon (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.6 for a discussion on assimilation and accommodation). 
 
Case: Logan 
The researcher on seeing that Logan was able to provide a logical explanation for his refined 
pentagon generalization, asked him: “Do you think that the same result will hold for a 
hexagon?”. Logan immediately responded as follows: “As long as the sides are all the same”. 
 
Logan’s response confirms that he has identified that “all sides equal” is a sufficient 
condition which must exist in order for his conjecture to prevail. He further acknowledged 
that his earlier generalization will hold for polygons such as hexagons, octagons and 





nonagons, and in general for any polygon, as long as the condition, “all sides equal” is 
present. 
 
RESEARCHER: - and for a heptagon? 
LOGAN: I believe it will as long as the sides are all the same. 
RESEARCHER: - and for an octagon? 
LOGAN: - yes, as long as the sides are all the same. 
RESEARCHER: What other polygons can it hold for? 
LOGAN: - a nonagon. 
RESEARCHER: Yes. 
LOGAN: - and a heptagon and a hexagon.  
RESEARCHER: How would you explain the result for a hexagon? 
LOGAN: I will basically follow the same procedure. 
RESEARCHER: - and for an octagon? 
LOGAN: Octagon - exactly the same. 
RESEARCHER: Now do you think the result will hold for an 11-sided polygon whose 
sides are equal?  
LOGAN: Yes. 
RESEARCHER: - for a twelve-sided polygon? 
LOGAN: - as long as the sides are equal. 
RESEARCHER: And how will you explain that? 
LOGAN: As long as the sides are equal, I’ll explain it in exactly the same way. 
…(referring to his earlier explanations) 
RESEARCHER: And will this result hold for any polygon whose sides are equal? 
LOGAN: Ja. 
RESEARCHER: And how will you explain that? 
LOGAN: In the same way, as long as the sides are the same…(referring to his 
earlier explanations) … 
RESEARCHER: But how will you explain that result? (probing the student) 
LOGAN: I would add all the areas of the inside triangles of the n-sided polygon, 
and take out the common factor as I did before, and then … get the 
heights on the one side, and because it’s a fixed polygon it remains 
constant (meaning its area remains constant), and the 2 is constant, 
and the small a of the sides will be all the same (meaning the sides are 





Although Logan did not finally conclude that the sum of the heights (which is presumably on 
the LHS of the equation) will be constant because 2A/a is constant, his explanation 
nevertheless demonstrates that he has seen the ‘sameness’ between his equi-sided polygon 
generalization and his earlier generalizations. He thus rationalized that the ‘triangle-area’ 
algebraic structure that was used to construct a logical explanation for each of his earlier 
generalizations could similarly be applied to construct a logical explanation that could justify 
his generalization for any equi-sided convex polygon (i.e. the general case).  This is much 
more evident in line 8 of his written explanation (see Figure 10.1.13), as he used the word 
‘pentagon’ instead of ‘polygon’ 
 
Of course at the surface level one can say this was a slip or error, but at a deeper level it 
seems to demonstrate that he was constructing a logical explanation for his equi-sided convex 
polygon generalization (a target) by building an appropriate correspondence with the 
elements (or steps) of his earlier logical explanation for his refined convex (equilateral) 
pentagon generalization (base or source), and in the process he may have forgotten to replace 
the word ‘pentagon’ with the word ‘polygon’. Despite, this anomaly, there appears to be a 
structural consistency (i.e. parallel connectivity) between the source and target (i.e. the 
logical explanation for the general case is relationally similar to the logical explanation for a 






















Although Logan, in his last statement, wrote down LHS instead of RHS, it seems evident 
from his  written explanation that he was able to look at the structure of the proofs (logical 
explanations) for the particular convex cases (equilateral pentagon, rhombus and equilateral 
triangle) and mirror a similar kind of proof for the general case, the equi-sided convex 
polygon.  
 
 Although Logan did not label the sub-parts of his explanation proof, he has clearly identified 
the antecedent, which is the given part, because he wrote the following as the initial statement 
in his worksheet, “Firstly the sides should be equal”. Although he did not draw a diagram and 
describe his constructions, Logan went on to logically explain that he will add up the areas of 
the smaller triangles and take out the common factor, which of course, was a common step in 
the proofs constructed for the earlier particular cases. After deriving the following equation, 
2A/a = (h1 + h2  + h3 …), he went on to argue that 2A/a is a constant on the basis of the 
following warrants: A is constant, 2 is a constant and , “a” is also a constant .  
 
Case: Renny 
When the Researcher, as per Task 4(a) in Figure 10.1.1, asked Renny: “Consider the above 
set of generalizations. Can you now generalize to polygons with a similar property?”,  Renny 
spontaneously replied: “Yes, for a polygon that has equal sides, the sum of the distances will 
always be constant”. However, the Researcher challenged Renny, by asking “Will it  be true 
for any polygon?”, and Renny confidently replied: “ yes,  if all the sides are equal”. 
 
Renny’ response, “yes, if all the sides are equal”, seems to suggest that from his previous 
generalizations, he has come to realize that that ‘equal sides’ is a condition that a polygon 
must possess in order for the distance sum to be constant. In other words, Renny has come to 
see ‘equal sides’ as a sufficient condition, which could give anyone the ‘go-ahead’ to extend 
the ‘constant-distance sum’ generalization to any equi-sided convex polygon. This suggests 
that Renny has a sense of what constitutes a logical relationship, that is a propositional 
relationship. In other words, if the premise, which in this case is, “If all the sides are equal”, 
prevails in a given case, then it automatically means that the conclusion, namely the sum of 
the distances from point P to the sides is constant, will logically follow. 
 
Despite the degree of logical deduction already displayed by Renny, the researcher asked 
Renny to produce a written logical explanation to justify his equi-sided polygon 
















Figure 10.1.14: Renny’s written explanation for his equi-sided convex polygon CG 
 
Renny did not set out his explanation in terms of the following aspects such as given, 
diagram, construction, required to prove and proof. However, he used the same area- triangle 
algebraic strategy to derive the following equation in his worksheet, “A = ½ a (h1 + h2 +… + 
hn)”. Thereafter Renny went on to successfully  manipulate the equation and re-arranged it to 
get, ( h1 + h2 + h3 +…+  hn) = 2A/a. Renny then claimed that 2A/a is constant on the basis of 
the warrants,  A and  a are constant. (A was considered constant the equi-sided polygon was 
fixed). Having logically deduced that 2A/a is constant, Renny then concluded by writing, “.. 
making the sum  (h1 + h2 +… + hn) also constant”.  
 
It seems that Renny, like the other PMTs, after having reflected on his earlier ‘triangle –area’ 
algebraic structure proofs for their respective specific equi-sided convex polygon 
generalizations, saw the general structure of the proof that would explain his ‘constant distant 
sum’ generalization for any equi-sided convex polygon. Hence, like the other PMTs, he 
proceeded with spontaneity to perform the necessary transformations on one of his earlier 
particular proofs (like the logical explanation for their refined pentagon conjecture 
generalization) to produce the desired general proof.  
 
According to Tall (2002) & Tall et al.(2012), this transition from  particular proof (or generic 
proof) to a  general proof,  characterizes the PMT’s cognitive growth in proof development, 
and simultaneously signals that he has in a sense cut off the ontological bonds (see 





10.2 Findings as per  Section 10.1 (PMTs producing and justifying CG to any equi-sided 
polygon) 
1. All PMTs were asked to consider the set of generalizations that they may have 
developed earlier with regard to particular convex polygons 
G1:  In an equilateral triangle the sum of the distances from a point inside the 
triangle to its sides is constant. 
G2: In a rhombus the sum of the distances from a point inside the rhombus  
 to its sides is also constant. 
G3:  In any equi-sided pentagon the sum of the distances form a point inside  
 the pentagon to its sides is also constant. 
  
When each of the eight PMTs were asked to consider the above set of generalizations, 
and generalize to polygons with a similar property, they made their generalization on 
logical grounds, without expressing any explicit need for visual/experimental 
confirmation through the use of Sketchpad as follows: 
 
1.1  Six of the eight PMTs extended their earlier ‘constant distant sum’ generalization 
that was made for specific equi-sided convex polygons like the equilateral 
pentagon,  rhombus and equilateral triangle, automatically onto their ‘any’ equi-
sided convex polygon (i.e. general equilateral convex polygon). 
1.2 One PMT, namely Shannon, saw that the structure of the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic  
explanations that she had used to construct deductive justifications for each of the 
generalizations (i.e. G1. G2 & G3) could similarly be used to construct a logical 
explanation (i.e. deductive justification) for any equi-sided convex  polygon, and 
hence made her generalization to any convex polygon with equal sides on logical 
grounds.  
1.3 One PMT, namely Alan, demonstrated that he was aware that the general polygon 
needed to have equal sides to produce a constant distance sum, and tried to 
deductively demonstrate  that the ‘constant distance sum’ would not prevail if the 
sides of a convex polygon are not all equal. 
1.4 In summary, all PMTs arrived at the following generalization: The sum of the 
distances from a given point inside any equi-sided convex polygon to its sides will 






2. By virtue of making their generalization to any equi-sided convex polygon on logical 
grounds with no need for experimental/empirical verification, it seems that all PMTs 
had finally cut off their ontological bonds with their earlier forms or processes of 
making generalizations. 
3. The underlying condition, “all sides equal”, was acknowledged in different ways by 
all PMTs, as a sufficient condition for the sum of the distances to remain constant. 
4. When asked to explain why their generalization for any equi-sided convex polygon 
was true, all of the PMTs equivalently mentioned: if all the sides of the convex 
polygon are equal, then a similar kind of procedure or explanation, i.e. the ‘triangle–
area’ algebraic explanation offered for the other particular cases, like the equilateral 
pentagon, rhombus and equilateral triangle will hold.  
5. None of the eight PMTs provided an empirical argument or made reference to 
Sketchpad to justify why their conjecture generalization for the equi-sided convex 
polygon was always true. 
6. None of the eight PMts required any specific form of scaffolded guidance to develop 
a logical explanation to justify why their conjecture generalization for the equi-sided 
convex polygon was always true. 
7. All 8 PMTs discernibly reflected on the general process and made a generic 
abstraction, from the earlier cases, to recognize that the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic 
method, can be extended, widened or extrapolated to construct a logical explanation 
to justify the invariance of the distance sum in any equi-sided conex polygon. Thus, in 
this instance the generic abstraction coupled with analogical reasoning made it 
possible for all PMTs to make the transition to formal abstraction, i.e. to construct and 
develop a general proof for any equi-sided convex polygon. This essentially means 
they have seen the general proof through a set of particular proofs or they have seen 
the general through the particular. 
 
8. It seems that the phenomenon of ‘looking back’ (i.e. folding back) at their prior 
explanations assisted the PMTs to extend their logical explanations to the general 
equi-sided convex polygon. This development of a logical explanation (proof) for the 
general case after looking back  and carefully analysing the statements and reasons 





rhombus and equilateral triangle, emulates the discovery function of proof as 
discussed and elaborated in Section 5.4.2  of Chapter 5.  
 
9.  The insight and understanding gained from the logical explanations for the earlier 
generalizations, seemed to have created a ‘road map’ that enabled all the PMTs to 
discover a general proof for the equi-sided convex polygon. Thus in this sense, the 
explanatory function proof complimented that discovery function of proof and vice 
versa  (see Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 for discussion on the explanatory and discovery 
functions of proof respectively). The prior logical explanations seemed to have 
empowered PMTs to attempt a general argument as it increased their confidence and 
ability to compose it immediately on logical grounds in combination with analogical 
reasoning (i.e. cognitive blending). 
 
10. All eight PMTs appeared to have assimilated their logical explanations for their ‘equi-
sided convex polygon’ generalization into their previously described logical 
explanations for the refined pentagon generalization (or regular pentagon or rhombus 
or equilateral triangle generalizations), and then modified it to accommodate the 
regular pentagon cases. The aforementioned assimilation–accommodation of the 
logical explanations, is consistent with Ausubel’s theory of correlative subsumption, 
because it seems that in conceptualizing the logical explanation for the ‘equi-sided 
polygon’ generalization ( a new idea),  a link was made to an already existing idea 
(old idea), namely the ‘triangle area’ algebraic explanation for the refined pentagon 
conjecture generalization (or other earlier generalizations). The new idea was 
assimilated into the old idea, and was subsequently modified to produce (or 
accommodate) the logical explanation for the regular pentagon case (see discussion of 
correlative subsumption in Section 4.5.1 of Chapter 4). 
 
11. The PMTs’ justification for their equi-sided convex polygon generalization in the 
form of a logical explanation, showed understanding of and expressed propositional 
relationships explicitly, wherein the relationship between premise and conclusion was 
well articulated in their deductive arguments, with the necessary data, warrants and 
backings. 
12.  All PMTs provided some structure to the layout of their written explanations. For 





was  appropriately considered as the ‘given’ aspect in the write up, and this is then 
followed by a relevant sketch, constructions, the ‘required to prove part’ and the 
subsequent logical development of the explanation/proof. The required to prove part, 
speaks to the consequent aspect of the conjecture or conditional statement. 
The next Chapter, contextualizes the findings with regard to each of the four problems 
(Equlialteral triangle, Rhombus, Pentagon and ‘any’ Equi-sided Polygon) in relation to the 

































Chapter 11: Findings in Relation to Research Questions 
11.0 Introduction  
The PMTs in this study engaged with four connected task-based activities associated with a 
sequence of convex polygon problems, namely the equilateral triangle problem, rhombus 
problem, pentagon problem, and ‘any’ equi-sided convex polygon problem. These activities 
were designed with the idea of creating a learning path to support pre-service teachers in 
generalizing (i.e. extending) Viviani’s  theorem to a sequence of equilateral polygons of four 
sides (rhombi), five sides (pentgaons) and  then ultimately to equi-sided convex polygons. 
The ultimate purpose of the tasks was to enable PMTs to discover a generalization of 
Viviani’s theorem, namely: In any equi-sided convec  polygon the sum of the distances from 
a point inside the polygon to its sides is constant.  
 
In this Chapter the findings that emerged through PMTs engagement with each of the convex 
polygonal problems (equilateral triangle, rhombus, pentagon (regular & irregular) and any 
equi-sided polygon) are discussed and reflected upon in the context of the research questions 
for this study. In so doing a graphic exposition is provided to reiterate the sequence of events 
as the generalizing and justifications unfolded as the PMTs responded to the respective task- 
based activities during their one-to-one task-based interview sessions. Further to this, the 
researcher wishes to emphasize the effect of the changes in each of the eight PMTs as they 
sequentially progressed through each of the problems as well as the impact of the new 
discoveries on each of the PMTs. In addition reflections on the theoretical, methodological 
aspects of this study will be provided. 
 
The equilateral triangle problem created space for the pre-service teachers to re-construct the 
Viviani result (called a particular generalization in this instance) for equilateral triangles, 
whilst the rhombus, pentagon and equi-sided polygon problems provided an opportunity for 
the PMTs to extend their established Viviani result for equilateral triangles across to a 
rhombus and then to a pentagon and ultimately generalize to any equi-sided convex polygon 
through using one or more of the following kinds of arguments/reasoning: inductive, 
analogical, deductive. Through progressing from the equilateral triangle problem to the 
rhombus problem, then to the pentagon problem and finally to the equi-sided polygon convex 
problem, the pre-service mathematics teachers experienced typical mathematical processes 





justified. In particular, pre-service mathematics teachers were exposed to the following kinds 
of processes through the designed task-based activities: intuitive guessing; conjecturing and 
generalizing through experimentation, inductive reasoning and/or analogical reasoning; 
heuristic refutation and global refutation; deductive generalizing (i.e. generalizing on logic 
grounds); justifying of generalizations either empirically, generically, deductively or 
deductively with the aid of analogical reasoning.  
 
The engagement of the pre-service mathematics teachers in the whole process until they 
produced a generalization of Viviani’s Theorem, was underpinned by the learning theory of 
constructivism. The following theoretical frameworks/theories were invoked for this study: 
Piaget’s equilibration theory (i.e Piaget’s socio-conflict theory); Ausubel’s theory of 
meaningful learning; Gentner’s Structure Mapping theory; explanatory and discovery 
functions of proof; counter-examples and scaffolding. 
 
The data analysis, results and discussion Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively reported on the 
pre-service teachers’ constructions and justifications of their generalizations across the 
following convex polygons: equilateral triangle, rhombus, pentagon and general convex  
equi-sided (equilateral) polygon. This Chapter presents the key findings of this study in 
relation to each of the four research questions, which were as follows: 
 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers construct a generalization, which says that the sum 
of the distances from a point inside an equilateral triangle to its sides is constant? If so, 
how do they accomplish this generalization (which is commonly referred to as Viviani’s 
theorem)?    
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers support their equilateral triangle generalization 
     with a justification, and if so, how do they construct (or provide) a justification for it? 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers further generalize and extend the Viviani Theorem 
for equilateral triangles to equilateral (convex) polygons of four sides (rhombi), five sides 
(pentagons), and then to equilateral convex polygons in general?  If so, how do they 
accomplish the constructions of such further generalizations? 
 Can pre-service mathematics teachers justify each of their extended generalizations to 
equilateral convex polygons (namely, rhombus, pentagon and general equilateral polygon 
generalizations)? If so, how do they accomplish the justification of each of their 






11.1 Equilateral Triangle Problem 
This section discusses the findings related to Research Questions 1 and 2.  Research Question 
1 focuses on the generalization for the equilateral triangle problem and Research Question 
focuses on the justification of the equilateral triangle conjecture generalization. 
11.1.1 Research Question 1:  Generalization for the Equilateral Triangle 
As described in Section 7.0, the equilateral triangle problem was used as the ‘vehicle’ to 
answer this core question. Figure 11.1 provides an overview of the path that PMTs traversed 
to construct their inductive generalization for the equilateral triangle problem. I believe this 
can help understand the dynamism that evolved with the construction of a generalization for 
the equilateral triangle. 
 
At the very start of the task based activity (see Section 7.1.1), PMTs were first given an 
opportunity in a non-Sketchpad context with an expectation that they would spontaneously 
use their own intuition to locate a point in the equilateral triangle (which was drawn on the 
hard copy worksheet) where they thought Sarah should build her house so that the total sum 
of the distances from the house to all three beaches is a minimum. All eight of the PMTs 
located a point in the centre (or middle) of the equilateral triangle (see Finding 1 of Section 
7.1.1.1). The same kind of choice was also exhibited unanimously by all the grade 9 learners 
that participated in a similar activity in Mudaly’s (1998) study. Indeed the choice of the 
centre (commonly known as midpoint or centroid) is certainly one of the correct positions 
amongst many others that will create the minimum distance. 
 
When the PMTs were asked to explain or justify why they chose the centre, the explanations 
of three PMTs, Victor, Logan and Renny, suggested they had been thinking that the distances 
to the sides should be equal to minimize the sum (i.e. they displayed a misconception that the 
distances have to be equal in order to minimize the sum). Although some of the other five 
PMTs may have also been intuitively thinking along the same lines, none of them provided a 
reason to justify their choice (see Findings 2 & 3 in Section 7.1.1.1). In particular, none of the 






































Figure 11.1:  A trajectory of the PMTs Inductive Generalization   
 
Consistent with a constructivist perspective of learning which suggests that learning should 
occur through the active involvement of learners as discussed in Section 4.2, the Researcher 
provided the PMTs an opportunity to explore and experiment with their initial conjecture 
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given a ready-made sketch containing an equilateral triangle with a point P inside the triangle 
representing a possible position of the house. As per Task 1(b) in Appendix 1, through 
dragging point P, the PMTs constructed a visual continuum of cases with each having a 
different location of point P, and hence observed the invariance of the distance sum, namely 
the sum of the distances was constant. As discussed in Section 7.1.4.1, the first visual 
example acted as a heuristic counter example not to their initial non-Sketchpad conjecture but 
to the assumption that the centre was the only point creating the minimum distance. Although 
the further experienced empirical examples supported their acceptance of their heuristic 
counter-example. this occurred with a degree of surprise to all PMTs (see Finding 1 of 
Section 7.1.2.3) and prevailed across the cases as described in Section 7.1.2. This surprise can 
be attributed to the PMTs seeing that the displayed dynamic empirical examples, were 
contradicting an assumption in their initial conjecture, namely that point P should be at the 
centre. A similar element of surprise was exhibited by the grade 9 learners in Mudaly’s study 
(1998, p. 66), when through dragging they found that the sum of the distances from point P to 
the sides of the equilateral triangle remained constant for any position of point P within the 
equilateral triangle.  
 
As per Piaget’s Equilibration Theory discussed in Section 4.6, the experienced contradiction 
seemed to have caused some cognitive conflict within their cognitive structures and hence 
disturbed their cognitive equilibrium, i.e. it brought about cognitive disequilibrium, which is 
commonly known as cognitive conflict. In an attempt to resolve their internal conflict, each 
PMT abandoned their initial conjecture and through accommodation of the new idea within 
their cognitive structures, reconstructed a new conjecture which embraced the invariance of 
the distance sum. In this way each PMT restored his/her cognitive equilibrium. Thus, within 
this context (see Section 7.1.4.1, it seems that the heuristic counter-example was the 
underlying cause of the ‘cognitive conflict’ that forced the PMTs to reject their earlier 
conjecture and generalize to a new conjecture which says that Sarah could build her house 
anywhere inside the equilateral triangle shaped island. The aforementioned PMTs 
modification (refinement) of their initial non-Sketchpad conjecture (see Finding 1 in Section 
7.1.4.3) in favour of their new conjecture portrays cognitive conflict as a ‘key driver’ for 
conceptual change (see Ausubel, 1968; di Sessa, 2006; Biemans & Simons, 1999; Duit, 1999; 
Lee et al., 2003). Through further experimentation with new particular cases, and seeing that 
their Sketchpad conjecture was still true for such new cases, the PMTs began to see and 
believe that their Sketchpad conjecture was true in general. In particular, the visual empirical 





completely convinced that were no counter-examples to their conjecture generalizations (see 
Finding 2 in Section 7.1.4.3). 
 
Returning to Research Question 1, the results that accrued from the Equilateral Problem 
Task, demonstrated that the PMTs were able to construct a conjecture generalization, namely, 
that the sum of the distances from a point inside an equilateral triangle to its sides is constant. 
This conjecture generalization was arrived at inductively, not through one single process but 
rather a set of complementary processes as represented by the multi-faceted trajectory 
depicted in Figure 11.1.  
 
11.1.2  Core Research Question 2: Justification of equilateral triangle conjecture 
 As per finding in Section 7.1.5.1, all eight PMTs expressed some desire and need for an 
explanation, despite being highly convinced by quasi-empirical testing This is similar to 
Mudaly’s (1998, p. 85) finding in a dynamic context and that of De Villiers’s (1991, p. 258) 
finding in a non-dynamic context. As this study adopted a constructivist-oriented approach to 
learning (see Section 4.2), the PMTs were first given an opportunity to construct their own 
explanation to explain and/or justify their posited conjecture generalization. The finding that 
emerged in Section 7.1.6, showed that none of the eight PMTs could provide a logical 
explanation on their own, but instead 7 of them only attempted to justify the general truth of 
their conjecture generalization with reference to their dynamic geometry exploration, i.e. they 
provided an empirical kind of justification (see Section 7.2.1). However, as pointed by 
Stylianides (2008) trying to explain why a conjecture generalization is always true by merely 
showing that it holds true for some particular examples or cases does not provide conclusive 
evidence that the conjecture generalization is always true. 
Like Mudaly (1998, p. 101) it was found that all eight PMTs displayed a need for guidance in 
constructing a logical explanation to justify why the sum of the distances always remain 
constant in the equilateral triangle case (see Finding 1 in Section 7.1.6.1). The researcher then 
provided each PMT with a scaffolded worksheet (see Task 1(c) of Appendix 1 and See 
Section 7.2.2). As each PMT engaged with the sub-tasks in the worksheet, they were 
provided with necessary guidance by the facilitator as and when it was needed by the PMTs 
or when it was noticed that a PMT was not able to move on from one sub-task to the next or 
was just struggling to respond to a given sub-task(s). The amount of intervention and 





she could otherwise not complete on their own was largely a function of the extent that PMTs 
could not (or struggled) to answer sub-questions in the scaffolded worksheet. To determine 
the kind of assistance or guidance that a particular PMT needed, the facilitator first probed a 
PMT about his/her response (or no response) by asking specific questions that were related to 
the sub- question (or sub-problem at hand).  
 
The knowledge, skills and ideas that each PMT acquired as he/she moved through each sub-
task of the scaffolded worksheet through individualized guidance whenever it was necessary, 
was connected to each PMT’s existing schemes and were gradually internalized by each 
PMT. Similar to Mudaly’s finding (1998, p. 101), the scaffolded worksheet coupled with 
some individualized guidance by the facilitator allowed each PMT to become “increasingly 
self-regulated and independent” as espoused by the social constructivist approach to teaching 
and learning (Snowman, Mcowan, and Biehler, 2009, p. 328). Through connecting and 
linking their respective  internalized ideas as per sub-tasks, each of the eight PMTs managed 
to build (construct) an explanation that both explained and justified why the sum of the 
distances from the sides from a given point inside an equilateral triangle to its sides always 
remained constant.  
 
The PMTs’ progression through the various scaffolded sub-tasks in the worksheet with the 
aid of necessary guidance, support, probing and facilitation from the researcher, seemed to 
have enabled them to build on their prior knowledge, internalize new information, gain  the 
necessary insight as to why the sum of the distances remained constant, and move onto the 
next level. For example, when the PMTs were afterwards asked to write down a complete 
coherent logical explanation as an argument in a paragraph form or two column form, such 
that it logically explains why their conjecture generalization is always true, seven of the 
PMTs were able to do so independently (see Finding 1 of Section 7.2.3.1). Three PMTs 
produced their logical explanation in a two- column form wherein the following aspects were 
clearly described: The given information; what was required to be proved; the necessary 
constructions; and the main body which showed the development of the logical argument 
with necessary and sufficient reasons. Four PMTs provided their logical explanation in 
paragraph form. (See Finding 1 in Section 7.2.3.1)  
Returning to Research Question 2, the findings of this study show that majority (seven out of 





equilateral conjecture generalization. Subsequently through scaffolded support they were able 
to justify their equilateral conjecture generalization by means of a logical explanation. 
 
11.2 Rhombus Problem  
In this section, the findings associated with the Rhombus problem are related to Research 
Questions 3 and 4. Research Question 3 focuses on the extension of the Viviani 
generalization for equilateral triangles to the rhombus, pentagon  and finally to any equi-sided 
convex polygon as well as how the PMTs made their generalization to the respective cases. 
On the other hand, Research Question 4, focuses on whether PMTs can justify each of their 
extended generalizations and also on ‘how’ they constructed their generalizations.  
 
11.2.1 Research Question 3: Rhombus Problem (Generalizations) 
Figure 11.2.1, provided at this juncture of my narrative is meant to signpost my visualization 
of the trajectory of Rhombus Conjecture Generalizations. I believe this will augment the 
















Figure 11.2.1:  Trajectory of Rhombus Conjecture Generalizations  
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Alan and Shannon immediately generalized to a rhombus and did not display any need to 
experimentally explore/test their claim by using Sketchpad (see Finding in  Section 8.1.1.1). 
The remaining six PMTs, however, were not able to quickly (immediately) generalize the 
result from the equilateral triangle to the rhombus (see Finding 2 in Section 8.1.1.1). In fact, 
four of these latter  six PMTs, who all conjectured that point P should be located at the centre 
(middle) of the rhombus, again exhibited the ‘equality misconception’, namely, that the sum 
of the distances would be a minimum when the four distances to the sides are equal to each 
other (see Finding 3 in Section 8.1.1.1). In other words, they seemed to ‘subconciously’ think 
of this minimum point as the incentre of the rhombus. The remaining two of these six PMTs, 
namely Logan and Renny, seemed to confuse distances to the sides with distances to vertices 
in their justification of their choice for the location of point P at the centre (see Finding 4 in 
Section 8.1.1.1) 
 
The six PMTs, who did not initially realize that point can be located anywhere with the 
rhombus, were given an opportunity to dynamically explore their claim using Sketchpad (see 
Section 81.2). In the process, each of the PMTs surprisingly experienced a heuristic counter-
example (i.e. contradiction) to the assumption that the centre or middle point is the only point 
that can be used to obtain the minimum distance sum as evidenced in their initial conjecture 
(see Komatsu, 2010). The  further empirical examples in turn supported the acceptance of the 
heuristic counter-example (see Finding 1 in Section 8.1.2.1). The contradiction the PMTs 
experienced disturbed their cognitive equilibrium. i.e. caused cognitive conflict, which 
triggered their surprised appearance. Hence, in their attempt to resolve their internal cognitive 
conflict, each PMT rejected the notion that centre as the only point and hence modified the 
initial conjecture to accommodate their discovery, i.e.the new idea (see Lee et al., 2003; 
Piaget, 1978, 1985; Sections 3.2 and 4.6). In effect, the heuristic  counter-example functioned 
as a driving force for conceptual change and the subsequent modification the initial non-
Sketchpad conjecture.This effectively resulted in each  of the six PMTs constructing a new 
kind of conjecture (see Ausubel, 1968; di Sessa, 2006; Biemans & Simons, 1999; Duit, 1999; 
Lee et al., 2003; Sections 3.2.5 and 4.6.2). 
 
As reported in Finding 2 in Section 8.1.2.1 through further exploration in a dynamic 
geometry context, each PMT successfully validated their new conjecture, which claims that 
point P can be located anywhere inside the rhombus to maintain the invariance of the 





signaling that through the process of accommodation they had adapted their ‘rhombus 
schemata’ to the new idea, and hence re-established their cognitive equilibrium (See Berger, 
2004, Piaget, 1978, 1985, Section 4.6).  
 
On reflecting on Research Question 3 in respect of  the Rhombus problem, the findings firstly 
showed that a limited number (just two) of PMTs (namely Alan and Shannon) immediately 
extended the Viviani generalization for equilateral triangles to a rhombus on analogical 
grounds. However, their level of analogical reasoning turned out to be rather superficially 
executed (see Section 8.1.3). Further to this, these two PMTs, who expressed high levels of 
certainty in their rhombus conjecture generalization, did not express or exhibit any desire to 
confirm their newly constructed rhombus conjecture generalization through experimental 
exploration in a Sketchpad context (see Finding 2 in Section 8.2.3).  
 
Secondly, the findings of this part of the study, showed that whilst the majority (six out of 
eight PMTs) were not able to initially generalize the Viviani Theorem for equilateral triangles 
to a rhombus whilst restricted to a non-Sketchpad context, they were able through 
experimental exploration within a Sketchpad context to construct a conjecture generalization 
for the rhombus case that was similar in construct to the Viviani generalization for equilateral 
triangles. However, the latter process of experimental exploration was not a linear process, 
but a process that was characterized by an amalgamation of experiences, actions and moves 
such as: encountering  of a heuristic counter-example that contradicted their assumption that 
the centre point was the only point that could  produce the required minimum distance sum; 
witnessing supporting examples to the heuristic example; acceptance of the heuristic 
example; cognitive conflict; modifying (refining) their initial non-Sketchpad conjecture; 
construction of a new Sketchpad conjecture for the rhombus case; achievement of cognitive 
equilibrium; validation of the Sketchpad conjecture for new cases; and then accepting that the 
Sketchpad conjecture was true in general (see Findings 1 and 2 on Section 8.1.2.1). Thirdly, 
the findings of this study showed that none of the PMTs produced a conjecture generalization 










11.2.2   Research Question 3: Rhombus Problem (Justifications) 
As reported in Finding 1 in Section 8.3.1, all eight PMTs expressed a desire and need for an 
explanation as to why their Rhombus conjecture generalization is always true. Figure 11.2.2 
can assist in understanding the dynamism that evolved with reference to the trajectory of 
justifications for rhombus conjecture generalizations. 
 
As reported in the Findings in Section 8.4.5, one of the six PMTs, namely Trevelyan, who 
made his rhombus conjecture generalization on empirical grounds, saw on his own  that he 
could similarly use the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanation to logically explain his rhombus 
conjecture generalization. Further to this, three of the six PMTs, who also finally made their 
Rhombus conjecture generalization through empirical induction by using dynamic cases, 
through the use of scaffolded guidance developed a logical explanation for it (see Finding 1 
of Section 8.4.5). However, two of the six PMTs, Victor & Renny, who also established their 
Rhombus conjecture generalization via empirical induction through using dynamic cases, 
used the parallel distance sum proposition to explain why the distance sum will remain 
constant in the rhombus case (see Finding 2 of Section 8.4.5). In addition, as discussed in 
Section 8.4.4.1, the two PMTs, Alan and Shannon, who presumably used analogical 
reasoning of superficial form to construct their Rhombus conjecture generalization, also used 
the parallel distance sum proposition to advance a logical argument to justify it (see Finding 4 
of Section 8.4.5).  This was unexpected as the researcher had assumed that having done the 
equilateral triangle explanation in terms of the equality of sides, they might similarly think of  
considering  the equality of the sides of a rhombus. However, this shift in focus and approach 
can possibly be attributed to week-long delay between the equilateral triangle and rhombus 
task. 
 
These latter  four PMTs, Victor, Renny, Alan and Shannon, were each provided an 
opportunity to provide an alternate logical explanation for their Rhombus conjecture 
generalization As discussed in Section 8.4.2.2, Victor and Renny, needed  scaffolded 
guidance. This guidance was offered to them via Task 2(d), which is task-based worksheet as 
outlined in Appendix 2. As reported in Finding 2 in Section 8.4.5, these two PMTs, Victor 
and Renny, completed each activity in the rhombus worksheet with  a great amount of 
accuracy and ease. This ease in the analogical transfer of information from their previous 
scaffolded equilateral triangle-algebraic explanation across to the rhombus could have been 
made possible through structural parallelism, i.e. by mapping the structure of the sub- 
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generalization via  a one- to- one correspondence onto the matching explanatory sub-
arguments for the rhombus conjecture generalization  (see discussion Gentner’ Structure 
Mapping Theory in Section 4.4.2 & 4.4.3). In the main, it seems that their previous 
scaffolded experience enhanced their analogical transfer of information from the source 
problem to the target problem. 
 
However, as reported in Finding 5 of Section 8.4.5, Alan and Shannon did not require any 
form of scaffolded guidance to develop a logical explanation for their conjecture 
generalization. As soon as they saw the dynamic rhombus, which showed the division of the 
rhombus into four triangles with respective heights, they quickly (spontaneously) asserted 
that the same kind of ‘triangle-area’ algebraic proof that they offered for the equilateral 
triangle generalization could likewise be used to construct a ‘triangle-area’ type of logical 
explanation for their rhombus conjecture generalization, and hence produced their ‘triangle-
area’ algebraic logical explanations as shown in Figure 8.4.4.2 and Figure 8.4.4.3 
respectively. This analogical-deductive move by both Alan and Shannon characteristically 
demonstrated that a proof in itself can through analogical structural mapping (i.e. cognitive 
blending) enable mathematics students to discover proof(s) of similar results or 
generalizations (compare Schoenfeld, 1986 and De Villiers, 2003). 
 
The aforementioned discovery function of proof (see Section 5.4.2), was also exhibited by 
Trevelyan, who after making his conjecture generalization as a result of experimental 
exploration in a Sketchpad context, spontaneously saw a similarity between the equilateral 
problem and the rhombus problem, and thereby proceeded without any assistance from the 
researcher to similarly use the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic proof structure for the equilateral 
triangle case to construct a logical explanation for his rhombus empirical generalization. 
 
In terms of Piaget’s theory of assimilation and accommodation, Alan, Shannon and Trevelyan 
appeared to have assimilated their logical explanations for their rhombus conjecture 
generalization into their previously accommodated explanations for the equilateral triangle 
case, and then modified it to accommodate their logical explanations for the rhombus 
conjecture generalization (see Sections 4.2.1 & 4.6). 
 
Returning to Research Question 4, the findings show that through the use of a scaffolded 
worksheet and the provision of varied guidance by the facilitator, some PMTs were able to 





Also through scaffolded guidance, those PMTs who initially used the proposition that the 
distance between parallel sides is constant to justify their Rhombus conjecture generalization, 
were then able to construct a logical explanation through using the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic 
strategy. Still focusing on the development of an alternative explanation, it was found that 
when PMTs were presented with a dynamic rhombus divided into triangles (i.e. a hint), they 
spontaneously saw a similarity between the explanatory structure for the rhombus problem 
and the equilateral triangle problem, and hence proceeded on their own to construct their 
‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanation. However, in one case (see Trevelyan) a student on his 
own saw the similarity between the equilateral problem and the rhombus problem, and then 
through structural analogical mapping proceeded to construct a ‘triangle-algebraic’ logical 
explanation for his rhombus conjecture generalization. This in turn suggests that justifications 
in the form of logical explanations can be discovered through being able to draw parallels 
between explanatory structures (see discussion in Section 4.4.3). 
 
 11.3 Pentagon problem: Findings 
In Sections 11.3.1 and 11.3.2, the findings associated with the Pentagon problem in relation 
to research questions 3 and 4 are reported respectively. Research question 3 focuses on the  
extension of the Viviani generalization for equilateral angles to a sequence of equilateral 
(convex polygons) of 4 sides (rhombi), five sides (pentagons) and finally to general convex 
equilateral n-gons, as well as how the PMTs made their generalization to the respective cases. 
On the other hand, core research question 4, focuses on whether PMTs can justify each of 
their extended generalizations and also on ‘how’ they constructed their generalizations.   
 
11.3.1 Research Question 3: Pentagon Problem (Generalizations) 
Figure 11.3.1 can assist in clarifying how the PMTs made their respective pentagon 
generalizations. As illustrated in Figure 11.3.1, there was one PMT, Alan, who on his own 
during his first attempt extended his prior generalizations associated with equilateral triangle 
and rhombus problems directly to the general equilateral pentagon on logical grounds with 
the aid of analogical reasoning (see Finding 1 of Section 9.1.6). Hence, Sections 11.3.1.1 and 
11.3.1.2 do not further report on Alan, but only on the findings associated with making of 
generalizations by the remaining seven PMTs in relation to regular pentagon problem and 






11.3.1.1 Regular Pentagon Generalizations 
On their first attempt seven PMTs restricted their pentagon generalization to a regular 
pentagon, and in doing so seemed to exhibit the following misconception: ‘equal sides always 
imply equal angles’, and vice versa (see Finding 8 of Section 9.1.6).  In this instance all seven 
of them were apparently thinking (or believing) that all equilateral pentagons are regular, i.e. 
they appear to have been thinking that ‘all sides equal’ always imply that all angles are equal, 
and thus rationalized that their generalizations were limited to just regular pentagons. Despite 
having worked with a general rhombus in the previous Task 2d (see Appendix 2) , which had 
all sides equal and not all angles equal, it is rather surprising that all seven PMTs thought that 
‘equal sides’ is a sufficient property to produce a regular pentagon. This can perhaps be 
explained by them probably never having  seen any other pentagon, but a regular one. This 
‘regularity’ misconception for higher polygons, which was overwhelmingly exhibited by the 
seven PMTs, may have already been very well embedded in a complex schema within each 
PMT’s mind (see Sinatra &  Pintrich, 2003 as cited  in  Eggen &  Kauchak, 2007), and hence 
caused the PMTs to restrict their conjecture generalization to regular pentagons only. 
 
As reported in Findings 2 to 7 in Section 9.1.6, there had been an increase in the number of 
PMTs forming their conjecture generalizations via either inductive or analogical reasoning, 
without actually doing any experimental exploration in a dynamic geometry context prior to 
making their generalization. Hence, in effect none of the PMTs produced the regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization by empirical induction from dynamic cases in Sketchpad  
context (see Finding 1 in Section 9.1.1). Four of these seven PMTs (Shannon, Trevelyan, 
Renny, Logan) expressed 100% certainty in their conjecture generalization, and did not 
express any desire to empirically test their claim by using Sketchpad (see Findings 2 and 6  in  
Section 9.1.6).  
 
However, there was just one PMT, Inderani, who after producing her conjecture 
generalization through either inductive or analogical inductive grounds, requested on her own 
accord  to do some experimental exploration within a Sketchpad context to determine the 
extent to which her regular pentagon conjecture generalization was always true. As a result of 
her experimental exploration her certainty level in her regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization subsequently climbed to 100% (see Finding 3 of Section 9.1.6), more so 
because she did not encounter any visual counter-examples as she dragged the selected vertex 
point around. In addition, two students, Tony and Victor, seemed to have had some doubts 
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experimentation under my guidance their doubts were resolved and they then expressed 100 
% certainty in their regular pentagon conjecture generalization (see Findings 4 and 5 of 
Section 9.1.6). 
 
As reported in Chapter 9, the PMTs were first asked to justify their regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization before they were presented with the Mystery pentagon (i.e. 
irregular pentagon with equal sides) activity. However, to keep a holistic focus on 
generalizations and justifications as required of Research Questions 3 and 4 respectively, the 
findings associated with the refined pentagon generalizations (see Section 11.3.1.2 ) precedes 
the discussion of the findings associated with justifications of the regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization (see Section 11.3.2.1). However, the reader should read Section 11.3.2.1, 
before reading Section 11.3.1.2. 
 
11.3.1.2   Mystery Convex Pentagon (Irregular): Generalizations  
In this section, the findings in relation to the ‘Mystery Pentagon’ problem are presented. In so 
doing it provides an exposition as to how the PMTs overcame their ‘regularity’ 
misconception through a heuristic counter-example experience, and hence refined their initial 
regular pentagon conjecture generalization to involve irregular pentagons with equal sides as 
well. 
 
As discussed in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 (Piaget’s Equilibration Theory, Conceptual Change 
and Cognitive Conflict), changing the PMTs ‘regularity’ misconception in this instance 
required a restructuring of their already existing ‘regularity’ schema through a process of 
conceptual change.  Conceptual change is similar to Piaget’s notions of disequilibrium, 
accommodation and assimilation as illustrated in Figure 4.6.1 (see Alparsian et al., 2004; 
Berger, 2004; O’Donell, Reeve and  Smith, 2009; Piaget, 1978, 1985). From a conceptual 
change perspective, as described in Section 4.6.2 certain minimum conditions need to prevail 
or be created to enable students to change their thinking. Consistent with conditions for 
conceptual change summarized by Eggen and Kauchak (2007) (see Section 4.6.2) as well as 
the instructional strategies suggested by Piaget (1978, 1985), Nussbaum and Novick (1982), 
Lee et al., (2003), Limon (2001) (see Section 4.6.2), the researcher used the Mystery 
Pentagon activity to allow the PMTs to experiment in a dynamic geometry context and 
experience a pentagon that had equal sides, but angles not necessarily equal. As reported in 





surprised look seemed to have been symptomatic of a deeper inner cognitive conflict (i.e. 
cognitive disequilibrium), that emanated from them seeing what they did not expect to see, 
namely a pentagon having equal sides which was not necessarily regular (see Finding 2 in 
Section 9.3.1). In addition, their cognitive equilibrium was further disturbed, when they 
found that as they dragged a point inside the irregular pentagon, which had equal sides but 
unequal angles, the invariance of the distance sum was maintained (see Finding 3 in Section 
9.3.1). The PMTs’ existing schemata (or schemes) were inadequate to explain their new 
unexpected experiences, and consequently resulted in the disruption of their cognitive 
equilibrium, which from a conceptual change perspective satisfies one of the three core 
conditions that are necessary to bring about change in students thinking (see Eggen & 
Kauchak (2007). 
  
To re-establish their cognitive equilibrium in this instance, all PMTs adapted to their new 
experiences via the process of accommodation. They firstly modified their existing schemas 
that intimated that only regular pentagons have equal sides and created a new schema in 
response to their unexpected experience. The resultant new schema embraced the idea that it 
is possible to have a pentagon with unequal angles, but equal sides (i.e. a pentagon with equal 
sides). Secondly, they also modified their schema that encompassed the idea that not only in 
regular pentagons an invariance of the distance sum can be achieved but also in irregular 
pentagons (provided equality of sides were maintained). The accommodation of these new 
ideas suggests that the new discoveries (or results), which was made possible through the 
process of experimentation and appropriate questioning by the researcher, made sense to each 
of the seven PMTs, and thus asserts that the second core condition for conceptual change had 
been realized. 
 
Thus, in a sense dynamic exploratory experience of the PMTs with the irregular pentagon 
(called the Mystery Pentagon in this study) brought to the fore how a purposefully designed 
heuristic counter-example helped the PMTs to correct their misconception that ‘equal sides’ 
imply ‘equal angles’ (see Finding 8 in Section 9.3.1). They came to generally realize that 
equal sides are not just possessed by regular polygons but could also be possessed by some 
irregular polygons as well. Note that this heuristic counter-example did not invalidate their 
conjecture generalization for a regular pentagon, but served as a counter-example to their idea 
(or assumption) that only regular pentagons had equal sides (see Finding 8 in Section 9.3.1). 





sufficient pentagon property to maintain an invariance of its distance sum (see Findings 3 and 
4 in Section 9.3.1).  For example, one of the PMTs, Renny, stated the following refined 
pentagon conjecture generalization:  “If the sides of the polygon (pentagon) are equal, the 
sum of the distance from an interior point P to the sides of the pentagon will not change 
(meaning the distance sum will remain constant)”.  
The heuristic counter-example in the Mystery Pentagon case therefore appears to have served 
as a driving force for each PMT to refine his/her initial pentagon conjecture generalization, 
which was limited to regular pentagons, to a pentagon conjecture generalization that 
encompassed any equilateral pentagon (see Finding 6 in Section 9.3.1). Such a refinement of 
a conjecture generalization with respect to any equilateral convex pentagon, signals the re-
establishment of cognitive equilibrium within the minds of each affected PMT. From a 
conceptual change perspective, this re-establishment of cognitive equilibrium supplements 
the third core condition that is required for conceptual change (see Eggen & Kauchak, 2007). 
Furthermore, as demonstrated via Findings 1, 2, 7, and 10 in Section 10.2, it seems that the 
PMT were able to assimilate new  experiences into their refined pentagon conjecture 
generalization schema on logical grounds. 
Reverting to Research Question 3 in relation to the Pentagon problems, the findings show 
that PMTs were able to extend their Viviani generalization for equilateral triangles and 
rhombi across to any equilateral pentagon. However, this process was not a linear one but one 
that was fueled by the following processes and events: 
 First making a pentagon conjecture generalization that was restricted to a regular 
pentagon through analogy or inductive reasoning. 
 Experimental confirmation of the regular pentagon conjecture generalization by some 
PMTs. 
 Experience of a heuristic counter-example within a dynamic geometry context that 
caused cognitive conflict and surprise. 
 Further experimental exploration aggravating the cognitive conflict and cognitive 
disequilibrium,  that resulted in the PMTs eventually accepting the counter-example, 
and subsequently reformulating their initial regular pentagon conjecture general to 









































Figure 11.3.2 illustrates how the PMTs accomplished their respective justifications of their 
pentagon generalizations. As illustrated in Figure 11.3.2 and reported in Section 11.3.1, one 
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rhombus problems directly to the general equilateral pentagon on logical grounds with the aid 
of analogical reasoning (see Finding 1 in Section 9.1.6) through the process of correlative 
subsumption. Thus, the findings connected to Alan’s justification are discussed last under 
Section 11.3.2.3. The findings connected to the justifications of the remaining seven PMTs to 
their regular pentagon conjecture generalizations and refined pentagon conjecture 
generalizations are discussed in Sections 11.3.2.1 and 11.3.2.2 respectively. 
 
11.3.2.1   Research Question 4: Regular Pentagon Problem (Justifications) 
The researcher being aware of the extent of the ‘regularity’ misconception exhibited by seven 
PMTs, nevertheless requested each of the seven PMTs to provide a justification in the form 
of a logical explanation for their regular pentagon conjecture generalization. As illustrated in 
Figure 11.3.2, the results of this showed that all seven PMTs could justify their conjecture 
generalizations through the construction of a logical explanation. However, the route to such 
a logical explanation was not necessarily the same for all PMTs. Firstly, Logan constructed 
his logical explanation via scaffolded guidance whilst working in a dynamic geometry 
context (see discussion in Section 9.2.1 and Finding 1 in Section 9.2.4). In effect, earlier 
scaffolded activities did enhance both his competency and insight on using the ‘triangle-area’ 
algebraic to explain similar conjecture generalizations.  
 
Findings also showed that the other six PMTs, having seen a connection between the 
equilateral triangle, rhombus and pentagon problems via the ‘equal sides’ property, were 
rather quick to see that ‘triangle-area’ algebraic approach they had used to construct logical 
explanations for the previous conjecture generalizations could analogically be applied to also 
construct a logical explanation for their regular pentagon generalization. All 6 PMTs 
succeeded to explain their regular pentagon conjecture generalization in a logical manner 
through parallel transfer of the core steps from their previous ‘triangle–area’ algebraic 
explanations and relevant modifications thereof (see Finding 2 (a-d) and 3 in Section 9.2.4). 
This cognitive move in itself shows that through analogical reasoning (cognitive blending) 
and transfer, one may develop logical explanations for newly conjectured results, as well as 
discover such logical explanations (see discussion on discovery function of proofs in Section 
5.4.2, and Finding 3 in Section 9.2.4) 
 
Within this continuum of the moves exhibited by each of the six PMTs in the building up of 
their logical explanation for their regular pentagon conjecture generalization, all  of them 





proof in Section 5.4.1) gained from their previous triangle area algebraic explanations to see 
and build on  the ‘triangle area’ algebraic proof for the regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization. Thus on seeing a connection between the regular pentagon problem and the 
previous problems, the PMTs through looking back on their previous triangle-area algebraic 
proofs were able to see the ‘sameness’ for the proof of the regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization. Hence as described by Mason and  Pimm (1984), they were able to move 
from one particular proof to another particular proof by transferring the generic argument 
from one particular instance to another instance (see Finding 5 in Section 9.2.4. In this sense, 
we say that the PMTs were able to see the particular proof for the regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization through previous particular proofs, which acted as generic examples in this 
particular context.  
 
According to Johnson (1975, pp. 425-426), the ‘meaningfulness’ of new information that 
learners or students come to experience in their classrooms, is seen as the “most powerful 
variable” that governs the learning and explanation of complex results and verbal discourses. 
In addition, Driscoll (2005) maintains that the basic idea underpinning any form of 
meaningful learning is characterized by the learner actively making some attempt to connect 
new ideas to already existing ones. As discussed in more detail in Section 4.5, meaningful 
learning is underpinned by two kinds of subsumption, namely derivative subsumption and 
correlative subsumption. 
  
As reported in Finding 4 in Section 9.2.4,  six PMTs constructed their logical explanations for 
their regular pentagon conjecture generalization through a process of correlative subsumption 
(see Figure 11.3.3). Consistent with the process of correlative subsumption (see Ausubel et 
al., 1978, & Driscoll, 2000; Section 4.5), the ‘new information’ in this study, namely the 
construction of a logical explanation for the regular pentagon CG, was assimilated into a 
previous idea or experience (i.e. ‘established idea’), namely the triangle-area algebraic 
explanations for equilateral triangle and rhombus CG’s (see Findings 4 and 6 in Section 
9.2.4).  This assimilation is likely to have been triggered by observing the presence of the 
same ‘equal sides’ property in their pentagon figure as before (general, equilateral pentagon 
in the case of Alan and regular pentagon for the other students).  In particular, on having 
gained the necessary insight and experience as to how the ‘equal sides’ property was used to 
construct ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanations for their earlier equilateral triangle and 
rhombus generalizations, the PMTs were quick to see that logical explanations for their 





means that their prior experience and insight helped them to easily assimilate their anticipated 
logical explanation for their new pentagon conjecture generalization into either one of their 
previous ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanations, which were already stored in their long-term 
memory. Then through modifying some of the key attributes of either one of their previous 
logical explanations in an analogical manner, all seven PMTs appear to have managed to 
accommodate their ‘triangle–area’ algebraic explanation for their new regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization. In much the same manner, Alan also accomplished his ‘triangle-
area’ algebraic explanation for his new general pentagon conjecture generalization (see 















               
 
 
Returning to Research Question 4 in relation to justification of a regular pentagon conjecture 
generalization, all seven PMTs were able to justify it. The ways that were sought to 
accomplish their justifications could be summarized as follows: 
 Scaffolded guidance through engaging with a scaffolded worksheet in a dynamic 
geometry context. 
 Generic Justification: The general proof was seen through the previous particular 
proofs. The parallel transfer of information from the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic structure 
proof for the rhombus conjecture generalization to the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic 
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structure proof for the regular pentagon problem through the process of analogical 
reasoning. Hence, we can refer to this as an analogical-deductive generalization. 
 
 
11.3.2.2   Research Question 4: Justifications of the Refined Pentagon (Convex)  
               Conjecture Generalization  
As reported in Section 9.4, there were seven PMTs who after experiencing a heuristic 
counter-example to their assumption that ‘all equilateral pentagons are regular’  saw that it 
was possible to have an irregular pentagon with equal sides but angles not necessarily equal 
that still preserves the distance sum. This caused the PMTs to modify (refine) their regular 
pentagon conjecture generalization  to include any pentagon with equal sides. Soon after each 
of the PMTs expressed their refined pentagon conjecture generalization, the researcher 
requested each of them to provide a justification in the form of a logical explanation as to 
why their new result is always true. 
 
Findings show that all 7 PMTs were able to justify their refined pentagon conjecture 
generalization through the provision of a deductive justification (i.e. logical explanation) 
through similarly using the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic structure proof that they had previously 
used to justify their previous conjecture generalizations (see Findings 1-4 in Section 9.4.1).  
In so doing, three confidently advanced their logical explanations verbally (see Findings 1 
and 2 in Section 9.4.1) and four confidently wrote down the logical explanation immediately 
(see Finding 3 of Section 9.4.1). 
 
As discussed in detail in Section 9.4,  these seven PMTs had already worked with the regular  
pentagon wherein they used the ‘equal sides’ property to construct a logical explanation 
providing insight as to why the distance sum remained constant. It appears that on seeing that 
the ‘equal sides’ property also featured as the main condition in the new refined pentagon 
conjecture generalization, they immediately saw the logical connection between the regular 
pentagon (source problem) and the equilateral pentagon (target problem). The latter is 
consistent with Ausubel’s philosophy of meaningful learning (see Section 4.5 for a detailed 
discussion) which claims that when a learner encounters new ideas or phenomena he/she 
actively attempts to naturally connect them to already existing ideas accommodated in their 
cognitive structures to try and make sense and/or explain the existence of such new 
phenomena or ideas. In particular, the development and construction of the desired logical 





process of derivative subsumption (see discussion of derivative subsumption in Section 4.5.1) 
each of the seven PMTs automatically subsumed the target problem, namely the construction 
of a logical explanation for their refined pentagon conjecture generalization into an existing 
but relevant ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanatory structure, namely the logical explanation for 
their regular pentagon conjecture generalization (source problem).  
 
As indicated in Figure 11.3.2, the findings of this part of the study demonstrates how the 
process of derivative subsumption was facilitated by the process of analogical structural 
transfer (i.e. cognitive blending) of the explanatory steps from the PMT’s logical explanation 
for their regular pentagon conjecture generalization in a parallel manner across to their 
logical explanation for their refined pentagon conjecture generalization (see Finding 4 in 
Section 9.4.1). 
 
Returning to Research Question 4 in relation to the justification of the PMTs refined 
pentagon conjecture generalization, all seven PMTs were able to justify it by providing a 
deductive justification that was made possible through the process of derivative subsumption 
in consonance with analogical structural transfer.  
 
11.3.2.3   Research Question 4: Alan’s Justification of his ‘any’ Equilateral Convex 
               Pentagon Generalization  
Although Alan produced his conjecture generalization for a general pentagon immediately on 
logical grounds, it seems his earlier ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanations for his equilateral 
triangle and rhombus conjecture generalizations also acted as generic examples and thereby 
provided him with the necessary insight and approach to similarly construct a logical 
explanation for his general pentagon conjecture generalization via analogical transfer (see 
Finding 6 in Section 9.2.4). The latter deductive move affirms that one could very well 
construct conjecture generalizations immediately on logical grounds with the aid of 
analogical reasoning as has been argued by De Villiers (2008). In addition, it seems that in 






































In this section the findings associated with ‘any’ equi-sided convex polygon problem in 
relation to Research Questions 3 and 4 are discussed. The accompanying Figure 11.4, 
provided at this juncture of my narrative is meant to provide an overview as to how  PMTs 
constructed their generalization for any equi-sided (or equilateral) polygon. I believe this will 
augment the discursive flow of this section. 
 
DEDUCTIVE GENERALIZATIONS 
All eight PMTs extended the ‘constant distance sum’ generalization 
to any equilateral polygon on logical grounds, without expressing 
any need for visual/experimental confirmation 
Pre-service mathematics teachers making 
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When each of the eight PMTs were asked to consider their previous generalizations, and then 
generalize to polygons with a similar property, they each immediately made a generalization 
to any equi-sided polygon on logical grounds, without expressing any need for 
visual/experimental confirmation in a Sketchpad context (See Finding 1 of Section 10.2). In 
particular, the results showed that six PMTs on seeing that they were dealing with any 
polygon with all sides being equal, readily generalized the invariance of the distance sum to 
an equi-sided polygon (see Finding 1.1 in Section 10.2).  For example, Trevelyan without any 
experimental exploration confidently responded as follows: “My conjecture is that given any 
polygon, if the sides of the polygon are the same, then the sum of the distances from a point 
to each side of the polygon, it should be constant”. Similarly Renny spontaneously replied: 
“Yes, for a polygon that has equal sides, the sum of the distances will always be constant”, 
and went on affirm that such a generalization will hold true for any equi-sided polygon (see 
Section 10.1) 
 
The responses by these six PMTS are discussed more fully in Section 10.2. These students 
seemed to have accommodated the idea of ‘equal sides’ as a sufficient property to yield a 
‘constant distance sum’ within their respective cognitive structures. This kind of deductive 
generalization, which accrued from their experiences and constructions of their earlier 
generalizations and related logical explanations (proofs), highlights the discovery function of 
proof described in Section 5.4.2. In other words, the identification of a definitive property 
like ‘equal sides’ in this instance, was now seen to be sufficient to enable further 
generalization of the constant distant sum to any equi-sided polygon.  The deductive 
generalizations produced by each of the PMTs at this stage, demonstrates that they had seen 
the general result through particular results.  
 
As the PMTs progressed to make their generalization to any equi-sided convex polygon on 
logical grounds, they drew away from their prior use of non-deductive or empirical processes 
to make a generalization. Freudenthal (1973) refers to this change in one’s thought processes, 
as the “cutting of the ontological bonds”. This cutting of the bond with empirical reality, 
demonstrates that the PMTs had cognitively grown in the construction of generalizations 
through the processes of generalizing and abstracting (see Tall, 2002; Tall et al., 2012). For 
example, Shannon, without working with any dynamic sketch of an equi-sided convex 
polygon (with n > 5), saw that she could divide an equi-sided polygon into triangles, and 
thereby proceeded on her own to similarly and successfully use the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic 





Figure 10.1.2, Shannon constructed a logical argument that demonstrated that the sum of the 
distances, namely h1 + h2  + h3 +…+ hn , remained constant. On the basis of her constructed 
logical explanation, Shannon then generalized that the ‘distance sum’ will remain constant 
for any equi-sided polygon as shown in Figure 10.1.2. When asked to produce a coherent 
logical application, Shannon polished up her logical argument that she had already 
constructed as per Figure 10.1.3, by providing the necessary warrants for her statements in 
her logical explanation  and also demonstrated her fluency with propositional relationships 
(se discussion in Section 10.2). 
 
Alan also demonstrated that he was aware that the general equilateral convex polygon needed 
to have equal sides to produce a constant distance sum, and produced a correct, generalized 
proof based on the ‘triangle-area’ strategy. However, upon looking back (i.e. folding back) at 
his proof, he then tried to deductively demonstrate that the ‘constant distance sum’ result will 
not hold true if the sides of the polygon are not equal. The argument produced by Alan to 
explain why ‘constant distance sum’ generalization will not hold for irregular polygons with 
unequal sides, was premised on the fact that he would not be able to extract a common “a”, 
which is the variable used to represent the equality of all sides in the polygon, as part of the 
common factor ½a. In other words, he argued that if there is no common equal side in a given 
polygon, then it would not be possible construct a logical explanation to justify the ‘constant 
distance sum’ generalization. However, Alan’s reasoning as discussed in Section 10.1 is 
incorrect, as all his argument shows is that if the sides of some polygon were not equal and 
the sum of the distances to its sides were constant, then it could not be explained (proved) in 
the same manner.  
 
Like Alan and Shannon, none of the other PMTs provided an empirical argument or made 
reference to Sketchpad to justify why their conjecture generalization for the equi-sided 
polygon was always true (see Finding 5 in Section 10.2). Furthermore, none of the eight 
PMTs required any specific form of scaffolded guidance to develop a logical explanation to 
justify why their conjecture generalization for the equi-sided polygon was always true (see 
Finding 6 in Section 10.2) 
Findings of this study also showed that all eight PMTs appeared to have looked back (i.e. 
folding back) at the logical explanations for their previous generalizations, and reflected on 
the general strategy (process) that was used to build a justification that logically explained 





PMTs made a successful generic abstraction from the earlier cases to recognize that 
‘triangle–area’ algebraic method can be extended or extrapolated to construct a logical 
explanation to justify the invariance of the distance sum in any equi-sided polygon (see 
Finding 7 in Section 10.2). This kind of generic abstraction is consistent with the pedagogical 
underpinnings of the discovery function of proof as described in Chapter 4, and also suggests 
that the explanatory function of proof compliments and stimulates the discovery function of 
proof (See Finding 9 in Section 10.2; and also Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2). In this instance, as 
summarized in Figure 11.5, the generic abstraction, coupled with analogical reasoning, made 
it possible for all PMTs to make the transition to formal abstraction, i.e. to construct and 
develop a general proof for any equi-sided polygon. In short, they have seen the general proof 













For example, the latter is typically illustrated in Victor’s written response as shown in Figure 
10.1.10 in Chapter 10. The steps in Victor’s logical explanation show that there was a 
reasonable degree of parallel connectivity (i.e. cognitive blending) between his logical 
explanations for his equi-sided convex polygon generalization and his refined pentagon 
conjecture generalization (see Figure 9.4.2 in Section 9.4), i.e. there was some structural 
consistency between the two logical explanations.  
 
From the perspective of meaningful learning as argued by Ausubel et al. (1978), it appears 
that all PMTs were able to construct their logical explanations for their equi-sided convex 
polygon generalizations through a process of correlative subsumption  (see Finding 10 in 
Section 10.2), which is one of the ways in which a new problem (or a variation of a given 
problem) is related to previous or relevant knowledge in the existing cognitive structure (see 
All 8 PMTs analogically used the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic 
structure to logically explain  their general equilateral polygon 
generalization. 
Through generic abstraction coupled with analogical reasoning all 
PMTs saw the general proof through a set of particular  proofs. 
 
Figure 11.5: Trajectory of Justifications of Generalization for ‘Any’ Equilateral 
                     Convex Polygon 





Ausubel et al.,, 1978; Aziz et al., 2009). In other words, they saw the ‘equal sides’ similarity 
between the equi-sided convex polygon generalization and their earlier generalizations for the 
equilateral convex pentagon, rhombus and equilateral triangle cases. This cognitively 
triggered the correlative subsumption (Ausubel, 1978) of the construction of the logical 
explanation for the ‘equi-sided’ polygon generalization into their earlier conceptual ‘triangle- 
area–algebraic’ explanatory structure. Analogical reasoning was then used to modify their 
existing ‘triangle-area’ algebraic explanation to accommodate the equi-sided convex  polygon 
generalization.  
 
Taking all the findings as discussed in this section, one can say that all eight PMTs were able 
to extend their previous generalizations to ‘any’ equi-sided convex polygon on logical 
grounds. 
 
The next Chapter provides concluding remarks, implications of the findings, limitations of 

























Chapter 12: Concluding remarks, Implications, Limitations and  
     Recommendations 
12.0 Introduction 
This Chapter provides concluding remarks, and also discusses the implications of the findings 
and the limitations of this study. In addition some recommendations are suggested for future 
possible research studies in mathematics education 
12.1  Concluding Remarks 
In this qualitative study, which was governed by a constructivist framework, eight pre-service 
mathematics teachers were involved in typical mathematical processes that mathematicians 
normally traverse in their endeavour to construct, justify, extend and generalize 
generalizations.  In particular, this study investigated the active engagement of eight pre-
service mathematics teachers in the processes of generalizing and justifying through the use 
of selected activities, and their attempts to evaluate the validity of their generalizations 
through experimentation and justifications. In so doing, the research attempted to determine 
and explain how pre-service mathematics student teachers (PMTs) developed and justified 
their generalizations in a dynamic context. In the process, this study explored how PMTs 
experienced counter-examples (particularly heuristic counter-examples to assumptions 
embodying the development of thir initial conjectures) from a conceptual change perspective, 
and how they modified their conjecture generalizations and/or justifications as a result of 
such experiences. In addition the explanatory and discovery functions of proof were reflected 
upon during the constructions and justifications of further generalizations. 
 
Analysis of data was grounded in an analytical–inductive method governed by an interpretive 
paradigm. Firstly, pre-service mathematics teachers were given an opportunity to reconstruct 
Viviani’s theorem for the domain of equilateral triangles. Results of this part of the study 
showed that PMTs first experienced a heuristic counter-example to the assumptions defining  
their initial conjecture and hence resultant cognitive conflict. Subsequently through further 
experimental exploration and reformulation of their initial conjecture, the PMTs finally re-
established their cognitive equilibrium. In summary, students reconstructed Viviani’s 
generalization for equilateral triangles through empirical induction of dynamic cases, i.e. they 





Although the PMTs were highly convinced by the quasi-empirical testing, all eight of them 
expressed a need for an explanation. When they were given an opportunity to provide an 
explanation, none of them managed to provide a logical explanation on their own, but instead 
seven out of eight PMTs offered an empirical kind of justification. However, results of this 
study showed that through appropriate scaffolded guidance all eight PMTs constructed a 
logical explanation that justified their equilateral triangle conjecture generalization. 
 
Results for the Rhombus task, showed that the majority (six out of eight) of PMTs were 
unable to initially generalize the Viviani Theorem for equilateral triangles to a rhombus, and  
conjectured that the minimum point would lie at the centre of the rhombus. However, through 
experimental exploration in a dynamic geometry context the PMTs experienced a heuristic 
counter-example to their assumption that the centre point would be the only point that could 
enable one to acquire the minimum distance to the sides of the rhombus, and caused them 
internal cognitive conflict. Through further experimental exploration the six PMTs accepted 
the heuristic counter-example to their centre point assumption as contained in their initial 
conjecture, and subsequently modified their initial conjecture to finally achieve the desired 
cognitive equilibrium. In so doing, these six PMTs constructed a rhombus conjecture 
generalization that was similar in construct to the Viviani generalization for equilateral 
triangles. Two of the PMTs seemed to have extended their equilateral triangle conjecture 
generalization to the rhombus on analogical grounds. However, their level of analogical 
reasoning was later revealed to be rather weak and superficial, as they expressed a desire and 
need for an explanation during their one-to-one task based interview session.  
 
Results showed that PMTs accomplished their logical explanations (i.e. deductive 
justifications) for their rhombus conjecture generalization as follows:  
 Three directly required  scaffolded guidance, which was connected to the with the 
‘triangle–area’ algebraic explanation, but to a limited extent as compared to the 
equilateral triangle case 
 Two seemed to have used and algebraic strategy encompassing the proposition: the 
distance between parallel lines is constant. However, later through scaffolded 
guidance they alternatively developed a  ‘triangle–area’ algebraic explanation with 
relative ease. 
 Two spontaneously used and algebraic strategy encompassing the proposition: the 





‘triangle–area’ algebraic explanation without any kind of scaffolded guidance but 
through analogy. 
 One  used  analogy  straight away, i.e. assimilating the rhombus logical explanation 
into the proof structure of the equilateral triangle conjecture. 
 
As the PMTs proceeded with the Pentagon problem, one PMT extended the ‘constant- distant 
sum’ generalization for the previous equilateral triangle and rhombus cases onto any equi-
sided pentagon on logical grounds with the aid of analogical reasoning.  The remaining seven 
PMTs  proceeded as follows: 
 One PMT made a conjecture generalization to a regular pentagon via inductive 
or analogical reasoning at a superficial level without using Sketchpad or 
simply guessing. 
 Six PMTs made their conjecture generalization to a regular pentagon on 
inductive or analogical grounds without using Sketchpad.  
 
As regards the latter seven PMTs, who restricted their pentagon conjecture generalization to a 
regular pentagon, results showed that one PMT developed a logical explanation 
encompassing the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic strategy via scaffolded guidance, and the 
remaining six PMTs did so by seeing the structure of the proof for the regular pentagon 
conjecture generalization through the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic structure proofs that were 
constructed respectively to logically explain their earlier rhombus and equilateral triangle 
conjecture generalizations. This latter move typically represents the process of correlative 
subsumption as explained by Ausubel et al. (1978), and is also connected to the process of 
analogical transfer in a parallel manner as described by Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory  
(Gentner, 1983, 1989) as well as cognitive blending. 
  
In restricting their pentagon conjecture generalization to a regular pentagon, the seven PMTs 
exhibited an inherent misconception, namely that only regular pentagons have equal sides. 
However, the experience of a carefully designed heuristic counter-example functioned as a 
driving force for the PMTs to correct this misconception, and subsequently they refined their 
regular pentagon conjecture to include any equilateral convex polygon.   
 
Each of the seven PMTs succeeded in constructing a logical explanation by similarly using 
the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic structure that was used to construct logical justifications of their 





the explanatory steps from the source problem onto the explanatory steps of the target 
problem via analogical structural mapping, i.e. parallel transfer of information from source to 
target (see Gentner, 1983, 1989). As the PMTs’ logical explanation was linked to their 
previous ‘triangle area’ algebraic explanation for the regular pentagon, i.e. a superordinate 
idea, it seems that the process of derivative subsumption took place in this instance. 
 
When each of the eight PMTs were asked to consider previous generalizations, and then 
generalize to any polygon with a similar property, all eight PMTs made their generalization 
to any equi-sided polygon on logical grounds, without expressing any explicit need for 
visual/experimental confirmation through the use of Sketchpad. This cognitive move suggests 
that all the PMTs had now severed the ontological bonds with their earlier forms or processes 
of making generalizations (see Freudenthal, 1973, p. 451), and this in turn signals cognitive 
growth in proof construction amongst the PMTs (see Tall, Yevdokimov, Koichu, Whitely, 
Kondratieva, & Cheng, 2012; Harel & Sowder, 1998, 2005). In particular, all eight PMTs 
reflected on the general process and made a generic abstraction from the earlier cases to 
recognize that the ‘triangle-area’ algebraic method, can be extended, widened or extrapolated 
to construct a logical explanation to justify the invariance distance sum in any equi-sided 
polygon. In the light of this, the generic abstraction coupled with analogical reasoning made 
it possible for all PMTs to make the transition to formal abstraction, i.e. to construct and 
develop a general proof for any equi-sided polygon. This essentially means they had 
perceived the general proof through a set of particular proofs, or that they had seen the 
general through the particular. 
 
In addition, this study showed that the phenomenon of looking back (i.e. folding back) at 
their prior explanations assisted the PMTs to extend their logical explanations to the general 
equi-sided convex polygon. This development of a logical explanation (proof) for the general 
case after looking back and carefully analysing the statements and reasons that make up the 
proof argument for the prior particular cases, namely pentagon, rhombus and equilateral 
triangle, emulates the discovery function of proof. Furthermore, the insight and understanding 
gained from the logical explanations constructed for their earlier generalizations, seemed to 
have created a ‘road map’ that enabled  all the PMTs to discover a general proof for the equi-
sided polygon. Thus in this sense, the explanatory function of proof complimented the 






In most of our classrooms at schools and universities, the objective of proving a given 
mathematical statement or conjecture generalization is often just to verify the validity of such 
a statement or generalization. Thus students at schools, prospective mathematics teachers and 
qualified teachers come to view proofs as products produced through a deductive mechanism 
that exist in isolation from mathematical processes, and also come to see a proof as an end in 
itself, i.e. it has no further role to play in the development of new mathematics (see Chazan, 
1993; Harel & Sowder, 1998).  This limited treatment of proofs in our classrooms invariably 
does not provide the necessary insight to the students as to why a particular result is always 
true (see De Villiers, 2003a; Hanna, 1995). Furthermore it does not allow them to see how 
new knowledge (like proofs and further generalizations or specializations) can be constructed 
by looking back and reflecting on a particular proof (or set of proofs) and then analogically 
transferring the explanatory structure of such a proof across to new domains in a manner that 
enables one to build a logical explanation that could meaningfully justify an extended 
generalization.  In a sense, the way proof is dealt with in our mathematics classrooms 
compromises the notion of meaningful learning as posited by Ausubel (1962) and Ausubel, 
Noval & Hanesian (1978) and is not used “as a vehicle to promote mathematical 
understanding” (Hanna, 1995, p. 42). Further to this, Schoenfeld (1994, p. 75) argues: “In 
most instructional contexts proof has no personal meaning or explanatory power for 
students”.  
 
However, this study has illustrated how proving activities can stimulate meaningful learning 
and can be used as a vehicle to promote mathematical understanding to an extent that pre-
service mathematics teachers were able to discover a generalization of Viviani’s theorem on 
deductive grounds on their own with/without the aid of analogical reasoning. This in a sense 
concurs with Piaget’s notion that students have the innate capability to logically develop 
mathematical ideas autonomously, and that such autonomy can be stimulated through the 
provision of appropriate learning contexts characterized by meaningful interactions (Beth and 
Piaget, 1966).  
 
As a pedagogical contribution to mathematics teaching and learning, this study provides a 
descriptive analysis of a ‘guided approach’ to both the construction and justification of 
generalizations via an evolutionary process, which mathematics teacher educators could use 
as a model for their own attempts in their mathematics classrooms. For example, it provides 
plausible ideas as to how students through experimental exploration can construct inductive 





modify (refine) their conjectures (or conjecture generalizations, i.e. make a conceptual 
change as per Piaget’s model of socio-cognitive conflict. It also provides a road map of how 
analogical reasoning can be used to extend generalizations from one domain to the next, as 
well as aiding in the construction of deductive generalizations and logical explanations of 
particular generalizations through parallel transfer of explanatory structures from one domain 
across to another domain. In particular, this study brings to the fore three basic ways in which 
generalizations can be developed: namely inductive, analogical and deductive; and also 
illustrates three plausible ways of justifying a conjecture generalization: namely empirical, 
generic and deductive. In this respect the study provided a set of plausible trajectories for 
generalizations as well as justifications, which mathematics teacher educators and 
mathematics teachers can use in their own classroom to facilitate the construction and 
justification of generalizations not only from a teaching and learning perspective, but also a 
research perspective (see Figures 11.1;11.2.1; 11.2.2.;11.3.1,11.3.2; 11.4; 11.5). 
 
In addition, the study showed that deductive justifications and deductive generalizations are 
not necessarily constructed independent of analogical reasoning; and approaching the 
construction of a proof from an explanatory lens enabled the PMTs to engage in the 
construction of proofs that made sense. As a result of this sense making they seemed to have 
gained the necessary insight as to why their respective generalizations were always true, and 
this in turn helped them to meaningfully discover new generalizations and proofs. More 
importantly, establishing a learning environment in our university mathematics education 
classrooms, wherein pre-service mathematics teachers experience the processes of 
generalizing and justifying as reported in this study, could very well influence how they 
might eventually engage their own learners in mathematical processes like conjecturing, 
refutation, generalizing and justification when they return to mathematics classrooms as 
qualified mathematics teachers. In this way, mathematics learners might come to view 
mathematics as a process that is within their capabilities and not just a series of ‘products’ 
that are produced, and hence learn mathematics in a more meaningful way.  
 
This study also made some theoretical contributions to the field of mathematics education 
and research. On a theoretical level, this study illustrated how a multi-faceted conceptual 
framework, which has hardly been used before, acted as an efficient mechanism and helped 
integrate different approaches, processes and frameworks to work in harmony  to support and 





Section 4.1, enabled me to interpret the findings of this study into a coherent structure, which 
can be easily accessed and implemented by both practitioners and researchers.  
 
In addition, this study firstly differentiated between the following types of generalizations in 
the field of mathematics: Inductive generalization, deductive generalization, constructive (a 
priori) generalization (see Section 1.6). Further to this the study showed that analogical 
reasoning and deductive reasoning can work in a complimentary manner to produce an 
analogical-deductive kind of generalization as well as an analogical-deductive kind of 
justification. In other words, the study demonstrated that deductive reasoning does not 
necessarily happen independently from analogical reasoning. Furthermore, this study showed 
that the phenomenon of ‘seeing the general through the particular’ is a powerful didactic 
device not only to extend generalizations to higher order polygons but to also construct 
logical explanations to explain such generalizations.  
 
This study also made some methodical contributions. From the results of study that were 
presented in this case study, it is clear that the method of one-to-one task-based interviews 
conducted within a dynamic geometry context, provided an apt way to individually track the 
generalizing and justifying experiences of the pre-service mathematics teachers with deeper 
insight and understanding. It made it possible for myself as the researcher to see the cognitive 
growth that took place amongst the PMTs as they proceeded through the evolutionary process 
of generalization. Furthermore, the one-to-one task-based interview provided an opportunity 
to me, the researcher, to establish rapport with the PMT and hence obtain deeper insights and 
better data about his/her thought processes. In particular this data collection technique made it 
possible for me to clarify and seek further explanations to specific expressions, statements, 
justifications, misconceptions and explanations that a PMT made in the process of 
constructing and justifying his/her generalization.   
 
Although as a mathematics teacher and lecturer, my habitual role is to help students and see 
students succeed, it was a natural tendency to want to assist the students during their task 
based activities. However, in my role as researcher and participant observer, I managed to 
curtail this notion by providing just enough scaffolded support to a given PMT that the 
situation demanded. This was made possible through the use of appropriately designed task-
based worksheets and semi-structured interview protocols that provided me as a researcher 
the opportunity to intervene and render support as diagnosed during a PMT’s generalizing 





case study research approach enabled me to provide an in-depth account of each PMTs 
generalizing and justifying experience in a connected and holistic way, and hence can be 
accepted as methodological contribution to the research community in mathematics 
education. 
 
12.2 Implications of the Findings 
The investigation as to where a point should be located within an equilateral triangle such 
that the sum of the distances from the located point to its respective sides is a minimum, 
served as a rich context for pre-service mathematics teachers (PMTs) to engage in pivotal 
mathematical processes such as experimentation, conjecturing, generalizing, refuting, 
refining, and justifying. The equilateral triangle task provided a foundation to create rich 
tasks like the rhombus problem, pentagon problem (convex) and ‘general’ equi-sided convex  
polygon problem, which in different ways provided the space for PMTs to continually extend 
the ‘constant distance sum’ generalization from an equilateral triangle to a rhombus to any 
equi-sided convex pentagon and finally to generalize the ‘constant distance sum’ result to any 
equi-sided convex polygon. However, the ways in which PMTs extended their generalization 
grew mainly from an empirical approach in the rhombus case by largely using Sketchpad to 
an analogical approach in the pentagon case without initially using Sketchpad, and finally to a 
deductive approach in the general equi-sided polygon case. This suggests that mathematics 
teachers and mathematics educators should be prepared to initially receive generalizations 
made on empirical grounds when students face a problem for the first time. Further to this, 
they may expect their students through necessary scaffolded guidance to grow in their ways 
of generalizing as they progress from one polygon to higher order polygons that have at least 
a common characterizing property.  
 
This evolutionary process of generalizing a particular result from one domain to another 
domain in an iterative manner, and in progressively different ways, enabled the pre-service 
mathematics teachers to construct a generalization of Viviani’s theorem, namely: in any equi-
sided convex polygon the sum of the distances from a point inside the polygon to its sides is 
constant. See Figures 11.1, 11.2.1, 11. 3.1 and  11.4 in Chapter 11, which represent the range 
of processes that pre-service teachers experienced and engaged with in order to help them to 
re-invent (or re-construct) this generalization. The developmental processes that are reflected 
in Figures 11.1, 11.2.1, 11.3.1, 11.4, represent typical processes mathematicians themselves 
engage with in their endeavor to invent or discover new knowledge. Hence, it is hoped that 





equilateral triangle problem to the general equi-sided convex polygon problem helped them 
to develop a broader understanding of how new mathematics is sometimes created, and hence 
contributed in some way to the prospective mathematics teachers’ perspectives on the nature 
of mathematics. Providing such a generalizing and justifying experience to pre-service 
mathematics teachers across our teacher education institutions, can prepare, encourage and 
motivate them to build and create similar learning experiences for their students, during their 
teaching practice sessions and when they return to mathematics classrooms as fully qualified 
teachers. In this way they could help in some small way to break the traditional method of 
presenting learners with a result and proof as it is done in most textbooks and classrooms, i.e. 
stating a theorem or generalization and then verifying its truth by directly providing a proof.  
In other words, there would be greater chance for a wider learner population to experience 
some of the genuine mathematical processes. 
 
Polya’s (1957) notion of ‘Looking Back’ and Pirie and Kieran (1994) notion of ‘Folding 
Back’ embraces a much wider ground than just checking the correctness or meaningfulness 
of a solution. For Polya, ‘Looking Back’ embraces: “the consideration of alternative solutions 
and representations, the re-examination of the solution for a more efficient strategy, and the 
extension of the solution to other related problems” (Leong, Tya, Toh, Wek, & Dindyal, 
2011, p. 182). These latter tenets of ‘Looking Back”, which promote mathematical thinking 
(Tall, 1991) characterizes some of the typical processes that mathematicians constantly 
engage with in their mathematical practices. In fact, mathematicians do not simply stop after 
they have found a solution to a problem, but instead look back and reflect on their solution or 
logical explanation and use it “as a sort of kernel to generate solutions to related problems” or 
construct further generalizations (Leong, Tya, Toh, Quek, & Dindyal, 2011, p. 182). In this 
study, the process of looking back and reflecting on each of the previous generalizations 
played a significant role in assisting the PMTs’ in their extension of the Viviani result for 
equilateral triangles as well as its justification to other polygons, like the rhombus, pentagon 
and any equi-sided convex polygon. This suggests that  mathematics educators and practicing 
mathematics teachers should instill in their students the habit of reflecting and looking back 
at their generalizations and proofs to the extent that they always seek to extend their 
generalizations and justifications to higher order polygons whenever the opportunity prevails. 
 
In particular, through reflecting on their logical explanations for their respective earlier 
conjecture generalizations (i.e. equilateral triangle, rhombus and pentagon) all eight  PMTs 





method’. This method with some provided scaffolding and guidance by the researcher, 
especially earlier on with rhombus and pentagon problems, enabled them to eventually 
extend and extrapolate in order to construct both a generalization as well as a logical 
explanation to justify the invariance of the distance sum in an equi-sided convex polygon. 
This cognitive move by each of the eight PMTs, affirms that they saw a generalization of 
Viviani’s theorem advance through their logical explanations for their earlier generalizations, 
and were also able to deduce the General Proof (i.e. proof of the generalization for any equi-
sided polygon) from these. Furthermore, this recognition of the ‘general through the 
particular’, shows how the insight that the pre-service teachers gained via the process of 
constructing logical explanations to justify their earlier conjecture generalizations, enabled 
them to eventually ‘deductively’ discover a generalization of Viviani’s theorem. This 
realization affirmed the fact that the discovery function of proof does not exist in isolation 
from the explanatory function of proof, but rather that these functions interact with each other 
in a mutualistic way to construct new knowledge. This kind of  disposition to the phenomena 
of generalizing and justifying (or proving), which enabled the pre-service teachers  to 
construct and justify a general generalization through self-discovery and some guidance 
should be built into pre-service mathematics teacher education curriculums to inculcate and 
promote mathematical thinking and sense making amongst them (see Leong et al., 2011; 
Schoenfeld, 1992; Tall, 1991). 
 
Furthermore, this study showed that through initial and subsequent experimentation (see De 
Villiers, 2004) within a dynamic geometry context, pre-service mathematics teachers 
experienced genuine mathematical processes like abstracting, specializing, generalizing, 
conjecturing, global and heuristic refutation. In this study, experimentation embraced the use 
of non-deductive methods, and provided the space for pre-service mathematics to use 
intuitive, inductive or analogical reasoning to make their initial conjectures, particularly in 
the equilateral triangle, rhombus and pentagon problems. Through experimentation, pre-
service mathematics teachers generalized their conjecture, experienced heuristic counter-
examples to assumptions that played a part in the formation of their initial conjectures and 
finally led to  re-formulation of their conjecture or conjecture generalization. As evidenced in 
this study the process of experimentation made it possible for students to first encounter a 
new idea and then generalize such an idea and also extend the resultant generalization further 
to other domains via inductive and/or analogical reasoning (see Polya, 1954a). Thus, teachers 
and teacher educators should look at opportunities within their teaching curriculum that allow 





generalize a conjecture, experience a counter-example (see Lakatos, 1976) that cause some 
perturbation and cause them to abandon their conjecture or modify their conjecture.  
 
As reported in this study, through a heuristic counter-example to assumption(s) informing the 
development of their initial conjecture(s), PMTs experienced some perturbations (i.e. 
cognitive conflict) within their ‘regular polygon schema’ and hence cognitive disequilibrium. 
Through the process of conceptual change, PMTs modified their ‘regular polygon schema’, 
i.e. corrected their regularity misconception, and in so doing restored their cognitive 
equilibrium PMTs (see Balacheff, 1991; Komatsu, 2010; Lee et al., 2003; Piaget, 1978, 1985; 
Von Glasersfeld, 1989). This suggests that mathematics teacher educators can promote the 
conceptual growth of their pre-service mathematics teachers by identifying and creating 
similar opportunities that allow them to interact with mathematical tasks, reveal 
misconceptions and use experimental approaches to correct such misconceptions (Slavin, 
1997).  In other words, through appropriate pedagogical strategies mathematics teacher 
educators can promote experimentation, refutation, discussion, justification and reasoning, 
and thus help their pre-service mathematics to appropriately reorganize their own conceptions 
(see Clements and Battista, 1990; Cobb & Bauersfeld, 1995; Cobb, Yackel & McCalin, 2000, 
Ryan & Williams, 2000; Tsamir & Tirosh, 2003, Clements & Battista, 1990).  
 
Classroom practitioners should be aware that conceptual change is synonymous with Piaget’s 
notions of disequilibrium (i.e. cognitive conflict), accommodation and assimilation, and 
hence when students exhibit misconceptions in their thinking, they should first provide such 
students with a discrepant event that enables them to experience some degree of cognitive 
conflict that not only causes them to be surprised but also to become cognitively disturbed 
(i.e. experience cognitive disequilibrium) (see Eggen & Kauchak, 2007; Piaget, 1978, 1985; 
Posner et al.,1984).  Whilst in this state of cognitive disequilibrium, students should be 
allowed to experiment further to derive convincing evidence that their existing conception is 
indeed either fully or partially invalid. When this heightened convincing happens, the 
probability of changing their existing conceptions is more likely to occur. However, to foster 
such a conceptual change it is essential that students accommodate their thinking so that the 
alternate (or new) conception becomes intelligible or makes sense (see Eggen and Kauchak, 
2007; Piaget, 1978, 1985; Posner et al., 1984). Teachers can gauge such sense making 
through checking whether the students can successfully explain a solution to a problem using 






Lastly, from a conceptual change perspective, the new conception must enable the students to  
re-establish their desired cognitive equilibrium (i.e. be fruitful), and enable students to 
assimilate new experiences. That means that the new conception should create new pathways 
of enquiry and also be expanded to make sense of other experiences when the need arises or 
simply explain additional examples or cases (see Berger, 2004; Gage & Berliner, 1992; 
Eggen & Kauchak, 2007; Hadas, Hershkowitz & Schwartz, 2000; Piaget, 1978, 1985; Posner 
et al. 1984; Tirosh &  Graeber, 1990; Zazkis & Chernoff, 2008). 
 
As reported in this study, scaffolding was provided to all PMTs to assist them to develop a  
logical explanation for their equilateral triangle conjecture generalization. Although 
scaffolding was provided in the subsequent task based activities associated with the rhombus 
and pentagon problems, the degree and extent of the scaffolding decreased as PMTs moved 
from the equilateral problem to the pentagon problem. As posited by Snowman, McCown & 
Biehler (2009), this reduction in the need for scaffolded guidance affirms that the scaffolded 
guidance enabled the PMTs to gradually internalize the required knowledge and skills with a 
fair degree of insight, and in the process became increasingly self-regulated and independent 
as they progressed in an evolutionary manner from one task to the next. In fact they became 
so independent, that through the processes of subsumption, all PMTs saw that their ‘triangle- 
area’ algebraic proof for the regular pentagon could be used  analogicallyand also logically to 
justify their conjecture generalization for any equi-sided pentagon, and hence went on to 
produce a coherent ‘triangle-area’ logical explanation also on their own. This kind of 
development typically represented a trajectory of conceptual growth in each of the pre-
service mathematics teachers. 
 
Thus, for the purposes of successful teaching and learning, it is imperative that when a  
student cannot initially make progress with a given problem or task on his/her own, the 
facilitator ought to be able to diagnose the problem to ascertain the conceptual and procedural 
difficulties the student is experiencing or what else is hindering/blocking the student from 
making progress. Then according to the diagnosis by the facilitator, scaffolding should be 
given to provide the students with sufficient support at the beginning of the intervention. This 
procedure was followed to advance the development of a logical explanation for the 
equilateral triangle conjecture generalization in the study. Then as illustrated in this study, the 
facilitator may diminish such support as and when a student progresses with a similar kind 
task (or connected problem) to make allowance for the student to take increasing 





Puntambekar & Hubscher, 2005; Slavin, 1997; Snowman, McCown & Biehler 2009; Wood, 
Bruner, & Ross, 1976).  
 
Furthermore, this study showed that reasoning by analogy was used extensively by the pre-
service mathematics teachers to extend their generalizations to higher order polygons and 
even to logically explain why such generalizations are generally true. This is consistent with 
De Villiers’ (2008, p. 34) assertion that: “Analogy is often a powerful means of extending or 
applying mathematical results to other domains.” In particular the findings of this study 
demonstrated pre-service mathematics teachers were able to deductively construct their 
generalization for the general equi-sided polygon case, with the aid of analogical reasoning, 
and indeed produce their coherent logical explanation through a process of parallel transfer as 
suggested by Gentner’s theory of Structural Mapping Theory (Gentner, 1983,1989). This 
typically exemplifies the role that analogy can play in the discovery and invention of new 
mathematical knowledge (see (see De Villiers, 2008; English, 1998; Gentner 1983,1989; Lee 
& Sriraman, 2011; Polya, 1954a , 1981). 
 
In a sense, the extent of the use of analogical reasoning in the processes of generalizing and 
justifying in this study, resonates with Polya’s (1954a, p. 17) assertion: “Analogy seems to 
have a share in all discoveries, but in some it has the lion’s share”. Taking cognizance of the 
powerful role of analogical reasoning as illustrated in this study, it becomes prudent for 
mathematics teacher educators and practicing mathematics teachers to promote the use of 
analogy in their classrooms through appropriate and relevant activities, which are within the 
range of their prescribed curricula, so that their students (or learners) can likewise conjecture 
and justify generalizations, and then extend them across to other domains via the use of 
analogy on their own. 
 
Apart from Polya (1954a), who emphasized the role of analogical reasoning in problem 
solving, Holyoak and Thagard (1989) also illustrated that analogical reasoning can assist 
students to adapt to new novel contexts. Novick (1988) and White and Mitchelmore  (2010) 
also showed that students can transfer a representation from one context to the next via 
analogy-making (as described by Getner’s Structure Mapping Theory).  Furthermore, Benson 
(2007, p .4) as cited in De Villiers (2008) argues that the ability to recognize and use 
analogies is pivotal in attempting to solve problems primarily because it: “allows the solver to 
connect the familiar (a previously used method, strategy, or context) to the unfamiliar (a new 





problem may enable the student to adapt a known procedure for use with the target problem, 
thus precluding the necessity of constructing a new procedure. Thus it is imperative that 
mathematics teacher educators and practicing mathematics teachers understand analogies 
themselves and know how to design tasks that provide a space for their students to use 
analogical reasoning to discover new generalizations and/or their proofs. Pre-service 
mathematics teachers and practicing mathematics teachers ought to be exposed to task- based 
activities similar to those used in this study, so that they can develop a deeper understanding 
of how to use analogies (or analogical reasoning) to promote the discovery and justification 
of generalizations as well as problem solving amongst their learners, when they take up their 
positions as mathematics teachers in schools. 
 
12.3 Limitations of this study 
In this section, limitations associated with the sample, period of data collection, researcher 
role and shortage of time are presented respectively in Sections 12.3.1, 12.3.2, 12.3.3 and 
12.3.4. 
12.3.1  Sample of the study: 
This study consisted of a sample of only eight final year PMTs. This sample is small and 
extending the sample would have given more reliable results. Therefore, it is difficult to state 
to what extent the findings of this study would be generalizable. Given the thick 
‘descriptions’ presented in this study of the kinds of generalizations and justifications that all 
eight pre-service teachers constructed as well as how they arrived at their generalizations and 
justifications, it is plausible that pre-service mathematics teachers at other higher education 
institutions may move along similar ways of generalizing and justifying in mathematics with 
the same problem or problems of a similar kind. In this regard, the major concern will be for 
the reader to determine to what extent the findings of this study are applicable to a particular 
situation (Guba & Lincoln, 1993). However, one should bear in mind that the aim of the 
study was not to generalize but to provide qualitative data and analysis thereof which other 
teacher educators or researchers can find useful and applicable to their own particular setting. 
12.3.2  Period of Data Collection  
As this was a large in-depth study, data had to be collected for the four problems through 
one-to-one task-based interviews taking place within a dynamic geometry environment in a 





each PMT. The first session was limited to the equilateral triangle problem, and the second 
session dealt with the rhombus, pentagon and the general equi-sided convex polygon 
problems because during his planning for data collection the researcher had an intuitive sense 
that each of these sessions would take a great deal  of time. In fact, the amount of time that 
was consumed for the first session ranged from 25 minutes to 50 minutes, whilst the time 
taken for the second session ranged from 45 minutes to 80 minutes per PMT.  
 
As this data was collected during University session times, the researcher could only engage 
each PMT in their respective one-to-one task based interview sessions when they were free, 
i.e. when they were not attending lectures. With this constraint, it was feasible for the 
researcher to do one task-based interview on some days and two on other days. Thus the data 
collection phase took about 10 days. During these 10 days, the researcher asked the pre-
service mathematics teachers not to discuss any of the task-based problems or interview 
questions with their colleagues that were participating in this research. Despite this plea from 
the researcher, there is no guarantee that participating PMTs did not discuss the task-based 
problems and interview questions with their colleagues.  If such discussions happened it is 
not easy to rationalize or factor in its net influence on the results of this study. 
 
Thus, taking all this into cognizance, the researcher at first collected data via the one-to-one 
task-based interviews for the equilateral problem from all eight PMTs, and only thereafter 
proceeded with the second one-to-one task-based interview sessions to collect data associated 
with each of the three remaining problems. Thus the data for the equilateral triangle problem 
was collected during the first week, whilst the data for the remaining three problems was 
collected in the second week. As discussed in Chapters 7 and 10, there were five out of the 
eight PMTs who did not immediately see the connection between the equilateral triangle 
problem and rhombus problem, and it is not certain if the time delay of at least a week 
between sessions 1 and 2 could have contributed in some way to their not being able to 
immediately extend their generalization from the equilateral triangle case to the rhombus 
case. In fact six of them had to experimentally explore by using Sketchpad to arrive at the 
rhombus conjecture generalization. 
 
12.3.3 Researcher as data collector and analyser of data 
Although the data for this study came from the one-to-one task- based interviews which were 





mathematics teachers, and their dynamic geometry moves were also recorded by using 
Snagit. However, the researcher was the only person collecting and analysing the data. 
Hence, my own personal philosophy about teaching and learning mathematics, developed 
from ten years of experience as a high school teacher and seventeen years of experience in 
mathematics teacher education, could have had a potential bias in the process of data 
collection and the subsequent analyses of the data. Taking into consideration the possibility 
of such bias, the researcher took the necessary precaution to minimize any bias by recording 
salient aspects, thoughts, clarifications, dissonances, reflections, ‘aha’ moments, insights and 
decisions as and when they occurred during the one- to- one task based interview in a note 
book.  Furthermore, the triangulation of the data with task-based interview transcripts; 
worksheet responses and Snagit recordings affirms the findings of this study. All these data 
sources have been stored securely, and are available to any other researcher should they want 
to query any of the findings. 
12.3.4  Exploring other possible generalizations of Viviani’s Theorem  
As discussed in Sections 6.5 and 12.3.2, the time taken to conduct and complete one-to-one 
task based interview across all the task based problems was quite extensive. Hence, there was 
no further time in this study to explore other generalizations to Viviani’s theorem, like 
Generalizing to concave equilateral polygons, generalizing to any equi-angled polygon or any 
2n-gon with opposite parallel sides.  
 
12.4  Recommendations for Further Research 
The following recommendations for further research are made on the basis of the results that 
emerged from this study: 
 
12.4.1  The generalization of Viviani’s theorem for equilateral triangles to a sequence  
           of equilateral concave polygons of four sides (rhombi), five sides (pentagons) and  
general concave equilateral n-gons should be explored. If for example, one could 
explore a non-convex pentagon (which could be created by dragging in the mystery 
pentagon), one would find that the sum of the distances to the edges is a constant only 
for some part of the polygon, but switches to a variable quantity as the point is moved 
into interior regions, where the point does not ‘see’ along interior rays. It would be an 
interesting further exploration to see if the students could adapt and modify their 





12.4.2 A further exploration could focus on what generalizations could be made for points p 
exterior to even the equilateral triangle, or more so as to when do the sum of the areas 
of the triangles created = area of the polygon. More generally, what sign pattern 
should be used to compute the area of the polygon from areas of the triangles 
connected to a general point p. 
12.4.3 This study has shown that PMTs have cognitively grown in their ways of generalizing 
as they progressed through the sequence of task based problems. For example, this 
cognitive growth (or development) is evident in the regular pentagon case as most 
students made their initial generalizations on analogical grounds without effectively 
using Sketchpad, whilst none of the PMTs used Sketchpad when they constructed 
their equi-sided polygon generalization of Viviani’s Theorem. Research conducted on 
a larger scale with pre-service mathematics teachers to establish whether similar 
results can be obtained would be valuable. Perhaps an investigation can be carried out 
to see whether these results can also be obtained in a non-dynamic geometry 
environment. 
12.4.4 This research study could be repeated as follows:  
 Across other geometric content 
 Across another area within mathematics, for example trigonometry, calculus, 
algebra or data handling. 
 In a whole classroom situation where the social-constructivist dynamics of the 
interaction might be different and more complex. 
 With learners or practicing teachers at school 
12.4.5  More in-depth research be carried out to explore the extent that mathematics teacher  
educators and/or practicing mathematics teachers engage their students (or learners) 
with meaningful learning activities and pedagogical processes that promote cognitive 
conflict and conceptual change to help students (or learners) to not only eliminate 
misconceptions but refine and establish generalizations. In a much broader way, 
further research could encompass identifying misconceptions across mathematics at 
school among learners as well as teachers, and seeking ways to remediate them 
possibly by creating cognitive conflict. 
12.4.6 In conducting further research as described in 12.4.3, the following theoretical 
frameworks should be considered: Piaget’s equilibration theory (see discussion in 
Section 4.6) which embraces the processes of assimilation, disequilibrium and 





processes of subsumption, namely  derivative subsumption and correlative 
subsumption (see discussion in Section 4.5). 
12.4.7 In order to make the task of proving in our classrooms more accessible and 
meaningful from both an explanatory and a discovery perspective of proof, further 
research on a much larger scale could be conducted on the plausibility of engaging 
pre-service mathematics teachers, practicing mathematics teachers and/or school 
learners in the processes of generic proving across a broader range of mathematical 
content topics. This could serve as a vehicle to allow the possibility of good practices 
to permeate our mathematics classrooms at schools, where practicing mathematics 
teachers and/or learners can then also engage in development of proof from 
explanatory and discovery perspectives as well (see Section 5.4 for discussion on 
functions of proof).  
12.4.8 Further research could explore the other two possible generalizations of Viviani’s  
 theorem in the plane: 
 “The sum of the distances from an interior point to the sides of any equi-
angular polygon constant; 
 The sum of the distances from an interior point to the sides of any 2n-gon with 
opposite parallel sides is constant”  
                     (see http://frink.machighway.com/~dynamicm/viviani-general.html). 
12.4.9  Research could also focus on generalizing the Viviani result to 3D. One such  
example is the following possibility:  
“The sum of the distances from a point P to the faces of a tetrahedron with faces of  
  equal area, is constant” (see http://frink.machighway.com/~dynamicm/viviani- 
 general.html). 
12.4.10  More-over research could focus on generalizing and exploring the Viviani result in 
             non-Euclidean geometries, i.e. hyperbolic, elliptic and taxicab geometry. 
12.4.11  Other studies could focus on the processes of conjecturing and refutations, or 
  perhaps even other more formal processes of mathematics such as defining and 
  classifying. 
12.4.12 Another study could also investigate what intuitions learners and prospective teachers 










Alexander, J. (2004). Meaningful reception learning and schema theory. Retrieved 27 July, 
 2010, from   
http://www.indiana.edu/~p50alex/P540summer2004/P540Summer2004online/unit4  
Alexander, P.A., White, C.S., & Duagherty, M. (1997). Analogical reasoning and early  
mathematics learning. In L.D. English (Ed.), Mathematical reasoning: Analogies, 
metaphors, and images (pp. 117 -147). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc. 
Allen, R. (2006). The South African Oxford School Dictionary(2
nd
 ed.). Cape Town: ABC  
Press. 
Alibert, D., & Thomas, M.(1991). Research on Mathematical proof. In D. Tall (Ed.).  
Advanced Mathematical Thinking (pp. 215-230). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Almeida, D. (2010). Misconceptions in mathematics and diagnostic teaching. Retrieved  
30 March, 2010 from 
http://exeter.academia.edu/DennisAlmeida/Talks/31014/Misconceptions_in_mathema
tics_and_diagnostic_teaching. 
Alwyn, P.W., & Dindyal, J. (2009). Analogical Reasoning Errors in Mathematics at Junior 
CollegeLevel. In R.Hunter, B. Bicknell, & T. Burgess (Eds.), Crossing divides: 
Proceedings of the 32
nd
 annual conference of the Mathematics Education Research 
Group of Australasia (Vol1). Palmerston North, NZ: MERGA. Retrieved 16 August, 
2010, from www.merga.net.au/publicaions/counter.php?pub =pub_conf&id =781.  
Al-Eissa, A.I.(2009). Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence: The Case of Saudi  
 Arabia. Victoria University: Melbourne.  
Anderson, J. (1996). The place of proof in school mathematics. Mathematics Teaching,  
155, 33-39. 
Anderson, R.C., Nguyen-Jahiel, K., McNurlen, B., Archodidou, A., Kim, S.Y., Reznitskaya, 
A., Tillmanns, M., & Gilbert, L. (2001). The snowball phenomenon: spread of ways 
of talking and ways of thinking across groups of children. Cognition and Instruction, 
19, 1-46. 
Appel, K. & Haken, W. (1977). The solution of the four colour map problem. Scientific  
 American, 237 (4), 108-121. 





 Practice: Toward a Better Understanding. High School Journal, 84(2), 35-52. 
Appleton, K. (1997). Analysis and Description of Students’ Learning during Science Classes  
Using a Constructivist-Based Model.  Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 
34(3), 303-318. 
Ausubel, D.P.(1962). A subsumption theory of meaningful verbal learning and retention.  
Journal of General Psychology, 66, 213-224. 
Ausubel, D.P. (1968). Educational Pyschology: A cognitive view. New York: Holt, Rinehart 
 & Winston 
Ausubel, D.P., Novak, J.D., & Hanesian, H.(1978). Educational psychology: A cognitive view  
 (2
nd
 ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Ausubel, D.P., & Youssef, M. (1963). Role of discriminablity in meaningful parallel learning. 
 Journal of Educational Psychology, 54, 331-336. 
Australian Educational Council. (1991). A National Statement on Mathematics for 
 Australian Schools. Carlton, Victoria, Austria: Curriculum Corporation. 
Aziz, A.W.B., Razali, A.B., Hasan, L.B.C., & Yunos, Y.A.B.M. (2009). Cognitive Learning  
theories and its implication on science classroom teaching. Retrieved 12 December,  
2010 from http://www.slideshare.net/niena17/learning- theory-by-ausubel. 
Bachus,G.T.,& Vagrant, L. (n.d). Valid and Invalid Arguments. Retrieved on 5 January 2010 
from http://www.bbc.co.ik/dna/h2g2/A821107. 
Balacheff, N. (1988). Aspects of proof in pupils practice of school mathematics. In 
D.Pimm (Ed.), Mathematics, Teachers and Children (pp.216-235). London: Hodder 
 & Stoughton. 
Balacheff, N. (1991). Treatment of refutations: Aspects of the complexity of a constructivist 
 approach to mathematics learning. In E. von Glasersfeld (Ed.), Radical 
 Constructivism in Mathematics Education (pp. 89-110). Netherlands: Kluwer  
Academic Publishers. 
Ball, D.L., & Bass, H. (2003). Making Mathematics reasonable in school. In  J.Kilpatrick, 
 W.G. Martin, & D. Schifter (Eds.). A research companion to Principles and  
 Standards for School Mathematics (pp.27-24). Reston, VA: National Council of 
Teachers of Mathematics. 
Battista, M.T. (2009). Highlights of Research on Learning School Geometry. In T.V. Craine 
(Ed.), Understanding Geometry for a Changing World, Seventy–first Yearbook of the 





Battista, M.T., & Clements, D.H. (1995).  Geometry and Proof. Mathematics Teacher, 88(1),  
 48-54. 
Becker, J.R. & Rivera, F. (2005). Generalization strategies of beginning high school algebra 
students. In H.L. Chick & J.L. Vincent (Eds.), Proceedings of the 29
th 
Conference for 
the Psychology of Mathematics Education (Vol.4, pp. 1211-128). Melbourne: PME. 
Bell, A.W. (1976). A study of pupils’ proof-explanations in mathematical situations. 
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 7(1), 23-40. 
Bell, J. (2005). Doing your research project: A guide for first-time Researchers in education, 
health and social science. (4th ed.) Maidenhead: Open University. 
Belland, B. R., Glazewski, K. D., & Richardson, J. C. (2008). A scaffolding framework to 
support the construction of evidence-based arguments among middle school students. 
Educational Technology Research and Development, 56 (4), 401-422 
Ben-Ari, M. (2001). Constructivism in Computer Science Education. Journal of Computers 
in Mathematics and Science Teaching, 20 (1), 45-73. 
Bennett, D. (2002). Exploring Geometry with The Geoemter’s Sketchpad. Emeryville,  
 California: Key Curriculum Press. 
Ben–Zeev, T. (1996). When erroneous mathematical thinking is just as correct; the 
 oxymoron of rational errors. In R.J. Steenberg, T. Ben- Zeev (Eds.), The Nature of 
Mathematical Thinking (pp. 55-79). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Ben-Zeev, T. (1998). Rational errors and Mathematical Mind. Review of General 
Psychology, 2(4): 366-383. 
Berger, K.S. (2004). The developing person through the life span (6
th
 ed.). New York: Worth 
Publishers. 
Beth, E.W., & Piaget, J. (1966). Mathematical Epistemology and Psycholgy. Dordrecht, 
 Holland: D. Reidel. 
Bieda, K.N. (2010). Enacting Proof-Related Tasks in Middle School Mathematics:  
Challenges and Opportunities. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 41(4), 
351-382. 
Biemans, H.J.A., & Simons, P.R.J. (1999).Computer –Assisted instructional strategies for 
 promoting conceptual change. In W. Schnotz, S. & M. Carretero (Eds.), Advanced 
learning and instruction series: New perspectives on conceptual change (pp.247-
262). New York: Elsevier Science Ltd. 





Collaborative Problem Solving in Teacher Education. The Montanna Mathematics 
Enthusiast, 4(1), 1-30.  
Blanton, M., & Kaput, J. (2002, April). Developing elementary teachers’ algebra "eyes and  
ears": Understanding characteristics of professional development that promote 
generative and self-sustaining change in teacher practice. Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, 
LA. 
Blanton, M.L., Stylianou, D.A., & David, M.M. (2003). The nature of scaffolding in 
undergraduate students’ transition to mathematical proof. In N.A. Pateman, B.J. 
Dougherty, & J. Zillox (Eds.), Proceedings of the  27
th
 PME International Conference 
(Vol.2, pp. 1113-120). Honolulu, Hawaii: Center for Research and Development 
Group, University of Hawaii. Retrieved 16 June, 2010, from  
www.lettredelapreuve.it/OldPreuve/PME/PME27/RR_blanton.pdf. 
Block, J. (1982). Assimilation , accommodation, and the dynamics of personality 
development. Child development, 3(2), 281-295. 
Bodner, G.M. (1986). Constructivism: A theory of Knowledge. Journal of Chemical 
Education, 63(10), 873-877. 
Bogdan, R.C., &  Biklen, S.K.  (1998). Qualitative research for education: An introduction to  
theory and methods. ( 3
rd
 ed.). Needham Heights, M.A:: Allyn & Bacon. 
Bolt, B., & Hobbs, D. (2004). A Mathematical Dictionary for Schools. New York:  
Cambridge University Press. 
Borko, H., Liston, D., & Whitcomb, J.A. (2007). Genres of Empirical Research in Teacher 
 Education. Journal of Teacher Education, 58(3), 3-11. 
Bredo, E & Feinberg, W. (1982). Knowledge and values in social and educational research.  
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Brodie, K. (2010). Teaching mathematical reasoning in secondary classrooms. Dordrecht: 
 Springer. 
Brookes, J.G., &  Brooks, M.G. (2001). In search of understanding: the case for 
 constructivist classrooms. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall. 
Bruner, J.S. (1960). The process of Education. Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press. 
Bruner, J.S. (1966). Toward a theory of instruction. New York: Norton. 
Bruner, J.S. (1967). On knowing: Essays for the left hand. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard  
University. 
Bruner, J.S. (1973). Going beyond Information Given. New York: Norton. 





Bruner, J.S. (1985). Vygotsky: A historical and conceptual perspective. In J.V. Wertsch   
(Ed.),Culture, communication and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives. Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Bruner, J.S. (1986). Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
 Press. 
Bryman, A., & Burgess, R.G. (2000). Analyzing qualitative data. New York: Routledge. 
Bull, S., Jackson, T., & Lancaster, M. (2010). Students’ interest in their misconceptions in 
first-year electrical circuits and mathematics courses. International Journal of 
Electrical Engineering Education, 47(3), 307-318. 
Cabassut, R. (2005). Argumentation and proof in examples taken from French and German 
textbooks. In M. Bosch (Ed.), Proceedings of 4th CERME (Congress of European 
Research in Mathematics Education) (pp.391-400). Sant Feliu de Guixols, Spain: 
University Ramon Llull. Retrieved 7 May, 2010, from 
www.lettredelapreuve.it/OldPreuve/.../CERME4Cabassut.pdf 
Candas, M.C., & Castro, E. (2005). A proposal for the categorisation for analysing inductive  
reasoning. In M.Bosch (Ed.), Proceedings of CERME 4 International Conference (pp. 
401-408). Sant Feliu de Guixols, Spain.  Retrieved 5 July, 2010, from  
http://ermeweb.free.fr/CERME4. 
Canadas, M.C., Deulofu, J., Figuerias, L., Reid, D., & Yevdokimov, A. (2007). The 
conjecturing process: Perspectives in theory and implications in practice. Journal of 
Teaching and Learning, 5(1), 55-72. 
Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Carpenter, T.P., & Levi, L. (1999, April). Developing conceptions of algebraic reasoning in 
the primary grades. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, Montreal, Canada. 
Carraher, D.W., Martinez, M.V., & Schliemann,  A.D. (2008). Early algebra and 
 mathematical  generalization.  ZDM Mathematics Education, 40, 3-22. 
DOI 10.1007/s11858-007-0067-7. 
Caroll, J.M. & Swatman, P.A. (2000): Structured-case: A methodological framework for  
building theory in information systems research. Proceedings of European 
Conference in  Information Systems. Vienna, July 3-5
th
, pp.116-123.  
Carroll, J.B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities. A survey of factor-analytic studies.  
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Carter, P. , Govender, R., & Heany, F. ( 2007). Focus on Mathematics Grade 12. Cape Town:  





Chazan, D. (1993). High School Geometry Students’ Justification for their views of empirical  
evidence and Mathematical Proof. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 24 (4), 359- 
387. 
Chin, C.A., & Brewer, W.F. (1993). The role of anomalous data in knowledge acquisition: A  
 theoretical framework and implications for science education. Review of Educational 
Research, 63, 1-49. 
Cho, K., & Jonassen, D.H. (2002). The effects of argumentation scaffolds on argumentation  
and problem solving. Educational Technology Research and Development, 50(3), 5-
22. 
Christou, C., & Papageorgiou, E. (2007). A framework of mathematics inductive reasoning.  
 Learning and Instruction, 17, 55-66. 
Clark, A.M., Anderson, R.C., Kuo, L.J., Kim, I.H., Archodidou, A., & Nguyen-Jahiel, 
 K.(2003). Collaborative reasoning: Expanding ways for children to talk and think in  
school. Educational Pyschology Review, 15, 181-198. 
Clements, D.H. (2003). Teaching and learning geometry. In J. Kilpatrick, W.G. Martin & D.  
Schifter (Eds.), Research Companion to Principles and Standards for School 
Mathematics (pp. 151-178). Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics. 
Clements, D.H., & Battista, M.T. (1990). Constructivist Learning and Teaching. The  
Arithmetic Teacher, 38(1), 34-35. 
Clements, D.H., & Battista, M.T. Geometry and Spatial Reasoning. (1992). In D.A.Grouws 
(Ed.), Handbook of Research on Mathematics Teaching and Learning (pp. 420-464).  
Reston, Va: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics and Macmillan Publishing 
Co.  
Cobb, P. (1988). The Tension Between Theories of Learning and Instruction in Mathematics 
Education. Educational Pyschologist, 23(2), 87-103. 
Cobb, P., & Bauersfeld, H. (1995). The emergence of mathematical meaning: Interaction in 
classroom cultures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Cobb, P., & Yackel, E. (1996). Constructivsit, emergent, and sociocultural perspectives in the 
context of developmental research. Educational Pyschologist, 31, 175-190. 
Cobb, P.E., Yackel, E., & McClain, K. (2000). Symbolizing and communication in 
 mathematics classrooms. Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Coe, R., & Ruthven, K. (1994). Proof Practices and Constructs of Advanced Mathematical 
Students. British Educational Research Journal, 20(1), 41-53.  
Cohen I., Manion L., Morrison, R. (2002). Research methods in Education (5
th






Cohen I., Manion L., Morrison, R. (2004). Research methods in Education (6
th
 Edition).  
London: Routledge. 
Concise Oxford Dictionary Tenth Edition (1995). Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
Confrey, J.  (1990). A review of research on student conceptions in mathematics, science and  
programming. In C.B.  Cazden (Ed.), Review of research in Education (Vol. 16, pp.3- 
56). Washington: American Educational Research Association. 
Confrey, J. (1990). What constructivism implies for teaching. In R. Davis, V.Maher, & N. 
 Noddings (Eds.), Constructivist views on the teaching and learning of mathematics. 
Monograph 4, pp. 107-122. 
Confrey, J. (1991). Learning to listen: A student’s understanding of powers of ten. In E. von 
Glasersfeld (Ed.), Radical constructivism in Mathematics Education (pp.111-138). 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Cooper, S. (2009). Theories of Learning in Educational Psychology: David Ausubel: 
 Meaningful Verbal Learning & Subsumption Theory. Retrieved 20  June, 2010, from 
http:/www.lifecircles-inc.com/Learning theories/constructivism/asusubel.html 
Cox, D.A. (1994). Introduction to Fermat’s last Theorem. The American Monthly, 101 (1),  
3-14. Retrieved 3 September, 2010 from http:/www/jstor.org/stable/2325116. 
Cresswell, J.W. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
 Approaches . (2
nd
 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Creswell, J.W., & Miller, D.L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. Theory  
 into practice, 39(3), 124-130. 
Crystal-Alberta Outreach .(2010). Mathematics Reasoning Text. Retrieved 15 September,  
2010, from http://uofaweb.ualberta.ca/crystaloutreach/nav01.cfm?nav01=60602. 
Daniel, D.1997. Women and non-formal Education in South Africa: Creating and  
empowering  experience. Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University. 
Darmon, H., Diamond, F., & Taylor, R. (2007). Fermat’s last Theorem. Retrieved  
 1 October, 2010, from 
 http://www.math.mcgill.ca/darmon/pub/Articles/Expository/05.DDT/paper.pdf. 
Davis, J. (2011). Conceptual Change- Emerging perspectives on learning, teaching and 
 technology. Downloaded from internet on 20 July 2011, 
  http://projects.coe.uga.edu/epltt/index.php?title = Conceptual_Change 
Davis, P.J, & Hersh, R. (1983). The Mathematical Experience. Great Britain: Pelican Books. 





 Education. Sydney, Australia: Croom Helm. 
Davydov, V.V. (1990). Type of generalization in instruction: Logical and psychological 
problems in the structuring of school curricula. In J.Kilpatrick (Ed.), Soviet studies in 
mathematics education (Vol.2). Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics. 
Dekkers, P.M., & Thijs, G.D. (1998). Making productive use of students’ initial concept of 
  force. Science Education, 82, 31-51. 
Denscombe, M. (1998). The Good Research Guide for Small- scale Social Research Projects.  
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Denzin, N.K (1978). The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods.  
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Denzin, N.K. (1978b). Sociological Methods: A Source Book. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Book  
Company.  
Denzin, N.K., & Lincoln, Y.S. (2005). Introduction: the discipline and practice of qualitative 
 research. In N.Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (Eds), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (3
rd
 ed.) (pp.1-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Department for Education. (1995). Mathematics in the National Curriculum. London: Her 
 Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
Department of Education (2002a): National Curriculum Statement: Overview. Pretoria:  
Government Printer. 
Department of Education (2002b): Revised National Curriculum Statement for Grades R-9  
(Schools): Mathematics. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
Department of Education (2003a):  National Curriculum Statement for Grades 10-12 
(Schools). Mathematics. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
Department of Education (2003b): Revised National Curriculum Statement for Grades R-9 
(Schools): Teacher’s guide for the development of Learning Programmes:  
Mathematics. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
Department of Education (2003c): Revised National Curriculum Statement for Grades  
10-12(Schools): Teacher’s guide for the development of Learning Programmes: 
Mathematics. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
Department of Basic Education. (2011a). Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement for  
Further Education and Training Phase Grades 10-12: Mathematics. Pretoria: Printing 
Works. 
 Department of Basic Education. (2011b). Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement for  





Department of Basic Education. (2011c). Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement for 
Intermediate Phase Grades 4-6: Mathematics. Pretoria: Government Printing Works.  
Department of Basic Education. (2011d). Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement for  
   Intermediate Phase Grades 1-3: Mathematics. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. 
De Koning, E., Sijtsma,K., & Hammers,J. (2003). Construction and validation of test for  
           inductive reasoning. European Journal for Pschological Assessment, 19(1), 24-39. 
Delgarno, B. (2001). Interpretations of constructivism and consequences of computer assisted  
learning. British Journal of Educational Technology, 32(2), 183-194. 
Desmet. L., Gregoire, J., Mussolin, C. (2010). Developmental changes in the comparison of 
decimal fractions. Learning and Instruction, 20, 521-532. 
De Villiers, M. 1986. The role of axiomatization in mathematics and mathematics teaching. 
RUMEUS studies in Mathematics Education No.2. Stellenbosch, South Africa: 
Research Unit for Mathematics Education of the University of Stellenbosch 
(RUMEUS). 
De Villiers, M. (1990). The role and function of proof in mathematics. Pythagoras, 24, 17- 
 24. 
De Villiers, M. ( 1991). Pupil’s needs for conviction and explanation with the context of 
 geometry. Pythagoras, 26, 18-27. 
De Villiers, M. (1992). Children’s acceptance of theorems in geometry. Poster presented at 
PME 16, 6-11 August 1992, University of New Hamsphire, U.S.A. Retrieved 10 
November, 2012, from http://mzone.mweb.co.za/residents/profmd/accept.pdf 
De Villiers, M. (1992). Inductive and deductive reasoning: logic and proof. In M.  
Moodley, R.A. Njisane, & N.C. Presmeg (Eds.), Mathematics Education for In-
service and Pre-service Teachers (pp.45-59). Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter. 
De Villiers, M. 1996. Some Adventures in Euclidean Geometry. Durban, South Africa: 
 University of Durban-Westville.  
De Villiers, M. (1998). An alternative approach to proof in dynamic geometry. In R. Lehrer 
 & D. Chazan (Eds.), Designing Learning Environments for Developing and  
Understanding of Geometry and Space (pp. 369-394). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence 
 Erlbaum Associates. 
De Villiers, M. (1999). Rethinking proof with the Geometer’s Sketchpad 3. Emeryville, CA:  
Key Curriculum Press. 
De Villiers, M. (2002). Developing Understanding for Different Roles of Proof in 
Dynamic Geometry. Paper presented at ProfMat 2002, Visue, Portugal. Retrieved 





De Villiers, M. (2003a). Rethinking proof with Geometer’s Sketchpad 4. Emeryville, CA: 
Key Curriculum Press. 
De Villiers (2003b). The Value of Experimentation in Mathematics. Paper presented at the 
9
th
 National congress of AMESA, 30 June-4 July 2003. Retrieved on 5 May 2009 
from http://mzone.mweb.co.za/residents/profmd/homepage.html. 
De Villiers (2004). The Role and Function of Quasi-empirical Methods in Mathematics. 
Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, 4(3), 397-418. 
doi: 10.1080/14926150409556621. 
De Villiers, M. (2007a). A Hexagon Result and it Generalization via Proof. The Montana 
Mathematics Enthusiast, 4(2), 188-192. 
De Villiers, M. (2007b). An example of the discovery function of proof. Mathematics in 
         School, 36(4), 9-11. 
De Villiers, M. (2007c). Some pitfalls of dynamic geometry software. Teaching and Learning 
Mathematics, 4, 46-52.  Retrieved 3 May, 2010, from  
http:/academic.sun.ac.za/mathed/AMESA 
De Villiers, M. (2008). Generalizing the Nagel Line to Circumscribed Polygons by Analogy 
and Constrcutive Defining. Pythagoras, 68, 32-40. 
De Villiers, M. (2009). Some Adventures in Euclidean Geometry. Lulu Publishers: USA. 
De Villiers (2010). Experimentation and proof in Mathematics. In G. Hanna, H.N.Janke 
& H.Pulte (Eds.), Explanation and Proof in Mathematics: Philosophical and 
Education Perspectives (pp. 205-221). New York: Springer. 
De Villiers (2011). 2D Generalizations of Viviani’s Theorem. Retrieved on 7 July 2011 from 
http://frink.machighway.com/~dynamicm/viviani-general.html. 
Devlin, K. (1988). Mathematics: The New Golden Age (1
st 
ed.). England: Penguin Books. 
DiSessa, A. (1988). Knowledge in pieces. In G.Forman, & P.B. Pufall, Constructivism in the 
computer age (pp. 49-70). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
DiSessa, A. (1993). Towards an epistemology of physics. Cognition and Instruction, 10 (2/3), 
 105-225. 
diSessa, A.A. (2006).  A history of conceptual change research: Threads and fault lines. In  
R.K Sawyer (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Learning Sciences (pp.265-281). 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Donald, D., Lazarus, S., & Lolwana, P. (1997). Educational Pyschology in Social Context:  
Challenges of development, social issues, & special need in southern Africa. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press. 





Mathematical Knowledge: Its Growth through Teaching (pp.63-85). Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Douek, N.(1999). Some remarks about argumentation and mathematical proof and their  
educational implications. In I.Schwank (Ed.), European Research in Mathematics   
Education, I, Vol.1 (pp. 128-142). Osnabrueck. Retrieved15  June, 2010, from  
www.fmd.uni-osnabrueck.de/ebooks/erme/cerme1.../papers/g1-douek.pdf 
Douek, N. (2009). Approaching proof in school: From guided conjecturing and proving to a  
story of proof construction. In Proceedings of CERME 6. January 28th –February1st, 
Lyon France. Retrieved 15 August, 2010, from www.inrp.fr/editions/cerme6. 
Dreyfus,T. 1991. The Nature of Advanced Mathematical Thinking. In D. Tall (Ed.),  
Advanced Mathematical Thinking, pp.25-41.Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Driscoll, M.P. (2000). Psychology of learning for instruction. Massachusetts: A Pearson 
Education Company. 
Druyan, S. (1997). Effect of the kinesthetic conflict on promoting scientific reasoning. 
 Journal of  Research in Science Teaching, 34, 1083-1099. 
Dubinsky, E., & Tall, D. (1991). Advanced Mathematical Thinking and the Computer. In  
D.Tall (ed.), Advanced Mathematical Thinking (pp. 231-248). Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Duit, R. (1994). Conceptual change approaches in Science Education. Paper presented at the 
Symposium on Conceptual Change, Jena, Germany. 
Duit,R. (1999). Conceptual change approaches in Science Education. In W. Schnotz, 
S. & M. Carretero (Eds.), Advances learning and instruction series: New perspectives 
on conceptual change (pp.263-282). New York: Elsevier Science Ltd. 
Du Toit, D.J. (1992). Evaluation in mathematics Teaching. In M. Moodley, R.A. Njisane, &  
N.C.Presmeg (Eds.), Mathematics Education for in-service and pre-service teachers, 
pp.111-122. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter. 
Duval, R (1999). Questioning argumentation. International Newsletter on the Teaching and  
 Learning of Mathematical Proof.  Retrieved 5 June, 2010,  from  
http://www.lettredelapreuve.it/OldPreuve/Newsletter/991112Theme/991112ThemeU
K.html 
Duval, R. (2007). Cognitive functioning and understanding of mathematical processes of 
 proof. In P. Boero (Ed.), Theorems in schools: From history of epistemology and 
 cognition to classroom practice (pp. 137-161). Rotterdam, Netherlands: Sense 
 Publishers. 





  Retrieved 12 May, 2009, from 
  http://www2.edc.org/makingmath/Handbook/Teacher/Conjectures/Conjectures.pdf 
Eggen, P., & Kauchak, D. (2007). Educational Psychology: Windows on classrooms (7
th 
 ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall. 
Elkind, D. (1974). Children and Adolescents: Interpretive essays on Jean Piaget. New York, 
Oxford University Press.  
Ellis, A.B., (2007a). A taxonomy for categorizing generalizations: Generalizing actions and 
Reflection generalizations. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 16(2), 221-262. 
Ellis, A.B. (2007b). Connections between generalizing and justifying: Students reasoning 
with linear  relationships. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 38(3), 
194-229. 
Ellis, A.B. (2007c). The influence of reasoning with emergent quantities on students’ 
generalizations. Condition and Instruction, 25(4), 439-478. 
English, L.D. (1998). Reasoning by Analogy in Solving Comparison Problems. Mathematical  
Cognition, 1998, 4 (2), 125-146. 
English, L.D., & Sharry, P.V. Analogical Reasoning and the Development of Algebraic  
Abstraction. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 30 (2), 135-157. 
Ernest, P. (1994). What is constructivism in the psychology of mathematics education? In J.P. 
da Ponte, & J.F. Matos (Eds.), Proceedings of the 18
th
 Annual Conference of the 
International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education (Vol.2, 304-311). 
Lisbon, Portugal: University of Lisbon. 
Ernest, P. (1996). Varieties of constructivism: A framework for comparison. In L.P. Steffe, 
P.Nesher, P. Cobb, G.A. Goldin, & B.Greer (Eds.), Theories of mathematical 
learning, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Fischbein, E. (1982). Intuition and proof. For the Learning of Mathematics, 3(2), 9–18, 24. 
Fischbein, E., Deri, M., Nello, M., & Marino, M.S. (1985). The role of implicit models in 
 solving problems in multiplication and division. Journal for Research in 
Mathematics Education, 16, 3-17. 
Fischbein & Kedem. (1982). Proof and certitude in the development of mathematical 
thinking. In A. Vermandel (Ed.), Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference 
on the Psychology of Mathematics Education (pp. 128-131). Belgium: Universitaire 
Instelling Antwerpen, Antwerp.  
Fitton. S., De Jager, T., & Blake, P. (2004). On Track with Maths Grade 9. Cape Town:  
Phumelela Publishers (Pty) Ltd. 





Flick, U. (2008). Doing Interviews. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Fogelin, R.J. (1978). Understanding arguments: An introduction to informal logic. New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 
Fauconnier, G. & M. Turner (1996): Blending as a Central Process of Grammar, in A.  
Goldberg (ed.), Conceptual Structure, Discourse, and Language, Stanford University, 
Centre for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), p. 113-130. 
Fauconnier, G. and M. Turner (2002): The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the  
Mind’sHidden Complexities, New York: Basic Books. 
Fosnot, C.T. (1996). Constructivism: A  Psychological Theory of Learning. In C.T. Fosnot 
(Ed,), Constructivism: Theory, Perspectives, and Practice (pp.8-33).New York: 
Teacher College Press. 
Freudenthal, H. (1973). Mathematics as an educational task. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Fujita,T. Jones, K.,Kunimune, S., Kumakura, H. and Matsumoto, S. ( 2011).  
Refutations in lower secondary school geometry. Paper presented at 7th Congress of 
the European Society for Research in Mathematics Education, University of Rzeszów, 
Poland, February, 2011. 
Gage, N.L. & Berliner, D.C. 1992. Educational Psychology. 5
th
 edition. Boston:  Mifflin. 
Galbraith, P.L. (1981). Aspects of Proving:  A Clinical Investigation of Progress. Educational 
Studies, 12(1), 1-28.  
Gauvain, M. (2001). The social context of cognitive development. New York: Guilford Press. 
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. 
  Cognitive Science, 7, 155-170 
Gentner, D. (1989). The mechanisms of analogical learning. In S. Voiniadou & A. OrTony  
(Eds), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 199-241). New York, NY: Cambridge 
 University Press. 
Gentner, D., Loewenstein, J., & Thompson, L. (2004). Analogical Encoding: Facilitating  
Knowledge Transfer and Integration. Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual 
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Retrieved 30 September, 2010, from  
groups.psych.nortwestern.edu/gentner/…/GentnerLoewensteinThompson04.pdf 
Gentner, D., & Holyoak, K.J. (1997). Amercian Psychologist, 52(1), 32-34. 
Gentner, D., Holyoak, K. J., & Kokinov, B. N. (Eds.) (2001). The analogical mind: 
Perspectives from cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Retrieved 6 May, 
2010, from http://www.nbu.bg/cogs/personal/kokinov/Analogy-2002-intro.pdf 
Gentner,D., & Markman, A.B. (1997). Structure mapping in Analogy and  Similarity.  





Gholson, B., Smither, D., Buhrman, A., & Duncan, M.K.(1997). In L.D. English  
           (Ed.), Mathematical Reasoning: Analogies, Metaphors and Images (pp.  
           149-190).USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Giannajoulias, E., Matorides, E., Potari, D., & Zachariades, T. (2010). Studying teachers’ 
mathematical argumentation in the context of refuting students’ invalid claims.  
           Journal of Mathematical Behavior, 29, 160-168.  doi:10.1016/j.jmathb.2010.07.001 
Gillham, B. 2000. Developing a Questionnaire. London: Continuum 
Ginsburg, H. (1977). Children’s arithmetic: How they learn it and how you teach it. Austin, 
TX: Pro-Ed. 
Glasersfeld, E. Von (1991). Radical Constructivism in Mathematics Education. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Goldin, G. A. (2000). Affective pathways and representation in mathematical problem  
solving. Mathematical Thinking and Learning 2(3), 209-219. 
Goldin, G.A. (2002). Representation in Mathematical Learning and Problem Solving. In L.D. 
English (Ed.). Handbook of International Research in Mathematics Education (pp. 
197-218). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum 
Gonin, A.A., Archer, I.J.M., Slabber, G.P.L., Nel. G.D. (1981). Modern Graded  
Mathematics for Standards 9 & 10. Pietermaritzburg: Nasou Limited. 
Govender, R. (2002). Student Teachers' Understanding & Development of their Ability to 
    Evaluate & Formulate Definitions in a Sketchpad context. Unpublished Master's 
    Thesis, University of Durban-Westville, Durban. 
Govender, R., & de Villiers, M (2002). Constructive Evaluations of Definitions in a 
          Sketchpad Context. Paper presented at the Association for Mathematics Education of  
South Africa National conference, University of Natal, Durban, July 2002. Available 
from mweb.co.za/residents.profmd/rajen.pdf.  
Granville, A., Van de Lune, J. & Te Riele, H.J.J. (1989). Checking the Goldbach 
conjecture on a vector computer. In R.A. Mollin (Ed.), Number Theory and 
Applications (pp. 423-433). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Gray, D. (2008). Using The Geometer's Sketchpad in the Math Classroom to Improve 
Engagement, Transform the Learning Environment, and Enhance Understanding. 
Retrieved 9 March, 2013, from   
discoverarchive.vanderbilt.edu/bitstream/.../GrayCapstone.doc?...1 
Greenfield, P.M. (1984). Theory of the teacher in learning activities. In B. Rogoff & J. Lave  
(Eds.), Everyday cognition: Its development in social context (pp. 117-138). 





Greeno, J., Collins, A., & Resnick, L. (1996). Cognition and learning. In D.Berliner & R.  
 Calfee (Eds.), Handbook of Educational Psychology (pp.15-46). New York. 
MacMillan. 
Gruenwald, N., & Klymchuk (2003). Using counter-examples in teaching calculus: Student’s  
attitudes. New Zealand Mathematics Magazaine, 40(2), 33-41. Retrieved 13 May, 
2010, from www.scribd.com/doc/55655783/Counter-Examples-in-Calculus 
Gutierrez, A., & Jaime, A. (1998). On the assessment of the van Hiele levels of reasoning.  
Focus on learning problems in Mathematics, 20(2), 27 -46. 
Gutierrez, A., Pegg, G., & Lawrie, C. (2004). Characterization of students’ reasoning and 
 proof abilities in 3- dimensional geometry.  In M.J.Hoines & A.B. Fuglestad  (Eds.),  
Proceedings of the 28th Conference of the International Group for the Psychology of 
Education(Vol.2, pp. 1-8). Bergen,Norway: Program Committee. 
Guzzeti, B.J., & Glass, G.V. (1993). Promoting conceptual change in science: A comparative 
meta-analysis of instructional interventions from reading education and science 
education. Reading Research Quarterly, 28, 116-159. 
Hadas, N. & Hershkowitz, R. (1998). Proof in geometry as an explaining and convincing 
tool. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference for the Psychology of 
Mathematics Education, Vol (3), pp 25-32. 
Hadas, N., Herskowitz, R., & Schwartz, B.B. (2000). The Role of Contradiction and  
Uncertainty in Promoting the Need to Prove in Dynamic Geometry Environments . 
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 44 (1/2), 127-150.  Retrieved 5 July, 2010, from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3483207  
Hafner, J., & Mancosu, P. (2005). The Varieties of Mathematical Explanation. In P. 
Mancosu, K.F. Jorgensen & S.A. Pedersen, Visualization, Explanation and Reasoning 
Styles in Mathematics (pp.215-250). Netherlands: Springer 
Hanna, G. 1989. More than formal proof. For the learning of Mathematics, 9(1), 20-23. 
Hanna, G. 1990. Some Pedagogical Aspects of proof. Interchange, 21(1), 6-13.  
Hanna, G. (1991). Mathematical Proof. In D. Tall (Ed.), Advanced Mathematical Thinking  
 (pp.54-61). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Hanna, G. (1995). Challenges to the importance of proof. For the Learning of  
Mathematics, 15(3), 42-49. 
Hanna, G. (2000). Proof, explanation and exploration: An overview. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 44(1), 5-23. 
Hanna, G., & de Villiers, M.( 2008). ICMI Study 19: Proof and proving in Mathematics 





           DOI 10. 1007/s 11858-008-0073-4. 
Hanna, G., & Jahnke, H.N. (1996). Proof and proving. In A. Bishop, K. Clements, C. 
Keitel, J. Kilpatrick and C. Laborde (Eds.), International Handbook of Mathematics 
Education (pp. 877-908). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.   
Harel, G. (2007). Students’ proof schemes revisited. In P.Boero (Ed.), Theorems in schools: 
from history, epistemology and cognition to classroom practice (pp.65-78). 
Rotterdam,Netherlands: Sense Publishers. 
Harel, G., & Rabin, J.M. (2010). Teaching practices that can promote the authoritative 
proof scheme. Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology  
Education, 10 (2), 139-159. 
Harel, G., & Sowder, L. (1996).  Classifying processes of proving. In L.Puig & A.Gutierrez 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 20th PME International Conference (Vol.3, pp59-65). 
Valencia, Spain:  University of Valencia. 
Harel, G., & Sowder, L.(1998). Students’ proof schemes: Results from exploratory studies. 
In E. Dubinsky, A. Schoenfeld, & J. Kaput (Eds.), Research in Collegiate  
Mathematics Education (Vol.3, pp.234-283). Providence, USA: American  
Mathematical Society. 
Harel, G., & Sowder, L. (2007). Towards a comprehensive perspective on proof. In F. Lester  
(Ed.), Second Handbook of Research on Mathematics Teaching and Learning (pp. 
805-842). USA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics.  
Harel, G. &Tall, D. (1991). The general, the abstract and the generic in advanced 
mathematics. For the Learning of Mathematics, 11(1), 38-42. 
Healy , L., & Hoyles, C. (1998). Technical Report on the Nationwide Survey: Justifying and 
Proving in School Mathematics. London:  Institute of Education, University of 
London. 
Hemmi, K. (2010). Three styles characterizing mathematicians’ pedagogical perspectives on  
proof. Educational Studies of Mathematics, 75, 271-291. 
Hemmi, K., & Lofwall, C. (2011). Making discovery function of proof visible for upper 
secondary school students. A paper presented at the Seventh Congress of the 
European Society for Research in Mathematics Education (CERME), University of 
Rzeszow, Poland, 9-13 February 2011.  
Herkomer, M. (2004). Goldbach Conjecture Research. Retrieved 1 September, 2010, from 
http://www.petrospec-technolgies.com/Herkommer/goldbach.htm 






Hersh, R. (1997). What is mathematics, really? London: Jonathan Cape. 
Hershkowitz, R., Dreyfus, T., Ben-Zvi, D., Frielander, A., Hadas, N., Resnick, T., Tabach,  
M., Schwarz, B. (2002). Mathematics Curriculum Development for Computerized 
 Environments: A Designer- Researcher – Teacher- Learner Activity. In L.D. English, 
 Handbook of International Research in Mathematics Education (pp.657-694). 
Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Hewson, P.W., & Hewson, M.G. (1984). The role of conceptual change and the design of  
science instruction. Instructional Science, 13, 1-13. 
Hewson, P.W., & Thorley, N.R. (1989). The conditions of conceptual change in the 
classroom. International Journal of Science Education, 2 (special issue), 541-553. 
Hollebrands, K.F., Conner, A., & Smith, R. (2010). The nature of arguments provided by 
college geometry students with access to technology while solving problems. Journal 
for research on Mathematics Education, 41 (4), 324-350. 
Holland J.H., Holyoak K.J, Nisbett R.E, Thagard P.R. (1986).  Induction: Processes of  
inference, learning and discovery. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Holyhoak, K.J., Gentner, D., & Kokinov, B.N. (2001). Introduction: The Place of Analogy in 
Cognition. In D. Gentner, K.J. Holyoak, & B.N. Kokinov (Eds.), The analogical 
mind: Perspectives from Cognitive science (pp. 1-19). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Holyhoak, K.J., & Thagard, P. (1989). Analogical mapping by constraint satisfaction. 
Cognitive Science, 13, 295-355. 
Houston, K. (2009). How to think like a mathematician: a companion to undergraduate  
mathematics. Cape Town: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoyles, C. (1997). The curricular shaping of students’ approaches to proof. Learning of 
Mathematics, 17(1), 7-16. 
Hoyles , C., & Jones, K.(1998). Proof in dynamic geometry contexts. In C. Mammana & V.  
Villani (Eds.), Perspectives on the Teaching of Geometry for the 21
st
 century (pp. 
121-128). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Hoyles, C., & Kuchemann, D. (2002). Students’ understandings of logical implication.  
 Educational Studies in Mathematics, 51(3), 193-223. 
Hoyles, C., & Noss, R. (1994). Dynamic geometry environments: What’s the point? The 
 Mathematics teacher, 87(9), 716 -717. 
Hummel, K.E. (2000). Introductory Concepts for Abstract Mathematics. USA: Chapman 
& Hall. 





P.R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional Conceptual Change (pp.291-315). Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Ikenaga, B. (2008). Permutation groups. Retrieved 12 September 2010, from www. 
marauder.millersville.edu/~bikenaga/abstractalgebra/…/perm.html 
Izen, S.P. (1998). Proof in modern geometry. Mathematics Teacher, 91(8), 718-721. 
Jackiw, N. (1991). The Geometer’s Sketchpad Learning Guide. Emeryville, CA: Key  
Curriculum Press. 
Jackiw, N. (1995). The Geometer’s Sketchpad [computer software]. Berkeley, CA: Key  
Curriculum Press. 
John, L.P. (1975). The Origins of Intellect- Piaget’s Theory. USA: W.H. Freeman and  
Company. 
Johnson, D.A., & Taylor, D.F. (1963). Exploring Mathematics on Your Own: Logic and 
          Reasoning in Mathematics. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Kahrobaei, D. (nd). Primes and Greatest Common Divisors. [PowerPoint]. Retrieved  5 
  May, 2009, from  
  http://websupport1.citytech.cuny.edu/faculty/dkahrobaei/Primes%20and%20Great           
est%20Common%20Divisors.pdf 
Kaput, J. (1999). Teaching and learning a new algebra. In T. Romberg & Fennema 
(Eds.), Mathematics classrooms that promote understanding (pp. 133 -155). 
 Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Kieran, C. (1992). The learning and teaching of school algebra. In. D. Grouws (Ed.),  
Handbook of research on mathematics teaching and learning (pp.390-419). 
NewYork: Macmillan Publishing Company. 
Klauer, K.J., & Phye, G. (1994). Cognitive training for children: a developmental program of  
inductive reasoning and problem solving. Seattle: Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. 
Klein, F. (1924). Elementary mathematics from an advanced standpoint. New York: 
 Macmillan. 
Kline, M. (1982). Mathematics. The Loss of Certainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Klymchuk, S. (2008). Using Counter-Examples to Enhance Learners’ Understanding of 
Undergraduate mathematics. Good Practice Publication Grant e-Book:  
www.akoaotearoa.ac.nz.gppg e-book.   
Knuth, E. (2002). Secondary school mathematics teachers’ conceptions of proof.  Journal for 
 Research in Mathematics Education, 33(5), 379-405. 
Knuth, E., Slaughter, M., Choppin.J., & Sutherland, J. (2002). Mapping the conceptual terrain 





P.Sztajn, D.White, H.Wiegel, R.Bryant, & K.Nooony (Eds.), Proceedings of the 24th 
Annual Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the 
Pyschology of Mathematics Education (Vol.4, pp. 1693-17000). 
Ko, Y., & Knuth, E. (2009). Undergraduate mathematics majors’ writing performance 
producing proofs and counter examples in continuous functions. Journal of 
Mathematical Behavior, 28(1), 68-77. 
Koedinger, K.R. (1998). Conjecturing and Argumentation in High- School Geometry 
Students. In R. Lehrer & D. Chazan (Eds.), Developing Learning Environments for 
Developing Understanding of Geometry and Space (pp.319-347). Mahwah, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Komatsu, K. (2010). Counter-examples for refinement of conjectures and proofs in 
primary school mathematics. Journal of Mathematical Behavior, 29, 1-10.  
Krummheuer, G. (1995). The ethnography of argumentation. In P. Cobb & H. Bauersfeld 
(Eds.), The emergence of mathematical meaning: Interaction in the classroom 
cultures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Labuschagne, A. (2003). Qualitative research – Airy Fairy or Fundamental. The Qualitative 
Report, Volume 8, N01. Retrieved 4 March, 2009, from 
http://www.nova.edy/ssss/QR/QR8-1/labuschagne.html. 
Lakatos, I.  (1976). Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Languasco, A. (1995). Some results on Goldbach’s problem. Rend.Sem.Mat. Univ. Pol.  
Torino, 53(4), 325-337. Retrieved 5 October, 2010, from 
www.math.unipd.it/~languasc/lavoripdf/R2.pdf.   
Lannin, J.K. (2005). Generalization and Justification: The challenge of introducing algebraic 
reasoning through patterning activities. Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 7(3), 
231-258.  
Larsen, S., & Zandieh, M. (2008). Proofs and Refutations in the undergraduate 
mathematics classroom. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 67(3), 205-216. 
Lederman, N.G. (1992). Students’ and teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science: A 
 review of the research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29, 331-359. 
Lee, G., Kwon, J., Park, S., Kim, J., Kwon, H., Park, H. (2003). Development of an 
instrument for measuring cognitive conflict in secondary –level science classes. 
Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40 (6), 585-603.  





instrument for measuring cognitive conflict in secondary –level science classes. 
Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40 (6), 585-603.  
Lee, K.H., & Sriraman, B. (2011). Conjecturing via reconceived classical analogy.  
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 76, 123-140. DOI 10.1007/s10649-010-9274-1. 
Lee, L., & Wheeler, D. (1987). Algebraic thinking in high school students: Their conceptions 
            of generalization and justification (Research Report). Montreal, Canada: Concordia  
University, Department of Mathematics. 
Leedy, P. (1993). Practical Research: Planning and Design. (5
th
 ed.). USA: Macmillan 
Publishing Company. 
Leong, Y.H., Tay, E.G., Toh,T.L., Quek, K.S., Dndyal, J. (2011). Reviving Polya’s “Look 
Back” in a Singapore school. Journal of Mathematical Behavior, 30, 181-193. 
Leron, U., & Zaslavsky, O. (2009). Generic Proving: reflections on scope and method. In  
Proceedings of the ICME Study 19 conference: Proof and Proving in Mathematics 
Education, Vol 2, pp.53-58. Taipei, Taiwan. Retrieved 10 June  2010 from   
www.scribd.com/.../ICMI-study-19-Proof-and-Proving -in-Math-Education 
Limon, M. (2001). On the cognitive conflict as instructional strategy for conceptual change: 
A critical appraisal. Learning and Instruction, 11, pp. 357-380. 
Lin, F.L., & Yu, J.W. (2005). False Proposition- As a means for making conjectures in 
  mathematics classrooms. Invited speech in Asian Mathematical Conference, 
20-23, July, 2005, Singapore.Retrieved 5 January, 2010, from 
http://ww1.math.nus.edu.sg/AMC/papers/Lin-Fou-Lai.pdf 
Lin, F.L. (2005). Modeling students’ learning on mathematical proof and refutation. In  
H.L. Chick, & J.L. Vincent (Eds.), Proceedings of 29
th
 Conference of International 
Group for the Pyschology of Mathematics Education (Vol.1, pp. 3-18). Melbourne: 
PME. 
Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (2000). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and 
emerging confluences. In N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of 
qualitative research (2
nd
 ed., pp. 163-188). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Liu, B. (2009). Uncertain Entailment and Modus Ponens in the Framework of Uncertain  
  Logic. Journal of uncertain Systems, 3(4), pp 243-251. Retrieved  on 1 December 
  from online from www.jus.org.uk. 





Constructivism in Mathematics Education (pp. 75-87). Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Louw, A., van Ede, M., & Louw, E.(1998). Human Development ( 2
nd
 ed.). Pretoria: Kagiso  
Publishers. 
Loy, J. (1999). Converse, Inverse, Contrapositive. Retrieved on 10 February, 2010, from 
http://www.jimloy.com/logic/converse.htm. 
Luque, M.L. (2003). The role of domain-specific knowledge in intentional conceptual 
change. In G.M. Sinatra & P.R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional Conceptual Change 
(pp.133-170). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Marrades, R., & Gutierrez, A. (2000). Proofs produced by secondary school students learning 
geometry in a dynamic computer environment. Educational Studies in Mathematics,  
44(1/2), 87-125.  
Marioti, M.A. (2001). Justifying and Proving in the Cabri Environment. International 
Journal of Computers for Mathematical Learning, 6, 257-281. 
Mariotti, M.A. 2007. Geometrical Proof: The Mediation of a Microworld. In P.Boero (Ed.), 
Theorems in schools: From history, epistemology and cognition to classroom practice 
(pp.285-304). Netherlands: Sense Publishers. 
Martin, W.G., & Harel, G. (1989). Proof frames of pre-service elementary teachers. Journal 
for Research in Mathematics Education, 20(1), 41-51. 
Martinez, M.V., & Li, W. (2010). The conjecturing process and the emergence of the  
conjecture to prove. In M.F. Pinto & T.F. Kawasaki (Eds.), Proceedings of the 34
th 
Conference of the International Group for Psychology of Mathematics Education, 
Vol.3, pp.265-272. Belo Horizonte, Brazil:PME. 
Mason, J. (1996). Expressing generality and roots of algebra. In N. Bednarz, C. Kieran, & L.  
Lee (Eds.). Approaches to algebra: Perspectives for research and teaching (pp.65- 
86).Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer. 
Mason, J. (1999). Learning and doing mathematics (2nd revised edition). York. UK: QED. 
Mason, J., Burton,L., & Stacey, K. (1982). Thinking mathematically. London: Addison- 
          Wesley. 
Mason,J.,& Davis, J. (1991). Fostering and sustaining mathematics thinking through 
problem solving. Victoria: Deakin University Press. 
 Mason, L. (2001). Responses to anomalous data on controversial topics and theory change.  
Learning and Instruction, 11, 453-483.  





Mathematics, 15 (3), 277-289. Retrieved 19 June, 2010, from  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3482181 
Matz, M. (1980). Towards a Computational Theory of Algebraic Competence. Journal of 
Mathematical Behavior, 3(1), 93-166. 
Maxwell, J.A. (1992). Understanding and Validity in Qualitative Research. Harvard 
Educational Review, 62(3), pp. 279-299. 
Maxwell, J. A. (2005). Qualitative research design: An interactive approach (2nd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
May, T, (2001). Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process. (3
rd
 ed.). Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
Mayer, R.E. (2004). Should there be a three-strikes rule against pure discovery learning?  
American Psychologist, 59, 14-19. 
McMillan, J.H. & Schumacher, S. 2001. Research in Education. New York: Longman. 
McMillan, J.H. & Schumacher, S. 2010. Research in Education. (7
th
 ed.). New York: 
Longman. 
Medin, D.L. (1989). Concepts and Conceptual Structure. American Psychologist, 44. 1469- 
1481. 
Melis, E., Ullrich, C., & Goguadze, G. (2009). Culturally aware mathematics education 
Technology. Retrieved September 23, 2009, from http://www.alelo.com/. 
Meija-Ramos, J.P. (2005). Aspects of proof in mathematics research. In D. Hewitt (Ed.),  
Proceedings of the British Society for Research into Learning Mathematics 25(2), 
June 2005. Retrieved 12 June, 2011, from  
http://www.bsrlm.org.uk/IPs/ip25-2/BSRLM-IP-25-2-11.pdf 
Mingus, T.Y., & Grassl, R.M. (1999). Pre-service teacher beliefs about proofs. School 
Science and Mathematics, 99, 438-444. 
Miyazaki, M. What are essentials to apply the ‘discovery’ function of proof in lower  
secondary mathematics? In T. Nakahara & K. Mastaka (Eds.), Proceedings of the 24
th
 
Conference of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education 
(Vol.4, pp. 1-8). Japan: Hiroshima University. 
Molina, D.D., Hull, S.H., & Schielak, J.F. (1997). Guidelines for the Mathematical 
Preparation of Prospective Elementary Teachers. Austin, Texas: Texas Statewide 
Systemic Initiative. 
Moreno, R. (2004). Decreasing cognitive load for novice students: Effects of explanatory  






Morrison, K.R.B. (1993). Planning and Accomplishing School-centred Evaluation. Norfolk: 
Peter Francis Publishers. 
Mouly, G.J. (1978). Educational Research: the art and science of investigation. Boston: Allyn  
 & Bacon. 
Movshovitz-Hadar, N. (1988). School Mathematics Theorems- an Endless Source of  
Surprise. For the Learning of Mathematics, 8(3), 34-40. 
Mudaly, V. (1998). Pupils’ needs for conviction and explanation within the context of 
 dynamic geometry. Unpublished M.Ed. dissertation, University of Durban Westville. 
Mudaly, V., & De Villiers, M. (2000). Learners’ needs for conviction and explanation within 
the context of dynamic geometry. Pythagoras, 52, 20-23. 
Mudaly, V. (2002). Mathematical modeling and proof. Paper presented at AMESA, July  
2002. 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. (2000). Principles and standards for school 
mathematics. Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. 
Newby, T.J., Stepich, D.A., Lehman, J.D., & Russel, J.D. (2000). Instructional Technology 
 for Teaching and Learning: Designing Instruction, Integrating computers, and Using 
Media. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall. 
Newman, W.L. (2000). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.  
 (4
th
ed.). Needham Heights, M.A: Allyn & Bacon. 
Nesher, P. (1987). Towards an instructional theory: the role of student’s misconceptions. For 
the Learning of Mathematics, 7(3), 33-40. Retrieved 6 June, 2010, from  
http:/www.jstor.org/stable/40247905. 
Nesher, P., & Peled, I. (1986). Shifts in reasoning. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 17, 
 67-79. 
Njisane, R.A. (1992). Mathematical thinking. In M. Moodley, R.A. Njisane, & N.C.Presmeg 
(Eds.), Mathematics Education for inservice and pre-services teachers, pp.60-67.  
Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter 
Novick, L.R. (1988). Analogical Transfer, Problem Similarity, and Expertise. Journal of  
Experimental Psychology: Learning and Memory and Cognition,  14 (3), 510-520. 
O’Connor, J.J., & Robertson, E.F.(2009). Prime numbers.1-4. Retrieved 4 April, 2010,  
from http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/HistTopics/Prime_numbers.html 
O’ Donnell, A., Reeve, J., & Smith, J. (2009). Educational Psychology: Reflection for Action 
(2
nd
 ed). Hogoken: Wiley & Sons. 





N.C.Presmeg (Eds.), Mathematics Education for inservice and pre-services teachers, 
pp.193-209. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter. 
Ogunniyi, M.B. (2007).  Teacher’s stances and practical arguments regarding a science- 
indigenous knowledge curriculum: Part 1. International Journal of Science 
Education, 29(8), 963-986. 
Ogunniyi, M.B. (2008). The role of theoretical framework in research. Guest lecture 
delivered at the Research Seminar of the Department of Science and Technology 
Education, University of South Africa. 
Ogunnyi, M.B., & Mikalsen, O. (2004). Ideas and process skills used by South African and  
Norwegian students to perform cognitive tasks on acids, bases and magnetism. 
African Journal of Research in Mathematics, Science and Technology Education, 8 
(2), 151-164. 
 ̈ner, D. (2008). Supporting students’ participation in authentic proof activities in computer  
supported collaborative learning (CSCL) environments. Computer –Supported 
Collaborative Learning, 3, 343-359. 
Osborne, J., Erduran, S., & Simon, S. (2004). Enhancing the quality of argumentation in 
 school Science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 41(10), 994-1020. 
Otte, M. (1994). Mathematical knowledge and the problem of proof. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 26, 299-321. 
Oxford Dictionary (2
nd
  ed.). (2004). Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
Papalia, D.E., Olds, S.W., & Feldman, R.D. (2001). Human Development (8
th
 ed.). New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Patton, M.Q. (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (2
nd
 Edition). London: 
Sage Publications. 
Peled,J., & Zaslavsky, O. (1997). Counter-examples that (only) prove and counter- 
examples that (also) explain. Focus on learning Problems on Mathematics, 19(3), 
49-61. 
Piaget, J, (1953). The origin of intelligence in the child. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul. 
Piaget (1968).  Six Psychological Studies. London: University of London Press Ltd. 
Piaget, J. (1970). The Science of education and the psychology of the child. New York: Orion 
Press. 
Piaget, J. (1974). To understand is to invent: The future of education. New York: Grossman.  






Piaget. J. (1977). The development of thought: equilibrium of cognitive structures. New York:  
Viking. 
Piaget, J. (1985). The equilibration of cognitive structures: the central problem of intellectual 
development. Chicago: University of Chicago  Press.  
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The Psychology of the child. London: Routledge & Kegan 
 Paul.  
Pirie, S., & Kieren, T. (1994). Growth in mathematical understanding: How can we 
characterise it and how can we represent it? Educational Studies in Mathematics, 
26(2), 165-190. 
Pintrich,  P.R., Marx, R.W., & Boyle, R.A. (1993). Beyond cold conceptual change: The role 
of motivational beliefs and classroom contextual factors in the process of conceptual 
change. Review of Educational Research, 63, 167-199. 
Polya, G. (1954a). Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning: Induction and Analogy in 
Mathematics. Vol 1. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Polya, G. (1954b). Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning: Patterns of Plausible Inference 
Mathematics. Vol 2. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Polya, G. (1981). Mathematical Discovery: On understanding, learning and teaching 
problem solving (2 vols.). New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Polya, G. (1985). How to Solve It. USA: Princeton University Press. 
Posner, G.J., Strike, K.A., Hewson, P.W., & Gertzog, W.A. (1982). Accommodation of a 
scientific conception: toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 
66(2), 211-227. 
Potari, D., Zachariades, T., & Zaslavsky, O. (2009). Mathematics teachers’ reasoning for 
refuting students’ invalid claims. In V. Durand- Guerrier, S. Soury-Lavergne, & F. 
Arzarello (Eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the European Society for 
Research in Mathematics Education, 28 January - 1 February 2009 (pp. 281-290). 
Lyon, France: CERME 6. Retrieved 3 January, 2011, from 
http://www.inrp.fr/editions/editions-electroniques/cerme6/. 
Pritchard, A. (2007). Effective Teaching with Internet Technologies, Pedagogy and Practice.  
London: Paul Chapman Publishing. 
Puntambekar, S., & Hubscher, R. (2005). Tools for scaffolding students in complex learning  
environment: What have we gained and what have we missed? Educational 
Pyschologist, 40 (1), 1-12. 





Bednarz, C. Kieran, & L. Lee (Eds.). Approaches to algebra: Perspectives for 
research and teaching (pp.107-111). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer. 
Radford, L. (2003). Gestures, speech, and the sprouting of signs: A semiotic-cultural 
approach to students’ types of generalization. Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 
5(1), 37-70. 
Radford, L. (2006). Algebraic thinking and generalization of patterns: A semiotic 
 perspective. In S. Alatorre, J.L. Cortina, M. Saiz, & A. Mendez (Eds), Proceedings of  
the 28
th
 Annual Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group  
for the Psychology of Mathematics Education (Vol.1, pp.2-21). Merida, Mexico:  
Universidad Pedagogica Nacional. 
Raimi, R. (2002). On Mathematical Reasoning in School Mathematics- Part 2 of A 
Mathematical Manifesto. Retrieved 20 July, 2010, from http://nychold.org/raimi- 
reason02.html. 
Ratcliff, S. (2006). Background,  Strengths, and Limits – Videotape recording. Retrieved on 4 
March 2009  from http://qualitativeresearch.ratcliffs.net/vid.pdf 
Rattermann, M.J.(1997). Commentary: Mathematical Reasoning and Analogy. In 
L.D. English (Ed.), Mathematical Reasoning: Analogies, Metaphors and 
Images (pp. 247-266).USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Rav, Y. (1999). Why do we prove theorems?.Philosophia Mathematica, 7(3), 5-41. 
Reid, D.A. (2002). Conjectures and refutations in grade 5 mathematics. Journal for 
Research in Mathematics Education, 33(1), 5-29. Retrieved  June 19, 2010  
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/749867 . 
Resnick, L.B., Nesher, P., Leornard, F., Magone, M., Omanson, S., Peled, I. (1989). 
Conceptual basis of arithmetic errors: The case of decimal fractions. Journal for 
Research in Mathematics Education, 20, 8-27. 
Ribet, K.E., & Hayes, B. (1994). Fermat’s Last Theorem and Modern Arithmetic. 
American Scientist, 82, 144-156. 
Richland, L.E., Holyoak, K.J, &  Stigler, J. (2004). Analogy Use in Eighth-Grade 
Mathematics Classrooms. Cognition and Instruction, 22(1), 37-60. 
Rivera, F.D., & Becker, J.  (2003). The Effects of Figural and Numerical Cues on the  
  Induction Processes of Preservice Elementary Mathematics Teachers. In N. Pateman, 
  B. Dougherty, B & J. Zilliox (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2003 Joint Meeting of PME 
  and PMENA (Vol.4, pp. 63 –70). Honolulu, Hawai: University of Hawaii.   





changes. In J.H. Woo, H.C. Lew, K.S. Park, & D.Y. Seo (Eds.), Proceedings of the 
31
st
 Conference of the International Group for the Pyschology of Mathematics 
Education (Vol.4, pp. 121-128). Seoul: PME. 
Ross, K.A. (1998). Doing and Proving: The place of Algorithms and Proof in School 
Mathematics. American Mathematical Monthly, March 1998, 252-255. Retrieved on 6 
August 2010 from www.lettredelapreuve.it/OldPreuve/Resumes/Ross/Ross98.html. 
Rowland, T. (1988). Conviction, explanation and generic examples. In proceedings  
Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics 
Education, Vol (4), pp 65-72. 
Rowland, T. (2001). Generic Proofs: Setting a good example. Mathematics Teaching, 177,  
 40-43. 
Rowland, T. (2002). Generic Proofs in Number Theory. In S.R. Campbell & R. Zazkis (Eds.),  
 Learning and teaching number theory: research in cognition and instruction (pp. 157- 
 184). USA: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. 
Rowland, T., Turner, F., Twaites, A., & Huckstep, P. (2009). Developing Primary  
 Mathematics Teaching. London: Sage Publications. 
Ryan, J. & Williams, J. (2000). Mathematical discussions with children: exploring methods 
and misconceptions as a teaching strategy. Manchester: Centre for Mathematics 
Education: University of Manchester. 
Ryan, J., & Williams, J. (2007). Children’s Mathematics 4-15: Learning from errors and 
misconceptions. England: Open University Press, McGraw- Hill Education.  
Rydning, A.F. (2005). The Return of Sense on the Scene of Translation Studies in the Light 
 of the Cognitive Blending Theory. Meta: Translators' Journal, 50, 2, 392-404. 
Russel, S.J.(1999). Mathematical Reasoning in the Elementary Grades. In Stiff, L.V., &  
Curcio, F.R.(Eds.), Developing Mathematical Reasoning in grades K-12 (pp.1-12). 
Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. 
Sackur-Grisvard, C., & Leonard, F. (1985). Intermediate cognitive organizations in the 
process of learning a mathematical concept: The order of positive decimal numbers. 
Cognition and Instruction, 2, 157-174. 
Sasman, M., Linchevski, L., Olivier, A., & Liebenberg, R. (1998). Probing children’s 
thinking in the process of generalization. Paper presented at the 4
th
 Annual Congress 
of the Association for the Mathematics Education of South Africa (AMESA), 
Pietersburg.  
Saouter, Y. (1998). Checking the odd Goldbach conjecture up to 10
20
. Mathematics of  





Scher, D. (2002). Students’ Conceptions of Geometry in a dynamic Geometry Software  
Environment. Dissertation, PhD in Mathematics Education, New York: New York 
Univsersity.  
Schlimm, D. (2008). Two Ways of Analogy: Extending the Study of Analogies to  
Mathematical Domains. Philosophy of Science, 7, 178-200. 
Schoenfeld, A.H. (1982). Some thoughts on problem-solving research and mathematics 
education. In F.K. Lester & J. Garofolo (Eds.), Mathematical problem solving: Issues 
in research (pp.27-37). Philadelphia: Franklin Institute Press. 
Schoenfeld, A.H. (1985). Mathematical Problem Solving (1
st 
ed.).Orlando: Academic Press 
Inc. 
Schoenfeld, A.H. (1986). On having and using geometric knowledge. In J.Hiebert (Ed.),  
Conceptual and procedural knowledge: The case of mathematics (pp. 225-264).  
Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Schoenfeld, A. (1992). Learning to think mathematically: Problem Solving, metacognition,  
and sense making in mathematics. In D.A. Grouws (Ed.), Handbook of research on  
mathematics teaching and learning (pp. 334-370). New York: MacMillan. 
Schoenfeld, A.H. (1994). What do we know about mathematics curricula? Journal of 
Mathematical behavior, 13, 55-80. 
Schwarz, C. (1993). Chambers Dictionary. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Limited 
Schwartz, J.L., & Yerushalmy, M. (1986). The Geometric Supposer series [computer  
 software]. Pleasantville, N.Y.: Sunburst Communications 
Selden, A. & Selden, J. (1998). The role of examples in learning mathematics. The 
Mathematical Association of America Online. Retrieved August 10, 2009, 
from  http://www.maa.org/t_and_l/sampler/rs_5.html 
Selden, A., & Selden, J. (1999). Tertiary Mathematics Education research and its Future.  
A Technical report number 1999-6 from the Tennessee Technological University 
retrieved on 9 June 2012 www.math.tntech.edu/techreports/reports.html 
Selden, A., & Selden, J. ( 2003). Errors and misconceptions in college level theorem proving.  
Cookeville:  Department of Mathematics  Technical Report, Tennessee Technological  
University. Retrieved 5 May 2010 from www.math.tntech.edu. 
Senk, S.L. (1985). How well do students write geometry proofs? Mathematics Teacher, 
September, 448-456. 
Senk, S.L. (1989). Van Hiele levels and achievement in writing geometry proofs. Journal for 
Research in Mathematics Education, 20, 309-321. 






Serra, M. (2003). Discovering Geometry: An Investigative Approach. USA: Key 
Curriculum  Press. 
Shepherd, S. (2006). Family Word Finder. London: The Reader’s Digest Association 
Limited. 
Shulman, L. (1986). Those who understand: knowledge growth in teachers. Educational 
Researcher, 15(2), 4-14. 
Simon, M.A., & Blume, G.W. (1996). Justification in the Mathematics Classroom:  A study 
of Prospective Elementary Mathematics Teachers. Journal of Mathematical Behavior, 
15, 3-31.  
Sinclair,M., de Bruyn, Y., Hanna, G., & Harrison, P. (2004). Cinderella and the Geometer’s 
Sketchpad. Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Teachnology Education, 
4(3), 423-437.  DOI:10.1080/14926150409556623. 
Slavin, R.E. (1997). Educational Psychology: Theory and Practice (5
th
 ed). USA: Allyn &  
Bacon. 
Smith, J.P., DiSessa, A.A., Roschelle, J. (1993). Misconceptions reconceived: A 
constructivist knowledge in transition. Journal of Learning Science, 3 (2), 115-163. 
Snagit FAQ. Okemos, Michigan: TechSmith. Retrieved 2 June 
2010 from www.faculty.fairfield.edu/dgrignano/documents/SnagItFAQ.pdf. 
SnagIt Technical Reference Guide. Retrieved 10 September 2010 from 
http://download.techsmith.com/snagit/docs/onlinehelp/enu/9/default.htm?turl=snagitte
chnicalreferenceguide.htm. 
Snowman, J.,  McCown, R.,  & Biehler, R. (2009). Psychology Applied to Teaching (12
th 
ed.). USA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning. 
Southwood, S., & Spanneberg, R. (1996). Rethinking the teaching and learning of  
mathematics. Western Cape: Via Afrika: 
Sowa, J.F., & Majumdar, A.K. (2009). Analogical Reasoning. Retrieved 30 September,  
2010, from http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/analog.htm. 
Sowder, L., & Harel, G. (1998). Types of student’s justifications. Mathematics Teacher,  
91(8), 670-675. 
Spradley, J. (1979). The ethnographic interview. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston 
Staples. M.E., Bartlo, J., & Thanhesier, E.(2012). Justification as a teaching and learning 
practice: Its (potential) mulifacted role in middle grade mathematics classrooms. The 
Journal of Mathematical Behavior, 31, 447-462. 





Experimental Psychology: General, 112, 80-116. 
Stiff, L.V., & Curcio, F.R. (1999). Developing Mathematical Reasoning in grades K-12.  
Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. 
Sriraman, B. (2005). Polya revisited: The cognitive links between mathematical and  
analogical reasoning. Book Review of Lyn English (D).  Mathematical and 
Analogical Reasoning of Young Learners.New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum & 
Associates, 2004, 224 pages , ISBN 0-8058-4945-9. ZDM, 37(6), 506-509. Retrieved 
8 July, 2010, from www.springerlink.com/index.M835607787Q56406.pdf 
Strike, K.A., & Posner, G.J. (1985). A conceptual change view of learning and 
understanding. In  L.H.T. West & A.L.Pines (Eds.), Cognitive Structure and 
conceptual change (pp. 211-231). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
Strike & Posner. (1992). A revisionist theory of conceptual change. In R. Duschl & R. 
Hamilton (Eds.), Philosophy of Science, Cognitive Psychology, and Educational 
Theory and Practice (pp. 147-176). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Stylianides, A.J. (2007). Proof and proving in school mathematics. Journal for Research in 
Mathematics Education, 38, 289-321. 
Stylianides, G.J. (2008a). Investigating the guidance offered to teachers in curriculum 
materials. The case of proof in mathematics. International Journal of Science and  
Mathematics Education, 6, 191-215. DOI:10.1007/s10763-007-9704-y. 
Stylianides, A.J. (2008b). An analytic Framework of Reasoning-and- Proving. For the  
 Learning of Mathematics, 28 (1), 9-16. 
Swan, M. (2001). Dealing with misconceptions. In P. Gayes (Ed.), Issues in mathematics 
teaching (pp. 147-165). London: Routledge Falmer.  
Swan, M. (n.d.). Gaining diagnostic teaching skills: helping students learn from mistakes and  
misconceptions. Retrieved 30 March, 2010. from 
http://toolkitforchange.org/toolkit/download.php?opid=417 
Swinyard, C., & Larsen, S. (2010). Proofs and refutations as a model for defining limit. 
In Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Conference on Research in 
Undergraduate Mathematics Education (pp. 1-12).  Retrieved 13 January, 2011, from 
http://sigmaa.maa.org/rume/crume2010/Archive/Swinyard.pdf 
Tall, D. (1979). Cognitive aspects of proof, with special reference to the irrationality of  . 
In Proceedings of the Third International Conference for the Psychology of 
Mathematics Edcuation, pp 206-207. Warwick, England. Retrieved 15 August, 2010, 
from warwick.ac.uk DOTall – Proceedings of the third international conference for… 





Tall, D. (1988). The Nature of Advanced Mathematical Thinking. In A. Borbas (Ed.), 
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics 
Education). Veszprem, Hungary . Retrieved 5 September 2010 from 
homepages.warwick.ac.uk/staff/David.Tall/downloads.html 
Tall, D. (1989). The nature of mathematical proof. Mathematics Teaching, 127, 28-32.           
Tall, D. (1991). The Psychology of Advanced Mathematical Thinking. In D. Tall  
(Ed.),  Advanced Mathematical Thinking (pp.3-21). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
 Publishers. 
Tall, D.(1992). The transition to advanced mathematical thinking: Functions, limits, 
infinity and proof. In D.A. Grouws (Ed.), Handbook of Research on mathematics 
Teaching and Learning (pp.495-511). New York: Macmillan. 
Tall, D. (2002). Differing Modes of Proof and Belief in Mathematics. A paper presented at 
the International Conference on Mathematics: Understanding Proving and Proving to 
Understand, National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, Taiwan. Retrieved 12 
October, 2011, from 
 http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/staff/David.Tall//downlaods.html 
Tall, D ., Yevdokimov, O., Koichu, B.,Whiteley,W., Kondratieva, M., & Cheng, Y.H. (2011).  
The Cognitive Development of Proof. In G.Hanna & M.de Villiers (Eds.),  Proof and 
Proving in Mathematics Education, New ICMI Series 15, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-
2129-6_2, Springer Science & Business media B.V 2012. 
Thagard, P. (1992). The structure of conceptual revolutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Thorley, N.C., & Treagust, D.F.(1987). Conflict within dyadic interaction as a stimulant for 
conceptual change in physics. International Journal of Science Education, 9, 203-216. 
Tirosh, D., & Graeber, A.O. (1990). Evoking cognitive conflict to explore pre-service 
teachers’thinking about division.  Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 
21(2), 98-108. 
Tirosh, D., & Tsamir, P (2006). Conceptual Change in mathematics learning: The case of  
infinite sets. In J.Novotna, H.Moaraova, M. Krataka, & N. Stehlikhova (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 30
th
 Conference of the International Group for the Pyschology of 
Mathematics Education (Vol.1, pp. 159-161). Prague, Czech Republic: PME 
Tobin, K., & Tippins, D. (1993). In K.Tobin (Ed.), The practice of constructivism in Science 
Education, pp.3-21. Washington: AAAS Press. 
Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University 
Press. 





 2008, from http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/index.php 
Tsamir, P. & Tirsoh, D. (2003). Errors in an in-service mathematics classroom: what do we 
know about errors in classrooms? Paper presented at the 7
th
 International Symposium 
of  Elementary Mathematics Teaching, Prague, Czechoslovakia.  
Tsujiyama, Y.(2011). On the role of looking back at proving processes in school 
mathematics: focusing on argumentation. A paper presented at the Seventh Congress 
of the European Society for Research in Mathematics Education (CERME), 
University of Rzeszow, Poland, 9-13 February 2011.  
Van Lehn, K. (1982). Bugs are not enough: Empirical study of bugs, impasses and repairs in  
 procedural skills. Journal of Mathematical Behavior, 3(2), 3-71. 
Van Lehn, K. (1986). Arithmetic Procedures are Induced from Examples. In J. Hiebert (Ed.),  
Conceptual and procedural Knowledge: The Case of Mathematics (pp.133-180). 
USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers. 
Vincent, J., Chick, H., McCrea,B. (2005). Argumentation profile charts as tools for analyzing 
student’s argumentation. In H.L. Chick & J.L. Vincent (Eds.), Proceedings of the 29
th 
Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Vol.4, pp. 281-288. 
Melbourne: PME. 
Volmink, J.D. 1990. The nature and role of proof in mathematics education. Pythagoras,  
23, 7-10. 
Von Glasersfeld, E. (1989). Constructivism in Education. In T. Husen & T.N. Postlethwaite 
(Eds.), The International Encylopaedia of  Education (pp. 162-163). New York: 
Pergamon Press. 
Von Glasesrfeld, E. (1991). Radical Constructivism in Mathematics Education. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Vosniadou, S. (1989). Analogical Reasoning as a mechanism of knowledge  acquisition: a 
developmental perspective. In S.  & A.OrTony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical 
reasoning (pp.199-241). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vosniadou, S.(1994). Capturing and modeling the process of conceptual change. Learning 
and Instruction, 4, 45-70. 
Vosniadou, S., & Brewer, W.F.(1987) Theories of knowledge restructuring in development. 
Review of Educational Research, 57 (1), 51-67. 
Vosniadou, S., & Lieven, V. (2004). Extending the conceptual change approach to 
mathematics learning and teaching. Learning and Instruction, 14 (5), 445-451. 
Vygotsky, L. (1978). Mind in Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 






Watson, J.M. (2007). The role of cognitive conflict in developing students’ understanding of  
average. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 65, 21-47.  
 Weber, K. (2001). Student difficulty in constructing proofs: The need for  
strategic  knowledge. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 48 (1), 101-
119. 
Weber, K. (2003, June). Students’ difficulties with proof. Research Sampler, 8. Retrieved  
12 July, 2009, from  http://www.maa.org/t_and_I/sampler/rs_8.html. 
Welman, J, & Kruger, S.J. (2001). Research Methodology. Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press. 
Weisstein, E. (2010). Prime generating polynomial. Retrieved 5 May, 2010, from 
 http:/mathworld.wolfram.com/Prime-GeneratingPolynomial.html 
Whiteley, W. (2000). Dynamic Geometry Programs and the Practice of Geometry. Retrieved  
3 May, 2009, from http:www.math.yorku.ca/Who/Faculty/Whiteley 
Wikipedia.,(2010a). Fermat’s Last Theorem. Retrieved 1 September, 2010, 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermat’s_Last_Theorem. 
Wikipedia., (2010b). Goldbach’s Conjecture. Retrieved 1 September, 2010, 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach’s_conjecture. 
Wilcox, R.T. (1993). Rediscovering discovering learning. In K.M. Cauley, F.Linder, & J.H. 
McMillan (Eds.), Annual Editions: Educational Psychology 93/94. Guilford, CT: Dushkin 
William, G. (1992). Geometry: discovery and proof. In M. Moodley et al. (Eds.), 
Mathematics Education for in-service and pre-service teachers, pp. 336-351. 
Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter. 
Winston, P.H. (1980). Learning and reasoning by analogy. Communications of the 
Association for Computing Machinery, 23, 689-703. 
Wood, D.  (1988). How Children Think and Learn. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wood, D.J., Bruner, J.S., & Ross, G. (1976). The Role of tutoring in problem solving. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 17, 89-100. 
Yackel, E., & Hanna, G. (2003). Reasoning and Proof.  In J.Kilpatrick, W.G. Martin, & D.  
Schifter (Eds.), A research companion to Principles and Standards for School 
Mathematics (pp.227-236). Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics. 





Microworld: The case of geometry. In J.L. Schwartz, M. Yerushalmy, & Wilson, B. 
(Eds.) (1993), The Geometric Supposer: What is it a case of? Hillsadle, N.J: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Inc. 
Yin, R.K. (1984). Case Study Research: Design and methods. (1
st
 ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage. 
Yin, R.K. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and methods. (2
nd
  ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:  
Sage. 
Yssel, J.C., & Dill, A.W. (1994). Mathematics for the primary teachers’ course. 
Johannesburg: Educum Publishers. 
Zazkis, R., & Chenoff, E.J. (2008). What makes an example exemplary? Educational Studies 
in  Mathematics, 68, 195-208. 
Zazkis, R., & Liljedahl, P. (2002). Generalization of patterns: The tensions between algebraic  
thinking and algebraic notation. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 49, 379-402. 
Zaslavsky, O. (2005). Seizing the opportunity to create uncertainty in learning mathematics. 
Educational Studies in  Mathematics, 60, 297-321. 
Zaslavsky, O., Nickerson, S.D., Andreas, A.J., Kidron, I., & Landman. G.W. (2010).  The 
 need for proof and proving: Mathematical and pedagogical perspectives. In G.Hanna 
& M. de Villiers (Eds.), Proofs and Proving in Mathematics Education, New 
ICMI Study Series 15. Springer: New York. 
Zodik, I., & Zaslavsky, O. (2008). Exemplification in the mathematics classroom; What 
is it like and what does it imply?  In D. Pitta- Pantazi & G. Philippou (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the European Society for Research in 
Mathematics Education (pp. 2024-2033). Larnaca: University of Cyprus. 
Zodik, I., & Zaslavsky, O. (2008). Characteristics of teachers’ choice of examples in and 















Appendix 1: Session one task-based activity – Equilateral Triangle Problem                                                         
Task 1:  Ship wreck problem  
Sarah, a shipwreck survivor manages to swim to a desert island. As it happens, the island 
closely approximates the shape of an equilateral triangle. She soon discovers that the surfing 
is outstanding on all three of the island’s coasts and crafts a surfboard from a fallen tree and 
surfs everyday. Where should Sarah build her house so that the total sum of the distances 
from the house to all three beaches is a minimum? (She visits them with equal frequency). 
 
Task 1(a): Locating a point in the triangle not using Sketchpad. 
 
(i) Before you proceed further, locate a point in the triangle at the point where you 
think Sarah should build her house.   
                  
                                    
(ii)  Why did you choose that position? Explain or justify your choice. 
               
Task 1- (b): Using Sketchpad to develop a conjecture  
 
Open the sketch Distances.gsp. Drag point P to experiment with your sketch. 
 
(i) Press the button to show the distance sum. Drag point P around the interior of the 
triangle. What do you notice about the sum of the distances? 
             
(ii) Drag a vertex of the triangle to change the triangle’s size. Again, drag point P 
around the interior of the triangle. What do you notice?           
         
(iii) Write your discoveries so far as one or more conjectures. Use complete sentences. 







Task 1 (c): Certainty, counterexamples and logical explanations 
 
1. You probably can think of times when something that always appeared to be true turned 
out to be false sometimes. How certain are you that you conjecture is always true? Record 
your level of certainty on the number line and explain (or justify) your choice. 
                    
                                
 2.    If you suspect your conjecture is not always true, try to supply a counter-example.            
        If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture, do you still have a  need for  
        explanation ? (i.e. do you want know why it is true?). 
3. Can you support your conjecture with a logical explanation (justification)? 
You may use the back of this page, another sheet of paper, a Sketchpad sketch,  
       or some other medium to write your explanation (or justification). 
     
Task 1- (d): Developing a logical explanation  
Press the button to show the small triangles in your sketch. 
(i) Drag a vertex of the original triangle. Why are the three different sides all labeled 
a? 
(ii) Write an expression for the area of the small      using a and the variable  h1. 
(iii) Write an expression for the area of the small      using a and the variable  h2.  
(iv) Write an expression for the area of the small      using a and the variable  h3.  
     
(v) Add the three areas and simplify your expression by taking out any common 
factors. 
        
(vi) How is the sum in Question (iii) related to the total area of the equilateral triangle? 
Write an equation to show the relationship using A for the total area of the 
equilateral triangle. 
              
(vii) Use your equation from Question (iv) to explain why the sum of the distances to 
all three sides of a given equilateral triangle is always constant. 
             
[NB: In some cases Questions (ii-iv)  was asked as follows: Write an expression for the area  






Task 1 (e): Present your explanation/justification 
Summarize your explanation/justification of your original conjecture. You can use questions 
(i)-(v) to help you. You may write your explanation/justification as an argument in paragraph 
form or in a two-column format. Use the back of this page, another sheet of paper, a 
Sketchpad sketch, or some other medium. 
 
Task 1(f): Challenge 
In this session you may have observed, conjectured and logically explained the following 
result: In an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a point inside the triangle to 
its sides is constant. 
1.  Do you think that the above result might be true for other kinds of triangles? 































Appendix 2: Session two task based activities -  Rhombus, Pentagon and any Equi-sided   
                      Polygon Problems 
 
In the previous session you may have observed, conjectured and logically explained that in an 
equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a point inside the triangle to its sides is 
constant. In this session, we will consider the same problem for a rhombus, pentagon, and 
then any equi-sides polygon respectively. 
 
Task 2: Rhombus Task-based Activity 
 
Task 2(a): Locating a point in a rhombus not using Sketchpad 
Consider the rhombus ABCD below: 
 
                               
1. Where should you locate point P in the rhombus ABCD to minimize the sum of the 
distances to all four sides of the rhombus? 
 2.  Why did you choose that position? Explain or justify your choice. 
Task 2(b): Using Sketchpad to develop a conjecture related to a rhombus  
Open the sketch Rhombus.gsp.  
i) Press the button to show the distance sum. Drag point P around the interior of 
the rhombus. What do you know about the sum of the distances? 
ii) Drag vertices A, B or D of the rhombus to change the rhombus’s size or shape. 
Again, drag point P around the interior of the rhombus. What do you notice? 
iii) Write your discoveries as one or more conjectures. Use complete sentences. 
 
 
Task 2 (c): Certainty, Counterexamples and Logical Explanations 
1.How certain are you that your conjecture is always true. Record your level of certainty on  
   the  number line and explain your choice 
   .  










2.  If you suspect your conjecture is not always true, try to supply a counter-example.          
3.  If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture, do you still   have a need for  
    explanation (i.e. do you want know why it is true?) 
 4.  Can you support your conjecture with a logical explanation (justification).   
 
Task 2 (d): Developing a logical explanation (proof)  
Press the button to show the small triangles in your sketch. 
(ii) Drag A, B or D of the original rhombus. Why can you label each of the sides with 
the variable a? 
(iii) Write an expression for the area of each small triangle using a and the variables  
h1, h2 , h3 and h4.  
(iv) Add the four areas and simplify your expression by taking out any common 
factors. 
(v) How is the sum in Question (iii) related to the total area of the rhombus? Write an 
equation to show the relationship using A for the total area of the rhombus.              
(vi) Use your equation from Question (iv) to explain why the sum of the distances to 
all four sides of a given rhombus is always constant. 
         
Task 2 (e) Present your Explanation/Justification 
Summarize your explanation/justification of your conjecture (generalization). You can use 
questions (i)-(v) to help you. You may write your explanation/justification as an argument in 
paragraph form or in a two-column format. Use the back of this page, another sheet of paper, 
a Sketchpad sketch, or some other medium. 
 
Task 3: Pentagon Task-based activity 
Task 3(a): Generalizing to a pentagon 
1. In the previous activities you may have observed, conjectured and logically  explained the 
following results  (or generalizations): 
(a) In an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a point inside the 
triangle to its sides is constant.  
(b) In a rhombus the sum of the distances from a point inside the rhombus to its 
sides is also constant.    







2. Do you want to test or confirm your conjecture (generalization)? 
 
Let us experimentally investigate your conjecture using Sketchpad: 
 
Task 3 (b): Using Sketchpad to develop a conjecture related to a pentagon 
Open the sketch Regular Pentagon.gsp.  
1. Press the button to show the distance sum. Drag point P around the interior of the 
pentagon. What do you know about the sum of the distances? 
2. Drag a vertex of the pentagon to change the rhombus’s size. Again, drag point P around 
the interior of the pentagon. What do you notice? 
3. Write your discoveries as one or more conjectures. Use complete sentences. 
 
Task 3(c): Certainty, Counterexamples and Logical Explanations  [Pentagon] 
1. How certain are you that your conjecture (generalization) is always true.   
2.   Record your level of certainty on the number line.                    
        
3. If you suspect your conjecture (generalization) is not always true, try to supply a  
       counterexample.            
If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture (generalization), do you 
still have a need for explanation or do you want know why it is true? 
(a) Support your conjecture (generalization) with a logical explanation  (justification). 
4. (a) Do you think the result might true for other kinds of pentagons?  If not, why. If so,  
     why?   
(b) Would you want to test or confirm your response to Q 4 (a)?   
                                 OR                                          
Are you already convinced.  If so, why? If not, why?            
(c) Open the sketch Mystery Pentagon.gsp. 
Investigate whether your generalization explained in Question 3(b)  holds true or  
not for the Mystery pentagon. You may also investigate your response to Q4(a) if  
necessary.   
(d)  What special property must a pentagon have so that it can yield the following  
result: the sum of the distances from an interior point in the pentagon to its sides 






5. Consider your response to 4(d) and then edit or rephrase your initial conjecture 
(generalization) with respect to the sum of the distances from an interior point in a 
pentagon to it sides. 
6. Support your conjecture (generalization) in Q5, with a logical explanation (justification) 
 
Task 3(d): Developing a logical explanation (proof): Regular Pentagon 
Press the button to show the small triangles in your sketch. 
(i) Drag a vertex of the original pentagon. Why are the five different sides all labeled a? 
(ii) Write an expression for the area of each small triangle using a and the variables   
          h1, h2 , h3,  h4 and h5. 
(iii) Add the five areas and simplify your expression by taking out any common factors. 
(iv) How is the sum in Question (iii) related to the total area of the pentagon? Write an 
         equation to show the relationship using A for the total area of the pentagon. 
(v)     Use your equation from Question (iv) to explain why the sum of the distances to all  
          five sides of a given pentagon (regular) is always constant. 
 
Task 3(e):  Present your Explanation/Justification  
Summarize your explanation/justification of your conjecture (generalization). You can use 
questions (i)-(v) to help you. You may write your explanation/justification as an argument in 
paragraph form or in a two-column format. Use the back of this page, another sheet of paper, 
A Sketchpad sketch, or some other medium. 
 
TASK 4:  Further Generalizations : To ‘Any’ Equi-sided Polygon 
Task 4(a): Generalizing Further  
1. Below are a set of generalizations that you may have developed earlier: 
 G1: In an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances from a point inside the triangle 
        to its sides is constant, and 
G2:  In a rhombus the sum of the distances from a point inside the rhombus to its   
        sides is also constant. 
G3: In any equi-sided pentagon, the sum of the distances from a point inside the pentagon  
       to its sides is also constant. 
 







Task 4(b): Certainty, Counterexamples and Logical Explanations  
1. How certain are you that your conjecture (generalization) is always true. Record your 
level of certainty on the number line.                    
    
2. If you suspect your conjecture (generalization) is not always true, try to  supply a 
counter-example. If you are fully convinced of the truth of your conjecture    
(generalization), do you till have a need for explanation or do you want know why it is 
true? 
3. Support your conjecture (generalization) with a logical explanation (justification).  
 
Task 4(c) : Developing a logical explanation – n-Equi-sided polygons 
(i) Open the sketch n-Equi-sided Polygon.gsp.  Press the button to show some of the n  
          small triangles in your sketch. 
(ii) Write an expression for the area of each small triangle using a and the variables   
          h1,  h2 , h3, h4 …….. hn. 
(iii) Add the n areas and simplify your expression by taking out any common factors. 
(iv) How is the sum in Question (iii) related to the total area of the n-equi sided polygon? 
         Write and equation to show the relationship using A for the total area of the  
          n-equi-sided polygon.           
(v) Use your equation from Question (iv) to explain why the sum of the distances to all 
          n  sides of a given n-equi-sided polygon is always constant. 
 
Task 4(d): Present your Explanation/Justification : n- equi-sided polygon 
Summarize your explanation/justification of your conjecture (generalization). You can use 
questions (i)-(v) to help you. You may write your explanation/justification as an argument in 
paragraph form or in a two-column format. Use the back of this page, another sheet of paper, 










Appendix 3: Semi- structured interview schedule for Equilateral    Task  
R: Researcher ; PMT= Pre-service Matheamatics Teacher; FG = Further Generalization 





























                                        







R asks PMT: How certain are you that your conjecture is always true?  
 
After sufficient exploration on Sketchpad, R asks PMT to write their 
discoveries  so far as one more conjectures, using complete sentences. 
 
After PMT has read the problem, then R asks PMT to locate a point in the 
triangle at  the point where you think she should build her house.  
 
R asks PMT:  Why did you choose that position? 
                         Explain your choice? 





































R asks PMT: If you believe your 
generalization (conjecture) is 
always true, provide some 
examples to support your view 
R asks PMT: If you suspect 
your conjecture is not 




R asks PMT: How would you convince your 
facilitator or classmate or members of your group? 
R asks PMT: Support your conjecture with a 
logical explanation/justification or a convincing 
proof. 
Task 1- (c): Developing a logical explanation (proof) through 
guided questions will be given to the student. R asks PMT : 
To proceed with the task. 
 
R asks PMT: Summarize your explanation/justification of 
your original conjecture. You can use questions (i)-(vii) to 
help you. You may write your explanation/justification as an 
argument in paragraph form or in a two-column format. Use 
the back of this page, another sheet of paper, A Sketchpad 
sketch, or some other medium. 
R asks PMT: Record your level of certainty on the number line and 






Appendix 4: Semi-structured interview schedule for Rhombus Task 
R: Researcher ; PMT= Pre-service Mathematics Teacher; FG = Further Generalization 









                                                         
 
      Choosing ‘centre’/ vertex/ 1point             Any point                    Proceed to Task 2(c)  
 
    Proceeds to Task 2(b) 
 







                        Proceed to Task (2c) 
 
 
                        
 
 
R asks PMT to reflect on the explanation provided for the generalization : In 
any equilateral triangle , the sum of the distances from a point inside the 
triangle to it sides is constant. 
 
R asks PMT:  Why did you choose that position? 
                  Explain your choice? 
A sheet containing Task 2(b): Using sketchpad to develop a conjecture 
through generalization 
After  exploration on Sketchpad, R asks PMT to write their discoveries  so 
far as one more conjectures, using complete sentences. 
 
R asks PMT: How certain are you that your conjecture is always true?  
 
R asks PMT to consider the Rhombus ABCD. 
R asks PMT: Where should you locate point P in the rhombus ABCD to minimize 

















            
 
  Unacceptable/incorrect         acceptable/correct     Proceed to Task 3 
 
 Proceed with Task 2(d) 
                          











R asks PMT: If you believe your 
generalization (conjecture) is 
always true, provide some 
examples to support your view 
R asks PMT: If you 
suspect your conjecture 




R asks PMT: Support your conjecture with a 
logical explanation/justification or a convincing 
proof. 
 
Task 2(d): Developing a logical explanation (proof) through 
guided questions will be given to the student. R asks PMT: 
To proceed with the task. 
 
R asks PMT: Summarize your explanation/justification of 
your original conjecture. You can use questions (i)-(vii) to 
help you. You may write your explanation/justification as an 
argument in paragraph form or in a two-column format. Use 
the back of this page, another sheet of paper, A Sketchpad 
sketch, or some other medium. 
R asks PMT: Record your level of certainty on the number line and 






Appendix 5: Semi- structured interview schedule – for Pentagon Task  
R: Researcher ; PMT= Pre-service Matheamatics Teacher; FG = Further Generalization 
   R asks PMT:  To proceed with task 3(a) 
 
 
      
    For what kinds of pentagons will your conjecture (generalization) hold true for? 
    What properties should a pentagon have for your conjecture (generalization) to be true?   
                                                                
 
                                                      
            Yes                                                                           No. [Logical Grounds] 
[Logical grounds, but needs experimental (visual)  
confirmation; only experimentally (visually)] 
                                                                                                          
 Proceeds Task  3(b)      Proceeds Task  3(c)                           
            













  R asks PMT: How would you generalize the results of the equilateral triangle 
and rhombus to a pentagon.  
 
A sheet containing Task 3(b): Using sketchpad to develop a conjecture 
through generalization 
After  exploration on Sketchpad,   R asks PMT to write their discoveries  so 
far as one more conjectures, using complete sentences. 
 





















 Unacceptable/incorrect      Acceptable/correct                       Proceed to Mystery 
                                                                                              Pentagon  
                                                                                               Task 3(c): Q4 :(a),4(b) 
 Proceed with Task 3(d)  
                          










R asks PMT: If you 
suspect your conjecture is 




 R asks PMT: If you are fully 
convinced of the truth of your 
conjecture (generalization), do you 
still have a need for explanation ?(i.e. 
do you want to know why it is true)? 
 
 
 R asks PMT: Support your conjecture with a 
logical explanation/justification or a convincing 
proof. 
 
Task 3(d): Developing a logical explanation (proof) through 
guided questions will be given to the student. R asks S: To 
proceed with the task. 
 
R asks PMT: Summarize your explanation/justification of 
your original conjecture. You can use questions (i)-(v) to help 
you. You may write your explanation/justification as an 
argument in paragraph form or in a two-column format. Use 
the back of this page, another sheet of paper, A Sketchpad 
sketch, or some other medium. 
R asks PMT: How certain are you that your conjecture is always true?  
 
  R asks PMT: Record your level of certainty on the number line and 





Proceed to Mystery Pentagon: Task 3(c): Q4(a) & (4(b)  
 
 R asks PMT: Do you think the result might be true for other kinds of pentagons? 
(ie.  For what other kinds of pentagons the above result might be true?) 
                                         
                      No                                                  YES 
                                                    
 
  
 R asks PMT:                    Why? 




Do you want to test or confirm your response to Q 4 (a) in Task 3? 
                  Yes                                                                       No 
 













R asks PMT: Does this confirms or refutes 
your response to Q. 4(a)] 
 
R asks PMT: To open Mystery  
Pentagon.gsp and investigate whether 
the sum of the distances from an 
interior point of the mystery pentagon 
















        Cannot identify property!    
     
              STOP!     
 
                                  Identifies property- Proceeds 







       Does not modify 
             
           STOP!                 
 




  R asks PMT: What special property must a 
pentagon have so that it can yield the following 
result: The sum of the distances from an interior 
point in the pentagon to it sides remain constant? 
R asks PMT: Consider your response to Q4(e) and if necessary 
edit or modify or rephrase your initial pentagon conjecture 
(generalization) that you explained in Q3(b) or made earlier. 
 R asks PMT: Does your 
generalization explained in Q3(b) or 



































R asks PMT: Support your conjecture (generalization) you made in 
Q5, with a logical explanation or counter-example?  
 
Indicates or shows 
that the proof for 
regular pentagons  
also applies. 
 Hence does not 
re-write or  




 R asks PMT: To consider 
steps/questions in Task 3(d) 
Acceptable/correct 
Rewrites paragraph 
of two column proof 
that is identical for 
regular pentagon 
 R asks PMT : Summarize your explanation/justification of your final conjecture 
(generalization) in Q5. You can use questions (i)-(v) to help you. You may write 
your explanation/justification as an argument in paragraph form or in a two-
column format. Use the back of this page, another sheet of paper, A Sketchpad 
sketch, or some other medium 
 
Indicates that 
the proof is 
similar to that 







Appendix 6: Semi- structured interview schedule for  -Equi-sided Polygon  
   Task  
R: Researcher ; PMT= Pre-service Matheamatics Teacher; FG = Further Generalization 
R asks PMT :  
 
 
                                                    
 
  
Unacceptable/Incorrect                                          Acceptable/ correct 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




Unacceptable/Incorrect              Acceptable/ correct 
  
  Proceeds Task  4(b)            
        
     Stop                            
 
 
                  
 




R asks PMT: How would you generalize the results of the equilateral triangle ; 
rhombus and equi-sided pentaggon  to polygons with a similar property 
 
R asks PMT: How certain are you that your conjecture 
(generalization) is always true?  
 
R discusses the  3 specific 

















  Unacceptable/incorrect      Acceptable/correct               Proceed to Task 4 (c) vi 
                                                                                                    
  Proceed with Task 4(c) i-v                                          
       
                          
          
 








   
                                   STOP 
 
R asks PMT: Support your conjecture with a logical 
explanation/justification or a convincing proof. 
 
Developing a logical explaination (proof) through guided  
Questions will be given to the student. R asks PMT: To 
Proceed with the task. 
 
 
R asks PMT: If you suspect 
your conjecture-generalizatiom 




R asks PMT: If you are fully convinced of 
the truth of your conjecture-generalization, 
do you still have a need for explanation? (i.e. 
do you want to know why it is true?) 
 
 
R asks PMT Summarize your explanation/justification of your 
conjecture (generalization). You can use questions (i)-(v) to help you. 
You may write your explanation/justification as an argument in 
paragraph form or in a two-column format. Use the back of this page, 
another sheet of paper, a Sketchpad sketch, or some other medium. 
 
R asks PMT: Record your level of certainty on the number line and 


























Appendix 9: Informed consent for participants 
 
From: Rajendran Govender 
           Lecturer – Mathematics Education 
           School of Science and Mathematics Eduation 
           Faculty of Education 
           University of Western Cape, Modderdam Road, Bellville, 7535 
           2 April 2009 
 
TO:    B.Ed/PGCE Student 
          Name: _____________________ 
          Student Number: ______________________ 
 
RE: INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICPATE IN MY PhD RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Dear Student,  
The purpose of writing letter to you, is to seek your consent to participate in my PhD research 
project, which will be registered with the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. Kindly read the 
information below, which I have explained to you in some detail. If you do consider to 
participate in my PhD research project, in terms of the information given below, then kindly 
complete and sign the declaration, which is found at the end of this letter. 
 
Below is the  information about my research project and ethical aspects: 
Project Title: A dynamic interactive guided approach to the construction and validity of 
some geometric generalizations 
Purpose of Study: 
The purpose of the study is twofold: 
Firstly, to investigate how to actively engage pre-service mathematics teachers in the process 





validity of the generalizations through proof and experimentation. The aim is to arrive at a 
descriptive analysis of a “guided approach” to both the development and proof of 
generalizations, which teachers could use as models for their own attempts in mathematics 
classrooms. 
 
Secondly, the purpose is to investigate from a conceptual point of view, the level of cognitive 
unity (continuity/ discontinuity) that exists between the production of a generalization and the 
construction of its proof, by pre-service mathematics teachers. 
 
The  name, affiliations and contact details of the researcher with qualifications: 
Name of Researcher: Mr. Rajendran Govender 
 Occupation: Lecturer – Mathematics Education, School of Science and Mathematics  
                        Education. 
 Qualification: UDE (UDW); BSc.(UNISA); BSc. Honours – Mathematics (UDW); M.Ed 
(UDW). 
Current PhD Study is being done at the University of Kwa- Zulu Natal, Faculty of Education. 
Contact details: rgovender@uwc.ac.za;  0824513648 (cell);  021 -9592248  (office). 
Name, contact address or telephone number of an independent person whom potential 
subjects/participants may contact for further information: 
Project Supervisor: Prof. Michael de Villiers 
Contact details: Prof Michael de Villiers 
Mathematics Education (Edgewood Campus) 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Private Bag X03 
3605 ASHWOOD, South Africa 
Tel: 027-(0)31-2607252 (w): 027-(0)31-7083709 (h) 
Fax: 027-(0)31-2603697 (w): Cell: 0836561396 
http://mysite.mweb.co.za/residents/profmd/homepage.html  
You have been identified as a participant because: 
 You are a pre-service mathematics teacher 
  If you are doing the B.Ed Program you will be doing Method of Mathematics 301 in 





Mathematics Education 121 in your second semester of your final year (4
th
 year) of 
study with respect to the B.Ed program.  OR if you are doing the PGCE program, you 
will be doing Method of Mathemtics 411 & 412. 
  Mathematics Education 121 – deals with the use of ICT in the teaching and learning 
of Mathematics; and  Method of Mathematics 401 and 301 (Or 411 & 412)  deals 
precisely design of learning materials, learning programmes and lesson plans as well 
as the use of the investigative approach to generalize and develop conjectures and 
validate them through experimentation and proof. The PGCE method modules also 
focusses on the use of ICT in Mathematics. 
 
You will participate in this research study as follows: 
You will participate in task-based activities using worksheets in an interactive dynamic 
geometric context, which uses a dynamic interactive guided approach to construct and 
validate some geometric some geometric generalizations. Throughout the task-base activities 
you will work on your own using the Sketchpad program and the worksheets. The task-based 
activities will take place in two separate sessions, and each session will be a different day. 
The first session will consist of the development of a generalization linked to the Equilateral 
triangle (Viviani’s Theorem) and the development of proof for the established generalization. 
The second session will consist of the development of a further generalization to another 
polygon (for example a quadrilateral) and its corresponding proof. As you conduct each 
activity, a one-to-one task based interview will take place.  The one-to-one task based 
interview will be video recorded by another colleague who will also serve as an observer. 
Observational notes will be recorded by the observer. Also, I as a researcher will record 
observational notes in my diary after the one-to –one interviews a well as during the time 
when you are working on the tasks independently (when you are not being interviewed). 
Another video recorder will be focused entirely on your computer screen for the entire 
duration of each session to record all your action moves during your generalizing phase and 
proof phase (session 1), further generalizing phase (session2). You will be working in a 
relaxed and comfortable environment with no undue stress or unfair demands. 
 
As indicated above, you will be involved in two task-based activity sessions. Each session 





develop a generalization and develop its proof using guided worksheets. On day 2, you will 
develop a further generalization and its corresponding proof. 
Potential benefits: 
Your participation in this study will provide an opportunity for you to develop the necessary 
pedagogical knowledge and skills to model the teaching of generalizations and their 
corresponding proofs in dynamic geometric context, using a dynamic interactive guided 
approach in a school environment. Also, you will become more competent, informed and 
versatile of how to use software like Sketchpad, to develop learners reasoning and proof 
skills. 
Payments or Reimbursements or Financial Expenses: 
You will not be paid for participation in the study.  However, you will be reimbursed for any 
travelling expenses to and from the University of Western Cape, for the specific days that you 
participate in the task-based activities one-to-one task based interviews. You will provided 
with lunch on the specific days that you participate in the task-based activities and one-to-one 
task based interviews. 
 
Use of any written, audio or video recordings made 
The audio and video recordings will be transcribed by the researcher. This together with the 
observational notes and completed worksheets (documents), will be used to identify patterns 
by grouping similar responses into categories, which is a way of organizing the data. Selected 
responses during the interviews as well from documents (like the worksheets) and associated 
observations will be inserted in the research report to substantiate and back specific and 
relevant claims that the study posits.  This data will represented as: 
o tables 
o selected quotations. e.g. powerful, representative or illustrative direct statements 
from responses to a question in an interview. 
o case boxes 
How and when the gathered data will be disposed: 
The observational notes (diary) and documents (like worksheets) and video recordings and 
audio-tapes will be stored in my locker in my office for a period of five years. Thereafter the 
observational notes (diary) as well documents like worksheets will be shredded and disposed 
to the waste centre. The audiotapes and video recordings will be incinerated and disposed to 





Confidentiality or Anonymity 
Your anonymity will be respected and thus you will not be referred by your actual name in 
the research report or any other forms of communication. All your deliberations during the 
interviews as well as written documents (like worksheets) completed during the activity 
sessions, as well observational notes, video recordings and audio tapes, will be treated with 
utmost confidentially at all times.  
Participation in this study 
Furthermore, you will not be disadvantaged in anyway if you decide not to participate in this 
research study. Your participation in this study is absolutely voluntary and you are free to 




[A dynamic interactive guided approach to the construction and validity of some 
geometric generalizations – PhD Study] 
 
I………………………………………………………………………… (Full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of 
the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. 




























Appendix 12: Letters from language editors 















Appendix 13: Turnitin Certifcate 
 
 
 
  
 
527 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
